Can excess bring success? CEO compensation and the psychological contract

Strategic human resource management involves creating and maintaining employee skills as well as encouraging employees to perform at their maximum. Both require developing the appropriate psychological contract between the organization and the employee [Human Resource Management Review 8 (1998) 265]. This is no less true for the chief executive officer (CEO), who plays a major role in creating organizational culture. Trust is a critical component in the success of HR activities [Research Management Review 7 (1997) 389], yet the HR literature is relatively silent about how to encourage CEOs to perform trust-generating behaviors. Research on psychological contracts suggests that in order to encourage trust-based behavior, it is necessary to foster a relational psychological contract with employees [Rousseau, D. M., & McLean Parks, J. (1993). The contracts of individuals and organizations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior (pp. 1–43). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press]. However, the generally recommended CEO compensation practice (pay-for-performance) often risks violating the CEO's relational psychological contract. Conversely, the practice of providing golden parachutes (much criticized in the press) helps uphold the CEO's relational psychological contract. Implications are discussed.     

论第三方物流合同违约责任的归责原则

20世纪末,第三方物流迅速发展,由传统第三方物流逐渐向现代整合性第三方物流过渡,相应的,第三方物流合同也逐渐从传统的运输、仓储合同向类型结合型的第三方物流合同转化。这种类型结合型的第三方物流合同系无名合同,其裁判依据包括双方之间订立的第三方物流合同本身(包括补充协议、体系解释、交易习惯)和民事法律规范。从双方之间订立的第三方物流合同角度而言,其违约责任多采用的是严格责任归责原则。从民事法律规范的角度来说,基于个案中能否确认货损发生的区间,第三方物流合同适用不同的违约责任的归责原则,或适用《合同法》总则的严格责任原则,或适用损失确认区间适用法律的违约责任的归责原则。     

企业融资交易的契约安排：一个交易费用经济学的分析框架

交易费用经济学理论将股权契约和债权契约视为对融资交易不同的契约治理结构。债权契约具有古典契约的特征,是一种按规则运作的契约治理结构;股权契约具有弹性治理的特征,是一种关系型契约治理结构。依据交易费用经济学理论关于交易与契约匹配的一般机理,可以得出融资交易的契约安排机理:低资产专用性融资交易选择债权契约,高资产专用性融资交易选择股权契约,中等资产专用性融资交易选择混合性融资契约,这既可达到交易费用的最小化,又可实现交易效率的最大化。究竟哪类契约在现实融资契约安排中占主导地位,这取决于融资交易包含的资产专用性大小。     

论企业并购对员工心理契约的影响及重建对策

并购引起的企业震荡容易引起员工心理契约失衡,产生心理契约违背和破裂,从而引起并购整合的失败。为此,要明确企业的发展目标与员工的角色定位,缓解员工的心理压力;及时加强沟通引导,建立组织中的信任关系;实施有效激励,充分调动员工的积极性、主动性和创造性;树立共同的价值观念,实现并购双方的文化整合。     

会展业中顾客抱怨处理的关系契约方法

本文从会展业的特点出发，指出多数顾客对于会展中出现的一些服务问题责任归属不能确认．因而难以认准投诉对象，影响了满意度。通过主办方与会展中心之间的关系契约，相互委托处理这些抱怨投诉，可以很好解决上述问题。     

Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation

Although extant literature has shown that formal contracts and relational governance play a key role in interorganizational relationships, the nature of their interplay still remains equivocal. To better understand the relationships between contractual and relational governance, we conducted a qualitative review and meta-analysis of the existing literature. Meta-analytic results from 33,051 interorganizational relationships across 149 empirical studies have indicated that contractual governance is positively related to both sides of relational governance—trust and relational norms. Our results have also indicated that contracts, trust, and relational norms jointly improve satisfaction and relationship performance and jointly reduce opportunism. These findings provide strong evidence for the complementarity arguments of the contractual–relational governance relationships and their joint impacts on performance. We also found that the mutual relationships between contractual and relational governance are moderated by the institutional environments, the interorganizational relationship type and length, and the construct measurement of contracts. Overall, this study provides new insights on when contractual and relational governance complement or substitute each other. We discuss the implications of our study for theory and practice and propose a research agenda for future research on governance in interorganizational relationships.     

