Why are currency crises contagious? A comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998

Why Are Currency Crises Contagious? A Comparison of the Latin American Crisis of 1994–1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998.—This paper analyzes three channels through which currency crises are transmitted between countries: contagion based on unsustainable economic fundamentals; contagion resulting from herding behaviour in financial markets; contagion induced by close trade integration. The presented model that links currency crises with these three types of contagion is employed to analyze the transmission of the Mexican crisis in 1994–1995 and the Thai crisis in 1997 to other emerging economies. The empirical results show that, first, the most important contagion channels were based on close financial and trade integration rather than on the weakness of macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, the vulnerability to capital flow reversals and weak financial sectors made countries particularly prone to a currency crisis, while external imbalances and currency misalignments were much less important. JEL no. F30, E60, E65, E44     

Informational Contagion of Sudden Stops in a Global Games Framework

This paper highlights the cross-country spread of self-fulfilling financial crises through an informational channel. It sets up a two-country framework of investment with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about economic fundamentals. Each market may be subject to sudden stops, triggered by agents preemptively withdrawing their investments for fear others do so. After observing a massive capital outflow from one country, agents downgrade common fundamentals, and therefore have higher requirements regarding factors specific to the other country. This in turn may induce a crisis in the latter, which is not justified by idiosyncratic events or economic interdependence.     

Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises, 1797–1994

We argue that recent currency crises reflect clashes between fundamentals and pegged exchange rates, just as did crises in the past. We reject the view that crises reflect self-fulfilling prophecies that are not closely related to measured fundamentals. Doubts about the timing of a market attack on a currency are less important than the fact that it is bound to happen if a government's policies are inconsistent with pegged exchange rates. We base these conclusions on a review of currency crises in the historical record under metallic monetary regimes and of crises post-World War II under Bretton Woods, and since, in European and Latin American pegged exchange rate regimes.     

Banking and Debt Crises in Europe: The Dangerous Liaisons?

The potential mutation of the Sub-Prime banking crisis into a sovereign debt one in Euro area countries is investigated. After reviewing the criteria used to measure the debt vulnerability, the balance sheet approach is presented in order to illustrate the potential connections between these two types of crises. A graphical analysis yields evidence that at the end 2009 the probability of observing a Euro area country defaulting is less likely than six month before. Nevertheless, the serious threats, which concern Greece and Ireland, do not permit us to exclude the occurrence of a contagious, or self-fulfilling, sovereign debt or currency crises in Euro area in the future.     

Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises with Borrowing Constraints and Domestic Currency Debt

This paper presents a model of self-fulfilling currency crises in economies that do not suffer from domestic liability dollarization but whose international borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. The model shows that when the collateral is a non-traded asset the expectation of a real exchange rate depreciation may trigger the constraint and cause a crisis in which the capital outflow and the real depreciation reinforce each other. Since in the model debt is denominated in domestic currency this paper highlights that borrowing constraints can cause self-fulfilling currency crises even in the absence of foreign-currency debt.     

Was the Currency Crisis in Argentina Self-Fulfilling?

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the 2002 crisis in Argentina was, at least to some extent, self-fulfilling. The theoretical basis we refer to is the so-called “second-generation” models. We use a Markov-switching model that allows us to empirically estimate the role played by fundamentals and/or shifts in devaluation expectations. Our results suggest that shifts in expectations have induced the crisis. However, because deteriorating fundamentals are also significant, we conclude that the collapse of the peg has been partly driven by adverse fundamentals and that abrupt shifts in devaluation expectations have forced a premature exit. JEL no. C22, D84, F31     

Analyzing and managing exchange-rate crises

This paper reviews theoretical work on exchange-rate crises and discusses recent attempts to reduce the risk of crises and manage them more effectively. Models usually used to explain crises—those in which they are due to bad policies and those in which they are due to self-fulfilling speculative attacks—do not often explain the timing of crises. Bad policies often play a role, but the onset of a crisis is frequently due to a political shock that leads market participants to revise their views about a government's ability to improve its policies. For this reason, efforts of the IMF to promote the publication of more economic data may not be very helpful in preventing crises. Turning to crisis management, the paper criticizes plans like those of Jeffrey Sachs, which would give soveregn debtors protection resembling that afforded by bankruptcy law. It favors instead the pragmatic approach developed in the report recently endorsed by the major industrial countries.     

