贷款损失准备、盈余管理与商业银行风险管控

本文探讨了贷款损失准备在商业银行风险管控中的作用,以及盈余管理行为对这种作用的有效性的影响。研究发现,贷款损失准备能够有效应对商业银行风险:在当期贷款质量保持不变的前提下,商业银行的贷款损失准备越多,其未来一期的个体风险和外溢风险就越低。而盈余管理行为则削弱了贷款损失准备的风险应对能力:商业银行受盈余管理行为影响而未足额提取的准备越多,其未来一期的个体风险和外溢风险就越高。本文的结论对于会计准则和监管规则的优化都具有一定的借鉴意义。     

贷款损失准备计提的影响因素分析——基于上市商业银行动态面板估计

本文利用动态面板模型的经验估计结果发现,在考虑宏观变量M2的稳健模型下,贷款损失准备金LLP与贷款总量、资产收益率、不良贷款率和货币供应量之间存在显著的正相关关系。中国商业银行提取贷款损失准备金的行为与宏观环境、经济周期以及央行货币政策调整有关,今后在准确界定行业景气、行业风险的基础上,可以考虑按预计损失而非实际损失计提特种准备,可在一定程度上做到逆经济周期和提前防范系统性风险。     

商业银行贷款损失准备计提的会计处理

在不确定性的作用下，商业银行贷款会面临风险.提取贷款损失准备，是商业银行应对风险的常见措施。由于产权制度的不同，我国商业银行在贷款损失准备计提的会计处理上没有遵循国际通行的做法，贷款损失准备金计提明显不足，利润虚增普遍而且严重，累积了较大的流动性风险.     

中国商业银行通过贷款损失准备计提进行盈余平滑吗？

本文研究我国不同类型的商业银行计提贷款损失准备的影响因素及其盈余平滑行为。我们发现当期贷款损失准备的计提与下一期不良贷款的变动存在显著的正相关性,同时,贷款损失准备被用来作为盈余平滑的工具,城市商业银行和非上市银行的平滑盈余现象更为明显。对于非上市的城市商业银行,发行债券或发行总量越多,使用贷款损失准备进行盈余平滑的程度越大,而新会计准则的实施对商业银行使用贷款损失准备进行盈余平滑的行为没有显著影响。     

基于自由裁量贷款损失准备的经理自主权行为分析北大核心CSSCI

本文以中国16家上市商业银行为研究对象,以自由裁量贷款损失准备为经理自主权的代理变量,分析中国商业银行经理人员在计提贷款损失准备方面的自主权行为。实证结果表明存在使用自由裁量贷款损失准备调整资本充足率和盈余管理的行为,银行还使用其来缓解风险和融资压力;银行经理人员主观感知到的经济下行和监管压力对自由裁量贷款损失准备有显著影响,经理人员在感知到经济下行后会减少计提自由裁量贷款损失准备,这在一定程度上缓解了贷款损失准备计提的顺周期性。     

我国商业银行贷款损失准备的效率分析

提取贷款损失准备金是商业银行应对信用风险的措施，无效的贷款损失准备对银行资本与盈利有一定的影响。以往的研究主要集中在银行有意愿操纵贷款损失准备方面，而对其贷款损失准备的决策效率很少涉及。贷款损失准备效率是指银行管理者对银行贷款损失准备决策的有效性，即实际设置的贷款损失准备与其有效边界的偏离程度。本文运用随机前沿模型研究了1998-2004年我国商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率，实证结果发现，我国商业银行贷款损失准备决策效率具有一定的无效性，没有达到效率边界；股份制商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率高于国有商业银行。     

论商业银行贷款损失准备计提的会计处理

商业银行的资产业务，尤其是贷款业务，通常会面临着较多的风险。为了应付可能发生的损失，避免陷入经营困境或出现破产状况，商业银行需要在估计风险和损失的基础上，提取资产损失准备金。对贷款计提损失准备，虽然已经成为一种国际惯例，但是，由于各国的情况千差万别，各国商业银行在贷款损失准备计提的会计处理上也有所不同。     

贷款损失准备对商业银行顺周期性的影响

本文运用非平衡动态面板数据验证了我国商业银行贷款损失准备对于缓解商业银行顺周期性的适用性。我国商业银行的贷款损失准备较弱地随着经济周期变化而变动,但具有明显的收入平滑、财务信号作用;非自愿贷款损失准备、资本监管对贷款的约束不明显。     

我国商业银行贷款损失准备的效率分析

提取贷款损失准备金是商业银行应对信用风险的措施,无效的贷款损失准备对银行资本与盈利有一定的影响。以往的研究主要集中在银行有意愿操纵贷款损失准备方面,而对其贷款损失准备的决策效率很少涉及。贷款损失准备效率是指银行管理者对银行贷款损失准备决策的有效性,即实际设置的贷款损失准备与其有效边界的偏离程度。本文运用随机前沿模型研究了1998～2004年我国商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率,实证结果发现,我国商业银行贷款损失准备决策效率具有一定的无效性,没有达到效率边界;股份制商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率高于国有商业银行。     

股权结构与上市公司应计和真实盈余管理行为

过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管...     

贷款损失准备金与资本充足率监管——来自日本银行业的实证分析

在以资本充足率监管为核心的国际银行业监管框架内,贷款损失准备金是影响资本充足率监管有效性的重要因素。本文运用向量自回归模型实证考察了日本银行业贷款准备金政策对资本的影响,实证结果表明:(1)银行增加贷款准备金计提在短期内会对资本造成负面冲击,而长期内却有利于提高资本水平;(2)短期内贷款准备金对资本的负面冲击向长期内贷款准备金对稳定和提高资本水平均衡调整的速度很慢,意味着贷款准备金政策的缺陷严重削弱了日本银行业资本监管的有效性。本文从日本银行业贷款准备金政策的发展进一步分析了实证结果的原因,并且指出我国实施资本充足率监管在完善贷款准备金政策方面的建议。     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

Bank Managers' Heterogeneous Decisions on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions

This study examines bank managers' three major motivations for discretionary behavior with respect to loan loss provisions: signaling, income smoothing, and capital management. To do so, it utilizes a bank-specific time-series regression approach that captures heterogeneity in the banks' priorities and strategies for alternative motives and compares the results to those from alternative model specifications. The statistical tests and results presented in this study lead to three conclusions. First, significant results for the income smoothing hypothesis are robust to the various model specifications. Second, average signaling coefficients estimated from bank-specific regressions are systematically larger than corresponding coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions and are statistically significant. Finally, bank managers appear to use loan loss provisions to manage their regulatory capital levels by comparing them with the minimum ratios specified by regulators rather than with a time-series bank-specific ratio or pooled time-series cross-sectional mean ratio.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward 'management' of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.     

The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.