Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments

We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environmentwhere legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the expertiseof judges and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyzea model in which a judicially influenced bankruptcy processcan enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioningthe allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality.We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interestsas a function of the legal environment and show that the optimaldegree of "creditor-friendliness" in the bankruptcy code increasesas judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as thequality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model showsthat a bankruptcy law that attempts to preserve going-concernvalue, such as US Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise tobe effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law thatfocuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. (JEL D86, G33,G34, K22)     

Leaving your tailings behind: Environmental bonds,bankruptcy and waste cleanup

This paper studies the impacts of an environmental bond, which fully covers waste cleanup costs, on a mining firm's optimal actions over the full life cycle of a mine, when bankruptcy may shift cleanup costs to the government. A firm's stochastic optimal control problem is described by an HJB equation with the resource price modelled as an Ito process. A theoretical result shows that under certain assumptions, an environmental bond can ensure that the option to declare bankruptcy has no impact on the firm's optimal actions. A numerical solution is implemented for a hypothetical copper mine using two different models of bankruptcy risk. Numerical results show that when bankruptcy is an option and no bond is required, the firm produces too much waste relative to a benchmark case, resulting in an efficiency loss and a cleanup liability imposed on government. In the presence of bankruptcy risk, a bond ensures that the firm acts optimally and no efficiency loss is imposed on society.     

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY AND CHAPTER CHOICE: STATE PANEL EVIDENCE

Between 1985 and 1996, the number of personal bankruptcy cases filed annually in the United States rose from 341,000 to 1.1 million, and the rate of bankruptcies per 100,000 adults increased from 203 to 596. By state, bankruptcy rates vary from a low of 147 in Hawaii to a high of 956 in Tennessee. A controversial aspect of bankruptcy policy is the discharge of debts permitted under Chapter 7, in contrast to Chapter 13, where the debtor agrees to repay all or a portion of unsecured debt over a 3-5-year period. This paper examines empirically the determinants of the frequency with which individuals choose Chapter 13 relative to Chapter 7 (chapter choice). The panel data set is a cross section of states and the District of Columbia for the 8-year period from fiscal year 1989 to 1996. The empirical model and policy application focus on the importance of several laws for bankruptcy decisions, and legal variables are included for each state's Chapter 7 homestead exemption, personal property exemptions, and garnishment laws. This study shows that both homestead exemption laws and garnishment laws are statistically significant for bankruptcy choices. Although the marginal effect of the homestead exemption is small, there is a large range under current laws, suggesting that changes in this exemption are important for bankruptcy policy. ( JEL K1, K4, D2, D9)     

Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.Our approach helps in answering the following key questions: can bankruptcy costs always be internalized? Who benefits from accrued severity? Should the creditors accept a certain level of moral hazard from their debtors? Should bankruptcy law be extremely severe in order to ensure ex-ante efficiency? Does such severity depend on the financial environment?The model focuses on three equilibriums. The first equilibrium describes honest firms that choose the best investment project (ex-ante efficiency). Here, we show that bankruptcy costs can be avoided through private renegotiation (ex-post efficiency). Yet, the legislator cannot directly implement this equilibrium as it does not depend on the level of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium describes tricky firms turning to the less profitable and riskiest project. Here, default is still privately resolved: the occurrence of such equilibrium can be avoided owing to a minimal amount of legal sanctions that depend on the level of interest rate. Last, we consider firms that adopt mixed strategies regarding their investment policy. Here, two post-default bargains prevail (pooling or separating) and costly bankruptcy may occur.Simulations illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. For moderate levels of legal sanctions, banks may accept a certain level of faulty management, expecting to take advantage of bankruptcy punishment. An increase in sanctions, however, has a compelling effect on the companies towards honoring their commitments. Once the optimal equilibrium prevails, any additional increase in sanctions is ineffective as the players' strategies no longer depend on the legal environment. As a result, extreme severity is not required to ensure both ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies. Last, we find that a more severe bankruptcy law increases the protection of banks and may result in reduction of the contractual interest rate, which on the other hand benefits the debtors.     

Capitalism's growth imperative

A capitalist firm operating in a competitive market is subjectto a growth imperative, because uncertainty about the profitrate under a no-growth policy makes the firm's prospects highlyunattractive in finite time and bankruptcy practically certainin the long run. A no-growth policy determines consumption andinvestment so that they and capital would remain constant overtime if the latter's expected return were realised with certainty.Simulation is used to arrive at the probability of bankruptcyby the end of t periods and the expected values of capital andmoney, for relevant combinations of time and uncertainty undersuccessively more realistic models of a no-growth firm in acompetitive market. The sensitivity of the results to variationin the parameters in each of the models is evaluated. Finally,we establish that a plausible growth policy may achieve growth,but the problem of bankruptcy is not resolved.     

