Indirect higher order beliefs and cooperation

This study experimentally examines the role of indirect higher order beliefs in sequential psychological games. We consider a three-player sequential game in which the first and third players do not interact sequentially, but only through an intermediary, the second player. We posit that the third player’s decision to cooperate depends on his indirect higher order belief, namely, his belief about what the first player believes the second player would choose. We employ pre-play communication between the first and third players as a way to influence the third player’s indirect higher order belief. The evidence demonstrates that communication can effectively induce cooperation from the third player by shaping his indirect higher order belief.     

On <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

Edward Peter Stringham’s book Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life (2015) is a compelling defense of the proposition that private governance is more widely used and more effective than most people think. Stringham looks to history to see how people solved problems of fraud and cheating without government intervention and provides example after compelling example to contradict the strong claim that a government or any third-party enforcer is necessary for voluntary exchange. While Stringham doesn’t take on the tough problem that private governance is not sufficient for its task, his book is intended to be the beginning, not the end, of thinking about private governance.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis> and the three biases of political philosophy

Private Governance shows that philosophers, political and legal theorists, and social scientists mistakenly believe in legal centralism, the view that order in the world depends upon and is made possible by state law. In fact, most governance not only happens to be private, but must be private. This paper extends Edward Stringham’s argument by claiming that philosophers tend to suffer from three biases. Diffidence bias means they are overly pessimistic about people’s willingness and ability to cooperate without state enforcement. Statism bias means the overestimate the degree to which cooperation is secured by the state. Guarantee bias means they overestimate the value and need for legal guarantees.     

A test of the Wagner's hypothesis for the Fiji islands

In this article we examine Wagner's law for Fiji for the period 1970 to 2002. Using the Johansen (1988 Johansen, S. 1988. Statistical analysis of cointegrating vectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12: 231–54. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) test for cointegration, we find one cointegration relationship between national output and government expenditure. Using five different long run estimators, we find robust results on the impact of national income on government expenditure. The elasticity ranges from 1.36 to 1.44, implying that a 1% increase in income leads to a 1.36–1.44% increase in government expenditure. Moreover, we find that in the long run national income Granger causes government expenditure. While these results are consistent with Wagner's law, we warn policy makers that because Fiji's total debt stands at around 69% of GDP, in future the bulk of expenditure will go towards debt financing at the expense of productive sectors.     

Cost analysis of the treatments for patients with advanced Parkinson's disease: SCOPE study

Abstract

Objective:

To perform a comparative long-term analysis of the associated healthcare costs for the therapeutic options in advanced Parkinson’s Disease (PD): deep brain stimulation (DBS), continuous duodenal levodopa-carbidopa infusion (CDLCI), and continuous subcutaneous apomorphine infusion (CSAI).     

Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games

This paper considers learning rates in finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas. If players think their opponents might be relatively cooperative (e.g., tit-for-tat or grim types), they will cooperate in finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas (see Kreps et al., J. Econom. Theory 27 (1982) 245). However, if there are actually no cooperative types, players will eventually learn this and cooperation will break down. This paper shows that this learning is extremely slow, so it will take an extremely long time for cooperation to break down.Thus, suppose the world is either “good” or “bad.” The probability of a grim type is δ>0 if the world is good, and zero if the world is bad. Successive generations pair up to play finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas. Players observe play in previous generations and use Bayes’ rule to update their prior, π, that the world is good. We show that, if the world is really bad, then π falls per generation on average. Thus, if δ is small, there is less cooperation if the world is good, but cooperation may become more stable. For a representative 19 period repeated prisoners’ dilemma, beliefs fall one percentage point on average after a thousand generations.To derive these learning rates, we must refine existing results on the sensitivity of repeated games to Kreps et al. (1982) type perturbations. Specifically, we show cooperation is possible in perturbed prisoners’ dilemmas repeated O(log(1/δ)) times. This improves significantly on the O(1/δ) results in previous work. The paper thus provides two new reasons why cooperation tends to be stable, even in short horizon repeated games.     

