会计师事务所国际化对审计质量的影响

基于中国会计师事务所在美国公众公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）注册视角,系统探究会计师事务所国际化对审计质量的影响。研究发现,中国会计师事务所国际化促使审计质量提升。进一步结合审计师能力、审计师声誉等机制检验结果说明会计师事务所国际化通过学习效应、声誉效应等渠道提高审计质量。研究表明会计师事务所国际化有助于提高审计质量,对于加强信息披露质量与完善资本市场建设具有积极作用,为会计师事务所国际化实践提供理论参考。     

监管诱致性审计师变更与审计意见的相关性研究——来自证券审计市场的经验证据

近年来我国证券审计市场接连爆发了一起起审计失败案例,例如"黎明股份"、"银广夏"、"蓝天股份"等,涉案注册会计师扮演了极其不光彩的角色。证券监管部门针对注册会计师的执业行为出台了一些政策,对于未能通过年检的会计师事务所实施暂停或撤销其证券许可证的处罚,从而引发监管诱致性审计师变更。本文以此研究监管诱致性审计师变更与审计意见的相关性。     

会计师事务所对审计质量的影响

进入21世纪，我国注册会计师行业在取得快速发展与长足进步的同时也暴露出了一系列严重的问题。注册会计师的独立性、审计质量受到理论界、实务界和广大投资者的广泛关注。加强审计质量控制，是审计工作管理的一项重要而紧迫的任务。因此，研究事务所对审计质量的影响是十分必要和有价值的。     

审计风险成因及防控措施分析——以中准会计师事务所审计抚顺特钢公司为例

<正>一、前言注册会计师审计风险的问题一直以来都是审计研究的重点，这既关系到每一名注册会计师个人的工作前途和命运，也关系到行业的发展，并且影响着整体经济的发展质量。随着注册会计师事业的不断发展，因为违反审计准则和未能恪尽职守实施审计业务的注册会计师正日益增加。关于注册会计师审计风险的问题也逐渐增多，审计风险防控措施变得越来越重要。     

我国注册会计师执业环境现状研究及改善

注册会计师在世界经济发展中起着至关重要的作用。我国的经济发展速度越来越快,在这个过程中,注册会计师是我国市场经济中必不可少的一分子。注册会计师行业的自身努力和良好执业环境,是这一行业得以发展和注册会计师有效地发挥作用的前提。目前各种各样的因素,使我国注册会计师的执业环境有很多有待研究和解决的问题,而这些问题不光对注册会计师执业质量产生了很大的影响,对审计质量同样会产生很大的影响。若想提高注会的审计质量,改善其执业环境已迫在眉睫。     

完善注册会计师审计质量的对策

随着我国市场经济体制的确立．我国的注册会计师事业得到了迅速发展。而审计问题是当前注册会计师行业面临的核心问题，因此研究提高注册会计师审计质量显得十分必要，它对保证会计信息质量、维护资本市场和社会经济的健康发展具有重要意义。     

审计收费对审计质量的影响研究

审计收费对审计质量的影响这一问题在金融危机之后再次成为全球研究的话题。注册会计师审计是被审计单位会计信息披露方式的重要保证途径之一,是查处虚假会计信息的经济警察,也是社会经济市场防守的最后一道防线。注册会计师审计质量的高低是由会计师事务所工作是否严谨认真决定的,实行审计工作收取的费用保证了审计工作是否能够顺利进行,是会计师事务所的主要收入来源。并且收费的多少一直是经济市场下各行业进行竞争的主要手段,会计师事务所也不例外。对于审计费用的多少与审计质量高低之间的关系,审计费用能否影响审计质量,审计费用如何影响审计质量,审计质量是否会因为审计费用的减少而下降,这些都是本文即将探讨的问题。     

我国注册会计师审计质量相关问题研究

文章针对注册会计师审计质量问题,首先分析了影响注册会计师审计质量的主要因素,进而分析了造成审计质量问题的成因,并结合这些审计质量问题系统论述了提高注册会计师审计工作水平的可行措施,以期为注册会计师审计工作管理提供参考。     

