财政分权对全要素生产率的影响--基于“省直管县”改革的准自然实验

"省直管县"改革一改以往"省-市-县"的管理模式,有助于提高县级政府的财政分权水平。为缓解内生性,将"省直管县"改革视为一项准自然实验,构建双重差分模型检验了财政分权对全要素生产率的因果效应。研究发现:①财政分权对全要素生产率的正向促进作用高于负面阻碍作用,但不同形式的分权影响有异质性,具体来说财权的下放有利于全要素生产率的提高,经济社会事务管理权限的下放则不利于。②当地方政府自主权提高时,其"重生产、轻服务"的支出偏好,使得当地基础设施供给增加,而能够增强地方软实力、加快创新要素集聚的公共服务供给相应减少,造成了全要素生产率的损失,导致在经济高质量高效益增长中政府"有形之手"的作用发挥不够。③随着改革的推进,财政分权对全要素生产率的正向作用逐渐减弱,并不再显著。据此,从合理划分省以下政府的事权与支出责任,充实基层政府财力;提高公共服务类指标在政府官员政绩考核中的权重,加强各县(市)政府间的合作,实现各自为政的地方经济向统一市场整合等方面提出政策建议。     

Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality

China's current fiscal system is largely decentralized while its governance structure is rather centralized with strong top-down mandates and a homogeneous governance structure. Due to large differences in initial economic structures and revenue bases, the implicit tax rate and fiscal burdens to support the functioning of local government vary significantly across jurisdictions. Regions initially endowed with a broader nonfarm tax base do not need to rely heavily on preexisting or new firms to finance public goods provision, thereby creating a healthy investment environment for the nonfarm sector to grow. In contrast, regions with agriculture as the major economic activity have little resources left for public investment after paying the expenses of bureaucracy. Consequently, differences in economic structures and fiscal burdens may translate into a widening regional gap. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 713–726.     

Government size,decentralization and growth: empirical evidence from Italian regions

The aim of this study is to empirically assess the relationship among government size, decentralization and economic growth in Italian ordinary regions. The empirical analysis, based on a panel dataset on Italian regions, provides evidence in support of the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between public expenditure and economic growth, that depends on the degree of fiscal decentralization. In particular, according to our estimates on the specific Italian case, the optimal degree of decentralization is around 32%, while the optimal government size value is approximately 52%.     

分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给

本文发现20世纪90年代中期以来中国地方公共品供给水平有下降趋势,同时发现较高的公共品供给水平总是和较高的地方财政自主权联系在一起.本文应用分省面板数据,特别利用了1994年分税制改革导致的地方财政自主权的跨时和跨区变化,为上述假设提供了实证证据.本文认为中国在财政分权化过程中面临的一系列既有制度设置可以作为上述因果关系的解释机制.一系列测量偏误和模型选择的检验显示本文的实证结论是稳健的.基于中国的研究支持了那些认为财政分权而不是集权将改善地方公共品供给水平的观点.     

影响我国地方政府财政支出效率的因素研究*——基于财政、晋升和发展压力的视角#br#

提高地方政府财政支出效率是实现财政可持续发展的重要条件。本文使用2004—2016年我国30个省份的数据,基于DEA模型和Malmquist指数测算了我国地方政府的财政支出效率,并分析了财政压力、晋升压力和发展压力对地方政府财政支出效率的影响。结果表明：（1）各地区财政支出技术效率变动指数均值和规模效率均值变化差异不大;（2）财政压力越大,地方政府财政支出效率越低;（3）经济增长率越高,地方政府财政支出效率越低;（4）地方政府超额完成中央的经济发展目标有利于改善当地财政支出效率。     

Employment and Wages in the Private and Local Government Sectors in a Centralized Fiscal System

This paper discusses the interaction between the local government and private sector in an institutional context consistent with a centralized fiscal system. Under decentralized wage setting in the private sector, the effects of shocks in the two sectors depend on whether private and local public goods are substitutes or complements in the union utility function. Higher wage markup in the local government sector unambiguously decreases government output while the effect on private sector employment is ambiguous. Higher income taxes have ambiguous effects on local government output. Shocks in the private sector can be reinforced through feedback effects from the local government sector. A shift from decentralized to centralized wage setting in the private sector reduces wages and increases employment in both sectors.     

Spending Growth With Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Decentralized Government Spending In Norway, 1880–1990

Vertical fiscal imbalance, decentralized responsibility of spending with centralized financing, creates a common pool problem with spending pressure towards central funds. A model of decentralized government spending under vertical fiscal imbalance is developed, and the importance of national political characteristics for internalization of costs and spending level is investigated in an econometric analysis of Norway during 1880–1990. We argue that in a parliamentary democracy, the internalization of costs is influenced by the party fragmentation of parliament. This is confirmed by the econometric analysis using a Herfindahl index as a measure of fragmentation and political strength.     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

The Crisis of America’s Cities

This paper aims to show how state intervention within the European Monetary Union can have positive effects not only on growth but also on public balances and debt. The relation between centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy partly solves the lack of coordination between the two. Each time a fiscal expansion in an EU country is not accompanied by a Central Bank interest rate increase, the expansionary effect of public spending, initially financed through the emission of public bonds, will be reinforced by endogenous money creation due to the increase in growth. The final result, if growth exceeds the rate of interest, is not only an increase in equilibrium income, but also a reduction in debt.     

