Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias

Decision makers have a strong tendency to retain the current state of affairs. This well-documented phenomenon is termed status quo bias. We present the probabilistic dominance approach to status quo bias: an alternative is considered acceptable to replace the status quo only if the chances of a (subjectively) severe loss, relative to the status quo, are not too high. Probabilistic dominance is applied and behaviorally characterized in a choice model that allows for a range of status quo biases, general enough to accommodate unanimity, but also standard expected utility maximization. We present a comparative notion of “revealing more bias towards the status quo” and study its implications to the probabilistic dominance model of choice. Lastly, the model is applied to the endowment effect phenomenon and to a problem of international portfolio choice when investors are home biased.     

Provided and perceived status quo in choice experiments: Implications for valuing the outputs of multifunctional rural areas

This article presents a choice experiment analyzing multifunctional rural development policies targeting conservation and recovery of environmental, social and cultural assets. In choice experiments a base alternative is usually included in order to estimate the welfare change associated to policy proposals. This study is concerned with the much neglected issue of the impact on policy analysis of the definition of a ‘status quo’ alternative either as an objective assessment by experts, or as a self-reported perception by respondents. Convergent validity analysis and prospective policy scenarios show a significant impact of different status quo specifications on individuals' preferences and related welfare measures when complex and unfamiliar biophysical systems are involved in policy analysis and evaluation.     

Complex ballot propositions,individual voting behavior,and status quo bias

One concern about direct democracy is that citizens may not be sufficiently competent to decide about complex policies. This may lead to exaggerated conservatism in the voting decision (status quo bias). To investigate how complexity affects individual voting behavior, we develop a novel measure of proposition complexity (using official pre-referendum booklets) and combine it with post-referendum survey data from Switzerland. Using Heckman selection estimations to account for endogenous variation in participation rates, we find that an increase in proposition complexity from the 10th to the 90th percentile would decrease voters' approval by 5.6 ppts, which is often decisive: an additional 12% of the propositions in our sample would be rejected.     

Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity. We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations as impossibility results. Received: September 29, 1999; revised version: March 22, 2000     

房地产市场理性回归现状和趋势前瞻

在全球金融风暴的大背景下,近期我国房地产市场经历着从未有的市场波动,房地产市场理性回归成为大势所趋。目前正处于市场供求关系调整的重要时期,出现观望的现象也是市场的必然。本文回顾了房地产市场的问题和现状,分析了其成因,并对其未来走势进行了前瞻。     

政治学维度的中国公共预算研究现状与进一步发展之见解

与传统预算研究不同,公共预算主要从预算政治与预算技术两个角度展开,并主要由政治学者与公共管理学者主导.本文主要描述了新兴的我国公共预算研究的现状,并提出了下一步的发展思路.     

公共财政:概念界说与演变脉络——兼论中国财政改革30年的基本轨迹

本文立足于中国特定的体制转轨背景,在系统考察公共财政问题来龙去脉的基础上,对这一经济范畴的内涵与外延做出了比较清晰的界说。本文的分析表明,跳出纯学术思维的局限而放眼中国财政改革30年的历史进程,可以发现,公共财政本来就是为了解决中国自身问题的需要而提出的一个富有中国特色的概念。鉴于"公共性"是财政与生俱来的本质属性,作为一个有别于计划经济年代的财政制度安排,以覆盖范围不断拓展为集中体现的中国公共财政建设之路,实质是一个让传统中国财政体制机制和传统中国财政学回归"公共性"轨道的过程。站在制度变革的高度,按照公共的理念和规则,深刻把握公共财政制度的基本要求,以此勾画中国财政改革与发展蓝图并改造中国财政学学科体系,是历史赋予我们这一代人的特殊使命。     

公共支出范围:分析与界定

本文建立一个新的理论假设 :政府存在的天然合理性在于防范和化解公共风险 (在不同历史条件下 ,其表现形式不同 ) ,并以此为逻辑起点 ,提出了两个基本观点 :一是公共风险决定公共支出 ;二是公共支出的使命是防范和化解公共风险。在此基础上 ,本文构筑了界定公共支出范围的两种基本方法———风险归宿分析法和反向假设分析法。     

Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining

There are several ethical objections to the dependence on the status quo when bargaining mechanisms are applied to problems of collective choice and, in this context, there is also some discussion about how to define the status quo. Can one think of bargaining mechanisms defined for some set of decision problems or of bargaining solutions for special problems that are independent of the status quo? Under which conditions do they exist? What are the crucial properties of the classical bargaining solutions or of bargaining mechanisms on economic environments implying dependence? These questions are answered by two impossibility results. It turns out that the only crucial assumption we search for is the axiom of “Weak Individual Rationality”. We also point out the consequences of our results for the discussion mentioned above.     

公共选择视角下的公共预算理念

绩效预算是20世纪公共预算管理的重大改革,是政府公共管理理念的重大转变。作为公共预算理性主义理念的应用,绩效预算对于提高政府预算决策的科学性和预算支出效率发挥了重要作用。然而,理性主义与现实主义的预算理念并不是完全矛盾的,在公共选择的视角下分析两种预算理念实际上是将公共预算作为政治程序的一部分,以经济的视角去分析其决策机制和最终要达到的绩效目标。同时,两种预算理念对于我国目前的预算改革也具有重要的借鉴意义。     

论公共政策的有效执行

公共政策的有效执行是政策目标实现的关键,公共政策的四大主要环节即政策制定、政策执行、政策评价机制以及政策监督都会对政策的实现产生一定的影响.政策制定时要考虑方案的科学合理性和连续稳定及与其他政策间的协调,政策执行过程中应重点考虑执行主体、目标群体和政策环境对政策执行的影响,另外还要完善政策执行评价机制以及加强政策的事中监督.     

