Consumption externalities,production externalities,and long-run macroeconomic efficiency

We analyze the effects of consumption and production externalities on capital accumulation. We show that the importance of consumption externalities depends upon the elasticity of labor supply. If the labor supply is inelastic, consumption externalities cause no long-run distortions. Whether there are distortions along the transitional path depends upon consumer preferences. The effects of production externalities are more pervasive; they exert long-run distortionary effects irrespective of labor supply. The optimal taxation to correct for the distortions created by the externalities is characterized. We analyze both stationary and endogenously growing economies, and while there are many parallels in how externalities impact, there are also important differences.     

The Installed Base Effect: Some Empirical Evidence From The Microcomputer Market

The penetration rate US network technologies is not only determined by the indigenous qualities of these technologies, but also by the adoption behaviour of other actors using the same network technology. This paper provides empirical evidence for the importance of network externalities and suggests that the econonmic consequences of network externalities - as they affect the diffusion speed of network technologies at an aggregate level - may be considerable.When the market offers incompatible network technologies, the relative share of previous adopters of the technologies plays a critical role in determining the diffusion speed of network technologies. This paper provides empirical evidence from the European microcomputer market between 1985 and 1994 which supports this hypothesis. Our analysis suggests that the diffusion speed of microcomputers at an aggregate level has varied with the relative order of magnitude of the network size of the two incompatible operating systems: a higher variation between the number of users of different microcomputers sold is positively relaled to a higher diffusion speed of microcomputers in general.     

网络外部性与补偿激励下的非线性定价

本文构建了一个一般性模型用以说明在非对称信息与网络外部性并存时,垄断厂商如何设计非线性价格合约甄别不同类型的消费者。模型表明两者的并存修正了经典逆向选择模型中"顶部无扭曲"和"单向扭曲"的基本结论。具体的消费量扭曲方式取决于网络是否存在拥挤:对于非拥挤性网络,消费量表现为单向扭曲;对于拥挤性网络,表现为双向扭曲;而对于中性网络则仍为顶部无扭曲。此外,本文还分析了引起双向扭曲的另一种原因,即由类型依赖的保留效用引起的补偿激励问题。     

CONSUMPTION AND LEISURE EXTERNALITIES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY

This paper analyzes the effects of consumption and leisure externalities on growth and welfare in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. Both types of externalities are shown to affect the long‐run equilibrium and optimal growth rates in a rather different way. The relationship between the steady state of the market and the centrally planned economy is also analyzed. The optimal growth path can be decentralized by resorting to consumption or labor income taxation, whereas capital income should be untaxed. Numerical simulations suggest that growth and welfare effects of mild consumption and leisure externalities may be quantitatively important.     

Do Currency Unions Grow Too Large For Their Own Good?

This article puts a rigorous foundation under the proposition that currency areas, as they admit more members, face a rising marginal cost curve which cuts the marginal benefit curve from below. However, at any given time, the median member faces lower marginal cost than the average member, so that, if new members are admitted by majority vote, and existing members are myopic, the currency area will expand beyond its optimum size. Although the currency area imposes negative externalities on countries outside it, we find that the existence of one currency union has no effect on the costs or benefits of forming or enlarging another.     

Stabilization policy and indeterminacy in a small open economy

This paper studies the (de)stabilizing effects of income tax rules in a two-sector small open economy with production externalities. The paper shows that in the model with positive sector-specific externalities in the investment sector and negative sector-specific externalities in the consumption sector (or positive aggregate investment externalities), a regressive income tax rule can stabilize such an economy against indeterminacy, whereas a progressive income tax rule can increase the tendency for indeterminacy to occur. This paper also studies two variants that consider an imperfect world bond market and an endogenous labor supply, respectively, and shows that the qualitative results stated above remain valid. Moreover, increasing the level of sector-specific investment externalities can decrease (increase) the minimal level of tax progressivity required for indeterminacy if the investment externalities are below (above) a certain critical value and if the negative externalities in the consumption sector are taken as given.     

INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE OPTIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION: THE CASE OF COURNOT‐TYPE COMPETITION UNDER NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

We derive the optimal subsidy policy for an interconnection agreement between two symmetric Internet service providers (ISPs) competing á la Cournot in a network service market. The interconnection quality agreed upon is lower than the socially optimal level, as suggested by Crémer et al. (2000 ). In the basic model where both ISPs compete in the domestic market, the optimal investment subsidy rate depends positively on the strength of network externalities. In the extended model where home and foreign ISPs compete in the home market, the optimal subsidy rate for the home government is higher than in the basic model.     

Household Demand, Network Externality Effects and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of households that have purchased the durable good. Next, in a model with a continuum of household types, we extend the analysis to the case where households consume both a durable good and a stream of non-durable goods. We show that in both settings, the presence of network externalities facilitates a sales strategy with intertemporal price discrimination.     

Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium

The existence and optimality of a general equilibrium in a model with a finite number of locations among which the continuum of individuals (each individual belonging to one of a finite number of types) have to choose is investigated. Each community finances its own production of public goods by taxes. The way in which the tax burden in shared among the different types in the different regions is left arbitrary. The model allows for: restrictions on the mobility of either residents and/or workers, congestion and externalities in both production and consumption, commuting costs, preferences of an individual may also depend on his location as well as on the distribution of all individuals across locations.     

