Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management?

We investigate the extent to which Australian firms that report small profits and/or small increases in earnings (i.e. benchmark beaters) have done so by the upward manipulation of these earnings. Although evidence of an unusually large number of firms managing to just beat such earnings benchmarks has been interpreted as evidence of earnings management, this approach fails to identify those firms that are the manipulators from those where unbiased earnings fall naturally into the benchmark beating group. Our results suggest that caution is required in interpreting benchmark beating as an indicator of the extent of earnings management. Using several methods for estimating the unexpected accrual component of earnings, we show that although benchmark beaters have larger positive unexpected accruals than other firms, a similar result holds when firms with small losses or earnings declines (i.e. ‘just miss’ firms) are compared with other firms. Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between unexpected accruals for the benchmark beating and just miss groups. At a minimum, we reject the joint hypothesis that unexpected accruals capture earnings management and that an unusual kink around zero in the distribution of earnings levels or earnings changes is caused by earnings management.     

Stock market response to analysts' perceptions and earnings in a technology-intensive environment

This paper investigates the contemporaneous stock market response to financial analysts' perceptions of the firm and accounting earnings in the telecommunication and electronics industry in Finland. Analysts' perceptions used in the study are based on the Most Admired Companies survey similar to that conducted by Fortune magazine in the United States. The results indicate the nonfinancial information of the firm measured in terms of the analysts' perceptions has value relevance in a technology-oriented stock market.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

Financial crisis,GDP variation and earnings management in Europe

The purpose of this study is to examine the consequences of the financial crisis on the European companies’ in conjunction with earnings management practice. It focuses on financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor during recession years. The study makes use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management and studies the influence of big 4 auditor, in order to shed more light on possible causes for shifting earnings. The findings of the study provide evidence that financially distressed companies that audited by a big 4 auditor exhibit lower discretionary accruals. The results reveal that Greek and Spanish companies reduce earnings management manipulation during recession. In contrast, Portuguese, Irish and Italian companies show mixed results. They tend to reduce earnings management practices, but there are reasons that influence managers’ behavior to increase earnings management. The findings of this study can be useful for both investors and standard setting authorities.     

Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock acquirers’ market performance

There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers’ pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits. The market only partially anticipates the effects of post-merger announcement lawsuits at the merger announcement and the post-merger announcement long-term market underperformance is largely limited to litigated acquisitions. Overall, the evidence suggests that it is important that investors not only undo the direct stock price effects of earnings management but also factor the contingent legal costs associated with earnings management.     

Capitalization of R&D costs and earnings management: Evidence from Italian listed companies

The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.