加入WTO与我国注册会计师的发展

我国加入WTO后,国际会计公司及注册会计师将会进入中国境内开展业务。他们的进入会为我国带来先进的审计技术和经验,对于促进我国审计事业的发展有一定的积极作用,但与此同时也带来了冲击与挑战。我国注册会计师行业如何面对,本文在揭示注册会计师市场现状的基础上,对加入WTO后对其影响及如何发展等问题进行探讨。 一、我国注册会计师市场的现状 1.规模小、竞争力弱。国外注册会计师行业已有上百年的发展史,因此,注册会计师队伍十分庞大。由于国外注册会计师事务所规模大、资金雄厚,抵御风险和竞争力就强。而我国注册会计师审计的历史比西方国家要短得多,据有关资料统计,我国有会计师事务所（包括审计师事务所）6683家（据1998年底统计数字）。其中有注册会计师不足5名的小事务所就占了大多数,年收入超过1000万以上的会计师事务所只有40多家,绝大部分不具备承担大型或特大型企业审计的能力,规模小、竞争力弱,无法与国     

审计师行业专长与审计市场研究综述及启示

审计师行业专长是影响审计质量以及审计收费等审计市场绩效的一个重要因素 ,遗憾的是国内审计师行业专长研究几乎还是一片空白。本文对国外审计师行业专长与审计市场关系的研究文献进行了回顾和总结 ,内容涉及审计师行业专长的衡量、审计师行业专长与审计师行为、审计师行业专长与审计收费、审计师行业专长与审计质量等四个方面。在此基础上 ,本文进一步考察了国内审计师行业专长发展和研究的现状 ,并结合两个审计失败的案例指出发展和研究国内审计师行业专长的重要意义。     

Auditors’ Joint Engagements and Audit Quality: Evidence from Italian Private Companies

This study examines the effect of auditors’ collaboration in joint audit engagements on knowledge transfer, auditor expertise, and audit outcomes. I employ a unique sample of Italian private companies whose financial statements are jointly audited by three individual auditors and use measures from the network literature to capture the intensity of interactions between these auditors. I find a positive association between several audit quality proxies and auditors’ collaboration in multiple joint engagements. My results suggest that auditors develop knowledge and contacts through collaboration which potentially leads to higher audit quality. Overall, my findings suggest that joint engagements facilitate knowledge transfer and increase auditor expertise.     

Do Clients Get What They Pay For? Evidence from Auditor and Engagement Fee Premiums

Despite the intuitive appeal, prior research finds mixed evidence on whether higher audit fees translate to superior audit quality. Under the assumption that product differentiation between auditors is based, in large part, on the level of financial statement assurance, we propose more refined measures of excess audit fees that separate auditor premiums from other fee premiums. Consistent with our conjecture, we identify significant variation in audit pricing across auditors (i.e., auditor premiums) that relates positively to audit quality. Conversely, we find no evidence that higher engagement‐specific fee premiums (i.e., fee model residuals) are positively related to proxies for audit quality. Additional tests indicate that our results do not simply reflect premiums attributable to auditor characteristics evaluated in prior research (e.g., Big 4 membership, office size, and industry expertise). In fact, our findings suggest that the positive association between auditor premiums and audit quality is better captured at the auditor level than it is at the auditor “tier,” office, auditor‐industry, or engagement levels. In sum, our results suggest that auditors charging higher fees, on average, deliver superior levels of financial statement assurance, but engagement‐specific fee premiums do not reflect quality‐enhancing audit effort. These contrasting results provide a possible explanation for the mixed findings in prior research.     

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation*

In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between‐subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non‐audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no‐disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact ‐ that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance.     

Auditor Fees and Fraud Firms

The issue of whether auditor fees affect auditor independence has been extensively debated by regulators, investors, investment professionals, auditors, and researchers. The revised Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements that resulted from the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (2002) limit nonaudit services (NAS) and mandate NAS fee disclosure. The SEC's requirements are based on the argument that auditor independence could be impaired—and hence audit quality may be reduced—when auditors become economically dependent on their clients or audit their own work. Economic bonding leads to reduced independence, which can lead to reduced audit quality. We study a sample of firms sanctioned by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (SEC‐sanctioned fraud firms) and examine whether there is a relationship between auditor fee variables and the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud. We use SEC sanction as a measure of audit quality that has not previously been used in the auditor fee literature and is more precise than some of the other proxies used for flawed financial/auditor reporting. We find, in univariate tests, that fraud firms paid significantly higher (total, audit, and NAS) fees. However, in multivariate tests, when controlling for other fraud determinants and endogeneity among the fraud, NAS, and audit fee variables, we find that while NAS fees and total fees are positively and significantly related to the likelihood of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud, audit fees are not. These findings suggest that higher NAS fees may cause economic bonding, thereby leading to reduced audit quality. Our findings of significantly higher NAS fees and total fees in fraud firms hold after controlling for latent size effects and other rigorous testing. These results contribute to the literature that examines the SEC's concerns regarding NAS and can be used by policy makers for additional consideration.     

