Privacy concerns,internal political efficacy,intrusiveness, and voter resistance to the acceptance of political mobile marketing campaigns

Political parties increasingly rely on information systems‐based approaches to present their messages, engender voter participation, and solicit voter support. Although research is being conducted on how mobile devices, mobile Internet, and social media are used to galvanize voters' participation in the political process, there is an observable dearth of research on how the use of these approaches by politicians might be resisted by voters. This study examines the antecedents of voter resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns with a conceptual model, and it employs reactance and internal political efficacy theories. Data for the empirical testing of the conceptual model were obtained through a survey of 971 South African voters. The findings of the study suggest that the proposed model provides a reasonable explanation of voter resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns and identifies privacy concerns, intrusiveness, and internal political efficacy as salient factors underlying voter resistance to political mobile marketing. The findings further suggest that internal political efficacy significantly moderates and reinforces the positive impact of privacy concerns on resistance. These findings provide important guidelines for reducing voters' resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns. They also provide a point of departure for future research into this relatively unexplored but potentially fertile domain.     

The long‐run effect of government ideology on economic freedom

According to popular attitudes in Western democracies, the choice between right‐wing and left‐wing parties is a choice between socialism and unbridled free markets. In contrast, the cold and staid research of academia has frequently concluded that particular political parties do not really matter, as whichever party is elected will be closely tethered to the will of the median voter. This article considers the effects of the ideology of parties in power over the long run (1928–95) on economic freedom in subsequent periods. Right‐wing governments are found to have modest, positive effects on economic freedom, but the effects are not particularly robust. The findings here are consistent with others elsewhere, which conclude that there is minor, uneven evidence of an effect. Nonetheless, historically small effects may not be indicative of the future, should these effects be poorly indicative of today's tumultuous political landscape.     

Managing change strategically: the technical, political, and cultural keys.

Managing strategic change is increasingly a way of life for organizations faced with the turbulent economic, political, and cultural forces of the 1980s. To manage such change, organizations and their managers will have to confront basic questions regarding the organization's technical, political, and cultural foundations. The technical questions include: What business(es) should we be in? How should we be organized to accomplish our strategy? What kinds of people do we need, and how will they be acquired, developed, and rewarded? The political questions include: Who gets to influence the mission and strategy of the organization? How is power allocated both vertically and horizontally across the organization? Who gets promoted to what key positions? The cultural questions include: What values and beliefs are necessary to support the organization's strategy? What subcultures are desirable, and should there be an overarching corporate culture? How should the human resources system shape and mold the culture?     

Government Size,the Role of Commitments*

We explore the hypothesis that long‐term commitments affect the dynamics of government expenditure. With the aid of a simple median‐voter model we interpret the pattern of increasing‐then‐constant tax rates observed in OECD countries in the second half of the last century: persistence of public expenditure and a lower bound on new interventions will push government size upward, and preferences of the electorate put a halt to this growth at some point. In this view, the fiscal policy variable is seen to consist of only a part of the total expenditure, the rest being predetermined by its past level.     

Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters

We consider the case where political advertising is targeted to a subset of uninformed voters and show how pressure groups, candidates, and uninformed voters interact to achieve an equilibrium outcome. The paper accomplishes the following: (1) It derives the optimal behavior of those uninformed voters who do not received targeted campaign advertising. (2) It suggests that previous results may have exaggerated the power of pressure groups and political advertising—even when there is directed advertising, any negative effect is mitigated by strategic behavior of the uninformed. (3) In the limit, pressure group donations move the outcome toward the median voter, contrary to what much of the literature on pressure groups claims.      

Social networks and citizen election forecasting: The more friends the better

Most citizens correctly forecast which party will win a given election, and such forecasts usually have a higher level of accuracy than voter intention polls. How do citizens do it? We argue that social networks are a big part of the answer: much of what we know as citizens comes from our interactions with others. Previous research has considered only indirect characteristics of social networks when analyzing why citizens are good forecasters. We use a unique German survey and consider direct measures of social networks in order to explore their role in election forecasting. We find that three network characteristics –  size, political composition, and frequency of political discussion – are among the most important variables when predicting the accuracy of citizens’ election forecasts.     

The business of elections

Two marketing reserach techniques, Conjoint Analysis and Quality Function Deployment (QFD), are imported to the political world and presented as superior substitutes to the conservative popularity contest surveys. Both techniques go deeper than "horse-race" popularity contests to analyze the roots of political success. Political Conjoint Analysis (PCA) and Political QFD (PQFD) identify and quantify consistent theoretical and operational features which statistically determine electoral victors. The successful application of such marketing techniques in the political world will hopefully eventually lead to Total Quality Politics (TQP) and intensify competition over voter satisfaction, rather than voter manipulation. Possible beneficial results of such techniques are a refinement of candidates' qualities in light of public demands and constant change in candidates' reservoirs due to the inability of existing pools to match voter preferences.     

Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption

What is the relationship between government corruption and firm performance? To address this question, I conduct a review of articles published in the leading management journals on government‐business interactions pertaining to rent‐seeking activities and integrate findings from the fields of international business, social issues in management, public organization, institutional change, and corporate political activity. I find that while much empirical work corroborates the earlier findings suggesting a corrosive impact of government corruption on firm performance in general, management research also points to the heterogeneous impact of government corruption on individual firm performance, driven by the strategic activities conducted by firms in response to corruption. I propose an integrative model of firm strategy vis‐à‐vis corruption that predicts the activity choice of the firm as predicated by its organizational structure, political resources, industry regulation, and surrounding political and social institutions.     

The recruitment and selection of pension trustees: an integrative approach

The role of a pension trustee is significant, which makes the recruitment and selection of labour trustees an important issue. In this article, we examine and combine aspects of two approaches to recruitment and selection: the political nomination model and the more professional HRM approach. We argue that an integrative approach would acknowledge the political, regulatory and organisational context while incorporating valid selection criteria such as domain‐specific skills and performance on the job. Such an integrated process can help trade unions in filling labour trustee positions with talented individuals who are more likely to be effective in achieving labour's goals in pension governance.     

SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT DECISION: A POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE APPROACH*

Abstract Social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez‐faire or in a first‐best setting, there would be no such trend. However, when first‐best instruments are not available, because health and productivity are not observable, the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision. The main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early retirement in many countries, a complete elimination of this bias (i.e. a switch to an actuarially fair system) is not the right answer for two reasons. First, some distortions are second‐best optimal. This is the normative argument. Second, and on the positive side, the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective. Depending on the political process, either it may not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself.     

The Political Economy of Low Inflation

What are the politics of inflation? This question is usually raised solely when inflation rates are high. All levels of inflation, however, high and low, are the outcome of political conflicts. But no current approach to the study of inflation — sociological, neoclassical, modern political economy — adequately captures the full range of political issues at stake, and this leads to problems for both theory and policy. This paper critiques the existing perspectives on inflation and then focuses on three theoretical issues raised by those critiques: the economic costs of inflation; the concept of monetary neutrality from economic and political perspectives; and the importance of disaggregating economic growth statistics. Finally, the paper introduces and explores a contending approach to the analysis of the political economy of inflation: a ‘micro‐politics’ perspective. This approach is the only one to address the politics of low inflation, which is of great significance for contemporary political economy.     

Which factors affect the sustainability of pension schemes?

This article seeks to determine the most influential factors on the sustainability of a pension system. To this end, an empirical analysis was conducted on a sample of 13 countries, with different characteristics, according to three criteria: the size of the pension system's assets, the old-age dependency ratio and the success of the system according to the Mercer CFA Institute Global Pension Index. The results of this preliminary study show that countries with successful pension systems share a high rate of formal employment, good political stability, high life expectancy at birth, and a good rate of coverage by the pension system.     

Segmenting youth voting behaviour through trusting–distrusting relationships: a conceptual approach

This paper reviews current evidence on the declining political engagement of British youth. What emerges is that causes of their political disaffection are manifold and complex, but trust, distrust and cynicism feature strongly. Traditional approaches to trust and distrust fail to recognise this complexity; consequently this paper offers a more sophisticated conceptual framework that examines trust and distrust as separate but linked dimensions, as advocated by Lewicki, McAllister and Bies.[Lewicki, R. J., McAllister D. J. and Bies R. J. (1998) ‘Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 438–458.] From the analysis four segments of ‘voter’ types are identified. By segmenting voters in this way, marketers can design strategies to help increase young people's trust and reduce their distrust, thereby increasing their propensity to vote in future elections. A synopsis of marketing aims to stimulate the ‘youth vote’ is presented along with areas for further research. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Political parties' use of web based marketing: some preliminary findings relating to first‐time voters in the 2005 general election

• This paper examines the marketing of political parties, via websites, in the 2005 UK general election with specific reference to first‐time voters (age 18–24). Common perception views young voters as predominantly politically apathetic and less likely to vote than older generations. However, research literature suggests given the right message and medium, the group will engage in the political process. Could the Internet provide a path to engaging younger voters and will websites become a key marketing vehicle for political parties?
• Young voters were asked to review political party websites using an extended web assessment method (EWAM), which is an evaluation tool created to determine both the importance and presence of website evaluation criteria. Preliminary research suggests that respondents felt the Internet had a significant role to play in the election process and marketing of campaign messages. However, while political parties scored well in relation to the technical/software aspects of website design, participants felt website material had little appeal and were ineffective in influencing voter intent.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Debate on Pension Systems: The Paradigmatic Cases of Chile and Spain

