Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie in the group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.     

Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999,Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816; Bolton-Ockenfels, 2000,American Economic Review. 90, 166–193) are investigated using a new three-person ultimatum game: One person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income and a positive consolation prize for the non-responder. The data show essentially no reductions in rejection rates, holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to both models' predictions.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Competition for Power and Altruism

The paper analyzes the trade-off between power and altruism by using an experimental framework which involved a group of experimental agents, undergraduate students of the University of Siena. The results show that the introduction into the experimental structure of a tournament for the power appreciably altered the behaviour of agents. More specifically the degree of altruism, measured by the dictator offers, significantly decreased when the agents were able to trade altruism for power. The results were more clear-cut and robust in the case of the dictator game, but also in the case of the ultimatum game the introduction of the tournament for power altered the behavior of subjects. A significant gender effect emerged.     

Noisy Directional Learning and the Logit Equilibrium

We specify a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions toward higher payoffs, subject to normal error. This process generates a probability distribution of players’ decisions that evolves over time according to the Fokker–Planck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all potential games, a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studied games. In equilibrium, the distributions that determine expected payoffs correspond to the distributions that arise from the logit function applied to those expected payoffs. This “logit equilibrium” forms a stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium and provides a possible explanation of anomalous laboratory data.     

基于生态学的工艺创新竞争博弈模型分析

分析了工艺创新竞争的先动者劣势、共生共荣性两大特点,以工艺创新能力的逻辑斯蒂增长模型为基础,基于生态学的捕食、竞争与竞合建立了相应的工艺创新竞争博弈模型,并分别探讨了博弈模型均衡解的稳定性。     

Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games

Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time.     

地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护

地方政府间竞争促进了区域经济增长问题,但是带来了许多流域环境污染问题。结合我国当前地方政府的竞争行为特征,建立地方政府的环境保护投资博弈模型,探究了地方政府之间的竞争对流域水环境保护投资方面的影响。分析表明,地方政府基于自身利益最大化的行为会使得环保投资不足,带来类似囚徒困境的环境污染问题。因此,要使得流域水污染治理投入不足问题得到有效解决,鼓励地方政府竞争的政策应该被重新认识,通过制定相应的制度安排和政策措施来约束地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取竞争策略,引导地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取合作行为,最大限度地把地方利益有机整合到全流域利益当中去。     

The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games

In this paper we report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as the exchange ultimatum game experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), pp. 346–380, 1994). In these additional experiments, we use instructions to change an impersonal exchange situation to a personal exchange situation. To do this, we prompt sellers to consider what choices their buyers will make. Game theory would predict that thinking about the situation would lead sellers to make smaller offers to buyers. In contrast, we find a significant increase in seller offers to buyers. This result suggests that encouraging sellers to thinking about buyer choices focuses their attention on the strategic interaction with humans who think they way they do in personal exchange situations, and who may punish them for unacceptable behavior, and not on the logic of the game theoretic structure of the problem.     

政府间横向税收竞争的博弈及效应分析

市场化改革、财政分权以及政绩考核等制度,进一步引发了我国政府间税收竞争。横向税收竞争实际上是政府间的一种博弈,是一国范围内不同辖区政府之间为了各自利益最大化而采用税收手段进行的角逐行为及其博弈过程。利用面板数据分析东、中、西部地区税收竞争与经济发展的关系,表明税收竞争对不同地区的经济发展有着不同的效应。所以,规范税收竞争,应从适当赋予地方税权、完善转移支付体系、改革政府绩效考核制度等方面入手。     

兼并和伯特兰德竞争的价格效应分析

本文采用博弈论方法研究兼并和伯特兰德竞争对价格、竞争等的影响.首先,分布在两个市场中的寡头公司分别选择同市场或跨市场的兼并活动,其次,两个市场中的寡头公司进行伯特兰德竞争.结论显示,有关需求函数的各种约束条件是决定价格升高或下降的关键因素,从而揭示了价格效应产生的原理.美国航空业的案例研究支持模型的基本结论.     

Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game

This paper examines the Dirty Faces problem as a Bayesian game. The equilibrium in the general form of the game requires the extreme assumption of common knowledge of rationality. However, for any finite number of players, the exact number of steps of iterated rationality necessary for the equilibrium to arise depends on the number of players of a particular type, allowing the game to be used to bound the number of steps satisfied by actual players. The game differs from other games used to study iterated rationality in that all players are better off when common knowledge of rationality is satisfied. While behavior in experiments is inconsistent with the game-theoretic prediction at the group level, individual level behavior shows a greater degree of consistency with theory and with previous results on iterated rationality. Finally, there is some evidence of learning in repeated play.     

