COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.     

PUBLIC GOODS,RENT DISSIPATION,AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*

The early literature on rent seeking presumed that total expenditures in the rent-seeking process would equal the value of a contested prize. Subsequent analysis has shown, however, that a number of circumstances give rise to underdissipation of the contested rent—imperfectly discriminating contests, risk-aversion, or where individuals' valuations of the prize are not identical. This paper shows how underdissipation is associated with the public-good character of contested rents. In particular, total rent dissipation is demonstrated to be less than the average stake of the individual contenders. In addition to assessing rent dissipation in contests for public-good allocations, the paper also endogenizes the value of the prize by placing the rent-seeking contest in a setting of candidate competition.     

UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSITIVE THEORY OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE*

This paper extends the analysis of Rees (1984a) of a public enterprise pursuing a size-related objective in the face of uncertain demand to a situation where its managers may be risk neutral or risk averse and where the public enterprise may produce more than one output. The optimal pricing policy of the public enterprise is analysed and the importance of not only the expected profit constraint but also the attitude to risk of the public enterprise in determining its relative prices is demonstrated.     

INTEREST GROUPS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION,AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee-Brock-Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.     

EXIT,VOICE, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE: AGENCY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP*

This paper asks what constrains the relative efficiency of a maximally decentralized form of public ownership of capital. It locates the answer in the nondecentralizability of common ownership. Relative inefficiency in the allocation of investment funds is predicted because the ability to arrange a private portfolio gives rise to incentives to investigate investment alternatives and to monitor the disbursers of investment funds, and these incentives cannot be replicated in a system in which (political) voice is the sole mechanism for instilling financial and managerial accountability. Implications for the design of public ownership systems are discussed.     

EVALUATING EU POLICIES ON PUBLIC SERVICES: A CITIZENS' PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT ** : This article evaluates EU policies on public services – particularly public network services – from the citizens' point of view. It is first argued that citizens' perceptions are important because the provision of fundamental services is at stake and because they constitute the infrastructure necessary for social and economic development. Citizens’‘voice’ can, therefore, be known, analyzed and used in the design of improved policy on public services along with other indicators. Changing EU policy on public services is synthesized and classified into two main phases in section two. Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or dealt with at the supranational level by ‘soft’ instruments.     

TYPES OF PUBLIC CAPITAL AND THEIR PRODUCTIVITY IN JAPANESE PREFECTURES*

Several researchers have studied the productivity of public capital in Japan but most have not paid attention to the types of public infrastructure or differences in production technology between prefectures. We estimate prefectural production functions with differently aggregated public capital. Through the model selection process, we examine the types of productive public capital. The empirical results show the production technologies used and how types of productive public capital differ between prefectures.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN TURKEY*

ABSTRACT: Public enterprises have played a distinct role in promoting economic development and have been instrumental in initiating the industrialization of Turkey, and in facilitating its balanced regional development, especially during the early stages of its economic development. However, since the late 1960s, public enterprises have been a drag on the economic performance of the country because of the economic problems they have caused. In response to the problems associated with public enterprises, privatization entered the political arena in the early 1980s. The Turkish government has now adopted a timetable to privatize the public enterprises. In this paper, an attempt is made to investigate the place and the weight of the public enterprises and their problems in the Turkish economy.     

FIRM SIZE AND PRICING POLICY

We relate pricing policy of firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational backlash if it ‘reneges’, i.e., deviates from its earlier price offer. This allows the firm to effectively commit to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay. Interestingly, this equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium of the related model that does not allow for reneging possibilities. For smaller firms, however, the reputational effects are much less intense, and consequently the equilibria may involve deviation possibilities. In this case, the equilibria are non‐unique and may involve delays as well.     

INFLATION AND THE PUBLIC DEFICIT WHEN THE UTILITY OF MONEY IS INSATIABLE*

When the marginal utility of money is positive even at very high levels of the asset (Yoshiyasu Ono's, 1994, assumption), the relationship between inflation and the public deficit at full employment may result in a unique perverse equilibrium where higher deficits reduce inflation. If there are two equilibria, the low inflation equilibrium is one where the perverse effect between inflation and the public deficit prevails; while in the high inflation equilibrium higher public deficits increase inflation. These results contrast sharply with traditional results found in the literature.