公共债务对实体经济的传导机制及政策启示

在我国经济发展的“新常态”下,公共债务将如何作用于实体经济的问题值得关注与思考。文章简要描述了国内外公共债务的实践历程及现状,并在对早期西方公共债务理论以及近期相关文献梳理的基础上,关于公共债务对实体经济的传导机制进行系统性分析。研究表明,公共债务分别通过三个层面实现对实体经济的传导：基于宏观层面,通过影响生产要素投入,实现公共债务对实体经济产出的传导;基于微观层面,通过刺激消费与投资,实现公共债务对实体经济总需求的传导;基于金融层面,通过调整流动性和利率,实现公共债务对实体经济运行的传导。因此,应当合理调控公共债务规模,提高公共债务的投资效率,有效地发挥公共债务对实体经济长期发展的推动作用。     

On the theory of reference-dependent preferences

A theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points. It is related to Tversky and Kahneman’s reference-dependent preference theory, but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory. Preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions. Apart from a continuity condition, the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice. The theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects. Reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade. The implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated.     

陕西技术创新的现状与对策研究

企业是技术创新的主体,而技术创新是当代社会经济发展的引擎.为此,我们对陕西省西安、咸阳、宝鸡等三个地区的62个企业进行了实地考察,通过调查研究,我们分析了陕西技术创新的现状,提出了陕西技术创新存在的问题,并针对问题提出了技术创新的对策措施,以期能为陕西技术--经济的发展献计献策.     

Property,redistribution, and the status quo: a laboratory study

Experimental Economics - We report experimental evidence showing a positive effect of redistribution on economic efficiency via the self-enforcement of property rights, and identify which status...     

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet–Kemeny aggregation method.     

Dissertation abstract: A status theory of collective action

The “collective action problem” describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to the collective action problem based on status. I argue that contributions to collective action increase an individual’s status in the group because contributions create perceptions of high group motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to receive a variety of social and material benefits for their contributions to the group. These rewards can help explain why individuals contribute to collective action. Four laboratory studies tested the theory. In Study 1, following interaction in a 6-person public goods game, participants reported viewing higher contributors as more group motivated and higher status. Higher contributors also wielded more interpersonal influence in task interactions with participants. Participants also cooperated with higher contributors more, and allocated greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange-theoretic alternative explanation for the findings of Study 1, showing that observers of collective action who did not benefit from higher contributors’ contributions to the public good, nonetheless rated them as higher status, cooperated with them more, and gave them greater altruistic gifts. These results show that collective action contributors can earn social and material benefits even outside the group. Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater proportion of resources for the collective action were rated as more group motivated and higher status than a moderate proportional contributor, even though the amounts they contributed were the same. These findings support the theory, and underscore the significance of self-sacrifice in the acquisition of status in collective action. Study 4 investigated the effects of status rewards on contributors’ behavior towards and perceptions of the group. Participants who received positive status feedback for their contributions subsequently contributed more than those who did not. Rewarded participants also identified more with the group and saw it as having greater solidarity and cohesion. I conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research. JEL Classification C71     

城乡公共服务均等化视角下地方公共财政体制改革

城乡公共服务均等化高级阶段实现城乡人均公共支出均等化,实质是保证普遍公平。城乡公共服务均等化初级阶段实现城乡基本公共服务均等化,实质是保证最低公平。我国目前处在实现城乡公共服务均等化的初级阶段。为此,地方公共财政体制改革的框架,是建立以城乡公共服务均等化为目标的公共预算体制,建立以实现最低公平为条件的农村公共服务内容体系,建立以平衡政府间公共财力为原则的转移支付体制,建立主体合理、机制完善的农村公共产品供给体制。     

中国:深化事业单位改革,改善公共服务提供

改善事业单位的绩效,对于提高公共服务的质量,适应中国所确定的建设小康社会的目标,落实“以人为本”的发展观,具有非常关键的意义。虽然过去以“推向市场”为目标的改革取得了很大成就,但同时也在公共服务领域引入了一些不合意的激励机制。为了改善公共服务,中国需要进行全面、协调的事业单位改革,其中包括重新界定政府的角色和从商业性活动中退出,改革公共财政以便更好地为公共服务付费,允许非国有部门提供更多的公共产品,加强公共部门内部的问责机制,建立绩效管理和监督体制。由于事业单位的复杂性和多样化特征,改革的设计与实施必须充分考虑不同部门和不同地区的具体环境以及对员工的影响。因此,有必要在中央层面建立一个跨部门的改革领导小组对事业单位改革进行指导和监督。     

区位性因素与公共品的最优供给

本文分析了两种区位性因素对地方公共品最优供给(质量与数量)的影响。一类区位性因素为某公共品在城市中所在的区域。分析表明,位于城市边缘地区的公共品的最优质量要小于位于城市中心地区公共品的最优质量。另一类区位性因素为某公共品与居民的相对位置(距离),这一因素在具体分析中被转化为使用居民出行半径表示的指标。结论表明,出行半径的增加一方面加大了中间投票人与公共品之间的距离,另一方面也使得原先距离公共品较远的居民得以有机会享用该公共品。前一种影响对公共品的最优质量起抑制作用,后一种影响的效果则相反。而公共品的最优质量随出行半径如何变化,将取决于这两种效应之间的比较。本文还根据公共品之间是否存在替代性区分了替代性公共品与非替代性公共品,并分析了这两种不同性质的公共品受区位性因素影响而在最优质量与最优供给数量上所呈现出的差异。