Intra‐Industry Information Transfers and the Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift

This study examines the role of intra‐industry information transfers in the analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift. I find that subsequent same‐industry‐peer earnings announcements influence a firm's post‐earnings announcement drift if these subsequent announcements confirm the firm's initial earnings surprise and the firm's industry exhibits ex ante positive (common effect) intra‐industry information transfers. The results suggest that underreaction to industry‐specific information contributes to analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift.     

An Empirical Examination of the Divergence between Managers’ and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts

We study circumstances when analysts’ forecasts diverge from managers’ forecasts after management guidance, and the consequences of this divergence for investors and analysts. Our results show that investors’ return response to earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts is significantly weaker when analyst and management forecasts diverge, and that this attenuating effect is stronger when the management forecast is more credible. When the divergent management forecast is more accurate than the analyst consensus forecast, the subsequent‐quarter analyst consensus forecast is significantly more accurate than that of the current quarter, and exhibits less serial correlation. Overall, our findings suggest that, when analyst and management forecasts diverge, investors find the two sources to contain complementary information, and analysts learn to improve their subsequent forecasts.     

Significance of Forecast Precision: The Importance of Investors’ Expectations

I investigate whether the alignment between individual investors’ expectations about forecast precision and actual forecast precision affects their estimates of firm value, and whether this relationship is mediated by individual investors’ perceptions of management credibility and future firm growth. Experimental results confirm that when expected and actual forecast precision align, individual investors estimate higher firm stock prices than when expected and actual forecast precision do not align. I also provide evidence of a mediation path through which the misalignment between expected and actual forecast precision affects individual investors’ perceptions of management credibility, future firm growth, and estimates of firm stock price. My findings help reconcile inconsistencies in prior earnings forecast literature and inform managers and researchers about strategies that lead to higher perceptions of management credibility and firm value.     

Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change*

Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8‐K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8‐K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement‐related or fee‐related reasons and higher for those that switched for service‐related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns‐earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8‐K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes.     

International Diversification,SFAS 131 and Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift

Using 1990 through 2013 data of U.S. firms with foreign operations, we show that (i) the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, (ii) post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) based on analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, and (iii) the impact of international diversification on the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors and its associated drift is significantly reduced after the implementation of SFAS 131 on segment disclosures. When we replicate our tests using seasonally differenced earnings, we fail to observe similar patterns. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ underreaction to announced earnings is a likely explanation for PEAD. Our findings also indicate that disclosures required under SFAS 131 are useful to analysts in forming efficient earnings expectations, thereby helping capital market participants in the pricing of internationally diversified firms’ earnings.     

Who Herds? Who Doesn't? Estimates of Analysts’ Herding Propensity in Forecasting Earnings

We develop parametric estimates of the imitation‐driven herding propensity of analysts and their earnings forecasts. By invoking rational expectations, we solve an explicit analyst optimization problem and estimate herding propensity using two measures: First, we estimate analysts’ posterior beliefs using actual earnings plus a realization drawn from a mean‐zero normal distribution. Second, we estimate herding propensity without seeding a random error, and allow for nonorthogonal information signals. In doing so, we avoid using the analyst's prior forecast as the proxy for his posterior beliefs, which is a traditional criticism in the literature. We find that more than 60 percent of analysts herd toward the prevailing consensus, and herding propensity is associated with various economic factors. We also validate our herding propensity measure by confirming its predictive power in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in analysts’ out‐of‐sample herding behavior and forecast accuracy. Finally, we find that forecasts adjusted for analysts’ herding propensity are less biased than the raw forecasts. This adjustment formula can help researchers and investors obtain better proxies for analysts’ unbiased earnings forecasts.     

The Effect of Investor Status on Investors' Susceptibility to Earnings Fixation

This study investigates whether an individual's status as a current or a prospective investor affects the investor's susceptibility to earnings fixation and proposes a mechanism to reduce earnings fixation. Our experimental results suggest that current investors are more susceptible to earnings fixation than prospective investors, and that current investors can reduce earnings fixation by explicitly forecasting future earnings as part of their evaluation process. We provide theory‐consistent evidence that current investors' prevention focus makes them elevate the importance of summary earnings in their evaluation of a company. However, after forecasting future earnings, current investors view summary earnings as only one of several similarly important evaluation inputs rather than as one substantially more important input (relative to its components). Our study contributes to research on earnings fixation and investor status. We also contribute to practice by documenting the moderating effect of investor status on earnings fixation and by identifying a simple mechanism that current investors can use to reduce their susceptibility to earnings fixation.     