Not just like starting over - Leadership and revivification of cooperation in groups

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over—a simple fresh start—leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new decay. Motivated by cooperation decay in organizations we study the potential of three interventions of triggering higher and sustained cooperation, which take place at the same time as a restart. Surprisingly, we find that the detailed explanation of the causes of the decay in cooperation of Fischbacher and Gächter (Am Econ Rev 100:541–556, 2010) combined with an advice on how to prevent decay do not have an effect beyond that of just starting over. In contrast, a one-way free form communication message sent by the leader to the followers strongly revives cooperation. We find evidence that repeated free form communication by the leader further strengthens the reviving effect on cooperation. Combining the two previous interventions does not outperform the pure effect of communication. Our content analysis reveals that leader communication is more people oriented than the expert advice.     

An essay on the biological origin of producing surplus value by human labor

In this essay, we explore the origins of the ability to produce surplus value through human labor. The main hypothesis is that the safety factor for energy capacity in humans determines the surplus value of human labor in human societies. We estimate the safety factor for Homo sapiens to be around 2.78. This is based on the rise of the encephalization quotient from 2.5 in Australopithecus africanus to 5.8 in H. sapiens, and we assume this rise is matched by a rise in the safety factor from 1.2 to 2.78. Being a communal species compels human individuals to produce both their personal and their community’s energy need. The possible correlation between Dunbar’s number and the safety factor of energy production capacity provides a very essential feature of human labor, namely “surplus value”. The average labor activity of a modern human is sufficient to provide energy for two to three people’s energy burden in a community. Human labor not only produces the energy for survival of an individual but also produces a surplus due to the safety factor. Therefore, work activity of an individual enables them to supply more than they need for themselves as a value.     

Absorptive capacity and innovation: when is it better to cooperate?

Cooperation can benefit and hurt firms at the same time. An important question then is: when is it better to cooperate? And, once the decision to cooperate is made, how can an appropriate partner be selected? In this paper we present a model of inter-firm cooperation driven by cognitive distance, appropriability conditions and external knowledge. Absorptive capacity of firms develops as an outcome of the interaction between absorptive R&D and cognitive distance from voluntary and involuntary knowledge spillovers. Thus, we offer a revision of the original model by Cohen and Levinthal (Econ J 99(397):569–596, 1989), accounting for recent empirical findings and explicitly modeling absorptive capacity within the framework of interactive learning. We apply that to the analysis of firms’ cooperation and R&D investment preferences. The results show that cognitive distance and appropriability conditions between a firm and its cooperation partner have an ambiguous effect on the profit generated by the firm. Thus, a firm chooses to cooperate and selects a partner conditional on the investments in absorptive capacity it is willing to make to solve the understandability/novelty trade-off.     

Liquidity and the marginal value of information

We revisit Kyle’s (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, 1985) model of price formation in the presence of private information. We begin by using Back’s (Rev Financ Stud 5(3):387–409, 1992) approach, demonstrating that if standard assumptions are imposed, the model has a unique equilibrium solution and that the insider’s trading strategy has a martingale property. That in turn implies that the insider’s strategies are linear in total order flow. We also show that for arbitrary prior distributions, the insider’s trading strategy is uniquely determined by a Doob $h$ -transform that expresses the insider’s informational advantage. This allows us to reformulate the model so that Kyle’s liquidity parameter $\lambda $ is characterized by a Lagrange multiplier that is the marginal value or shadow price of information. Based on these findings, we can then interpret liquidity as the marginal value of information.     

Market Inertia and the Introduction of Green Products: Can Strategic Effects Justify the Porter Hypothesis?

If, according to Porter’s hypothesis, a “greener” strategy is more profitable, why may its implementation need regulatory intervention? We present a repeated Cournot duopoly where the market may exhibit inertia towards the adoption of even cost-efficient environmental goods. With consumers recognizing that a product is green only with a time lag, if a firm unilaterally adopts the green product initially loses profit due to (a) increased costs (direct effect) and (b) reduced market share (strategic effect). By imposing simultaneous adoption, regulation eliminates (b), thus enhancing long-run profitability. Through a similar mechanism a government can increase its domestic firms’ international market share and profits by forcing them to simultaneously adopt the green product.     

