Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Keynes at the periphery: Currency hierarchy and challenges for economic policy in emerging economies

While the post Keynesian literature offers a rather clear concept for growth-oriented policies, it is necessary to adapt them for peripheral emerging economies. We base our analysis of an appropriate Keynesian policy mix for these countries on the concept of currency hierarchy, where the currencies of peripheral emerging economies have a lower liquidity premium than the currencies of advanced economies. The international asymmetry related to the currency hierarchy, amplified by financial globalization, imposes major constraints to the adoption of Keynesian policies for these economies. Under these conditions, we argue that domestic economic policy coordination should lay a major focus on a low policy rate and, especially, a competitive exchange rate for obtaining, at least, a balanced current account, in order to prevent capital flows boom-bust-cycles with subsequent financial crises. We conclude that it is a rather ambitious and long-term goal to climb up the currency hierarchy, especially under the current condition of financial globalization.     

The demand for money and the real exchange rate misalignments in emerging European countries: A nonlinear approach

This paper investigates the extent to which domestic and foreign money balances in emerging European countries are influenced by foreign exchange considerations. A well-specified and stable relationship between real money demand and the exchange rate can be perceived as an important part of a successful monetary policy. This study examines the long-run determinants of real exchange rates (RERs) associated with the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach and identifies currency misalignments in these countries. The misalignment is later used to test the nonlinear behavior of the demand for money. The results indicate that the RER misalignments have a significant impact on domestic money demand. When the currencies are overvalued, there is a reduction in domestic money demand, and when they are undervalued, there is an increase in domestic money demand. Furthermore, it can be concluded that overvaluation causes an increase in foreign money demand indicating a shift of preference from domestic to foreign currency.     

Smuggling, non‐fundamental uncertainty, and parallel market exchange rate volatility

Abstract.  We explore a model where smuggling and a parallel currency market arise, owing to government restrictions that prevent agents from legally holding foreign exchange. Despite such restrictions, agents are able to diversify their savings, holding both domestic and parallel foreign cash, basing their portfolio allocation on current and prospective parallel exchange rates. We attribute movements in parallel rates to non‐fundamental uncertainty. The model generates equilibria with both positive and negative parallel premia and correlations between illegal trade and the premium. The model has the novel implication that currency speculation drives smuggling, affecting real activities in all sectors of the economy. JEL classification: F31     

储备型汇率制度:发行非国际货币的发展中国家(地区)之选择

国际货币与非国际货币之区分构成了当前国际金融体系典型的非对称特征。该种区分必将影响不同国家间汇率及汇率制度的选择。本文试图提出一种观点:发行非国际货币的发展中国家所选择的汇率制度可以形容为"储备型汇率制度"。在该种制度下,中央银行对外汇市场不断进行干预以实现其国际货币储备的不断积累,由此而造成本币长期贬值(或低估)和贸易的持续顺差。该种观点不仅与当今世界汇率与汇率制度分布之事实相一致,而且还可通过一个反映发展中国家中央银行行为的动态优化模型进行严格的理论证明。尽管"储备型汇率制度"可能与当前IMF所规定的反"货币操纵"条款相冲突,但是在当前这种不公正和非对称的国际货币体系下,该制度无疑是发展中国家的最优选择。     

Monetary and macroprudential policy with foreign currency loans

In a number of countries a substantial proportion of mortgage loans is denominated in foreign currency. In this paper we demonstrate how their presence affects economic policy and agents’ welfare. To this end we construct a small open economy model with financial frictions, where housing loans can be denominated in domestic or foreign currency. The model is calibrated for Poland - a typical small open economy with a large share of foreign currency loans (FCL). We show that the presence of FCLs negatively affects the transmission of monetary policy and deteriorates the output-inflation volatility trade-off it faces. The trade-off can be improved with macroprudential policy but the outcomes are still worse than under this same policy mix applied to an economy with domestic currency debt. We also demonstrate that a high share of FCLs is harmful for social welfare, even if financial stability considerations are not taken into account. Finally, we show that regulatory policies that discriminate against FCLs may have a negative impact on economic activity and discuss the redistributive consequences of forced currency conversion of household debt.     

