论国际贸易授信开证风险管理

在实际操作中，由于银行之间业务竞争的加剧，大部分银行开证时予以进口企业在一定的授信额度内减免保证金。授信开证对外是一种或有负债，开证行面临着替开证申请人垫款的隐性风险。通过对风险的识别与管理，以最少的成本将风险减少到最低限度，是商业银行信用证贸易融资业务顺利发展的主要着眼点。     

论国际贸易授信开证风险管理

在实际操作中,由于银行之间业务竞争的加剧,大部分银行开证时予以进口企业在一定的授信额度内减免保证金.授信开证对外是一种或有负债,开证行面临着替开证申请人垫款的隐性风险.通过时风险的识别与管理,以最少的成本将风险减少到最低限度,是商业银行信用证贸易融资业务顺利发展的主要着眼点.     

银行信用证风险及防范措施

改革开放以来，我国在大力开拓外汇业务的同时，也暴露出外汇业务的风险，尤其是进口信用证业务的风险。信用证是国际贸易结算中使用最广泛、最主要的支付方式之一。但是，九十年代中期，随着远期信用证业务的迅速发展，出现了许多开立无一些客户在通过正当途径得不到银行资金支持的情况下，采用开立无贸易背景信用证的方式骗取银行资金，而其中绝大部分无贸易背景信用证都是远期信用证。造成外汇指定银行信用证项下垫款额激增，少则近千万美元，多则数十亿美元，给银行的经营和发展带来了严重的不良后果。本文就银行信用证垫款的成因和管理措施谈谈个人看法。     

浅谈我国商业银行国际贸易融资现状及其问题

目前我国的国有商业银行主要的国际贸易融资业务包括进口押汇、打包放款、出口押汇、授信开证等。随着中国加入WTO和外贸体制改革的不断深化,对外贸易保持了稳定增长的势头,为商业银行发展贸易融资业务提供了更为广阔的空间。通过解释分析我国商业银行经营和管理贸易融资业务中存在的风险,探求了发展国际贸易融资的措施和方法。     

假远期信用证融资的风险防范

在实际业务中,尽管银行的绝大多数贷款都要求借款人提供相应的担保或者抵押,但由于受担保人的资信或者所提供抵押品的变现等诸多因素影响,商业银行的贷款风险依然存在,贷款的安全性问题仍然面临着严重挑战。在商业银行所从事的进出口贸易融资业务中,因假远期信用证可使银行的信贷活动与商人的贸易活动进行有机的融合,因此这种融资方式便成为一种有效的避险工具,并为银行贷款资金的安全提供了保障。     

银行承兑信用证在进出口业务中的合理应用

所谓远期信用证是指开证行或付款行收到信用证规定的单据后,在规定期限内履行付款义务的信用证。 目前,在国际贸易中越来越多企业采用远期信用证结算方式,其主要原因是:第一,开证行收取远期信用证的开证费较高,能够为开证行带来较高的经济效益。第二,对进口商来说,实际上是利用卖方的资金融通。因为远期信用证是买方收到卖方交来的有关单据后即可凭单提货,等到信用证到期时才对外付款,这种结算方式无疑对买方有利,但当今国际市场竞争激烈,新贸易保护措施重新抬头,已形成了新的市场格局——买方市场,对此,卖方为了扩大出口,促进交易达成,只有委屈求全,做出让步,但这并不意味着卖方一定要受到远期信用证带来的风险,深入细致地认识理解远期信用证,正确巧妙地运用远期信用证,即可转危为安,化险为夷。为此,对远期信用证做如下分析,供出口企业参考。     

浅析国际保理业务

保理业务是一项在国际上较为成熟的贸易结算工具，保理商可通过审核买家的信用为卖方提供融资。在目前国际贸易竞争日益激烈、买方市场逐步形成、信用证结算比例逐年下降和赊销盛行的情况下，保理业务由于很好地解决了贸易资金安全和企业融资问题，因而在全球范围内形成空前的发展势头。2006年全球保理业务量达到11343亿欧元，增长率达到12％，占全球GDP的比重已超过3％。     

进口押汇业务的风险点及防范措施

进口押汇产生于英美国家的商业习惯和银行信用证实务,主要解决信用证贸易融资问题,早已获得英美国家相关的立法与判例的支持。中国各商业银行在信用证业务中也相继借鉴开设了该项业务。随着银行信用证业务的进一步发展,进口押汇中存在的风险日益凸现。主要对进口押汇业务的风险点及防范措施进行研究。     

国际贸易融资的风险及其防范

随着银行业竞争的日趋激烈 ,国际结算业务已成为各家商业银行重点发展的外汇业务 ,各大外贸公司、三资企业更是商业银行竞争业务的对象。贸易融资业务的承办优劣成为进出口企业选择银行业务合作的首选条件 ,但是国际贸易融资实际上也时刻潜伏着风险 ,若把握不好 ,进出口企业的贸易风险就会转嫁到银行身上。因此 ,如何控制和掌握贸易融资业务的风险 ,应是拓展外汇业务中亟待解决并加以完善的问题。一国际贸易融资业务是指商业银行在进行国际贸易结算过程中向本国进出口企业提供的装船前和装船后的一种短期资金融通。它正常包括票据贴现、单据…     

商业银行国际贸易融资业务探析

中国的商业银行贸易融资伴随着对外开放的快速发展而有了突飞猛进的增长,但仍然存在着市场工具少、融资市场对象单一、融资市场资金供给量不足、贸易融资产品市场推广不足等问题,本文针对存在的问题,提出了商业银行贸易融资业务发展对策,这有利于商业银行未来发展,并有利于相关外贸企业的良性发展。     

Regulation by prices and by command

Standard economic theory states that regulation by price is more efficient than regulation by command and control. Exceptions may arise if regulators have good knowledge of the supply curve. In practice, though, governments usually regulate by command and control and do so when there is uncertainty about the technology of supply. We show that government may prefer to regulate by command and control when it cares about the investment decisions of a firm.We are grateful for comments by Kenneth Small, the editor, and two anonymous referees.     

Working part time: by choice or by constraint

The selection of workers into part-time jobs and the wages they earn are analysed using the 1989 Labour Market Activity Survey. We focus on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary part-time workers, since involuntary part-time workers earn substantially lower wages than other workers. We find that the selection of individuals into involuntary part-time work is more closely tied to job characteristics than personal or human capital characteristics. The lower wage earned by involuntary part-time workers is largely due to differences in returns and selection effects, rather than differences in endowments. JEL Classification: J22, J23, J31     

Search by committee

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.     

Learning by investing

We test for learning among heterogeneous individuals who are engaged in bidding and who possess limited information about the auctioned assets. We use an extensive dataset taken from an auction through which state‐owned enterprises were privatized in the Czech Republic in 1993–94. To test for learning, we develop new measures of individual performance to accommodate the varying prices of assets available in six successive stages of bidding. We present evidence that learning took place among heterogeneous agents during a large‐scale multi‐stage auction that is unique in terms of its size, incentives and variation. The auction’s design, with multiple market periods, allowed agents to learn based on accumulated experience. As individuals had to pay a fee to participate, and as the potential gain was in the magnitude of several months’ salary, we conclude that large incentives were driving our results.     

Voting by veto

This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.