Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

Summary. We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest. With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for co-existence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money.Received: 20 April 2003, Revised: 10 July 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E0.An earlier version of this paper was entitled Money and Search with Enduring Relationships. We wish to thank Narayana Kocherlakota, Rachel Kranton, Jeff Lacker, Andrei Shevchenko, Shouyong Shi, Ted Temzelides, Chris Waller, and especially David Andofolatto, Gabriele Camera, Drew Saunders, and Randy Wright for helpful comments on that earlier draft, as well as seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania, Purdue University, American Economic Association Meetings, Summer Econometric Society Meetings, and NBER Summer Workshop. Corbae wishes to thank the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for research support.Correspondence to: D. Corbae     

国际工程承包企业外汇风险管理策略

随着我国汇率体制改革的深入,如何有效地规避外汇风险已成为我国国际工程承包企业经营管理中需要面对的重大课题.本文基于外汇风险的识别和企业外汇避险的实际要求,阐述了国际工程承包企业面临的外汇风险种类及其规避策略,并以实例分析了几种外汇风险规避方案的选择.     

Effects of exchange rate flexibility on the demand for international reserves

We incorporate a measure of exchange rate flexibility into the standard reserve demand equation and present empirical results for the 1976–1985 period which are consistent with the work of Officer (1976) and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) indicating the existence of economies of scale and the demand for reserves.     

Decentralized advice

We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.     

Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one that brings the level of taxation in the repeated game closest to the cooperative level of interest taxation. Sustainable levels of taxation in either regime depend on the importance of bank profits and on the marginal cost of public funds, among other things. Simulations with the model illustrate the choice between withholding taxes and information exchange. An explicit possibility is the emergence of a mixed regime, with one country imposing a withholding tax and the other country providing information. The basic model is extended to allow for size differences between the two countries and to incorporate a third, outside country.     

Decentralized learning from failure

We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through Crawford and Haller's [Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games, Econometrica 58 (1990) 571-595] attainability constraints on strategies. We analyze a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed subset of action profiles are successes and all others are failures. The location of successes is unknown. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. We partially characterize optimal attainable strategies in the infinite horizon game by showing that after any fixed time, agents will occasionally randomize while at the same time mixing probabilities cannot be uniformly bounded away from zero.     

A principal components analysis of international financial integration under fixed and floating exchange rate regimes

This paper presents an application of factor analytic techniques, employing principal components analysis, to determine to what extent international financial integration has been enhanced as a result of the move to a floating exchange rate regime by the major industrialized countries in the early 1970s. While several alternative, though related definitions exist, financial integration is viewed here as the extent to which the levels or changes in interest rates in different financial centers move in harmony. The results suggest that there has not been a marked increase in scope for countries to pursue independent interest rate policies since 1973, though Germany would seem to be an exception to this general observation.     

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate.     

Decentralized Management of a Fishery

We construct an economic mechanism to realize in Nash equilibrium an optimal consumption time path of a natural resource. For exposition convenience, the analysis is conducted within the model initiated by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:322–334, 1980). This framework allows us to explicitely compute the consumption time paths of the resource, associated with an open-access regime, with a cooperative management and with a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the difference game induced by the proposed mechanism.     

Decentralized matching and social segregation

Social segregation is a ubiquitous feature of human life. People segregate along the lines of income, religion, ethnicity, language, and other characteristics. This study provides the first experimental examination of decentralized matching with search frictions and institutionalized segregation. The findings indicate that, without a segregation institution, high types over-segregate relative to the equilibrium prediction. We observe segregation attempts even when equilibrium suggests that everyone should accept everyone else. In the presence of a segregation institution, we find that, while the symmetric segregation institution increases matching success rate and efficiency in one environment, it has weak or no effect in a steep-incentive environment. By adding an entry cost to a flat-incentive market, however, the asymmetric segregation institution leads to an increased matching success rate and efficiency in both environments, which underscores the importance of a coordination device.     

The demand for international reserves in a regime of floating exchange rates: Some empirical evidence

In this note the demand for international reserves during the recent float is analysed using a pooled cross-section, time-series data base. The main objective of the analysis is to demonstrate the importance of stochastic shocks in determining the demand for international reserves in a regime of floating exchange rates.     

Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program

Developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations, while retaining control over how much goes to each community. We offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players. Our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes. Results for Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) Program indicate that within-village targeting improved with program size, lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private redistribution. There is no sign that the center took account of village attributes conducive to reaching the poor.     

项目融资的汇率风险管理

项目融资是一种全新的筹资模式,由于其具有较强的融资功能,在一些大型基础设施项目建设中起到了良好的融资作用,因此已成为目前开发项目,特别是大型基础设施项目的重要融资手段.项目融资在上世纪80年代后期引入我国,并在一些项目中得到成功运用.     

Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns

We study the possibility of designing a decentralized resource allocation mechanism that yields optimal solutions in economies with increasing returns. After a brief review of the mechanisms already designed to cope with nonconvexities, we find out that either they fail to provide efficient solutions in Koopmans' sense, or else they use extremely complex messages. The question arises whether it is possible to define a nonwasteful and privacy-preserving mechanism over a class of environments with increasing returns using finite-dimensional vectors as messages. We show that the answer is no.     

On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation

Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, Journal of Public Economics, 35:333–354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions’ decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each locale sets capital tax rates to zero and sets optimal environmental standards. This paper shows the well-received Oates–Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms.Thanks to participants at the University of Alberta and the reviewers and editors for their helpful comments     

The links between international parity conditions and Granger causality: a study of exchange rates and prices

This article provides a simple equilibrium model of a futures market. Since the futures market is a zero sum game, some firms will, in equilibrium, end up being ‘speculators’ who bet against ‘hedgers’. We show it is firms that have high initial capital and/or poor production opportunities that are the most likely candidates to bet against the hedgers. In equilibrium, these groups earn a premium in order to provide this insurance so that speculating increases value. We also provide some results that imply an inverted U shaped relationship between trading volume and the level of futures prices. Empirical evidence from the S&P futures contract provides strong empirical support for this theoretical result.     

Decentralized pricing in minimum cost spanning trees

In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pricing rules, i.e., rules that cover at least the efficient cost while the price charged to each user only depends upon his own connection costs. We define a canonical pricing rule and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either superadditive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.