Currency interdependence and dollarization

This paper constructs a search model of currency interdependence, and uses it to examine how in dollarized economies the foreign currency reacts to various shocks to the domestic currency. Currency interdependence is generated by allowing sellers to take into account their outside option of trading with the domestic currency while bargaining with buyers holding the foreign currency. The shocks consist in movements in the domestic interest rate, domestic inflation and the domestic currency’s market power. We show that if the purchasing power of the domestic currency is low, any shock that increases its value, such as a higher domestic interest rate, translates into a depreciation of the foreign currency. However, the result is opposite when the purchasing power of the domestic currency is high. We show that when money is indivisible these shocks can drive in or out the foreign currency. When money is divisible, this currency substitution effect is more limited. We use our results to discuss the opportunity of various de-dollarization policies and show that some can be counterproductive.     

Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

Bulgaria’s hyperinflation in 1997: transition,banking fragility and foreign exchange

This article has two objectives: to study the 1997 episode of hyperinflation in Bulgaria, and to compare and contrast this analysis with the post-Keynesian theoretical approach. This approach highlights the role of three components observed simultaneously in order to understand the emergence of hyperinflation: a virulent distributive conflict; the presence of indexing mechanisms; and finally, flight from domestic currency into one or more foreign currencies. The article reveals that a transitional economy like that of Bulgaria in the 1990s may generate hyperinflation in the absence of any violent distribution conflict: the transition and the banking crisis engender inflation. The foreign exchange rate is decisive in the emergence of hyperinflationary dynamics (and therefore mistrust of domestic currency). This interpretation of hyperinflation is confirmed by an econometric analysis.     

VEHICLE CURRENCY*

Historically, the world economy has been dominated by a single currency accepted in the exchange of goods and assets among countries. In recent decades, the U.S. dollar has played this role. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in the sense that agents in nondollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly using the U.S. dollar instead of using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies. A vehicle currency is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from a vehicle currency and show how it depends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We find that there can be significant welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency country.     

The International Politics of Reactive Currency Statecraft: Japan’s Reaction to the Rise of the Chinese Renminbi

This study analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. This research argues that a state uses its policy related to a foreign international currency as a diplomatic means of managing its political relationship with the state issuing that currency, while also showing that in general most market actors are not greatly interested in their governments’ policies regarding foreign international currencies, especially those that are newly internationalising ones. This study finds as well that the conventional notion of ‘competition’ between international currencies does not necessarily affect a state’s reactive currency statecraft, even if its own currency is a major international one. All of this suggests that the inter-state politics between the state issuing an international currency and foreign states does have a crucial impact on the currency’s international use, especially during its early stages of internationalisation. It also implies that a state’s reactive currency statecraft can be fluid, depending upon the directions of its foreign policy.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Vertical Production and Trade*

This paper explores the optimal monetary policy response to domestic and foreign technology shocks in an open economy with vertical structure of production and trade. We find that any stage‐specific productivity shock in one country may have a transborder spillover effect on the other country via the vertical trade. So when choosing optimal monetary rules, each monetary authority should respond to both home and foreign productivity shocks. Also, the flexible exchange rate cannot replicate the flexible price equilibrium, even under producer currency pricing, due to price stickiness in multiple stages. We also find that the existence of a transborder spillover effect depends on the currencies of price setting. Finally, vertical trade may affect the value of exchange rate flexibility under PCP and LCP setting.     

Gross substitution, Gresham's law, and Hayek's free currency system

Professor Hayek has advocated that citizens be free to use foreign currency as a means of payment in order to put a check on national governments' tendency to rely on the seigniorage for fiscal purposes. His proposed scheme is based on an intuitive reasoning that being able to use foreign currencies makes demand for domestic currency more elastic, thus reducing the monopoly power of national governments on currency issue. This paper demonstrates that this would be true if and only if the foreign currency were a gross substitute for the domestic currency. The paper also shows that the same condition holds for Gresham's law to be valid.     