This article is focused on pension systems in the light of two case studies that are antagonistic within the capitalist economy. On the one hand, the Spanish pension scheme, based on the principle of intergenerational solidarity, was achieved by the working‐class after decades of struggle. It constitutes the backbone of the Spanish social security system, thanks to the creation and development of indirect and deferred wages. On the other hand, the Chilean pension scheme, first imposed by the Pinochet dictatorship, is based on a funded system and private management. It rejects the principle of solidarity and, therefore, it makes impossible the construction of a decent pension structure. The comparison of the Spanish and the Chilean pension systems can be expressed in just one revealing fact: while the average pension in Spain is 79 percent of the last salary earned, benefits in Chile barely reach 33 percent for male workers and 25 percent for female workers. The analysis of both cases is framed in terms of the critique of political economy, in direct opposition to the current mainstream in economics. Instead of assuming methodological individualism and a harmonious view of human societies, as orthodoxy does, the critical paradigm conceives of capitalist economy as a dialectical process determined by the existence of social classes with different and opposed interests.     

Endogenous party structure

This paper proposes a model of two-party representative democracy on a single-dimensional political space, in which voters choose their parties in order to influence the parties’ choices of representative. After two candidates are selected as the median of each party’s support group, Nature determines the candidates’ relative likability (valence). Based on the candidates’ political positions and relative likability, voters vote for the preferable candidate without being tied to their party’s choice. We show that (1) there exists a nontrivial equilibrium under natural conditions, and (2) the equilibrium party border and the ex ante probabilities of the two-party candidates winning are sensitive to the distribution of voters. In particular, we show that if a party has a more concentrated subgroup, then the party tends to alienate its centrally located voters, and the party’s probability of winning the final election is reduced. Even if voter distribution is symmetric, an extremist party (from either side) can emerge as voters become more politically divided.     

Voting on road congestion policy

This paper studies the political economy of urban traffic policy. A city council and a regional government (representing city and suburbs) decide respectively on parking fees and a road toll. Both charges are below the optimum when median voters in city and suburbs prefer cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average. Even if the city government would set an optimal road toll, the regional government blocks it when the median suburban voter prefers cars strongly enough. Letting the city control parking and road pricing may therefore increase chances of adoption of the latter. However, if the city controls parking and the region road pricing, the combined charges are higher than if the city controlled them both. Hence, when voters want all charges below the optimum, the involvement of two governments may be desirable. We also find that earmarking road pricing revenues for public transport is welfare-enhancing, compared to lump-sum redistribution, only if they are topped up by extra funds granted to the city by a higher level of government.     

Hard and Soft Densification Policies in the Paris City‐Region

This essay is concerned with the planning and densification of suburbs, which present a huge challenge insofar as they form a large area of urbanized land that remains underexploited due to low residential density. Drawing on current research in the Paris city‐region, the essay focuses specifically on the difficulty in implementing densification policies in low‐rise suburban areas. It examines the varying degrees of densification fostered by these policies, and builds upon recent urban studies literature on suburban change to trace how suburban areas are being transformed through regulations, instruments and market dynamics associated with densification processes. What kinds of densification policy are being implemented and what are the socio‐economic, political and cultural determinants of each type of regulatory approach? This essay will attempt to answer this question via an analysis of the densification policies being put in place in the municipalities of the Paris city‐region. It will offer in turn a typology of these different policies. It shows that densification is an instrument that can be used to address local political concerns which vary greatly depending on the economic, social and geographical position of municipalities within larger urban areas.     

PAC Congressional Election Campaign Contributions and Other Political or Economic Influences on the Voter Participation Rate

A bstract .   This study empirically investigates the potential impact of political action committee (PAC) election campaign contributions and other factors on the aggregate voter participation rate in the United States. For the study period 1960–1998, the aggregate voter participation rate appears to have been positively and significantly affected by the opportunity to vote in presidential elections and by the Vietnam War, as well as by "excessive" inflation and slow real GDP growth. The latter two findings of this study appear to be unique to this literature. In addition, the Watergate scandal and increased public dissatisfaction with government appear to have significantly discouraged voter participation. Finally, there appears to be strong evidence that PAC congressional election campaign contributions may have also acted to reduce the voter participation rate over the study period, a finding that also is unique to this study.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.