Asymmetric Learning from Prices and Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift

Motivated by research in psychology and experimental economics, we assume that investors update their beliefs about an asset's value upon observing the price, but only when the price clearly reveals that others obtained private information that differs from their own private information. Specifically, we assume that investors learn from the price of an asset in an asymmetric manner—they learn from the price if they observe good (bad) private information and the price is worse (better) than what is justified based on public information alone. We show that asymmetric learning from an asset's price leads to post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD), and that it generates arbitrage opportunities that are less attractive than alternative explanations of PEAD. In addition, our model predicts that PEAD will be concentrated in earnings surprises that are not dominated by accruals, and it also predicts that earnings response coefficients will decline in the magnitude of the earnings surprises.     

分析师的现金流预测有用吗——基于信息供给的视角

文章考察了证券分析师现金流预测行为对盈余预测质量的影响。研究发现,相对于没有现金流预测的公司,有预测的公司其盈余预测质量更高;现金流预测的次数越多,盈余预测质量越高;以上关系在盈余波动大、经营活动现金流波动大的公司更加明显。这说明我国分析师提供现金流预测信息的确有用,能够帮助分析师改善其盈余预测质量。文章的发现具有重要的实践价值,能够帮助投资者了解分析师现金流预测对盈余预测的影响,从而更有效地利用证券分析师报告进行决策。     

新闻报道是否会影响证券分析师盈利预测分歧——基于信息“噪声”的视角

文章以上市公司的百度新闻报道条数作为新闻报道指标,选择中国A股市场1776家股票作为研究对象,以2004-2012年为样本区间,实证检验上市公司新闻报道对证券分析师盈利预测分歧的作用及其影响机理,结果发现:上市公司的新闻报道与分析师预测分歧之间呈现显著的正相关关系;研究结论支持新闻报道本身含有大量"噪声"成分的解释,而不支持分析师"过度自信"的心理偏差的解释。     

Mitigating the Influence of Analysts Who Issue Aggressive Stock Price Targets: The Role of Joint Versus Separate Evaluation*

Investors frequently rely on individual analysts' stock price targets. Aggressive price targets often reflect analysts' attempts to strategically influence investors. Therefore, investors' welfare may be compromised if they take aggressive price targets at face value. In this study, we examine conditions under which investors are more likely to infer that analysts who issue aggressive price targets are acting strategically. Investors can evaluate multiple analysts' price targets with or without other related information (e.g., earnings estimates). Investors can also evaluate the information provided by multiple analysts jointly or separately one analyst at a time. Two experiments find that as predicted, when investors evaluate multiple analysts' price targets without earnings estimates, there is no difference in investors' perceptions about whether the aggressive analyst is acting strategically across joint versus separate evaluation. However, also as predicted, when investors evaluate multiple analysts' price targets along with their earnings estimates, investors perceive the aggressive analyst as acting more strategically under joint evaluation than under separate evaluation. Our findings suggest that jointly evaluating multiple analysts' price targets with other related information, such as earnings estimates, can reduce the likelihood that investors would be overly influenced by aggressive analysts.     

To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance

In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing “managerial short‐termism” and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance — decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability — is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long‐term investment once managers free themselves from investors’ myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward‐looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.     

基金赎回中的羊群效应

本文在个体投资者层次对基金赎回中的羊群效应进行了系统研究。通过建立Cox比例风险模型,本文发现在面对相同的风险和收益时,投资者看到更多人赎回基金,自己赎回基金的概率会提升,因此羊群效应存在。此外,本文研究了股票型基金投资者与混合型基金投资者在赎回行为中的差异。结果发现股票型基金投资者比混合型基金投资者表现出更强的羊群效应。     