中国环渤海、长三角、珠三角经济圈之间竞合博弈分析

中国环渤海、长三角、珠三角三大经济圈在竞合的一次性博弈中,各方都会为了各自利益单方面采取不合作的策略,其结果是陷入“囚徒困境”的低效。为了打破由于过度竞争而造成的低效状态,必须寻求区域问的合作。在无限期重复动态博弈下,通过贴现因子的引入,得出三大经济圈合作的可能性与贴现因子的大小成正比。为了促成三大圈之问的合作,必须实施某些约束性法律条款,其中通过调节惩罚幅度及贴现因子可以得到区域间合作的均衡解。在长期中,宏观调控政策在区域合作和协调发展方面起着重要作用。     

创建学习型组织中学习力的核心问题研究

通过对《比狼学得快》的故事的阐述,引出学习型组织的基本概念及五项修炼的基本内涵,剖析了现代企业管理中对五项修炼理论的运用,提出了提升企业竞争力的核心是学习力的问题,优势的建立就是要比竞争对手学习得更快。     

企业竞合行为的演化博弈分析--以我国创意产业为例

近年来,创意产业不仅成为学界关注的热点,也成为政府和企业专注与投资的特点。企业之间竞合行为将直接决定其竞争力,进而影响我国创意产业竞争力与发展方向。本文基于文化创意产业集群内企业间的竞合行为,运用演化博弈的理论方法,建立了核心企业之间的横向对称博弈及核心企业与其相邻下游企业之间的纵向非对称博弈的数理模型,分析了其演变的动态过程。研究结果表明,该系统的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,博弈结果受到合作收益、初始合作成本、独立创新能力、合作成功率、以及双方初始状态等因素的影响,最后给出了相关建议,为整合我国文化产业集群提供了理论依据。     

Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers

Focusing on responder behavior, we report panel data findings from both low and high stakes ultimatum bargaining games. Whereas Slonim and Roth (1998) find that offers are rejected fairly equally across rounds in both low and high stakes games, we find that learning does take place, but only when there is sufficient money on the table. The disparate results can be reconciled when one considers the added power that our experimental design provides-detecting subtle temporal differences in responder behavior requires a data generation process that induces a significant number of proportionally low offers.     

Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective

In the two-person ultimatum game, an allocator is required to split a given sum of money with a recipient. Subsequently the recipient can either accept or reject the offer. If it is accepted, both players receive their respective splits, while if it is rejected neither of them get anything. Using evolutionary psychology as the theoretical framework, we predicted and found that males made more generous offers when pitted against a female as opposed to a male. While females made equal offers independently of the sex of the recipient. That male allocators are altruistic towards female recipients and competitive with male recipients is construed as a manifestation of social rules, which evolve from the male pre-disposition to use resources for attracting mates. In contrast, females have not evolved such a pre-disposition, and thus, female allocators are more concerned about fairness when making offers to recipients. Several alternate explanations of the above findings are discussed and the evolutionary explanation is concluded as the most parsimonious one. Other potential moderators that are amenable to evolutionary explanations, namely, physical attractiveness, age and ethnicity of participants, are also discussed in this context. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

期货交易所与监管层多主体博弈分析--以交易品种竞争为视角

期货市场的信息博弈是指监管层、交易所、期货公司和投资者等各参与主体间围绕信息流动各环节产生的信息不对称这一固有现象进行的博弈。信息博弈的关键要素是资源配置。在现有的法律框架下,期货交易所申请新品种上市,需由作为监管层的中国证监会审核和批复。监管层是品种资源的所有者,交易所是品种资源的使用者,监管层的职责就是将有限的品种资源在各交易所间合理分配以实现整个期货行业的收益最大化,而交易所的目标则是争取到足够的品种资源使本交易所的收益最大化,因此,每个交易所与监管层间都不可避免地产生信息博弈。通过构建基于品种竞争的期货交易所与监管层的信息博弈模型,可以进一步解释资源有限条件下一个分配者与多个争取者之间的多主体博弈,具有普遍的分析意义。     

中印在海外石油能源供给中的竞合态势及博弈分析

随着中国和印度经济的崛起，两国对能源特别是石油的需求越来越大。由于两国国内石油储量有限，石油的生产远不能满足国内经济迅速增长的需求，这使得两国近年来在寻找海外石油供给来源时频频“碰撞”，存在争夺能源之势。由于两国特殊的国情，决定了两国必须在这个问题上采取合作的态度以避免“双输”。     

基于钢企纵向一体化程度下的竞争博弈分析

在铁矿石寡头市场供应情况下,钢企的纵向一体化程度又受到产业链上下游企业竞争博弈的影响。文章以博弈论为工具,建立了一个上游矿企寡头供应商和下游纵向一体化钢企的两阶段动态竞争博弈。第一阶段,下游钢企进行Cournot博弈,在无差异生产条件下,钢企一体化程度影响到各自边际成本和产量。第二阶段,在无产量约束或有Bertrand博弈均衡产量为约束条件下,上游寡头矿企之间进行Bertrand寡头博弈,以分析铁矿价格对钢企的一体化程度的影响。最后得出：上游矿企寡头供应商竞争状况决定作为中间产品的铁矿的价格,而铁矿原料的价格又影响到下游钢企一体化程度的趋势变化。从而在今后市场竞争中,为我国钢企获取原料资源以及经营决策提供了参考。