英国集权财政下公共服务供给的分析与启示

英国的集权财政按照收支匹配的原则,在政府间自上而下地细化分配政府职能,并采用公共部门与私人部门竞争合作的供给方式,体现了英国公共服务职能实现中集权财政和有限政府的两大特点,并通过2007-2008年英国中央与地方的财政收支分析及牛津郡个案得到了证实。英国中央政府掌握主要的财政税收,并负责支持大宗公共服务事务;地方政府之间相互独立、互不隶属,依靠有限的地方税收和转移支付,提供辖区内的贴近民众日常生活的、琐碎的公共服务。作为同是集权财政的中国,应当借鉴英国政府职责的划分方法,并在公共服务供给方式上,积极引进私人部门的竞争与合作。     

Fiscal Policy and Equitable Growth

This paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by exploring a case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures with distortionary tax finance: public production services, public consumption services, and state-contingent redistributive transfers. The paper shows that in a general-equilibrium model with given exogenous fiscal policy, a nonmonotonic relation exists between the suboptimal long-run growth rate in a competitive economy and distortionary tax rates. When fiscal policy is endogenously chosen at a social optimum, the relation between the rate of growth and tax rates is always negative. These two properties suggest that an alternative set of government policy instruments affects the response of private sector investment to fiscal policy. Moreover, the different properties of exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy theoretically account for the difference in the relation between economic growth and fiscal policy in empirical studies.     

South African fiscal relations

The democratic political system emerging in the new South Africa is not a sufficient condition to secure a stable society. The structure and composition of intergovernmental fiscal relations will become a very important dimension of public sector reform for the future South Africa. Historically, the South African government has been highly centralized. 1994 will record the beginning of the devolution and sharing of important responsibilities to subnational governments and the planning and implementation of new decentralized arrangements. Whether the new dispensation will adhere to the general economic principles of fiscal decentralization will in the first instance depend on the principles enshrined in the new constitution. The aim of this paper is to differentiate several key drivers which reflect upon the ability of the Government of National Unity to break away from the deeply ingrained institutions of apartheid. The paper starts with some constitutional issues relative to intergovernmental fiscal relations and economic performance. Second, I provide an overview of the theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations and examine the implications for the design of an intergovernmental financial system. Third, the current structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa is sketched. Fourth, I review the current output of the constitutionally established Fiscal and Finance Commission which serves as an advisory body to parliament to ensure greater transparency, efficiency, consistency, and predictability of fiscal policy. Finally, the paper concludes with some challenges ahead.     

中国地方政府债务可持续、财政空间与经济增长*

根据Ghosh et al（2013）财政空间理论，利用2010—2019中国省级面板数据，对中国省级政府债务可持续、财政空间和经济增长之间的关系及其机制进行了研究。结果表明，中国个别省份出现了财政疲劳现象，要把控好债务风险雷区，但各地区债务限额存在异质性，在不损害可持续性的情况下，大部分地方政府有足够的“回旋余地”实施财政刺激政策。我国省级政府的财政空间和经济增长之间存在倒“U”型关系，即当政府负债率高于财政空间的临界点（或较低的财政空间）时开始阻碍经济增长，因此，需要通过降低政府负债率实现更高的增长。进一步研究发现，政府债务影响经济增长最重要的渠道是公共投资和私人投资，全要素生产率、储蓄和长期真实利率也是政府债务影响经济增长的重要渠道，而长期名义利率未能成为政府债务影响经济增长的渠道。     

政府竞争与区域经济差异

本文以中国经济为背景,借助博弈模型从理论上探讨了存在区域差异、包含两级政府的经济中的政府竞争问题。我们导入了两种不同的征税体制,综合分析了中央领导下的政府竞争、地区分权下的政府竞争和同时行动的政府竞争模式下的竞争均衡的效率性以及相应的最优征税机制设定问题,并进一步讨论了政府竞争对区域经济差异的影响。分析表明,区域政府竞争可能导致效率的损失,要实现经济的最优状态,中央政府必须设定适当的征税机制以激励地区政府在选择时兼顾对其他地区的影响,适当的财政政策设计可以使竞争兼顾效率与公平。     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

Public capital,deficit financing,and economic growth in a stochastic economy

This paper examines the relationship among deficit-financing fiscal policy, risk and economic growth in a stochastic endogenous growth model with private and public capital. We show that there are positive balanced-growth rate and a debt-to-GDP ratio that depend on deep parameters such as the income tax rate and the standard deviation of the growth rate of private and public capital. Investment and fiscal shocks influence the mean and variance of the growth rate and the debt dependency rate through portfolio changes and capital accumulation. In particular, an increase in the risk of private investment destabilizes the economy and reduces the mean growth rate if the portfolio change is drastic, and this increase in risk increases the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, an increase in the income tax rate stabilizes the economy, increases the mean growth rate, and has a positive or negative effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio according to the ratio of public to private capital if the income tax rate is sufficiently small.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.