Analysts' Interpretation and Investors' Valuation of Tax Carryforwards*

We examine how financial analysts and equity investors incorporate information on deferred taxes from carryforwards into earnings forecasts and share prices. We focus on carryforwards because, in providing this information each period, management must use their private information about the firm's profitability prospects. Thus, accounting measurement of tax carryforwards is another way of providing a management earnings forecast. In analyzing the role of carryforwards in valuation, we distinguish between two conflicting effects. First, deferred taxes from carryforwards represent future tax savings; hence, they should be valued positively as assets. In contrast, the existence of tax carryforwards may signal a higher likelihood of future losses, which would have a negative effect on expected earnings and share prices. We find that analysts consider earnings of firms with carryforwards to be less persistent because of the increased likelihood of future losses. We also find that analysts tend to be less precise and more optimistic (biased) in forecasting earnings of firms with carryforwards. This higher optimism and lower precision are more pronounced just after firms adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SPAS) 109 and are almost entirely corrected over time. An analysis of investors' valuation indicates a strong positive relation between deferred taxes from carryforwards and share prices, suggesting that these carryforwards are valued as assets. Also, earnings and book values of equity are valued less in firms that have carryforwards than in firms without carryforwards. Finally, the valuation allowance required under SFAS 109 assists equity investors in valuing a firm's earnings and net assets. The combined findings on analysts' interpretation and investors' valuation suggest that analysts fail to fully capture the implication of carryforwards on future earnings within their forecasting horizon.     

Trading Behavior Prior to Public Release of Analyst Reports: Evidence from Korea

This paper investigates information leakage from analyst reports prior to their public release. Previous studies document abnormal trading by institutions or short selling before announcement of recommendation changes. Such prerelease abnormal trading is interpreted as evidence of information leakage from analyst reports. However, if sophisticated investors obtain information similar to what analysts have from other sources, abnormal prerelease trading patterns would be observed even if there were no information leakage from analyst reports. This paper, using a unique data set from Korea, aims to determine whether a direct causal link between recommendation changes and prerelease trading exists, by comparing trading behavior of client investors with non‐client investors. We find that abnormal prerelease trading by client investors, especially client institutions, is earlier in timing and greater in magnitude than that of other investor groups, supporting the information leakage hypothesis. We further find that net buying by client institutions and client large individuals is positively associated with firm, analyst, and earnings forecast change variables that influence formulation of recommendation changes and their impacts.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

The Effects of Financial Statement Information Proximity and Feedback on Cash Flow Forecasts*

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in their joint Financial Statement Presentation project, are reconsidering the basic format of financial statements. The Boards’ preliminary discussions related to this joint project indicate that they intend to modify the required financial statements to increase the proximity of performance‐related information for each reported period. We provide evidence related to this potential change by investigating the effects of financial statement information proximity on investors’ ability to learn the forecast‐relevant time series properties of reported cash flows and accruals. We also examine the role feedback plays in this relationship. Our experimental results suggest that nonprofessional investors are able to more quickly learn the relation between current period cash flows and accruals and future cash flow realizations when financial statement information is presented in a single statement rather than separated into two statements. In addition, we find that nonprofessional investors exhibit lower levels of absolute forecast errors and less forecast dispersion when financial statement information is unified into a single statement. Finally, we provide evidence that nonprofessional investors who receive extensive outcome feedback on a single page initially learn more quickly and later, after learning has leveled off, accurately forecast more consistently than do investors who receive extensive or limited feedback spread across two pages. Overall, our results provide evidence on the effectiveness of alternate financial statement presentation formats and the potential usefulness of receiving more extensive feedback.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements*

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.     

Investors' Misweighting of Firm-Level Information and the Market's Expectations of Earnings

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors analogous to those in analysts' biased forecasts. Therefore, these forecasts are not representative of investors' beliefs. The systematic measurement errors from using fundamental forecasts to proxy for market expectations occur because investors misweight the information in many firm-level variables when estimating future earnings, but fundamental forecasts are formed using the historically efficient weights on firm-level variables. Thus, we develop an alternative ex ante proxy for the market's expectations of future earnings (“the implied market forecast”) using the historical (and inefficient) weights, as reflected in stock returns, that the market places on firm-level variables. A trading strategy based on the implied market forecast error, which is measured as the difference between the implied market forecast and the fundamental forecast, generates excess returns of approximately 9 percent per year. These returns cannot be explained by investors' reliance on analysts' biased forecasts. Overall, our results reveal that market expectations differ from both fundamental forecasts and analysts' forecasts.