The relationship between regulation and prices in the workers' compensation insurance market

This study examined the effect of different state regulatory policies on the price of workers' compensation insurance. Using a time series of state cross section data for the years 1980–1987, estimates were obtained for models that differed according to how price was measured and whether the regulatory variables were treated as endogenous. When the regulatory variables were treated as exogenous, the results show that price is lower in deregulated states compared to states with prior approval regulation. Results for models with endogenous regulatory variables indicate that price tends to be lower in deregulated states, although the estimates are not statistically significant.     

The relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices

This study investigates the dynamic relationship between crude oil and retail gasoline prices during the last 21 years and determines that, in February 1986, the relationship had drastically changed. Since that date, the results show that gasoline prices include higher profit margins, respond substantially less to changes in crude oil prices(but still within one month), and are more volatile. Also discussed are the developments in crude oil and gasoline markets that have led to the above changes.     

The efficiency costs of the postal monopoly: The case of third-class mail

This paper provides an estimate of the efficiency costs of the letter monopoly for third-class bulk advertising, the Postal Service's second largest category of mail. Using market data from private mail carriers, excess costs to mailers in 1992 are estimated to be about $2.5 billion, almost one-third of the Postal Service's third-class mail revenues. These costs are the sum of (1) the allocative efficiency loss due to reduced output ($237 million); (2) the increased production costs due to non-cost-minimizing behavior ($712 million); and (3) transfers to postal labor ($1.511 billion). Total efficiency costs-the sum of (1) and (2)—are estimated to be about $950 million.The author would like to thank Roger Sherman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and Monica Bettendorf and Stephen McGonegal for their assistance in preparing this paper.     

Renewable resource regulation and uncertain prices: The role of financial structure and bankruptcy

We analyze the interaction between regulatory policies and the financial structure of a fishery and show that firms with debts may respond differently to regulations than firms that have not accumulated debts. There are conditions where more stringent regulation is counterproductive, providing a perverse incentive to increase harvesting effort. We show that optimal regulation depends on the sector's financial structure, and demonstrate that there are cases when intervention is counterproductive, or too costly to implement. There are also cases where successful regulatory intervention can only be implemented when accompanied by a sufficiently large subsidy.     

Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices

The size of the firm relative to market demand is crucial to a determination of whether there exist sustainable monopoly prices. In the one product case the size of the firm is its minimum efficient scale. In the multiproduct case size is defined by a set of outputs at which cost complementarities are present. The analysis shows that when the size of the firm is sufficiently large, there exist anonymously equitable Aumann-Shapley prices. Further, at these prices natural monopoly is sustainable against rival entry. The Aumann-Shapley price are also shown to be quantity sustainable in the sense of Brock and Scheinkman.     

Monetary policy as bad medicine: The volatile relationship between business cycles and asset prices

Austrian business cycle theory has become an important point of focus in controversial mainstream discussions regarding the role of asset prices in monetary policy. In this article, the relation between asset prices and the Austrian business cycle theory is examined. The analysis focuses on how central banking supports optimism, resulting in the redirection of entrepreneurial activity and knowledge via asset price bubbles. The crucial role of credit expansion for asset price booms is also analyzed. Following this analysis, the implications for monetary policy are deduced.

Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price-cap regulation: an example

A monopolist in a simple two-period model knows that a price cap will be imposed on a Laspeyres index of the firm's prices in the second period. (Tariff basket regulation is relevant to some UK utilities.) A simple example is developed to study the welfare changes that result from strategic weight manipulation by the firm as a consequence of its ability to adjust first-period revenue shares and interperiod price relatives. Uniform regulation requiring an equal percentage reduction in all of the regulated firm's prices provides a natural standard for comparison. One particular configuration of parameters induces identical pricing and welfare under the two forms of regulation in the example. Otherwise, compared with uniform regulation in the example, Laspeyres index regulation raises producer welfare but reduces consumer welfare in the first period and may also reduce consumer welfare in the second period. A numerical illustration shows that total welfare may also be lower under Laspeyres regulation.     

The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.     

