Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.     

Political business cycles and construction licensing

We analyze the effects of opportunistic and partisan politics on the licensing of construction activities, which in turn determines the level of housing supply. In line with Political Business Cycle theory, we hypothesize that the municipal incumbent may manipulate the supply of construction permits before (general and local) elections in order to boost economic activity and voter satisfaction, or to accommodate special‐interest groups. Our findings, based on time‐series data from post‐socialist Tirana (Albania), are consistent with opportunistic and partisan incentives’ creating cycle effects in the licensing of construction permits. However, we find that the direction of opportunistic election cycles depends critically on the interaction between the municipal incumbent and the central‐level government. Our paper raises important questions about the effects of transition politics on spatial development in post‐socialist cities.     

Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?

Abstract This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing party's subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox‐proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.     

How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis

Recent research has found inconclusive evidence regarding the presence of opportunistic political business cycles in German data. Inferring from Vaubel, 1993 and Vaubel, 1997one could argue, however, that at least in the case of monetary policy the results are seriously flawed from the onset, because an independent central bank such as the German Bundesbank will support the government only when it shares its partisan views. Vaubel has not presented parametric empirical evidence in support of his hypothesis. We show that the application of time series analysis yields results that clearly run counter to the hypothesis. Evidence on voting behaviour from the central bank council minutes points in the same direction. It appears perhaps paradoxically that an opportunistic government is better off facing an ideologically opposing Bundesbank council majority than a supportive one before elections.     

Election cycles in mining licensing: theory and evidence from Albania

Most of the literature on political business and budgetary cycles (PBBC) has focused on fiscal and monetary policy variables in advanced-country contexts. We extend this literature by investigating political cycle effects in a non-monetary, non-fiscal policy regime (the allocation of mining licences) in a transition country context. We propose a model of mining licensing that allows for corruption and for both supply and demand effects to determine the outcome. We then estimate this model using time-series data from post-communist Albania. Relying on a dynamic Poisson model, we find evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects. Based on our theory, we suggest a corruption interpretation of political cycles in non-fiscal/non-monetary variables. This interpretation, we suggest, may be more applicable to the context of developing and transition countries. Our study raises important questions about the unintended (and often pernicious) effects of transition politics on economic regulation and economic performance in post-socialist economies.     

Taxation and political business cycles in EU economies

This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the European Union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. The empirical evidence, based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period, does not support this hypothesis. Rather, it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies.     

Election cycles and mining-sector governance in post-conflict Kosovo

Political business cycles are typically linked to the manipulation of fiscal or monetary policy instruments. In a recent article, Imami, Lami and Uberti (ILU) argue that opportunistic politicians may also choose to manipulate non-fiscal/non-monetary policy instruments. Here, we extend ILU’s study using time-series data on mining-sector licensing from post-conflict Kosovo (2001–2018). We find robust evidence that is consistent with electoral opportunism in the allocation of mining permits, despite the checks-and-balance mechanisms introduced by Kosovo’s international administrators in an attempt to reduce the politicisation of licensing. That said, the cycle effect is only observed prior to scheduled, as opposed to early, elections. Disaggregating the data by licence type, in addition, we find that the observed election cycle is driven primarily by the manipulation of licences for the mining of construction materials. We argue that, in the context of post-conflict Kosovo, this is the category of licences whose strategic manipulation offers the greatest pay-off to the incumbent. The results raise some questions about the feasibility of fighting political opportunism (and, relatedly, corruption) by establishing formal check-and-balance mechanisms.     

European development banks and the political cycle

This paper investigates whether the lending activity of European development banks is affected by opportunistic political behavior, by looking at the change in loans extended by these entities in election years. The empirical analysis leverages on a unique manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks headquartered in Europe, for the period 2002–2015.A comparison with the rest of the European banking system reveals that while the political view of development banks cannot be supported as a general rule, it finds empirical evidence in flawed democracies, where large development banks actually tend to increase their lending activity in election years.     

Do business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada?