Survival of the hippest: life at the top of the hot 100

We analyse the survival characteristics of recordings that reached the number one spot on the US popular music charts over the period 1955 to 2003. Our results show that there has been a statistically significant change in the time spent at number one since ‘album cuts’ were included in the compilation of Billboard?'s Hot 100. Survival time is significantly improved if the recording is by a female solo artist, or if it is an instrumental tune. We also find a significant ‘Elvis effect’.

‘I’ll never be a saint, it's true. I’m too busy surviving!’ (Madonna, 1994 Madonna. 1994. “Survival”. In Bedtime Stories Album, Hollywood, CA: Warner Brothers Records.  [Google Scholar])     

Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination

This paper compares behavior under four different implementations of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: the standard random termination method [proposed by Roth and Murnighan (J Math Psychol 17:189–198, 1978)] and three other methods that de-couple the expected number of rounds and the discount factor. Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination [proposed by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (J Econ Behav Organ 48:37–50, 2002)] or followed by a coordination game [proposed in (Andersson and Wengström in J Econ Behav Organ 81:207–219, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn in Am Econ J Microecon 6:247–278, 2014a)]. We also propose a new method—block random termination—in which subjects receive feedback about termination in blocks of rounds. We find that behavior is consistent with the presence of dynamic incentives only with methods using random termination, with the standard method generating the highest level of cooperation. Subject behavior in the other two methods display two features: a higher level of stability in cooperation rates and less dependence on past experience. Estimates of the strategies used by subjects reveal that across implementations, even when the discount rate is the same, if interactions are expected to be longer defection increases and the use of the Grim strategy decreases.     

The endogeneity of the natural rate of growth in the regions of Italy

Following León‐Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002a León‐Ledesma, M.A. and Thirlwall, A.P. 2002a. The endogeneity of the natural rate of growth. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26: 441–59. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]), this paper examines the hypothesis that the natural rate of growth of the Italian regions is endogenous to and positively affected by the actual growth rate. Relying on fixed‐effects and SUR estimation techniques and using annual data for the 20 Italian regions over the period 1977–2003, we find strong support for the endogeneity hypothesis suggesting that faster actual growth raises the natural rate of growth of the average Italian region by about 3–3.7 percentage points. Furthermore, in line with recent findings in the literature, our analysis provides evidence of asymmetries in Okun’s Law. In particular, the asymmetric Okun coefficient in the high‐growth regime turns out to be positive in several cases, implying the unemployment rate may become pro‐cyclical when actual growth rises above a certain threshold rate.     

Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions

Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey in J Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.     

Money and totality: A review essay

Moseley’s (2016 Moseley, F. 2016. Money and Totality: A Macro-Monetary Interpretation of Marx’s Logic in Capital and the End of the Transformation Problem. Leiden: Brill Publishers. [Google Scholar]) Money and Totality focuses on two important issues: (a) the nature and significance of Marx’s notion of the “circuit of money capital” and (b) the solution to the “transformation problem”. The former question, in particular, makes this book important not only for Marx specialists but also for other dissenting economists. Recall that in writings before the General Theory Keynes (1933a, 1933b), in particular, made allusion to the Marxian circuit via the concept of the monetary theory of production. However, these references did not survive in the published version in 1936. Nor was Keynes at all confident on this topic in debate the following year. It is therefore important to both Marx scholars and other heterodox economists to inquire exactly how the Marxian circuit was supposed to work. A starting point is to write out the scheme from Capital Vol. 2 (Marx, 1885/1976 Marx, K. 1885/1976. Capital: Vol. II. London: Penguin Books. [Google Scholar]) in full, M – C?…?P … C’ –?M’, and try to explain what the magnitudes (M’ – M) and (C’ – C), are supposed to represent. This is indeed one of Moseley’s main tasks in this thought-provoking book.     

