基于零售商垄断势力的纵向关系理论研究述评

基于零售商垄断势力的纵向关系主要有两种:零售商的抗衡力量以及零售商向生产商实施纵向控制.本文梳理了国内外关于这两个方面的理论成果,并对现有研究进行了简要的评价和展望.     

零售商买方势力滥用刍议

零售商买方势力滥用不仅侵害供应商和消费者利益 ,破坏正常的市场秩序 ,同时也导致零售商自身经营管理水平的下降。要从根本上解决零售商买方势力滥用问题 ,必须尽快建立健全规范的市场竞争法律体系 ,并使竞争主体牢固树立依法竞争的法律意识。同时 ,在宏观政策上应鼓励供应商联合与提高产业集中度 ,促进零售商间的竞争 ,适当限制大型零售商间的联合与购并。     

主导零售商买方势力背景下的制造商技术创新决策

针对零售市场中大型零售组织买方势力不断增强的现象,研究了制造商的技术创新决策。在由上游垄断制造商、下游主导零售商和边缘零售商组成的纵向市场结构下,构建了四阶段的技术创新决策模型,提炼了主导零售商的谈判势力特征和市场份额特征,给出了主导零售商买方势力背景下制造商的最优创新决策,分析了主导零售商的谈判势力和市场份额对制造商技术创新决策的影响。最后通过具体算例探讨了参数变化对主要结论的影响,并据此提出了促进企业技术创新的建议。     

零售商垄断势力及通道费的福利分析

拥有买方垄断势力的零售商对生产商存在纵向约束,近年来零售商在产业链中越来越占有主导地位,向生产商收取高额的通道费。本文在一种的市场结构下,分析通道费的存在对生产商、零售商和消费者福利的影响,得出通道费会使得产品价格上升,社会福利受到影响,影响程度与需求曲线的形状有关。     

商业银行垄断势力测度研究

金融行业是现代国民经济的核心和支柱,而商业银行在整个金融市场及整个国家的国民经济体系中都占有重要的地位,本文对商业银行的垄断势力进行测度研究分析。对我国商业银行进行垄断测度分析时充分利用了勒纳指数,赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数,指出商业银行在整个金融市场领域的垄断势力是非常明显的,然后探讨垄断对商业银行业绩以及金融体系稳定与整个国家经济社会稳定的影响,并研究垄断的防范措施,最后对我国商业银行的发展提出了相应的建议。     

行政权力、纵向约束与管制困境

"行政性垄断"是我国垄断或寡头垄断产业与成熟市场经济体制的一个最为显著的区别,本文通过对相关案例的分析表明,在缺乏有效规制和监管的条件下,"行政性垄断"与市场势力相结合,严重地阻碍了这些产业的市场化进程,突出表现就是垄断企业依托行政性权力,通过市场进入、产权安排、价格制定、技术标准和市场划分等诸多手段来限制有效竞争的形成,即通过市场圈定将潜在的进入者从市场中排斥出去,以创造和维持非经济意义上的垄断势力.基于行政权力的纵向约束也是管制低效的一个主要原因,本文指出强化管制者的独立性和权威是管制重建的重要环节.     

国外基于流通企业买方市场势力的纵向控制研究动态及展望

随着生产能力的严重过剩,流通企业相对于生产企业的市场地位显著增强。目前对基于流通企业买方市场势力的纵向控制研究,国外学者主要从产业链的纵向关系角度、对社会福利影响的角度、市场绩效的角度以及社会分工网络的角度进行了分析。对流通企业买方市场势力纵向控制关系的分析,既不采用SCP范式也不采用芝加哥学派,应该针对中国这样一个发展中国家,根植于资本逻辑引导的空间非均衡发展差异样态,联系跨国公司主导的以追求更大弹性为目标的全球生产网络的重塑,来深入剖析跨国流通企业对中国产业体系及消费者的多维强大冲击。     

跨国零售商与本土制造商的纵向限制关系研究

本文通过特许费用案例分析跨国零售商与我国本土制造商的纵行限制关系,通过扩展关于买方集中、纵向限制的纵向关系模型,集中探讨了具有垄断势力的下游跨国零售商对上游供货商的纵向限制行为,最终对跨国零售商对我国本土制造商的影响提出了针对性的政策建议。     

零售商买方势力一定会导致通道费吗？--基于纵向市场结构的合作博弈分析

关于通道费的研究,有一种观点认为通道费是零售商买方势力的体现。但是现实经济中有些具有买方势力的零售商收取通道费,而另一些却不收取通道费,买方势力的观点不能对这一现象作出解释。针对此,构建双边双寡头的纵向市场结构模型,并在模型中引入零售商的价格竞争和服务竞争,在合作博弈的框架下分析研究了零售商买方势力与通道费之间的关系。研究发现买方势力并不是出现通道费的充分条件,而只是必要条件,通道费的出现与否除了与零售商买方势力有关外,还与其他的市场环境因素有关。最后,通过线性需求函数的特例对这一结论进行了验证,并在此基础之上提出了相应的规制政策建议。     

我国银行卡产业垄断势力的界定与政府管制政策研究

近年来银行卡产业受到世界各国和地区监管部门的广泛关注,许多国家对银行卡产业加强了监管。文章基于Emch和Thompson(2006)的模型从定价角度证明了我国银行卡产业垄断势力的存在,提出要根据银行卡产业业务环节的性质制定不同的分类管制政策。对于网络互连环节,应该打破垄断引入竞争机制;对于发卡和收单环节,要进一步放松进入管制,建立合理的定价机制;对于政府监管环节,则要明确职责、健全法制、组建管制机构。     

Vertical Restraints and Market Access

This paper analyzes vertical restraints in relation to market access issues. In Section II we briefly review the recent three major trade conflicts between Japan and the USA in light of vertical restraints. In Section III we review the major policy lessons of the economics literature of vertical restraints, and analyze whether we need a special treatment for vertical restraints abroad for a market access reason. In Section IV we evaluate the policy options towards foreign foreclosure and suggest that nondiscriminatory application of foreign or home competition policy should be the mechanism to address such concern instead of trade policy actions such as voluntary import expansions.     