Relative consumption, economic growth, and taxation

This paper studies the influence of consumption externalities in the Ramsey model. In contrast to the recent literature, a quite general specification of preferences is used and the concept of the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution is introduced. We give conditions for the observational equivalence between economies with consumption externalities and externality-free economies. An additional key result is that there exist several types of instantaneous utility functions in which the decentralized solution coincides with the socially planned one in spite of the presence of consumption externalities. The conditions for optimal taxation are also derived.     

Taxation of externalities: Direct versus Indirect

First, a model with separable utilities in the externalities is presented to analyze the impact of direct and indirect taxes on the correction of externalities that are caused by the consumption of one good. It is shown that the sign of the indirect tax is based not on the complementarity (or lack thereof) between the two taxed goods, but on the link between complementarity of the two goods for each consumer and the size of the marginal impact on his consumption on the externality. Second, a model of externality aggregate is further developed along the previous lines and alternative definitions of complementarity are considered.     

Two-part tariffs in the online gaming industry: The role of creative destruction and network externalities

Playing computer games online is a fast growing, billion dollar industry which has received little academic attention. The industry exhibits a number of interesting economic features. The industry structure is determined by creative destruction as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) [Aghion, P., Howitt, P. 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction, Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351], with game makers experiencing market power within a genre until the game is superceded. Furthermore, the attractiveness of playing a game online depends on the existence of opponents (positive network externalities) while technical and reputational problems eventually arise (negative network externalities). We model the choice of two-part tariffs by a monopolist under creative destruction and network externalities and derive conditions for the multiple equilibria which currently exist in the industry.     

Consumption externalities with endogenous time preference

This paper shows that in a model with inelastic labor supply, consumption externalities have impacts on stationary consumption and capital. The key element in observing the effects of consumption externalities on stationary consumption and capital is the endogeneity of the time preference rate, which depends on future-oriented resources rather than on private consumption. We conclude that when individuals experience jealousy, they become more impatient, leading to a lower level of capital stock and a higher level of consumption relative to those of the social optimum, while when they experience admiration, these relationships are reversed. We examine an optimal tax policy that replicates the socially optimal path in the centrally planned economy. Finally, using numerical analysis we explore how this economy evolves through time.      

Externalities and optimal taxation

This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second–best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).     

Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study

We study decision-making and the associated coordination problems in an experimental setting with network externalities. Subjects decide simultaneously in every round how much to invest out of a fixed endowment; the gain from an investment increases with total investment, so that an investment is profitable iff total investment exceeds a critical mass. The game has multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria; we find that whether first-round total investment reaches critical mass predicts convergence towards the Pareto optimal full-investment equilibrium. Moreover, first-round investments and equilibrium convergence vary with critical mass and group size in a complex way that is explicable by subtle effects of strategic uncertainty on decision making.     

现代经济环境下的自然垄断产业及其边界

现代网络型经济的发展，使自然垄断（Natural Monopoly）的特性发生着重大变化，网络效应（Network Externalities）越发成为决定自然垄断的重要原因。同时，网络效应还极大地改变着自然垄断产业的边界，使之处在一个动态的变化过程中，政府规制（Government Regulation）改革必须适应这种变化而进行及时的调整。     

On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

This article analyses the role of network externalities in managerial delegation contracts for differentiated products when the marginal product costs (the wage) are set by an industry-wide union. The results show that, in both Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, each owner offers a profit-oriented incentive scheme to his or her managers by penalizing sales maximization, irrespective of the strength of the network externalities. In the presence of weak network externalities and low product differentiation, firms can obtain higher profits in the equilibrium under Cournot-type quantity competition compared with that under Bertrand-type price competition. Furthermore, the wage chosen by the union is higher in the Cournot than in the Bertrand equilibrium. In the Cournot equilibrium, the wage increases with the strength of the network externalities. However, in the Bertrand equilibrium, there exists a threshold level of the degree of product differentiation.     

WELFARE‐MAXIMISING PRICING IN A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities.     

Persistent Inequality

When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However, divisibility (or fineness of occupational structure) has implications for both the multiplicity and Pareto-efficiency of steady states. Indivisibilities generate a continuum of inefficient and efficient steady states with varying per capita income. On the other hand, perfect divisibility typically implies the existence of a unique steady state distribution which is Pareto-efficient.     

A consumer-based model of competitive diffusion: the multiplicative effects of global and local network externalities

Competitive diffusion of two incompatible technologies, such as PC vs. Macintosh, VHS vs. Betamax and so on, is studied under the framework of a spatial game in which consumers are distributed on a two-dimensional square lattice network. The consumers play coordination-like games with their nearest neighbors and imitate the most successful strategy in their neighborhood in terms of aggregated payoffs after each round. The effects of global network externality are realized in the dynamic payoff matrix of the game, and the framework of spatial game provides the model with the effects of local network externality. These two types of externalities are set as multiplicative, that is, as nonlinear. Both simulations and mean-field approximation show that not only total but also partial standardization (robust polymorphic equilibrium) occurs depending upon the parameters and initial configurations, even when there are positive effects of both global and local network externalities. Moreover, effects of innovation factors that alter paths toward a lock-in situation are studied. It is shown that both the timing and the size of the innovation factors matter for a disadvantaged technology in order to overwhelm a market.JEL Classification: C7, D8, O3We are obliged to Professor John Paul Boyd at the University of California, Irvine and our anonymous referees for their constructive comments.