法律环境、金融结构与企业最优破产机制的经济学分析——对我国新企业破产法债务人机制的商榷

我国正在审议中的新破产法中的一个突破就是借鉴美国破产法的规定采取了债务人主导的破产重整方式。已有的经济学研究表明,法律环境与金融结构是密切相关的,在一个博弈模型中,本文认为,由于我国银行主导型金融结构决定的信息结构与英美发达国家的资本主导型金融结构决定的信息结构是不同的,因而最优破产机制的设计应该要考虑到金融结构的差异．银行主导型金融结构宜采取单一债权人机制,而资本市场主导型金融结构宜采取随机双元机制。     

Regulation or Markets? The Case of Employment Contracts

Regulation of the employment contract is both wide spread anddiverse. The diversity of regulation is surprising because itsuggests that there is little consensus regarding optimal interventioninto the labor market. This paper discusses several economicreasons why it may be efficient for employers and employeesto enter into long term contracts that make employee dismissalexpensive. This analysis suggests that employment contractscan be expected to be complex in practice, and hence can beviewed as part of the technology of exchange. Given that knowledgeof a technology requires skill and know-how, one cannot expectall employee-employer matches to discover and use the most efficientcontract terms possible. It is suggested that the regulationof the employment relationship might be improved with the creationof a market for contracts, similar to the one that currentlyexists in the United States for construction projects.(JEL J300,J410, K310)     

Counterparty effects on capital structure decision in incomplete market

This paper builds a static contingent-claim model that allows for examining the optimal capital structure with the joint arguments of counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier is adopted to capture the counterparty effects on the pricing of defaultable claims. Following the framework of Jarrow and Yu (2001), the jump in primary firm's bankruptcy barrier is designed as the loss on capital resulted from secondary firm's bankruptcy. The relevance of market incompleteness in the context of claim-pricing is considered using “good-deal asset price bound” method by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000). We show that the effects of counterparty's default clearly diminish the uses of debt, which indirectly explains the so-called under-leveraged puzzle. We further find that counterparty effects on capital structure are sensitive to market incompleteness and firm's characteristics, such as tax rate and bankruptcy cost rate.     

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce

The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorceif and only if doing so increases their joint surplus, regardlessof the legal rules governing divorce. This does not mean, however,that divorce laws only affect the distribution of rents. Becausethe distribution of rents affects each spouse's incentives fornoncontractible investments, divorce laws can affect the jointwelfare of the couple. This article analyzes the effects ofthe consent divorce regime and the unilateral divorce regimeon incentives for selfish and cooperative marital investments.Using these results, the article demonstrates how endogenouschoice of marriage with noncontractible investments can explainsome recent empirical results concerning the effects of theshift from consent divorce to unilateral divorce. (JEL C78,D1, D23, J12, J18, K3, K36)     

Optimal Vertical Arrangements When Resale Is Possible

This paper pinpoints optimal vertical arrangements in settingscharacterized by incomplete contracting and resale of an intermediateinput (a "widget"). In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rightstheory, we conclude that sometimes strictly complementary assetsshould be owned separately to permit the emergence of a secondarymarket. In a richer model where the parties choose specificand nonspecific investments, vertical separation may also dominatejoint ownership. The article then examines the profitabilityof three integration forms when the proposed bargaining modelsubstitutes random-order values (e.g., the Shapley value). Theconclusions differ markedly from existing claims. (JEL C70,C78, D23, L42)     

Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy–namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances–support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.     

Environmental self-auditing: setting the proper incentives for discovery and correction of environmental harm

Many firms conduct 'environmental audits' to test compliancewith a complex array of environmental regulations. Commentatorssuggest, however, that self-auditing is not as common as itshould be, because firms fear that what they find will be usedagainst them. This article analyzes self-auditing as a two-tieredincentive problem involving incentives both to test for andto effect compliance. After demonstrating the inadequacy ofconventional remedies, we show that incentives can be properlyaligned by conditioning fines on firms' investigative effort.In practice, however, the regulator may not be able to observesuch effort. Accordingly, we propose and evaluate the use ofthree observable proxies for self-investigation: the mannerin which the regulator detected the violation; the firm's owndisclosure of violations; and the firm's observed correctiveactions. Each method has its own efficiency benefits and informationalrequirements, and each is distinct from EPA's current auditpolicy.     

Do liquidity constraints generate excess sensitivity in consumption? New evidence from a sample of post-bankruptcy households

Previous work linking liquidity constraints to excessive consumption sensitivity have used household level information on wealth and assets to split the sample into households that are likely to be constrained from those with access to credit and liquidity. In this paper, we use the sample splitting methods of previous authors but refine the criteria by using direct information on whether the household filed for bankruptcy in the last 10 years. Legally, a flag can appear on a bankruptcy filer’s credit report for up to 10 years after bankruptcy. This bankruptcy flag affects an individual’s credit score, and therefore the individual’s access to credit, which may make post-bankruptcy consumers liquidity constrained. Our results indicate that post-bankruptcy consumers exhibit excess sensitivity likely due to the bankruptcy flag. Consistency checks confirm that the source of sensitivity is due to liquidity constraints and not other observationally equivalent behavior.     

Did Partial Globalization Increase Inequality? The Case of the Latin American Periphery, 1950-2000

Inequality is an important threat to the globalization of theworld economy that we experience today. This contribution usesthe coefficient of height variation as a measure of inequality.This indicator covers not only wage recipients, but also theselfemployed, the unemployed, housewives, children, and othergroups who may not participate in a market economy, for theperiod 1950–79, for which income inequality data is mostlyunavailable or inconsistent. It turns out that within-countryinequality is higher in time periods of greater openness. Thisresult is confirmed for the time period 1950–2000, anda much broader model. (JEL I12, I32, N33)     

从A123破产看美国支持新兴产业政策的失灵

2009年,美国政府宣布在经济复苏法案中拨款24亿美元支持电动汽车电池产业的发展,生产锂电池的A123系统公司获2.49亿美元拨款。A123虽获美国政府新兴产业政策的大力支持,但在美国能源法案关于资金用途的约束下,从辉煌走向崩塌,于2012年申请破产。A123的破产启示我们:政府培育新兴产业的政策要在尊重市场规律的前提下突出产品创新,提高产品的技术含量和成熟度;在新兴产业的发展过程中,最关键的是产品的技术含量,而对资金、人力资源起基础配置作用的是市场,若忽视产品的技术完善,背离市场规律,尽管政府扶持政策力度很大,也会出现政策失灵。     

Has Anything Changed in the Past Century? Revisiting Graue's "The Social Cost of Bad Debt"

In a seminal paper, Erwin Graue (1939) provides an institutional analysis of the causes and consequences of personal bankruptcy protection in the United States during the period 1900-1937 when bankruptcy procedures were guided by the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Law was revised in 1938). This paper revisits the Graue study in the context of the current recession using a simple institutional economic framework. Consistent with Graue, we begin shortly after the implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) and follow its evolution to the present time. Our analysis suggests that, since passage of BAPCPA, both total filings and Chapter 7 filings decreased significantly, however temporarily. Moreover, Chapter 7 filings as a percentage of Chapter 13 filings also temporarily decreased. These results are not only consistent with Graue's analysis, but also demonstrate that the institutional characteristics of bankruptcy law have a profound impact on the decision to file for bankruptcy and the chapter under which a petitioner files.     

Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start

This article considers bankruptcy law design in a setting thatis appropriate for entrepreneurial firms. These firms are characterizedby a dependence on an owner-manager who is essential to thefirm and must be given incentive through an ownership staketo maximize the value of the project. In a relationship-lendingenvironment, the banks that fund entrepreneurs cannot capturethe gains from providing the entrepreneur with this stake, andthis leaves the entrepreneur emerging from bankruptcy with alarger debt burden than is socially efficient. In this setting,a "fresh-start" bankruptcy policy provides greater debt reliefthan the bank would approve voluntarily, and this generatesgreater social surplus. The results suggest the value of separateprocedures for small business bankruptcies that allow some mandatorydebt relief to preserve ex post incentives.     

THE IMPACT OF CASINO GAMBLING ON PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY FILING RATES

Personal bankruptcies soared in the United States between 1994 and 1998. One activity that can precipitate personal financial crises and that has also experienced dramatic growth is commercial gambling, especially casino gambling. This article builds a simple model of bankruptcy choice and empirically tests the model using unique county-level data on debt, income, household age, population density, and casino gambling as well as state measures of employment and marital stability, health insurance coverage, and garnishment restrictions. The authors find that the proximity of casino gambling appears to be associated with higher bankruptcy rates, but that the local impact is far more pronounced than the influence of casino gambling on the national filing rate. To quantify the magnitude of the impact, the analysis predicts over a 5% decline in 1998 filing rates for counties surrounding a casino, and a 1% decline in the nationwide filing rate if one were to eliminate casino gambling. Consequently, although casino gambling exerts important local effects, nationwide the incidence and growth of casino gambling does not explain much of the rise in bankruptcies during the past decade.     

The role of the state and the hierarchy of money

This paper uses Minsky's definition of money as a two-sidedbalance sheet phenomenon to challenge many common positionson the nature, evolution and role of money. His definition isapplied to two opposing theories in the history of monetarydebates, and it is shown that the Chartalists (as opposed tothe Metallists) developed a general theory of money that canbe applied equally convincingly to the entire era of state money.This theory is then used to show that the state's power to makeand enforce tax laws renders its money the most acceptable formof debt within what can be considered a 'hierarchy' of monies.This leads to some important policy implications as well asa strengthening of the endogenous money position.     

Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia

This paper investigates institutional reasons for the soft-budget constraint problem; and how the soft-budget constraint problem creates conditions which may result in a financial crisis. As a consequence of soft-budget constraints, bad projects do not stop; bad loans accumulate; and banks and depositors do not receive bad news on time. Poorly informed depositors are then likely to herd to overinvest when there is no bankruptcy (`frenzy'); and they are likely to herd to panic when bankruptcy occurs (`crash'), which may be the result of excessive bad loans that are also a consequence of soft-budget constraints. In contrast, under hard-budget constraints information is disclosed quickly regarding liquidation. Better-informed investors are then less likely to herd wrongly.