洛阳旅游危机及其防范体系构建

洛阳作为我国著名的国际性旅游城市,旅游业已经成为其经济发展的重要产业,但随着外部环境的变化以及各种旅游危机的频发,洛阳旅游业危机管理日显迫切。文章以旅游危机理论为指导,总结出洛阳旅游危机的五大类型,指出洛阳旅游危机具有的特殊性;并从外部和内部阐述了洛阳旅游危机产生的原因;最后在梳理洛阳旅游危机应对中存在的问题基础上,从危机预警和危机防范两方面提出洛阳旅游危机管理的具体策略建议。     

What we know,what we still need to know: the Asian currency crisis revisited

From the literature on currency crises, it is widely understood that weak economic fundamentals increase tremendously the probability of currency crises, especially in emerging markets. However, what was not known is that an accumulation of small problems interacting with each other can be equally damaging. Using a new technique, a combination of Classification and Regression Tree (CART) and Logit regression, this paper re‐examines the causes of the Asian currency crisis in 1997–98. The results indicate that although weak fundamentals were at the root of the crisis, only self‐fulfilling panic and herd behaviour can explain the severity of the crisis. Contrary to previous empirical research, our results indicate that the Asian crisis was caused by the accumulation of small fragilities rather than large deficiencies in the macroeconomic fundamentals. An important policy implication of such findings is the need for governments not to underestimate small problems, which, when they interact, can create chaos. Another novelty of this paper is the interpretation of the crisis in terms of the concepts of trigger and vulnerability, using an empirical model that captures the magnitude of the self‐fulfilling panic and its contribution to capital reversal and eventually to the collapse of the currencies.     

China's vulnerability to currency crisis: A KLR signals approach

In this paper we use the Kaminsky–Lizondo–Reinhart (KLR) [Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C., 1998. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45, 1–48.] approach to conduct an ex-post study of the probabilities of China suffering a currency crisis during the period of January 1991 to December 2004. Two high-probability periods are identified: July 1992–July 1993 and August 1998–May 1999. The first period correctly predicts China's 1994 devaluation. The second period predicts currency devaluation in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, which did not occur. The results of the model indicate that the fundamentals were weak enough for China to experience contagion of the Asian crisis, and raise the question of the possible role of China's institutional arrangements in preventing the crisis. The paper further analyzes the economic fundamentals of China that drive the high probability of crises, and provides some suggestions for further reform.     

The Global Financial Crisis Revisited: Competition and Regulation

Abstract

Using data of the systematic banking crises from 1981 to 2008, we examine how competition and regulation are related to the crises. We find that countries with higher concentration and/or higher market power of the banking industry are less prone to crises. Further, they are more likely to have weathered the 2008 global financial crisis. However, regulatory and institutional factors play little role and the estimation results are shown to be sensitive to measures of the degree of competition or severity of the crisis, as well as the coverage of the crises.     

新兴市场国家金融危机原因浅析

新兴市场国家经济在过去的20年里取得了举世瞩目的成就,但自20世纪90年代开始,其却频频受到金融危机的冲击:1994年的墨西哥危机、1997年的东南亚危机、1998年的俄罗斯危机、2001年的阿根廷危机。这反映了新兴市场国家在金融全球化进程中的脆弱性。本文主要详细分析新兴市场国     

Speculative attacks and currency crises: The Mexican experience

By using data from the Mexican economy, this paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. A deterioration in fundamentals appears to generate high one-step-ahead probabilities for the observed regime changes during the sample period 1982–1994. Particularly, foreign reserve losses, expansionary output, monetary and fiscal policies, an increase in inflation differentials and the share of short-term foreign currency-indexed debt, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate appear to have contributed to the speculative pressures and the associated regime changes.     

Bank Runs in Emerging-Market Economies: Evidence from Turkey's Special Finance Houses

Recent banking crises in emerging-market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance. Because insurance erodes banks' incentives to manage risks prudently, some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability. Yet eliminating insurance could be destabilizing if it recreates risks of self-fulfilling runs. This paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on Turkey's Special Finance Houses, an uninsured sub-sector of Islamic banks. Detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self-fulfilling elements of runs. We found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs, suggesting a role for deposit insurance, judiciously used, in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run.     

