Labor Unions and Management’s Incentive to Signal a Negative Outlook*

Evidence suggests that the negotiated wage for a unionized employee group is an increasing function of the firm’s prior profitability. As a result, managers may have an incentive to strategically signal a negative outlook to their unionized workers in order to improve the firm’s bargaining position. I assess the strategy of missing mean consensus analysts’ earnings estimates as a way for managers to signal a negative outlook to their unionized employees. I find that unionized firms are more likely to miss estimates than their nonunionized counterparts. Additionally, this propensity to miss estimates is increasing in both the firm’s percentage of unionized employees and multiunionism, but is unaffected by the timing of the signal relative to contract renewal. Finally, the increased propensity to miss estimates appears to be driven by both differences in expectations management and earnings management across the two groups. Specifically, managers of unionized firms take less action than their nonunionized counterparts to guide forecasts downward when estimates are too high, and they take more action to deflate earnings when expectations are too low. Taken together, the findings suggest that managers do seek to project a negative outlook to their unions, and that this tendency is increasing in the union’s negotiation strength.     

The Role of Narcissistic Hypocrisy in the Development of Accounting Estimates

In an experiment including experienced managers, we investigate how supervisor and subordinate narcissism influence a supervisor's review of a subordinate's accounting estimate. While narcissistic supervisors express greater liking for narcissistic subordinates (narcissistic tolerance), they nonetheless reject and revise the accounting estimates of narcissistic subordinates to a greater extent than they reject estimates of non-narcissistic subordinates (narcissistic hypocrisy), even when doing so inhibits the supervisor's ability to reach a profit target. Our findings contribute to extant research in accounting and psychology. We demonstrate that narcissistic hypocrisy extends beyond the evaluation of others and alters narcissists' willingness to rely on other narcissists in a meaningful financial reporting decision. We also find that narcissistic hypocrisy is robust across age, gender, and supervisory experience.     

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.     

The impact of the rise and collapse of Japan's housing price bubble on households’ lifetime utility

This study estimates the impact of the dramatic changes in housing prices during Japan's bubble from the late 1980s to the 1990s on households’ asset accumulation and utility over their life cycle. We construct a life-cycle model explaining households’ consumption/saving and housing decisions under collateral and borrowing constraints. We estimate this model using data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), which includes data on households’ housing wealth estimated from objective information. Using the estimated model, we then conduct a counterfactual simulation in which we assume that housing prices remained constant during the bubble period. Doing so allows us to quantify the gains/losses of lifetime utility due to the housing price boom and bust. We find that 72.2% of the households experienced an average decrease in lifetime utility equivalent to 5.7% of lifetime income. On average, Japan's housing price boom and bust caused a loss in lifetime utility equivalent to 4.7% of lifetime income. Moreover, we compare the impact of the housing price bubble across cohorts and find that the impact was greatest for those who experienced the bubble at ages 35–45.     

The Effects of Norms on Investor Reactions to Derivative Use

Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.     

碳交易背景下考虑公平关切的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策

考虑到碳交易政策和公平偏好会影响双渠道闭环供应链定价决策，分别构建碳交易背景下公平中性、零售商公平关切信息对称与不对称时双渠道闭环供应链进行最优决策的Stackelberg动态博弈模型。通过求解各个均衡解，研究各个均衡解与制造商和零售商公平关切的关系。通过数值算例分析，着重考虑零售商公平关切信息对称与不对称时制造商和零售商公平关切对双闭环供应链最优定价决策的影响，并进行对比分析。研究结果表明：无论零售商公平关切信息对称还是不对称，新产品的销售价格与制造商和零售商公平关切都成正比，再制品的销售价格不受公平关切的影响；新产品的市场需求与制造商和零售商公平关切都成反比，再制品的市场需求与制造商和零售商的公平关切都成正比；公平关切会降低企业利润，公平关切信息不对称会加剧这一现象。     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

Accounting-based divisional performance measurement: Incentives for profit maximization*