The Future of EU-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of Decarbonisation

In 2013, there was a joint commitment to “long term strategic EU-Russia energy cooperation”.¹1. EU/RF Roadmap, ‘Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050‘, European Commission and Russian Government, March 2013, p. 4, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf>.View all notes Whilst centred on oil and gas, it is noted that “the importance of renewables for EU-Russia energy relations should grow too”,²2. Ibid., p. 21.View all notes and that for energy efficiency, “cooperation potential is immense and could… contribute to the objective of a Pan-European energy area”.³3. Ibid., p. 26.View all notes Given this shared objective, this article analyses EU and Russian energy decarbonisation policy objectives and considers the potential for a supplementary trade relationship based on renewable energy flows and decarbonisation-related technology, as well as the implications for existing energy trade. Despite declarative statements of mutual interest, shared objectives and cooperation in decarbonisation policy, there has been very limited cooperation by early 2016. The EU has set ambitious plans to decarbonise its economy and energy sector by 2050. However, in Russia energy policy is dominated by hydrocarbon exports, decarbonisation targets are modest, and there are major problems with their implementation. The drivers of EU and Russian energy policies are evaluated, and the argument advanced is that different understandings of energy security and types of energy governance provide major obstacles to decarbonisation cooperation and trade. However, it is argued that ideas about energy policy and security are contested and subject to change and there exists significant potential for mutual gain and cooperation in the longer term.     

Rethinking the Foundation of the Original Institutional Economics Policy and Reform Program: Reactions to Thomas C. Leonard’s “Illiberal Reformers”

John R. Commons, among other original institutional economists, argued for the interests of the common people against the power of vested interests in politics and business. Against this backdrop, a new book by Thomas C. Leonard contends that, in fact, these same economists were actually “illiberal” and only promoted the interests of certain groups, such as Anglo-Saxon men, and were against the progression of minority populations, women, or the disabled. But Leonard’s argument that these economists were “illiberal,” and that their entire reform program related to the role of government in the economy and the creation of the administrative state, is essentially defunct. As Leonard (2016 Leonard, Thomas C. Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics and American Economics in the Progressive Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. [Google Scholar], xiv) writes in the prologue, “expertise in the service of the administrative state, what progressives call social control, has survived the discredited notions once used to uphold it.” We respond to Leonard’s book by offering a direct critique of the arguments he makes. We argue that Leonard — at least partially — takes the founders’ view on these issues out of context, and that even where some of their views would be refused by today’s institutional economists, it does not mean that the entire reform project is rejected.     

The effect of the market-based monetary policy transparency index on inflation and output variability

This paper examines empirically the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s policy under different levels of transparency by using a dynamic and continuous market-based index proposed by Kia (2011 Kia, A. 2011. “Developing a Market-based Monetary Policy Transparency Index: Evidence from the United States.” Economic Issues 16 (2): 53–79. [Google Scholar]) on inflation volatility and output volatility. In theory, the more transparent the monetary policy, the less volatile the money market will be with fewer disturbances and thus the more stable will be the economy. First, a bivariate VAR-BEKK-GARCH(1,1) model is estimated for inflation and output variables in the US economy in order to produce conditional variances and covariance over the period October 1982 to December 2011. Second, by incorporating conditional variances and transparency in a VAR model, impulse response functions reveal that after a positive shock in the Federal Reserve’s transparency (i.e. market participants consider the Federal Reserve’s actions to be more transparent), there is a statistically significant decrease in both inflation volatility and output volatility. Our results reveal the dynamic and crucial role that a central bank’s transparency plays in retaining economic stability and assuring the forecasts concerning inflation and economic growth made by the economic units.     

Exploring the relationship between university and innovation: evidence from the Italian food industry

This study provides empirical evidence on the role of universities’ technological transfer (TT) activities in the Italian manufacturing sector, with particular attention to the food industry. Using the UniCredit-Capitalia database (2008 UniCredit-Capitalia. 2008. Decima Indagine Sulle Imprese Manifatturiere Italiane. Rapporto Corporate. [Google Scholar]) for firms and data from the Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) to obtain the university TT indicator, we estimate a probit model to assess the effect of universities’ TT activities on a firm’s likelihood to innovate. The role of proximity in knowledge spillovers from TT activities is also investigated. Results show that university TT activities seem to stimulate food industry firms innovation and the impact appears significantly higher than for the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the effect of TT activities on innovation appears to be geographically bounded. As regards policy implications, this study provides two insights which may help promote innovation in the food sector. First, the factors that influence innovative capability in the food sector are different from those in other sectors, suggesting the need for sector specific instruments for promoting innovation. Second, science is important in the food industry and this raises questions about the policy of mainly considering high-tech industries when promoting a closer relationship between firms and universities.