Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management?

We investigate the extent to which Australian firms that report small profits and/or small increases in earnings (i.e. benchmark beaters) have done so by the upward manipulation of these earnings. Although evidence of an unusually large number of firms managing to just beat such earnings benchmarks has been interpreted as evidence of earnings management, this approach fails to identify those firms that are the manipulators from those where unbiased earnings fall naturally into the benchmark beating group. Our results suggest that caution is required in interpreting benchmark beating as an indicator of the extent of earnings management. Using several methods for estimating the unexpected accrual component of earnings, we show that although benchmark beaters have larger positive unexpected accruals than other firms, a similar result holds when firms with small losses or earnings declines (i.e. ‘just miss’ firms) are compared with other firms. Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between unexpected accruals for the benchmark beating and just miss groups. At a minimum, we reject the joint hypothesis that unexpected accruals capture earnings management and that an unusual kink around zero in the distribution of earnings levels or earnings changes is caused by earnings management.     

Stock market response to analysts' perceptions and earnings in a technology-intensive environment

This paper investigates the contemporaneous stock market response to financial analysts' perceptions of the firm and accounting earnings in the telecommunication and electronics industry in Finland. Analysts' perceptions used in the study are based on the Most Admired Companies survey similar to that conducted by Fortune magazine in the United States. The results indicate the nonfinancial information of the firm measured in terms of the analysts' perceptions has value relevance in a technology-oriented stock market.     

Central supervision and earnings management: Quasi-experimental evidence from China

Earnings management is costly to society because it decreases the informativeness of earnings and hence distorts capital market efficiency. Drawing upon a natural experiment generated by the staggered random on-site inspection programme initiated by China's central government between 2013 and 2017, this paper finds that highly intensive central supervision significantly decreases local firms' earnings management behaviours. Moreover, the effect of central supervision is found to be more pronounced in provinces with severe GDP exaggeration, provinces with local governors facing impending promotion, and firms controlled by the government. These findings suggest that on-site inspections by the central government may alleviate local officials' political incentives and ability to pressure local firms to engage in earnings management. However, the estimation results of timing tests indicate that this monitoring effect is short-lived, calling for a more comprehensive strategy to enhance the supervision of local officials and consequently improve the reliability of firms' financial reporting quality. These findings highlight the importance of addressing the agency problem between central and local governments in curbing firms' earnings manipulation to improve the capital market efficiency of economies characterized by strong government intervention.     

Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management

We examine the impact of conditional conservatism on earnings management. Our findings support the view that conditional conservatism reduces accruals-based earnings management but also triggers a trade-off between accruals and real earnings management. In our main tests we use the passage of SFAS 121 as a plausibly exogenous regulatory change that increased the level of conditional conservatism but did not materially affect earnings management. We find that, after the regulation, treated firms reduce accruals-based earnings management and increase real earnings management, and are less likely to be marginal or habitual beaters of earnings benchmarks. Given the crucial role of earnings for firm valuation and analysis, and that conditionally conservative accounting choices are observable, our results should be of wide interest for investment professionals.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

The dynamics of earnings management in IPOs and the role of venture capital

We investigate the dynamics of earnings management (EM) in IPOs and the role of venture capitalist (VC) in hampering such practice. We study the behavior of EM in four phases: Pre-IPO, IPO, Lock-up and Post-lock-up. We find that VC-sponsored firms tend to do more EM in the Pre-IPO period, and less in two subsequent periods. These results are distinct for those of Wongsunwai (2013), for which, VC-sponsored firms do less EM only in the IPO period. We also find that VC and non-VC-sponsored firms do EM around the IPO in distinct fashions. Non-VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings during the IPO period and deflate in the Lock-up and Post-lock-up periods. VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings in the Pre-IPO period and deflate earnings only in the Lock-up period. Our results are robust with respect to how one measures EM and the statistical methods used.     

Financial crisis,GDP variation and earnings management in Europe

The purpose of this study is to examine the consequences of the financial crisis on the European companies’ in conjunction with earnings management practice. It focuses on financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor during recession years. The study makes use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management and studies the influence of big 4 auditor, in order to shed more light on possible causes for shifting earnings. The findings of the study provide evidence that financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor exhibit lower discretionary accruals. The results reveal that Greek and Spanish companies reduce earnings management manipulation during recession. In contrast, Portuguese, Irish and Italian companies show mixed results. They tend to reduce earnings management practices, but there are reasons that influence managers’ behavior to increase earnings management. The findings of this study can be useful for both investors and standard setting authorities.     