The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

Using Cultural Mindsets to Reduce Cross-National Auditor Judgment Differences

In a globalized audit environment, regulators and researchers have expressed concerns about inconsistent audit quality across nations, with a particular emphasis on Chinese audit quality. Prior research suggests Chinese audit quality may be lower than U.S. audit quality due to a weaker institutional environment (e.g., lower litigation and inspection risk) or cultural value differences (e.g., greater deference to authority). In this study, we propose that lower Chinese audit quality could also be due to Chinese auditors' different cognitive processing styles (i.e., cultural mindsets). We find U.S. auditors are more likely to engage in an analytic mindset approach, focusing on a subset of disconfirming information, whereas Chinese auditors are more likely to take a holistic mindset approach, focusing on a balanced set of confirming and disconfirming information. As a result, Chinese auditors make less skeptical judgments compared to U.S. auditors. We then propose an intervention in which we explicitly instruct auditors to consider using both a holistic and an analytic mindset approach when evaluating evidence. We find this intervention minimizes differences between Chinese and U.S. auditors' judgments by shifting Chinese auditors' attention more towards disconfirming evidence, improving their professional skepticism, while not causing U.S. auditors to become less skeptical. Our study contributes to the auditing literature by identifying cultural mindset differences as a causal mechanism underlying lower professional skepticism levels among Chinese auditors compared to U.S. auditors and providing standard setters and firms with a potential solution that can be adapted to improve Chinese auditors' professional skepticism and reduce cross-national auditor judgment differences.     

The Use and Characteristics of Foreign Component Auditors in U.S. Multinational Audits: Insights from Form AP Disclosures*

This paper investigates the common, yet previously opaque, practice of using foreign audit firms (component auditors) to conduct portions of audit work for U.S. public companies. U.S. regulators have expressed concern for the transparency and quality of audits using component auditors. Employing data disclosed in the newly mandated PCAOB Form AP, we find that component auditor use is largely structural, determined by the size and complexity of clients' multinational operations. We do not find that the mere use of component auditors is detrimental to audit outcomes, but rather the amount of work conducted by component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (i.e., higher likelihood of misstatement), higher likelihood of nontimely reporting, and higher audit fees, which collectively suggest that component auditor engagements are associated with adverse outcomes. Furthermore, we find that only the work performed by less competent component auditors and those facing geographic and cultural/language barriers, including significant geographic and cultural distance, weak rule of law, and low English language proficiency, is associated with adverse audit outcomes. Overall, these findings provide initial archival evidence that the use of certain component auditors on U.S. multinational audits is associated with audit coordination issues, which suggests that PCAOB Form AP disclosures provide relevant information.     

PCAOB Inspections and the Differential Audit Quality Effect for Big 4 and Non–Big 4 US Auditors*

In this study, we investigate whether the increase in regulatory scrutiny epitomized by the initial PCAOB inspection impacted audit quality differentially for Big 4 and non–Big 4 auditors to better understand the consequences of PCAOB inspections for different audit firm types. Because of competing views on the effect of PCAOB inspections, the relation between PCAOB inspections and the audit quality differential between Big 4 and other auditors is an empirical issue. Empirically, we take the endogenous choice of auditor as a given and utilize a difference‐in‐differences specification that takes into account the staggered timing of the initial PCAOB inspection for different‐sized auditors in the United States. Our results suggest that the initial PCAOB inspection improved audit quality more for Big 4 auditors than for other annually inspected or triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors. We also examine annually and triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors separately, and find that the pre‐post Big 4/non–Big 4 differential audit quality effect is more pronounced for the triennially inspected non–Big 4 firms. In the larger context of the highly concentrated US audit market, our findings that PCAOB inspections accentuate the Big 4/non–Big 4 audit quality differential are of potential interest to public company audit clients contemplating an auditor change, investors interested in learning about the consequences of PCAOB inspections, regulators concerned about the Big 4 dominance of the US audit market, and academics investigating audit quality differences.     

Board Gender Diversity,Auditor Fees,and Auditor Choice

We examine whether the presence of female directors and female audit committee members affect audit quality in terms of audit effort and auditor choice by using observations from a sample of U.S. firms, spanning the years 2001–2011. We find, after controlling for endogeneity and other board, firm, and industry characteristics, that firms with gender‐diverse boards (audit committees) pay 6 percent (8 percent) higher audit fees and are 6 percent (7 percent) more likely to choose specialist auditors compared to all‐male boards (audit committees). Our findings suggest that boards (audit committees) with female directors (members) are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.     

Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism

In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first‐time going concern opinions (GCOs). Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors' concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse ICOs documented in our baseline tests reflects higher‐quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.