Balancing psychological contracts: Validation of a typology

In this study, a psychological contract typology based on both content and exchange balance was developed. Content was defined along the transactional-relational dimension. Balance was assessed by comparing employees' perceptions on the number of employees' obligations relative to employer's obligations. Furthermore, the typology was related to type of employment contract (temporary versus permanent) as perhaps the most important antecedent of psychological contracts, and to various psychological consequences (job satisfaction, life satisfaction, organizational commitment, and psychological contract violation). Results were based on Belgian and German data (N = 1267). Latent Class Analyses suggested four psychological contract types which are clearly distinct with regard to content terms and exchange balance: mutual high obligations, employee over-obligation, employee under-obligation and mutual low obligations. Temporary workers were more likely to hold psychological contracts with few employer obligations, such as the mutual low obligations and the employee over-obligation type. Finally, the mutual high obligations type was most beneficial in terms of psychological outcomes. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Complexity of Outsourcing Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation*

abstract In this article, we use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource‐Based View (RBV) of the firm to study outsourcing agreements. We develop an original approach of contract complexity and analyse the links among exchange hazards (i.e. specificity and environmental uncertainty), the contractual aspects of outsourcing (control, incentives, penalties, price and flexibility clauses) and the level of ex post transaction costs. Both contract complexity and ex post transaction costs are operationalized and measured. Our empirical research analyses 82 outsourcing contracts. This article uses three different dimensions (proximity to the core business, switching costs and adaptation costs) to assess the strategic importance of an outsourced activity. Our findings extend TCE's validity for the outsourcing of activities with a strategic value. Finally, this study offers an indirect measurement of ex post transaction costs. In short, to restrict vendor opportunism, contracts must contain incentives and penalties, as well as pricing and monitoring clauses.     

供应链契约协调机制综述

综述了批发价格契约、回购契约、收入共享契约、数量弹性契约和数量折扣契约五种常用契约的国内外研究现状,并在此研究基础上提出了未来的研究展望。最后,将这五种契约从监控成本、风险承担方式、可操作性等六个方面进行了对比。     

供应链中分销企业与生产企业的关系契约分析

通过对供应链中分销企业与生产企业的关系契约分析，得出了契约双方非一体化情况下能够自执行的关系契约是存在的，并且存在向一体化的帕雷托改进，但有时也存在自执行的关系契约使得非一体化情况下的效率能够达到一体化下的效率。     

Contract Law and the Governance of Inter‐Firm Technology Partnerships – An Analysis of Different Modes of Partnering and Their Contractual Implications*

abstract This paper studies some major legal implications of inter‐firm technology partnering through equity joint ventures, non‐equity partnerships, and licensing contracts. These different partnerships are placed within the classical and relational contracting perspectives, while also considering intellectual property rights issues. Samples of contracts of partnerships in bioscience, fine chemicals, biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals are analysed, in detail, with reference to the distribution of property rights, major contractual clauses, and measures for conflict resolution. Equity joint ventures and non‐equity partnerships are found to largely follow a relational contracting perspective, while licensing contracts are governed by a classical contracting perspective.     

Personalauswahl durch Self-Selection-Strategien: Traditionelle Konzepte und Ansätze zu deren Weiterentwicklung

Economic literature deals with self-selection strategies to overcome quality uncertainty in the application process. Self-selection strategies are beased on the informational impact of an applicant’s preference of a contract within a set of different contracts. If applicants of different qualities prefer different contracts, a seperating equilibrium occurs. In reality self-selection strategies are rarely used by companies. This paper analyses two possibilities to develop theoretical approaches so that they may be useful devices in practical staff selection.     

国家建设项目审计决定与承包合同的法律效力及其协调

审计决定、承包合同各自具有公法、私法属性,在各自范围内发生法律效力。协调合同和审计决定法律效力的明智之举是：审减合同确定的价款须征得承建单位的书面认可,证明合同无效。但治本之策则是完善立法,找到合法行使公权力和依法保护私权利的平衡点。     

供应链数量折扣契约与退货契约研究评述

供应链契约是目前供应链管理研究的前沿问题之一,主要目标是解决如何协调供应链中各方的决策和利润分配,其中数量折扣契约和退货契约是目前研究较多、应用较广泛的契约形式.本文综述了数量折扣契约和退货契约的研究现状,指出以下问题是未来重要的研究方向:(1)不确定需求下的数量折扣契约;(2)数量折扣与退货的组合契约;(3)跨国供应链数量折扣契约、退货契约;(4)多级供应链的数量折扣契约、退货契约.     