纵向交易理论与中国煤电的纵向交易效率

纵向交易理论的核心在于纵向专业化经济和纵向一体化经济之间的取舍与平衡。节约组织成本会产生纵向专业化经济,节约交易成本会带来纵向一体化经济。理想情况下,两条边际成本曲线的交点决定纵向交易关系(如煤、电关系)最优形式的决择。本文对煤电纵向交易关系进行了分类,构建了煤电纵向交易关系形式选择的理论分析框架,并结合中国煤电纵向关系实际,分析了中国煤电企业的纵向交易关系效率。     

Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing

We examine Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station‐specific observations from 2003 to 2006. The four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry‐wide (labeled price support). This moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where we observe de facto simultaneous decision‐making by the headquarters (without knowledge of their rivals’ prices) when every Monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level. The price level on Mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies.     

资源约束和金融市场效率对经济增长的影响研究

本文研究发现:人力资本结构、金融市场效率对经济增长的作用依不可再生资源的存量而异,当不可再生资源的存量大于某一临界值时,最终产品部门雇佣的人力资本数量越多,金融市场效率越高,经济增长的速度越快;不可再生资源存量的增多有助于进一步放大人力资本结构、金融市场效率对经济增长的正向促进作用。不可再生资源存量有助于经济增长,金融市场效率的改善有助于进一步增强不可再生资源对经济增长的正向促进作用。     

Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion

The paper argues that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point which facilities tacit collusion by low-wage employers, effectively pulling down wages of the lowest-paid workers. This can explain the puzzle as to why the minimum wage does not reduce employment, as predicted by the traditional economic theory. A simple game-theoretic argument explains when collusion emerges. The hypothesis is tested using the 1990–2002 CPS data on service occupation workers. The results suggest that during this period, on average 19.3%, and as much as 31% of service occupation workers, who earned minimum wage or less, could had been affected by collusive wage-setting.     

Competition Policy towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United States

Following a brief review of the economic analysis of vertical restraints, we discuss current policy standards in both Europe and the United States. Since 1981, U.S. policy towards these restraints has been lax, and no restraints were challenged during the 12-year period between January 1981 and January 1993. More recently, the pendulum has shifted back somewhat and there is renewed interest by enforcement officials in this area. In contrast, European policy standards have been more stringent, and have paid particular attention to vertically imposed restraints that can limit trade among member countries. To a large part, their different treatment may primarily reflect the lack of consensus as to their long-run economic consequences. Consistent policy standards across jurisdictions are not likely to arise until there is general consensus as to the economic implications of these restraints.     

土地垄断供给、纵向市场关系与房地产价格——兼论基于价值链分析的房地产市场竞争促进政策

地价与房价之间并不仅仅是一种成本联系.土地市场与房地产产品市场之间还存在着纵向市场关系,在两个市场均为寡头垄断的情况下,则会存在着双重垄断加成的现象.与上下游产业之间的市场交易关系相比,垂直一体化和垂直约束同样是组织住房生产的有效方式,并有助于增加消费者剩余.此外,促进房地产开发价值链上各环节的竞争,消除其垄断行为,将是降低房价和增进居民福利的重要选择.     

纵向所有权安排与跨国公司的纵向市场圈定——基于轿车产业的模型分析和案例考察

跨国公司在中国轿车产业的成长和发展中发挥着重要的作用,但随着其在产业上下游势力的增加,也对国内大型企业的自主研发产生了一定的负面影响.文章以中国轿车产业特有的部分所有权安排和跨国公司纵向控制现象为对象,构建了差异化产品价格竞争下的纵向约束模型,以分析跨国公司实施投入歧视,使中方参与者产生自主开发行为"滞后"的结构性诱因.产业和企业层面的案例分析发现,在中国轿车产业"后WTO"时期,跨国公司纵向控制力的不断强化,在下游市场挤出本土品牌的同时,还具有弱化大型国企自主创新的效应.政府应对自主研发的投入和产品实施一定的不对称性激励政策,引导大型国企逐渐摆脱对跨国公司的长期依赖.     

Upstream Market Power and Wasteful Retailers*

We provide a novel explanation for the wasteful product disposal by retailers. In our model, after purchasing a quantity of a product from the manufacturer, the retailer exerts a costly effort to sell the product to the final users. The manufacturer’s production cost and the outside opportunity associated with it is private information. We show that, when the manufacturer has the upstream market power, the retailer sells all units purchased from the manufacturer. However, when the retailer has the market power, it might deliberately purchase more than it sells to the final users (thus wasting the unsold amount).     

Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets

Many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive. When markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics, however, shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches? This paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits. Results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms,strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models,undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer. Whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm, marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets. Final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy, indicating that policy-makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances.