Do Client Bankruptcies Preceded by Clean Audit Opinions Damage Auditor Reputation?*

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.     

Growing Pains: Audit Quality and Office Growth

This study provides evidence on how local office growth affects audit quality. We predict that significant recent growth will temporarily stress office resources, leading to a negative relation between office‐level growth and audit quality. To test this prediction, we examine a sample of 17,062 firm‐year observations from 2005 to 2010. Results indicate a consistent negative relation between changes in volume of audit work and audit quality. Specifically, clients of offices that experience increases in workload over the prior year have greater absolute discretionary accruals as well as an increased likelihood of restatement. Our tests also indicate that the effect of office growth is transient and vanishes after one year. We find limited evidence that the size of the auditor's national network of offices partially mitigates the negative effects of office growth on audit quality. We further show that proxies for audit quality are negatively related to office‐level growth from new and existing clients. These findings are robust to controls for client and auditor characteristics as well as alternative specifications of growth. Taken together, evidence indicates that while larger offices provide higher audit quality, the benefits of office size are not realized immediately and rapid growth temporarily impairs audit quality. These results are informative to regulators concerned with audit quality and to practitioners charged with adjusting to office growth.     

Office Size of Big 4 Auditors and Client Restatements

Francis and Yu (2009) and Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang (2010) report evidence that Big 4 audits are of higher quality when the engagement office is of larger size. Specifically, client earnings quality is higher and auditors in larger offices are more likely to issue going‐concern audit reports. We extend this line of research to test if larger Big 4 offices have fewer client restatements. A client restatement provides more direct evidence of a low‐quality audit than earnings quality metrics or going‐concern reports, because a restatement indicates the client's auditor did not effectively enforce the correct application of GAAP at the time the original financial statements were issued. We analyze 2,557 firm‐year restatements in a sample of 23,190 financial statements originally issued by U.S. firms from 2003 to 2008. We find that Big 4 office size is associated with fewer client restatements after controlling for innate client characteristics that may affect restatements (client size, financial performance, industry membership, nonfinancial measures, off‐balance sheet activities, and market‐related measures), and a set of controls for other auditor factors such as fees and industry expertise. The study raises important questions about the ability of smaller offices to deliver high‐quality audits for SEC registrants.     

Did Houston Clients of Arthur Andersen Recognize Publicly Available Bad News in a Timely Fashion?*

Despite the allegations of audit failure and the enormous publicity surrounding Arthur Andersen's indictment, there is no systematic empirical evidence on characteristics of accounting information of clients of Arthur Andersen vis‐à‐vis other Big 6 auditors. I examine whether earnings of Andersen's Houston‐based clients are timely in reporting bad news about future cash flows. I find that relative to a control group consisting of Houston‐based clients audited by other Big 6 auditors, earnings of Andersen clients are less timely in reporting bad news. Further, it appears that operating accruals of Andersen clients are less effective in accelerating the timely recognition of bad news than operating accruals of non‐Andersen clients. The findings suggest that the clients of Andersen's Houston office engaged in aggressive accounting practices, including delayed recognition of publicly available bad news.     

The Riskiness of Large Audit Firm Client Portfolios and Changes in Audit Liability Regimes: Evidence from the U.S. Audit Market*

We investigate whether the financial riskiness of large U.S. audit firm clienteles varied with the changing audit litigation liability environment during the period 1975‐99. Partitioning the period of study into four distinct periods (a benchmark period (1975‐84), a period of increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985‐89), a period of lobbying for reform (1990‐94), and a post‐relief period (1995‐99)), we find some evidence of risk decreases during 1985‐89, strong evidence of risk decreases during 1990‐94, and strong evidence of risk increases during 1995‐99. However, we also find that over the period of our study, a time during which Big 6 market shares grew appreciably, the proportion of litigious‐industry clients in Big 6 client portfolios grew at about the same rate as the proportion of such clients in the population. Moreover, the Big 6 share of the financially riskiest clients in the economy did not grow as fast as the overall Big 6 market share. In sum, although our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the riskiness of Big 6 client portfolios responded to changes in the audit litigation liability environment, we find no systematic evidence of a "race to the bottom" or "bottom fishing" by these firms in a bid to increase their market shares.     

Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.     

An Examination of Factors Affecting Audit Practice Development*

In this study, we examine the possibility that audit managers' judgments may be affected by practice development objectives. Given the competitive nature of public accounting, the extent to which auditors are inclined to be aggressive in the domain of practice development may be a function of their superiors' preferences. This study builds on the exploratory work of Hooks, Cheramy, and Sinich 1994 and Asare, Hackenbrack, and Knechel 1994 by examining the delicate balance that exists between a public accounting firm's need to “grow its business” and its need to maintain its objectivity and professionalism. An experiment is conducted to determine whether the auditor's willingness to tender a bid on an engagement is affected by (1) the nature of the auditor-auditee relationship (i.e., do existing clients receive the same treatment as potential clients?), or (2) the audit partner's aggressiveness with respect to practice development, which also includes elements of ethics and competence. Seventy-four audit managers from two Big-Six firms participated in the study. The results indicate that the type of client (current or potential) and the type of partner (more or less aggressive with respect to practice development) significantly affected the auditors' judgments. Specifically, subjects in the “current client” condition, as well as those who are accountable to a more aggressive partner, are more likely to recommend bidding for the client. The experimental results of this study are based on a case where the client was proposing a relatively aggressive position with respect to accounting for research and development (R&D) costs. Our findings also suggest that the judgements related to bidding on the client are not independent of the auditor's willingness to accept the client's accounting treatment. These results also provide further evidence that the influence of accountability is important in the professional audit environment.     

Evidence of Industry Scale Effects on Audit Hours,Billing Rates,and Pricing

Using a proprietary data set consisting of all private firm audit engagements in 2000 from one Big 4 firm in Belgium, we investigate (i) whether audit office industry scale is associated with a reduction of total, partner, and staff audit hours and thus with efficiency gains triggered by organizational learning from servicing more clients in an industry and (ii) whether the extent of efficiency pass‐on from the auditor to its clients depends on the audit firm's market power. We find that auditor office industry scale is associated with efficiency gains and a reduction of the variable costs (i.e., fewer total audit hours, partner hours, and staff hours), ceteris paribus. Our results also suggest that, on average, realized efficiencies are entirely passed on, as evidenced by a nonsignificant effect of auditor industry scale on the auditor's billing rate. Furthermore, we find that the extent of the efficiency pass‐on decreases with the market power of the audit firm in the industry market segment as we document a higher billing rate for auditors with high market power (versus low market power). In addition, we find that the lower audit hours associated with auditor industry scale do not compromise audit quality.     

Does the Identity of Engagement Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions

This study examines the persistence and economic consequences of variations in reporting style across audit partners in individual engagements. Our results show that both aggressive and conservative audit reporting, measured by the pattern of prior Type 2 and Type 1 audit reporting error rates in auditor‐specific clienteles, persist over time and extend to other clients of the same partner. Analyses of abnormal accruals and persistence of client firms’ accrual estimates corroborate this finding, and hold both for private and publicly listed companies. Further, our results also show that the market penalizes client firms susceptible to aggressive audit partner reporting decisions. In particular, we find that our proxies for aggressive audit reporting are related to higher interest rates, worse credit ratings and less favorable forecasts of insolvency for private client companies, and a lower Tobin's Q for publicly listed client companies. Collectively, these results imply that audit partner aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across engagements.     

Accounting Comparability,Audit Effort,and Audit Outcomes

Accounting comparability among peer firms in the same industry reflects the similarity and the relatedness of firms’ operating environments and financial reporting. From the perspectives of “inherent audit risk” and “external information efficiency,” comparability is helpful for auditors in assessing client audit risk and lowers the costs of information acquisition, processing, and testing. I posit that the availability of information about comparable clients helps improve audit efficiency and accuracy. Empirical results show that comparability is negatively related to audit effort (surrogated by audit fees and audit delay). Moreover, comparability is negatively associated with the likelihood of audit opinion errors. These findings are robust to different specifications of regression models, particularly for the “endogeneity” issues due to the possible reverse causality that auditor style might influence client firms’ comparability. In sum, the study shows that accounting comparability enhances the utility of accounting information for external audits.     

Auditors' Fee Premiums and Low‐Quality Internal Controls*

We examine the relation between low‐quality internal controls and audit fee premiums. Using a novel data set of audit hours and audit fees we find, consistent with the audit risk model, that auditors increase their effort (hours) owing to low internal control quality. We find that auditors also charge a significant fee premium to clients with internal control weaknesses. This premium is observed for severe internal control weaknesses and companies with low‐quality alternative governance mechanisms. The results are robust to multiple methods to address endogeneity, including company fixed effects, difference‐in‐differences design, and a propensity score‐matched sample. Taken as a whole, low internal control quality leads to fee premiums, which are a deadweight loss to client companies.     

Auditor Experience and the Timeliness of Litigation Loss Contingency Disclosures*

This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms audited by city‐industry specialists have more timely disclosures of contingent losses from litigation when there is no news coverage relating to the legal case prior to management disclosures. A closer examination reveals that this result is explained by the specialist auditors’ prior experience auditing clients in the same office and industry who are involved with litigation. In our setting, disclosures of litigation‐related contingent losses, we identify two kinds of knowledge generated from experience: industry knowledge and litigation knowledge. Industry knowledge helps auditors detect and correct poor implementation of guidance for litigation loss contingency disclosures. Auditors gain litigation knowledge from auditing clients in a given office and industry with previous involvement as defendants. Thus, the two types of knowledge interact in their effects on reporting outcomes.     

Who Cares about Auditor Reputation?*

I provide evidence on the demand for auditor reputation by examining the defections of Arthur Andersen LLP's clients following the accounting scandals and criminal conviction marring the auditor's reputation in 2002. About 95 percent of clients in my sample did not switch auditors until after Andersen was indicted for criminal misconduct regarding its failed audit of Enron Corp. I test whether the timing of client defections and the choice of a new auditor are consistent with managers' incentives to mitigate potentially costly information and agency problems. I find that clients defected sooner, mostly to another Big 5 auditor, if they were more visible in the capital markets; such clients attracted more analysts and press coverage, had larger institutional ownership and share turnover, and raised more cash in recent security issues. However, my proxies for agency conflicts — managerial ownership and financial leverage — are not associated with the timing of defections or the choice of new auditor. Overall, my study suggests that firms more visible in the capital markets tend to be more concerned about engaging highly reputable auditors, consistent with such firms trying to build and preserve their own reputations for credible financial reporting.     

The Consequences of Audit‐Related Earnings Revisions

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer (CFO) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFOs face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.     

审计师行业专长、客户重要性与审计质量

本文以中国上市公司2006--2009年数据为样本,检验了审计师行业专长、客户重要性对审计质量的影响以及审计师行业专长对审计质量的影响是否受制于客户重要性。研究结果发现,总体而言,审计师行业专长能够抑制客户的盈余管理行为,提高审计质量,审计师对客户的经济依赖性并不会影响到独立审计判断。但行业专长审计师只针对大客户提供高质量审计服务,而对小客户这种效应则并未体现,这是具有行业专长审计师基于中国审计市场环境作出的最优选择。进一步研究发现,上述研究结论仅存在于“十大”样本组中。     

Future Nonaudit Service Fees and Audit Quality

Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, audit partners experienced economic pressure to grow revenue from the sale of nonaudit services to their audit clients. To an auditor who is highly rewarded for revenue generation and growth, nonaudit services may represent a particularly strengthened economic bond with the client. Prior research shows that, in general, nonaudit service fees received in the current period do not impair audit quality. We examine a different setting. We propose that auditor independence can become impaired, and audit quality compromised, when clients that currently purchase relatively low amounts of nonaudit services, increase their purchases of nonaudit services from the auditor in the subsequent period. We test our prediction in the context of earnings management as a proxy for audit quality, measured by (a) performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals and (b) classification shifting of core expenses. Our results indicate that prior to the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, rewards to the auditor in the form of future additional nonaudit service fees from current‐year high fee‐growth‐opportunity clients adversely affects audit quality. This effect is particularly strong among companies with powerful incentives to manage earnings. Our findings indicate that regulators should consider the multiperiod nature of the client–auditor relationship when contemplating policies that restrict nonaudit services, as well as the overall environment in which audit partners operate. This might include partner compensation arrangements that put pressure on audit partners to focus on increasing revenue at the expense of audit quality.     

Did the 1998 Merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand Increase Audit Quality?

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse (PW) and Coopers & Lybrand (CL) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW/CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.     

Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses

In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.     

Awareness of SEC Enforcement and Auditor Reporting Decisions

We find that non‐Big 4 audit offices with greater awareness of SEC enforcement are more likely to issue first‐time going‐concern reports to distressed clients; where SEC “awareness” is measured using (i) audit office proximity to SEC regional offices, and (ii) proximity to specific SEC enforcement actions against auditors. We also show that these non‐Big 4 audit offices issue more going‐concern opinions to clients who do not subsequently fail, indicating a conservative bias that reduces the informativeness of audit reports. This conservative reporting bias is also associated with higher audit fees and higher auditor switching rates. These findings are important because non‐Big 4 firms now audit 39 percent of SEC registrants and issue 88 percent of going‐concern audit reports. For Big 4 offices, we find some evidence that awareness of SEC enforcement may improve reporting accuracy by reducing Type II errors (failing to issue a going‐concern report to a company that fails), although the number of cases is small.     

What is the Relationship Between Audit Partner Busyness and Audit Quality?

Contemporaneous studies generally find a negative relationship between audit partner busyness (APB), measured as the number of clients in an audit partner's portfolio, and audit quality. Their argument is that a busy partner does not devote sufficient time to properly audit his average client. Contrary to these studies, we argue that when busyness is optimally chosen by the partner, in equilibrium, there is no causal relationship between APB and audit quality. Using Australian data for the 1999–2010 period, we show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory. We argue that causality can be ascribed to the APB‐audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002–04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels. Supporting this disequilibrium view, we find that higher APB reduces a partner's propensity to issue first‐time going‐concern opinions during this period. Our evidence highlights the importance of the equilibrium condition in testing empirical associations between audit outcomes and endogenous auditor attributes, and shows that the detrimental effect of APB on audit quality is not as pervasive as contemporaneous studies suggest.