试论保护少数股东措施之完善

由于股东会实行“资本多数决”原则，少数股东处于弱势地位，须对其进行特别保护。我国《公司法》对少数股东采取了一些保护措施，但还需通过实行累积投票、股东回避表决、股东代位诉讼等制度进一步加以完善。     

小股东保护、公司治理与资本市场发展

小股东因其在公司结构中所处的弱势地位，不仅要负担管理层机会主义行为带来的代理成本，还可能受到处于控制地位的大股东的侵害，实际上面对着大股东和管理层的双重损害。海外股东保护主要通过股东权指标来衡量。借鉴国际经验加强小股东保护，不仅对公司的市场价值，而且对一国资本市场的规模、广度、结构和功能发挥都有重要意义。     

股票回购中的小股东利益保护机制

股票回购起源于美国20世纪20年代，80年代后开始盛行。近几年来，纽约证券交易所每年都有约三分之一的上市公司实施回购，涉及总金额已接近上市公司付的股利总额。依各国法例，被购回的股票，或作为库藏股，或进行注销。     

上市公司收购中对小股东利益的法律保护

上市公司收购是公司并购的一种重要形式,是资产重组、产权交易的重要方式,随着资本市场的不断发展,上市公司收购这种资本运营形式将日趋普及.     

以股抵债与控股股东债务清偿

以股抵债意指上市公司以其控股股东侵占的资金作为对价,冲减控股股东持有股份,被冲减的股份依法注销。以股抵债的目的是解决目前我国上市公司控股股东大量侵占上市公司资金问题。     

股东对公司治理的贡献与其股份的关系

研究表明，增加股权结构的集中度或者增加股东的股权比例．以及引进资金实力雄厚的大股东，可以提高股东对于公司治理的贡献水平或参与程度。     

独立董事津贴与控股股东利益关联性

现行制度 2001年8月16日,中国证监会颁布《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(以下简称《指导意见》),要求“境内上市公司应当按照《指导意见》的要求修改公司章程,聘任适当人员担任独立董事,其中至少包括一名会计专业人士.在2002年6月30日前,董事会成员中应当至少包括两名独立董事;在2003年6月30日前,董事会成员中至少包括三分之一独立董事”.     

上市公司增发中控股股东行为分析

<正>以上市公司作为行为主体的股票增发过程中控股股东的掏空与支持行为之间是否存在相关关系,是一个值得关注的话题。本文对控股股东掏空与支持行为和上市公司增发之间的关系及其经济后果进行了分析。研究发现,为了促进上市公司     

我国控股股东关联交易规制制度之探讨

防范控股股东通过不正当关联交易损害中小股东及债权人利益是我国关联交易规制制度的重点。从世界范围看,各国对控股股东关联交易进行规制的制度主要包括股东大会批准制度、股东表决权排除制度、股份收买请求权制度、股东直接诉讼制度、股东派生诉讼制度、信息披露制度等,而我国的相关制度构建尚存在很大的改善空间。     

上市公司股权转让的决定机制研究——兼谈股权转让对公司治理的影响

引言 股权转让是一个股东(自然人或法人主体)将其持有的对公司的所有权让渡给另外一个主体,使其成为公司新的股东的过程.通过转让,新旧股东对公司的权利、义务发生变化,公司的股权结构实现调整.股权转让的份额有大有小,本文的股权转让指大宗股权转让(block trade).股权转让机制是指使股权转让得以实现的一系列因素的总称.在市场经济条件下,这些因素主要指资本市场的作用,包括资本市场通过股票价格对公司价值的定价作用、接管市场对公司未来价值增值的识别作用以及对股权交易的促进作用.     

Number of Shareholders and Stock Prices: Evidence from Japan

Merton (1987) proposes that an increase in a firm's investor base increases the firm's value. In Japan, companies can reduce their stock's minimum trading unit—the number of shares in a round lot—which facilitates trading in the stock by small investors. We find that a reduction in the minimum trading unit greatly increases a firm's base of individual investors and its stock liquidity, and is associated with a significant increase in the stock price. Further, the stock price appreciation is positively related to an increase in the number of shareholders.     

Impression Management in Letters to Shareholders: Evidence from Poland

We study impression management in an emerging market setting with high ownership concentration. Using content analysis, we identify impression management techniques in a sample of letters to shareholders written in the Polish language by the 60 largest companies listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2008 and 2013. We find patterns in the occurrence of these techniques with the use of k-means clustering: the largest cluster includes letters that praise the management, while the rest include defensive arguments, discussions of negative outcomes and short, formal letters. The more concentrated ownership is, the shorter the letters are, which indicates that management invest less effort in communicating with investors. This is particularly visible in companies held by insiders, which tend to produce short, formal letters, devoid of impression management. In contrast, companies controlled by foreign shareholders prepare letters that are longer and which are more likely to present defensive arguments, while institutional non-controlling shareholders favour extensive disclosure. The results shed light upon communication practices in Central and Eastern Europe, and offer implications for regulators and managers that may help strengthen the information environment in regional stock markets.     

How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers

This paper shows that target shareholders can be made better off through the use of certain types of defensive strategies that reduce the value of the target by different amounts for different bidders. In many cases, simply the threat of such strategies can make target shareholders better off. Therefore, empirical tests based on stock price reactions at the adoption of defensive strategies may be underestimating the effect of such strategies. The paper also identifies the necessary characteristics that make these strategies effective and shows that many observed defenses possess similar properties.     

Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China

In this paper, we examine the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on financial reporting quality. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2007–2018, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower financial reporting quality. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness tests, including controlling for possible omitted variables, a Heckman two-step sample selection model, and a difference-in-differences analysis based on a propensity score matched sample. We further show that the effect of MLS on financial reporting quality is attenuated for firms followed by more analysts, cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and held by institutional blockholders. Finally, we find that agency problems appear to be the possible underlying mechanisms through which MLS lower financial reporting quality.     

投资者的权利与责任

对玩弄盈利游戏、粉饰资产负债表的公司说不!对视公司为个人玩物的董事长们说不!对欺世盗名的基金、及其广告说不！对拉抬投资组合价格以虚增收益率的基金经理说不!对有利于券商而不是有利于投资的交易系统与交易行为说不!对网上交易欺诈说不!对每一只股票都作推荐的证券分析师说不！对不关心投资利益的监管说不……这是作为投资的权利与责任。     

Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders

Theory predicts the existence of explicit bilateral contracts between firms and expert shareholders. I assemble and analyze a large-scale data set of these contracts. Using block investments from 1996 to 2018, I find that these contracts involve mainly corporate owners and activist owners, and often specify covenants pertaining to financing, trading, directorships, dividends, joint ventures, corporate investment, financial reporting, and information access. I also find that some of the contract covenants are stated in terms of accounting information, and that the prevalence of these contracts is significantly positively associated with measures of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Overall, this study provides some of the first systematic evidence on explicit bilateral contracts between firms and shareholders.     

Institutional Shareholders and Bank Capital

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.     

关于向控股股东收购商标权的关联交易的思考

一、案情简介某上市公司发布关于受让商标之关联交易公告称,整体商标评估价值为11亿元,母公司对整体商标的贡献价值为1.5亿元,经双方协商,以1.5亿元受让母公司整体商标。关联交易的目的是为理顺商标所有权关系,保持     

Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation

Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The model predicts that institutions' influence on managers' pay-for-performance sensitivity and level of compensation is enhanced when institutions have lower implied costs of monitoring, but that these effects are attenuated when the firm-specific cost of monitoring is high. Our empirical results are broadly consistent with these implications, suggesting that independent investment advisors and investment company managers have advantages in monitoring firms' management.