Abstract. This paper discusses the decentralization of production and cost decisions in a multidivisional firm via divisional performance measurement systems based on accounting information. The model firm has a single producing division that supplies goods to several consuming divisions for further processing and sale on external markets. Production is assumed to be characterized, in the long run, by constant returns to scale, and, in the short run, by constant unit variable cost up to a fixed capacity, which imposes a short-run fixed cost. It is also assumed that the final products sold on external markets face downward sloping demand. The firm's accounting information system transmits a comprehensive record of quantities, revenues, and costs resulting from realized transactions, including the classification of costs between fixed and variable, but transmits no information concerning unrealized production, cost, and revenue possibilities. The paper shows that such information is not sufficient to motivate short-run profit maximization, which requires the optimal allocation of scarce producing division capacity among the competing demands of the consuming division. However, in the long run, a more positive result is obtained. A class of transfer price mechanisms, termed profit-sharing systems, leads net-income maximizing division managers to optimal production decisions and cost-efficient technology choices in the long run. Moreover, it is shown that the profit-sharing transfer price is equal to the “arm's-length” negotiated price determined by the Nash bargaining solution. Résumé. L'auteur traite de la décentralisation des décisions relatives à la fabrication et aux coûts dans une entreprise à divisions multiples, par l'intermédiaire de systèmes de mesure du rendement divisionnaire fondés sur l'information comptable. L'entreprise type possède une seule division de fabrication qui approvisionne plusieurs divisions consommatrices en produits intermédiaires qui sont retraités par elles et vendus sur les marchés extérieurs. L'auteur suppose que la fabrication se caractérise à long terme par des rendements d'échelle constants, et à court terme par des coûts variables unitaires constants au regard d'une capacité établie qui suppose un coût fixe à court terme. Il pose également l'hypothèse que la demande pour les produits finis vendus sur les marchés extérieurs connaît un déclin. Le système d'information comptable de l'entreprise comporte un registre complet des renseignements concernant les quantités fabriquées, les produits d'exploitation et les coûts relatifs aux opérations ainsi conclues, avec classification des coûts fixes et varibles, mais ne livre aucune information relative aux possibilités de fabrication, de coûts et de produits d'exploitation auxquelles l'entreprise a renoncé. L'auteur montre que cette information ne suffit pas à motiver la maximisation des bénéfices à court terme, qui exige l'affectation optimale des capacités de fabrication limitées de la division de fabrication entre les divisions consommatrices dont les demandes sont en concurrence. À long terme, l'on obtient cependant un résultat plus positif. En effet, un ensemble de mécanismes touchant l'établissement des prix de cession, qu l'on appelle les systèmes d'intéressement, amène les gestionnaires qui cherchent à maximiser le bénéfice net de leur division à des décisions optimales de fabrication et à des choix économiques rationnels en matière de technologie. On constate en outre que le prix de cession en système d'intéressement est équivalent au prix négocié « sans lien de dépendance » déterminé selon la solution de négociation de Nash.     

Evidence of Choice Avoidance in Capital‐Investment Judgements*

Evaluating capital‐investment decisions is an important function of managerial accountants. There is anecdotal evidence, however, that managers avoid making decisions or delay decisions, which is costly in terms of time, effort, and lost opportunities. Prior research has shown that choice avoidance among nonprofessionals making personal decisions is associated with having to choose between alternatives with very different features or that require trade‐offs of very important goals (choice difficulty). It is unclear, however, whether experienced managers, using the analytical decision tools at their disposal, respond in the same way as nonprofessionals when making accounting decisions. Hence, this study examines whether increased choice difficulty increases negative affect in the capital‐investment decision‐making process and, as a result, the tendency of managers to avoid choice even when analytical decision tools are used. In an experiment with 120 executives, participants facing more difficult decisions reported they felt more worried, nervous, uneasy, and anxious and had a greater desire to postpone making the decision than participants in a control group. Participants provided with a decision aid designed to help them focus their cognitive effort reported a lower desire to postpone making the decision than participants in the choice‐difficulty conditions without the decision aid. I conclude by discussing the result's implications for managers and accountants.     