Internationalisation of the Renminbi as an Investing and a Funding Currency: Analytics and Prospects

This paper develops a three‐currency model to study the determinants of the demand for assets and liabilites denominated in an international currency and to shed light on the prospects for the renminbi as a budding international currency. We show that interest rate differentials would be only one of the factors shaping the renminbi's position, while other factors, including the correlation between foreign countries' economic growth and their bilateral exchange rates against the renminbi, and the correlation between exchange rates of the renminbi with other international currencies, would also be important. A broad interpretation of these findings is that the renminbi will likely be attractive to investors from high‐income economies and fund‐raisers from emerging market economies.     

略论中国外汇储备面临的潜在资本损失

本文分析了中国巨额外汇储备面临的由本币升值汇率风险而导致的资本损失。文章从两个角度来研究该项损失:一是从央行资产负债表由于货币错配而招致的现实以及潜在资本损失的角度;二是从以一篮子货币或者一篮子商品来衡量的中国外汇储备国际购买力损失的角度。本文的结论是:中国央行资产负债表面临的资本损失是显著的;中国外汇储备国际购买力的波动显著高于市场价值的波动,尤其是用油价来衡量的外汇储备购买力波动相当剧烈。     

Optimum currency areas and the European experience

Across nations or regions, the debate on optimum exchange rate cum monetary policies is not yet resolved on three levels. First is the optimum domain of fixed exchange rates versus keeping them flexible. Second is the subordinate debate on whether one needs full monetary union (as in continental Europe) to secure an optimum currency area's internal domain; or, whether virtually fixed exchange rates — where national currencies remain in circulation — can be sufficient. Third is whether a regional grouping of economies with close trade ties (as in East Asia) gain by collectively pegging to an outside currency such as the US dollar. Using an axiomatic approach, which limits the set of cross‐country financial claims to what is feasible, I analyse how best to both share and reduce macroeconomic risks on these three levels. JEL classification: F31, F36.     

贸易结算货币的新选择:稳定的篮子货币——对“金砖五国”货币合作的探讨

文章研究"金砖五国"货币合作的可能形式,构建了稳定的篮子货币作为贸易结算货币,为货币合作提供政策建议。文章首先考察了汇率之间的关系,认为一种货币的加权几何平均汇率能够消除不同货币表示币值的差异,在此基础上构建了篮子货币指数;其次研究了篮子货币波动最小的货币权重的选取,通过最优化方法获得最优权重;最后模拟计算了"金砖五国"篮子货币的权重,并探讨了如何把篮子货币最优权重转化为具体的货币篮子,同时给出了篮子货币和各国货币之间的汇率关系。     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

Pegging emerging currencies in the face of dollar swings

The aim of this article is to study ruptures of exchange rate pegs by focusing on the fluctuations of the anchor currency. We test for the hypothesis that currencies linked to the USD are more likely to loosen their peg when the USD is appreciating, while sticking to it otherwise. To this end, we estimate smooth-transition regression models for a sample of 28 emerging currencies over the 1994–2011 period. Our findings show that while the real effective exchange rates of most of these countries tend to co-move with that of the USD in times of depreciation, this relationship is frequently reversed when the US currency appreciates over a certain threshold.     

A Signaling Model of Multiple Currencies

In this paper, we demonstrate that it may be socially optimal for countries to have different currencies, even though they have no possibility of independently controlling their money supplies. We assume that agents have heterogeneous preferences over goods of different national origin, and that these preferences are private information. We prove three results. First, for a range of parameters, it is optimal for different countries to have different currencies so that buyers can more efficiently signal their preferences over goods to sellers. Second, if it is socially optimal to have different national currencies, then it is socially optimal for sellers to sell lower quantities to buyers bearing foreign currency. Finally, it is only necessary to have two monies if cross-country trade is optimal.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: F33