On monopoly welfare gains,scale efficiency and the costs of decentralization

Inside the neoclassical framework a monopoly produces an unambiguous loss of social welfare. In this article some dynamic efficiency aspects of monopoly in connection with economies of scale are discussed. Two different cases of the costs of capacity expansion for a branch are compared: (1) the capacity expansion takes place with only one, multiplant, monopoly firm, (2) the capacity expansion takes place in a branch producing the same output but with two or more multiplant firms. It is argued that monopoly welfare gains are likely to arise for a centralized process of capacity expansion compared to a decentralized one.     

Re-thinging the relationship between enviromental regulation and industrial innovation: The social negotiation of technical change

This paper draws attention to the current political and acdemic dislocation between regulation and innovation as activities and aims to emphasize the significance of the interrelationship both in terms of academic analysis and of policy approaches. The notion that innovation and regulation are both facets of the same overall process of technical change is explored, and accordingly, it becomes important to analyse them together as well as seperately. A conceptual approach is advocated which draws upon the notion of 'social and institution negotiations' in coming to terms with the nature of innovatory and regulatory processes.     

Robust correlations between prices and labour values: a comment

The paper addresses Kliman's criticisms of the observed correlationsbetween prices and labour values. It argues that the notionof spurious correlation is not relevant in this case. It examinesKliman's own simulations and shows that his statistical correctiontechniques involve dividing through by the signal to leave thenoise.     

Seoul housing prices and the role of speculation

Between June 1998 and March 2006, the price index of apartment houses in Seoul, Korea, more than doubled, while fundamentals such as GDP, wage, and population increased by less than 35%. This study examines the role of a rational speculative bubble in this price surge. We find that unobservable information explains part of the price volatility; and that a rational bubble proxy is a significant driver of prices. However, neither latent information nor rational bubble is enough to explain the recent housing price appreciation, even in conjunction with observable fundamentals.     

Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation

Economists generally assume that systems of transferable property rights are preferable to non-market systems. This paper suggests that the design of a market-based policy that dominates a command-andcontrol regime is more subtle than is commonly believed, even in theory. The subtlety arises because identical approaches to monitoring and enforcement will not generally yield the same results in different regulatory environments. The paper identifies conditions under which a kind of market dominance result obtains. The theory is then applied to the problem of trading rights to emit pollutants from motor vehicles.Mr. Hahn is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Carnegie University. Mr. Axtell is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution. We would like to thank Linda Cohen, Glenn Loury, Eric Stork, and participants in the Harvard environmental economics workshop and the Stanford environmental economics conference for constructive comments. Jeff Alson, Richard Wilcox, and Don Zinger helped identify useful data sources. This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation.     

The competitive firm and the role of information about uncertain factor prices

This paper studies the role of information about uncertain input prices for a competitive firm. The production decision has to be taken when the price of an input factor is perceived as random. However, a signal is observable in advance, conveying some information about the future factor price. Transparency is linked to the informational content of this signal. The impact of a higher level of transparency is analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the information signal is observed. The change of factor use, production amount and cost are determined by comparing the strength of the curvatures of total and marginal product. By contrast, ex ante profit always increases, independently of the shape of the production function.     

A comparison between the core and the monopoly solutions in a mixed exchange economy

Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers. Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996     

Information transmission during the trial: The role of punitive damages and legal costs

This paper studies an incomplete information model in which a preventable accident occurred. The judge determining punitive damages observes the firm's (defendant) investment decisions, but is uninformed about the firm's experience adopting safety measures. Our model allows firms to file an appeal if the judge's verdict is incorrect, which the judge may accept or reject. We identify under which conditions a separating equilibrium exists where the firm's investment decisions signal its type to the judge, who responds with a correct verdict, thus avoiding future appeals. Our paper also finds conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists whereby the firm's investment in precaution conceals its type from the judge, who can respond with an incorrect verdict thus giving rise to appeals. Furthermore, we show that the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise if the percentage of revenue that defendants are required to pay in punitive damages decreases, if the punitive‐to‐compensatory ratio increases, and if the legal cost of filing an appeal increases.