Earnings Management: Do Firms Play “Follow the Leader”?

In this study we examine whether the reported performance of one firm affects the discretionary reporting behavior of another firm. We do this by identifying the leader within each industry, defined as the first large announcing firm. We find that the discretionary performance of followers (those firms announcing after the leader) relates positively to the leader's reported performance. Specifically, when the leader misses analysts’ expectations, followers report lower discretionary accruals, have fewer income‐decreasing special items, and are less likely to meet analysts’ expectations. In contrast, when leaders report good news, followers report higher discretionary accruals and are more likely to meet expectations (although we do not find evidence of a positive association between leaders’ good news and followers’ income‐decreasing special items). Overall, the results are consistent with managers of followers perceiving that earnings news of the leader will affect investors’ and others’ performance expectations for their firms.     

The ‘price revolution’ of the sixteenth century: Some Swedish evidence

Abstract

Since the publication in 1895 of George Wiebe's work, Zur Geschichte der Preisreuolution des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts, ¹ the ‘price revolution’ has been a generally accepted concept found in most historical textbooks. By the ‘price revolution’, Wiebe meant the general rise in commodity prices which occurred in western Europe during the 16th century, the primary cause of which according to him was the influx of silver from the new Spanish possessions in America. His explanation also came to be generally accepted, but perhaps an even more significant contribution to the influence which this book has wielded is the fact that he synthesized in readily usable form the price analyses in existence when he wrote, i.e. at the end of the 19th century. In the 1930s his tables still formed the basis of sweeping conclusions and generalizations.     

Voluntary Disclosures When There Is an Option to Delay Disclosure

What incentives drive managers to disclose immediately when they have an option to delay disclosures? I examine this question in a two-period setting in which public news that is positively correlated with firm value arrives periodically. I show that, when the manager's likelihood of receiving information is independent of the public news, an informed manager is more likely to disclose immediately when the public news is good. This happens even as the disclosure threshold itself increases in the public news. My model provides a potential explanation for why managers have a higher propensity to provide earnings forecasts when current earnings are high. I also show that, even when disclosures are credible, the average price reaction to a voluntary disclosure is (i) decreasing in the magnitude of the public news and (ii) lower when the manager is more myopic. These results have potential implications for studies that use stock returns to measure the news contained in management disclosures.     

Separating shocks from cyclicality in Indian aggregate supply

Simultaneity issues as well as incorrect measurement of shocks and of the cyclical variable bias estimated slopes of the Indian aggregate supply curve (AS). Our initial Generalised Method of Moments estimation, based on a filtered output gap variable and including supply shocks, also gives an unrealistic downward sloping AS. But we find measures of asymmetries in price changes outperform traditional measures of supply shocks. Estimation using marginal costs as a proxy for the output gap gives a positive coefficient that reduces in size on including our comprehensive supply shock variable, implying the correct AS has a small positive slope, but is subject to multiple shifts. The semi-structural specification, closer to firms’ actual decisions, gives estimates of structural parameters such as degree of price stickiness and extent of forward-looking price adjustment. The results more correctly separate shocks from cyclicality, help to interpret India's growth and inflation experience, and have implications for policy.     

Earnings Management under Price Regulation*

Price controls¹ have a major impact on firms' earnings and cash flows. Because price control regulation is costly to firms, it is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm's accounting decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, regulatory changes that give firms relief from price controls provide incentives for earnings management. This paper examines discretionary accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations issued in 1971 and 1972. These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. Using a modified accruals mode! that adjusts for price-level movements, the paper tests discretionary accruals of two samples of manufacturing firms and one control sample of nonmanufacturing firms. The results provide evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. The control firms do not exhibit significant discretionary accruals in 1971 or 1972. Also, this paper provides evidence that failing to adjust for price-level movements in high inflationary periods could result in inferences of income decreasing discretionary accruals where none may exist.     

Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence

Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.     

Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.     