Inflation forecast contracts

We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers׳ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.     

Automatic‐renewal contracts with heterogeneous consumer inertia

Automatic contract renewals are a common feature in consumer markets. Since these contracts renew automatically unless a consumer actively cancels, firms can use them to exploit consumer inertia. As a source of inertia I study limited attention and investigate how firms use contract renewal to sell to consumers with different degrees of inattention. In monopolistic markets, adverse selection of more‐attentive consumers limits the exploitation of naively inattentive consumers. When signing a contract, naively inattentive consumers overestimate their future probability to make an active cancellation decision. To exploit this mistake, the monopolist wants to target these consumers with large prices after contracts renew. These back‐loaded contracts, however, adversely attract more‐attentive consumers who cancel more often when choosing these exploitative contracts. To mitigate adverse selection, monopolists focus less on exploiting naively inattentive consumers. Adverse selection induces fewer consumer mistakes and can increase efficiency. I show that competition mitigates adverse selection, which induces firms to focus more on exploitation with more back‐loaded pricing. I discuss implications for recently implemented policies on automatic‐renewal contracts.     

The selection of contracts in supply chains: An empirical analysis

This paper seeks to empirically identify the key drivers for firms in selecting a contract in a supply chain by investigating their performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration. A conceptual model is drawn up based on the existing literature in supply chain coordination contracts, performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration and tested on a large sample of European firms. Multiple and multinomial logistic regression models allow for estimating the relationships between these variables. Our results demonstrate that the selection of contracts and the probability of their adoption depend on several combinations of firms' performance, supply chain orientation, and integration. Overall, the research provides an empirical contribution to the literature on coordination with contracts, which turns out to be mainly game theory based.     

Contract employment policy and research productivity of knowledge workers: an analysis of Spanish universities

Abstract

This article investigates how contract employment practices adopted by universities—fixed-term contracts and permanent contracts—impact research productivity measured in terms of publications in scholarly journals. The empirical application considers the Spanish public higher education system for the period 2002–2008. We report an inverse U-shaped relationship between the rate fixed-term contracts and the research productivity of Spanish universities. That is, contract policies based on fixed-term contracts are conducive to research productivity; however, beyond a critical threshold value increases in the proportion of fixed-term contracts are associated with declining research productivity. These findings reveal that contract employment policies shape research productivity, and that flexible and balanced contract practices are critical for enhancing universities’ research productivity. The results suggest that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts might create an unstable working environment that limits the universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. Policy implications and future research avenues are discussed.     

Risk Preferences and Asset Ownership: Integrating Prospect Theory and Transaction Cost Economics

We integrate prospect theory into the discussion of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to illustrate how risk aversion may affect integration decisions. In particular, we argue that risk aversion creates incentives to acquire assets in situations where neither opportunism nor transaction‐specific investments are present, provided the assets in question can change in value unpredictably during their use. Our theory illustrates that risk aversion could connect opportunism, asset specificity, and uncertainty with integration decisions in the presence of incomplete contracts. Our theory complements and extends TCE by showing the role of risk aversion in integration decisions under bounded rationality and contract incompleteness. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is a Long‐term Business Relationship an Implied Contract? Two Views of Relationship Disengagement*

ABSTRACT Current knowledge of business‐to‐business relationship dissolution centres upon definitions of relationship dissolution, models of dissolution, antecedents for dissolution, and dissolution strategies. In this paper an empirical case example of a terminated business relationship in the aftermath stage of the dissolution process is presented. William Baird sued Marks and Spencer for £53.6 m for breach of contract. The relationship between the actors was long‐term, exclusive, and involved substantial investment in specific assets. There was no written contract in place, yet one actor considered that the relationship was equal to an implied contract. The contribution of the paper is to discuss the possibility for legal redress using the transaction cost economics, relational contracting, and industrial networks literatures.