Adjusting the measurement of US manufacturing productivity for air pollution emissions control

We estimate a distance function and derive producer shadow prices for SO₂ and PM-10 emissions. The shadow prices are used to adjust a traditional measure of total factor productivity growth in order to account for the reallocation of inputs from production of the marketed output to pollution abatement activities. Adjusted total factor productivity growth rates are calculated for the two-digit SIC manufacturing industries in the United States for 1970–1996. The results indicate that including the “output” of pollution abatement activities has a measurable effect on the productivity of many industries in the manufacturing sector.     

Environmental regulations,induced R&D,and productivity: Evidence from Taiwan's manufacturing industries

This paper examines whether stringent environmental regulations induce more R&D and promote further productivity in Taiwan. Using an industry-level panel dataset for the 1997–2003 period, empirical results show that pollution abatement fees, a proxy for environmental regulations, is positively related to R&D expenditure, implying that stronger environment protection induces more R&D. On the other hand, pollution abatement capital expenditures do not have a statistically significant influence on R&D. Further evaluation of the influence of induced R&D by environment regulations on industrial productivity shows a significant positive association between them. This finding supports the Porter hypothesis that more stringent environmental regulations may enhance rather than lower industrial competitiveness.     

The impact of environmental regulation on productivity in German industries

The objective of this paper is to adjust a traditional total factor productivity (TFP) measure for the direct effect of environmental regulation on material and capital input. For this purpose we consider the fact that part of material input and pollution abatement capital have not been used to increase output but to cover the cost of using the environment as a factor of production. Therefore TFP growth rates are lower if part of the material input is allocated to abatement activities instead of producing output. We propose to treat compliance with environmental regulation as an unproductive input linked to the use of productive material input. Our aim is to answer and discuss two questions: How to measure the effect of environmental regulation on TFP, and does the effect matter. We examine data from 1975–1991 for ten pollution intensive German industries.We would like to thank Cornelia Oßwald for valuable research assistance. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed

We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.     

Growth, welfare and transitional dynamics in an endogenously growing economy with abatement labor

This paper sets up a simple endogenous growth model that highlights the importance of the endogenous labor-leisure choice and the allocation between production labor and abatement labor. We show that, in contrast to the common notion (e.g. [Bovenberg, A.L., Smulders, S., 1996. Transitional impacts of environmental policy in an endogenous growth model. International Economic Review 37, 861–893] and [Bovenberg, A.L., de Mooij, R.A., 1997. Environmental tax reform and endogenous growth. Journal of Public Economics 63, 207–237]), the existence of an environmental production externality is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for environmental policies to stimulate economic growth if the labor-leisure choice is endogenously determined. In particular, since there are complementarities between public abatement and private abatement, the public abatement expenditure will have a more powerful enhancing effect on economic growth when it is accompanied by more efficient private abatement. This result also leads to a corollary to the effect that it is easier to achieve double dividends in terms of enhancing both growth and welfare if the endogenous labor-leisure choice is taken into account.In our dynamic analysis, we show that if public abatement is substantially large, dynamic indeterminacy may occur despite the absence of a positive labor externality and interestingly, this is more likely to be the case when abatement labor plays a more significant role. Besides, the transitional effects of an increase in public abatement are also investigated.     

Environmental productivity and Kuznets curve in India

As a result of India's extremely rapid economic growth, the scale and seriousness of environmental problems are no longer in doubt. Whether pollution abatement technologies are utilized more efficiently is crucial in the analysis of environmental management because it influences the cost of alternative production and pollution abatement technologies. In this study, we use state-level industry data of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and suspended particular matter over the period 1991-2003. Employing recently developed productivity measurement technique, we show that overall environmental productivities decrease over time in India. Furthermore, we analyze the determinants of environmental productivities and find environmental Kuznets curve type relationship existences between environmental productivity and income. Panel analysis results show that the scale effect dominates over the technique effect. Therefore, a combined effect of income on environmental productivity is negative.     

Input Intensity: A Missing Link between Production,Trade Patterns,and Environmental Standards

Trade and production implications of a change in environmental policy using the 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin framework are identified. For otherwise identical economies a difference of environmental policy standards generates two effects: the “effective‐endowment effect” where the abatement activity uses up some resources of the economy leaving less for the production of the final goods and the “factor‐price effect” where changes in the abatement requirement affects factor prices that in turn affect production. The direction and relative strengths of these two effects determine whether production and trade patterns are consistent with or opposite to the pollution haven expectation.     

The Clean Development Mechanism’s Low-hanging Fruit Problem: When Might it Arise,and How Might it be Solved?

It is widely recognized that industrialized countries’ commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions will be far less costly to achieve if they can be met at least in part through investment in cheap abatement options available in developing countries, as is permitted under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Developing-country NGOs and others involved in the policy debate on the CDM have frequently raised concerns, however, about the so-called “low-hanging fruit” problem. The standard characterization of this problem is that if developing countries allow their cheap abatement options to be used now, they may find themselves worse off in future when they take on emissions-reduction commitments of their own, because only expensive abatement options will remain. We show that under plausible CDM-market imperfections a low-hanging fruit problem may indeed arise, but that the standard characterization of the problem is incorrect. We also present a potential solution, based on mandating a “virtual” option clause in CDM-investment contracts.     

Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross‐border Pollution and Public–Private Clean‐up*

We construct a two‐country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform; if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined.     

Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands

Different nutrient abatement activities jointly determine water quality. Policies are determined by governments at central and local level, implying that decisions can be affected by strategic considerations. In this article, decentralization of wetland policies is analyzed with regard to the environmental and economic consequences. A two-stage game is used to investigate strategic abatement decisions regarding nitrogen fertilizer reductions, waste water treatment plant phosphorus reductions and wetlands, assuming that wetland decision can be decentralized. It is shown that under particular circumstances, strategic consideration may imply that a central government undertakes more abatement than socially optimal, but in most cases the opposite is likely to occur. Decentralization of wetland decisions is advantageous to the central government but only benefits the local government if its wetland technology is considerably more efficient that the central government’s. This paper explains why local governments often hesitate to take on additional responsibilities for environmental management, and identifies conditions under which local governments make smaller losses or even gain from delegation. The results also contribute to understanding how strategically optimal matching grants are chosen when governments only take into account their own direct costs of abatement and the central government needs to satisfy the local government’s participation constraint.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

(In)Efficient Environmental Policy with Interacting Pollutants

Many environmental problems involve the transformation of multiple harmful substances into one or more damage agents much in the same way as a firm transforms inputs into outputs. Yet environmental management differs from a firm’s production in one important respect: while a firm seeks efficient input allocation to maximize profit, an environmental planner allocates abatement efforts to render the production of damage agents as inefficient as possible. We characterize a solution to the multiple pollutants problem and show that the optimal policy is often a corner solution, in which abatement is focused on a single pollutant. Corner solutions may arise even in well-behaved problems with concave production functions and convex damage and cost functions. Furthermore, even concentrating on a wrong pollutant may yield greater net benefits than setting uniform abatement targets for all harmful substances. Our general theoretical results on the management of flow and stock pollutants are complemented by two numerical examples illustrating the abatement of eutrophying nutrients and greenhouse gases.     

Who invests more in advanced abatement technology? Theory and evidence

We study firm investment in abatement technology under a heterogeneous‐firm framework. We find that more‐productive firms make more (less) investment in abatement technology if investment and productivity are complements (substitutes). Under linear demand, firms’ abatement investments exhibit an inverted U‐shape with respect to productivity level. This finding is in contrast to results in existing studies. We also find that in response to tightened environmental regulations, more‐productive firms raise their respective investments in abatement technology, whereas less‐productive firms do the opposite. More‐productive firms have lower pollution emission intensity. The key theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical tests using Chinese data.     

Japanese Bank Productivity, 2007–2012: A Dynamic Network Approach

We estimate a dynamic network (DN) directional output distance function for 100 Japanese banks operating during 2007–2012. Network production occurs in that deposits and other funds raised are produced as intermediate products in stage 1 and those intermediate products are used to generate a portfolio of assets in stage 2. The dynamic technology links production periods via nonperforming loans (NPL) and carryover assets, which take the form of excess reserves. Carryover assets expand the future production possibility set while NPL shrink future production possibilities. We extend previous DN methods to measure the performance of three types of Japanese commercial banks: city banks, regional banks and second regional banks. We test for and find differences in the three bank technologies relative to a common technology. Such differences are likely due to different institutional and regulatory structures. Unlike previous DN studies, we also allow for a non‐uniform abatement factor between previously‐produced NPL and other inputs in stage 1 and between performing loans and NPL in the current period. Measured productivity change is greater when each bank faces their own group technology rather than the pooled technology consisting of all bank types.     

Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard.     

Effluent taxes,market structure,and the rate and direction of endogenous technological change

This paper studies the effects of effluent taxes on firms’ allocation of resources to cost-reducing and emission-reducing R&D, and on entrepreneurs’ decisions to develop new goods and enter the market. A tax set at an exogenous rate that does not depend on the state of technology reduces growth, the level of consumption of each good, and raises the number of firms. The induced increase in the variety of goods is a benefit not considered in previous analyses. In terms of environmental benefits, the tax induces a positive rate of pollution abatement that offsets the “dirty” side of economic growth. A tax set at an endogenous rate that holds constant the tax burden per unit of output, in contrast, has ambiguous effects on growth, the scale of activity of each firm and the number of firms. Besides being novel, the potential positive growth effect of this type of effluent tax is precisely what makes this instrument effective for welfare-maximizing purposes. The socially optimal policy, in fact, requires the tax burden per unit of output to equal the marginal rate of substitution between the growth rate of consumption and abatement. Moreover, a tax/subsidy on entry is needed, depending on whether the contribution of product variety to pollution dominates consumers’ love of variety.      

Pigouvian tax,abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N-th order risk changes.     

Climate Policy,Uncertainty, and the Role of Technological Innovation

We study how uncertainty about climate change severity affects the relative benefits of early abatement and a portfolio of research and development (R&D) in lowering future abatement costs. Optimal early abatement depends on the curvature of the marginal benefit and marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions and how the uncertain parameter affects marginal benefits. R&D in a particular technology depends on whether uncertainty increases early abatement; whether investment lowers marginal costs for that technology; whether R&D lowers the slope of that technology's MAC function; and the shape of that technology's MAC function. We illustrate, focusing on the role of backstop technologies.     

经济结构、技术进步与环境污染——基于中国工业行业数据的分析

文章将环境污染的影响分解为规模效应、结构效应、纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应、混合技术效应、结构生产技术效应、结构治理技术效应和综合效应,并运用37个工业行业2001-2009年三种主要废气排放数据实证分析了工业经济结构和技术进步对工业废气减排的贡献,得到如下结论:纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应在减排过程中占据了主导地位;工业经济结构的变化对工业废气减排的作用效果不明显,相对2001年甚至还加剧了环境污染;结构生产技术效应和结构治理技术效应都对废气减排起到了促进作用,环境技术进步在一定程度上弥补了工业结构的不合理。