Farm household economics: Some policy implications for emergent farmers in Southern Africa

Farm household economics recognises the fact that production and consumption decisions are made jointly by small farm (ie surplus‐producing) households. This phenomenon is of particular importance in areas where small farm households predominate.

Most empirical applications of farm household economics have been directed at measuring the effects of price changes on consumption and have relied on the ‘separable’ approach in deriving estimates. This approach assumes that production decisions always precede consumption decisions with farm households treated as profit maximizers in production and utility maximizers in consumption. Results have clearly demonstrated consumption responses smaller than estimates based on consumer theory alone.

Although many researchers regard mathematical programming as a potentially suitable tool for simulating smallholder behaviour, proponents of new household economics would be reluctant to accept any model that does not (a) maximize utility (rather than profit) and (b) capture the ‘profit effect’ which variations in product prices have on the farm household's full‐income constraint. Attempts to include these basic postulates of farm household economics in programming models are in progress.     

Climate change impacts on China's agriculture: The responses from market and trade

China's food security has been facing several challenges, which are likely to be worsened due to climate change. The purpose of this paper is to provide an evidence on the impacts of climate change on China's agriculture, with particular attention to the market and trade responses. Using projected crop yield changes for China and its' main trading partners under changing climate, we employ an agricultural partial equilibrium model (CAPSiM) and a linked national and global equilibrium model (CAPSiM-GTAP) to assess the impacts on food production, price, trade and self-sufficiency of China. Our results show that climate change will have significant effects on crop production though with large differences among crops. Under the worst climate change scenario RCP 8.5, wheat yield in China is projected to decline by 9.4% by 2050, which is the biggest yield reduction among the crops. However, the market can also respond to the climate change, as farmers can change inputs in response to reduced yields and rising prices. As a result, production losses for most crops are dampened. For example, wheat production loss under RCP8.5 reduces to only 4.3% due to market response. The adverse impacts on crop production will be further reduced after accounting for the trade response as farmers adjust production to much higher prices in the more severely affected countries. The paper concludes that we need to learn more from farmers who optimize their production decisions in response to the market and trade signals during climate change. A major policy implication is that policymakers need to mainstream the market and trade responses into national plans for climate adaptation.     

A method for estimating the volume of Baltic timber products exported through the Sound and its application to Portugal, 1669–1815

Abstract

In this article, the conventional wisdom on German trade policies during the interwar and the wartime years are examined from the Swedish experience. The conventional view, represented by, for instance, Hirschman, Child and Ellis, is that Germany adopted exploitative trade policies during the 1930s. By forcing bilateral agreements onto its smaller trading partners, the bargaining power was biased towards Germany's advantage – that is, Germany gained the market position of a monopolist-monopsonist. According to the conventional view, this was reflected in the cash flows, export and import prices and the commodity structure of the trade. In this article, German trade policies are analyzed with respect to the design and practice of the Swedish-German bilateral exchange clearing agreement; the commodity structure of the trade; and the price trends in Swedish-German bilateral trade. In the analyses, no evidence was found that would suffice to confirm the conventional view on German trade policies. Instead, it seems more likely that the Germans aimed for long-term cooperation, as has been claimed by, for instance, Milward, Neal and Ritschl. This does not mean that German trade policies were not exploitative, but since bilateral arrangement leveled the asymmetric power relations, Germany could not make use of its relatively stronger position.     

An Application of the Boostrap Method to the Simultaneous Equations Model of the Demand and Supply of Audit Services*

This paper extends the application of the bootstrap method in accounting research to a simultaneous equations model of the demand and supply of audit services with mixed qualitative and continuous dependent variables. A moderately sized sample of 118 quality control reviews (Copley, Doucet, and Gaver 1994) is used to demonstrate the bootstrap method and compare results to estimates of standard errors obtained from Amemiya's 1978 asymptotic generalized least squares (GLS) procedure. We find that the GLS t-statistics are inflated by as much as 55 percent and the corresponding p-values are likewise overstated when compared to the bootstrap results. The problem is more acute with the qualitative dependent variable for audit quality, which is often the key variable of interest.