An Interpretation of the Collapsing Process of the Bretton Woods System

This paper attempts to determine the environments that market confidence might play a significant role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We build a game-theoretic model of currency crises where a continuum of small speculators can decide their market confidence and trading positions. In the model, the convertibility of dollar is assumed to exhibit a long-term downtrend due to Triffin’s dilemma. The problem is analyzed on the grounds of both certainty and uncertainty. In the certainty case, we find that if the convertibility of dollar is low enough, a dollar crisis is inevitable, but if the convertibility is in an intermediate range with multiple equilibria, the Bretton Woods system is vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculation. In the uncertainty case, the incidence of the confidence crises will disproportionately increase as the convertibility of dollar falls. Lastly, this paper shows that the Federal Reserve Bank’s secrecy may extend the maximum lifespan of the Bretton Woods system.     

Financial Restructuring and Economic Growth in Thailand

Abstract

After a sharp downturn in 1998, the Thai economy has up until 2003 registered a strong growth. There has also been a significant increase in exports as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). While examining the performance of the Thai economy, this paper pays special attention to the factors that contributed to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Owing to increased financial rather than trade liberalization facilitated by improvements in communications technology, it is virtually impossible to eliminate the possibility of crises in the future. Through sound macro-economic management polices it is however possible to reduce the frequency of crises and their subsequent impact on the real economy. This paper suggests policies that may help to reduce the risk of similar crises in the future.     

Capital flows and exchange rates: recent Korean and Taiwanese experience and challenges

We first study the characteristics of the financial crisis and its impacts on Taiwanese and Korean economies. We have examined 22 macroeconomic fundamentals, such as GDP, inflation rates, government budget, trade balance, external debt, money supply, and ratios of average monthly imports and cumulative inward portfolio investment to international reserves, and compared with an extensive data set of the two countries. The comparisons point out that the macrofundamentals of both countries are basically the same, except the international finance sector. After defining currency crisis and banking crisis, the causes of crises are identified as the nominal exchange rates and the short-term external debt-to-international reserves ratios. In view of this, we use cointegration and causality tests to examine the relationship between these two time series. We have found a unidirectional causality from the short-term debt ratio to the exchange rate for Korea, but no causality between the two for Taiwan. The paper ends with some discussions on the lessons and challenges from the experience of the two countries.     

Financial Globalization and Banking Crises in Emerging Markets

Bank crises in emerging economies have been a feature of the recent global crisis, and their incidence has increased in the post-Bretton Woods era. This paper investigates the impact of financial globalization on the incidence of systemic bank crises in 20 emerging markets over the years 1976–2002 using measures of de facto and de jure financial openness. An increase in foreign debt liabilities contributes to an increase in the incidence of crises, but foreign direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities have the opposite effect. A more liberal de jure capital regime lowers the incidence of banking crises, while a regime of fixed exchange rates increases their frequency. The results of the econometric analysis is consistent with the experience of East European and central Asian emerging markets, which attracted a relatively large proportion of capital flows in the form of debt in recent years and have been particularly hard hit by the global financial crisis.     

European crises and the Asian economies

This paper analyses the impact of recent financial crises in Europe on the Asian economies. What is often abbreviated to GFC included three distinct crises: the 2007–2008 North Atlantic financial crisis, a 2008–2009 global economic crisis and public finance crises which became increasingly focussed on the eurozone in 2010–2012. Asia did not experience significant financial crises, and the open economies recovered relatively rapidly from the global economic crisis. The relative weight of Asian economies in the global economy, which had been increasing for several decades, grew even more rapidly in 2009–2011 as the economies of the USA and Europe faltered. This poses challenges for global economic governance, although there are constraints on Asia being a more assertive force. Problems in the eurozone hold lessons for Asia; the euro and the Schengenzone are positive responses to the emergence of increasingly complex supply chains. In a similar context, East Asia is moving hesitantly toward financial cooperation and adopting second-best approaches, such as de facto dollar pegs, to reducing bilateral exchange rate volatility.     

What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?

The paper explores the view that the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 and 1998 reflected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even if market overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The first part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial ‘overlending’, banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows. The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian crisis from the antecedents in 1995–1996 to the recent developments in early 1999 in parallel with a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international intervention, and the costs and benefits of capital controls.