Cash from operations and earnings management in Korea

Our study investigates the relationship between the operating performances of Korean industrial firms and the behavior of discretionary accruals during the period 1994-1997. We hypothesize that the degree of earnings management will depend on the firm operating performances. We construct 10 “cash from operations (CFO)” portfolios to test if there are systematic differences in discretionary accruals across portfolios.Four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change test) are used to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. We compare three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in testing the earnings management hypotheses.The results support the hypothesis that Korean industrial firms manage earnings. When operating performance is poor, the firms tend to choose income-increasing strategies. In addition, when operating performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while some of the exceptionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.     

Bank earnings management and performance reporting of comprehensive income

FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.     

Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks

Business decision making depends on financial reporting quality. In identifying the drivers of financial reporting quality, proxied by earnings management (EM), prior literature has drawn attention to the association between corporate EM practices and commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Empirical evidence, however, provides inconclusive results regarding the direction of this association. Using simultaneous equations, we examine the bi-directional CSR–EM relationship in U.S. commercial banks. We demonstrate that, although banks that engage in EM practices are also actively involved in CSR, the reverse relationship is not significant. We provide implications for investors, analysts, business participants and regulators.     

Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock acquirers’ market performance

There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits. The market only partially anticipates the effects of post-merger announcement lawsuits at the merger announcement and the post-merger announcement long-term market underperformance is largely limited to litigated acquisitions. Overall, the evidence suggests that it is important that investors not only undo the direct stock price effects of earnings management but also factor the contingent legal costs associated with earnings management.     

Capitalization of R&D costs and earnings management: Evidence from Italian listed companies

The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.     

Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective

This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999–2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms.     

Credit unions and earnings management to mitigate political scrutiny over tax-exempt status

In this paper, we examine whether credit unions manage earnings to mitigate political scrutiny. In particular, we study whether credit unions increased loan loss provisions to decrease earnings around a 2005 congressional hearing on the efficacy of credit unions’ tax-exempt status. On average, we find evidence consistent with credit unions managing earnings downward via the loan loss provision in the quarters leading up to and surrounding the congressional hearing. In addition, we find that credit unions with higher earnings before the loan loss provision engaged in more downward earnings management than credit unions with lower earnings before provision. Our findings contribute to the literature examining the use of downward earnings management to avoid political scrutiny and the banking literature. Likewise, our results inform the continued debate as to whether credit unions should be tax-exempt.     

Discretion in bank loan loss allowance,risk taking and earnings management

We study whether banks use the allowance for loan losses (ALL) for efficiency or for opportunistic reasons. We find that banks that had higher abnormal ALL during the period prior to the 2007–2009 crisis engaged in less risk taking during the pre‐crisis period and had a lower probability of failure during the crisis period. In testing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, we find that abnormal ALL is unrelated to next period's loss avoidance and just meeting or beating the prior year's earnings. Our results suggest that banks use ALL for efficiency and not for opportunistic purposes.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Business strategies and management accounting in response to climate change risk exposure and regulatory uncertainty

This study aims to theorise and foster a better understanding of the strategies organisations adopt to respond to the risks and opportunities emerging from changing government climate change policies and the supporting management accounting adopted. Data include interviews and archival documents from five New Zealand electricity generators. We construct a theoretical framework that links climate change risks and opportunities to strategic responses. Climate change risk exposure increased during the period due to changes in the estimation/perception of climate change risks, market opportunities and regulatory uncertainty. Organisations' strategies changed in response, moving from a stable strategy to different combinations of anticipatory, proactive, and creative strategies, and finally regressing to a reactive strategy. Carbon management accounting changed to support the new strategy adopted in each time period. Long term physical and monetarised accounts for sustainability and extensive use of carbon information were prevalent during periods when the companies employed a proactive or creative strategy. In contrast, short-term physical accounts for unsustainability and limited use in decision-making were observed when the companies adopted stable, anticipatory or reactive strategies. Regulatory uncertainty was found to be the major constraint to a proactive strategy and carbon management accounting development in response to climate change.