This paper examines the empirical regularity that in Canada business cycle peaks and federal elections have tended to arise together over the long post-Confederation time period following 1867. We argue that rather than being simultaneous, the two events are related sequentially and that causality can be identified properly if the selection issue associated with observed events is addressed carefully. Our results suggest that business cycle peaks lead federal elections rather than the other way around. Such a finding reinforces the hypothesis of strategic election timing for such countries and is insightful in helping to explain why the presence of a political business cycle is harder to establish for parliamentary governments where the date of the next election is under the control of the incumbent governing party than in democratic systems where governing durations and election dates are fixed.     

The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation

Authoritarian regimes have surpassed democracies in foreign reserve accumulation since the Asian Financial Crisis. Two prominent institutionalist theories could explain this diverging trend in reserves: First, the political business cycle theory, suggesting that reserves are reduced before an election. Second, the veto player theory, implying that a high number of veto players increases the de facto independence of central bankers, who are reluctant to invest in reserves. A time-series cross-sectional analysis for up to 182 countries over the period 1990–2013 shows that democratic governments tend to reduce their reserves before elections. While veto players do not affect reserves directly, a high number of veto players tends to limit a political business cycle before an election. Elections and veto players do not have an influence in authoritarian regimes. Election cycles tend to explain why democracies have relatively fallen behind in a period of massive reserve accumulation.     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.     

Political business cycles when real activity is persistent

Theoretical and empirical analyses of endogenous policy making have not addressed the implications of output or unemployment persistence. This paper investigates how political business cycles in models with nominal frictions and inflationary biases under rational expectations are affected by persistence. It turns out that even moderate degrees of persistence may turn the political business cycle upside down: Policies are expansionary as long as the election is far away and turn restrictive as the election draws close.     

POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879–1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914–1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns.     

Political budget cycles,incumbency advantage,and propaganda

This paper combines incumbency advantage and political budget cycle theory. An opportunistic politician is given two instruments: deficit‐financed transfers and propaganda. Unlike earlier analytical models, but in accordance with the empirical literature, government manipulations do actually improve re‐election chances. However, the optimal level of government manipulation depends on country characteristics, in particular the competence dispersion among potential candidates. This may explain why it is easier to detect political budget cycles in, for instance, developing countries or new democracies. Results are robust to alternative competence distribution and propaganda cost assumptions.     

HAS INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY INCREASED IN ASIA? EVIDENCE FROM THE POST‐1997 FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIOD

This paper examines whether international capital mobility in Asia has increased after the 1997 Asian financial crisis by estimating the Feldstein‐Horioka (FH) coefficients using panel cointegration and dynamic OLS regressions. In the benchmark estimation, we find that the FH coefficients of ten Asian economies decrease significantly from 0.65 during the pre‐crisis period to 0.32 during the post‐crisis period. Furthermore, the coefficient for the post‐crisis period is less statistically significant than that for the pre‐crisis period. The extended model estimations with additional control variables controlling for the business cycle, different foreign exchange rate systems, and capital control also show the results which are consistent with the benchmark estimation results. Rolling regressions show a consistently declining trend of the FH coefficients in Asia during our sample period. These results provide consistent evidence, according to the FH proposition, of increasing international capital mobility in Asia during the post‐1997 Asian financial crisis period. (JEL F36, F37, F21)     

Sustainability of Austrian public debt: a political economy perspective

Sustainability of Austrian public debt is investigated in the context of political objectives such as stabilizing the business cycle, increasing chances for being re-elected and implementing the ideologies of political parties. Several tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were sustainable in the period 1960–1974, while from 1975 on, public debt grew much more rapidly. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not primarily by ideology, but by structural causes and a shift in the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party run higher deficits than coalition governments. There are no indications of a political business cycle.     

The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.     

Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty

Variable rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. Fluctuations of economic activity result from uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the exact timing of elections. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of variable rational partisan cycles.     

ECONOMIC VOTING AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: HOW DO INDIVIDUAL,LOCAL, AND NATIONAL FACTORS AFFECT THE PARTISAN CHOICE?

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post‐election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign‐born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left‐wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native‐born and foreign‐born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right‐wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left‐wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.