Macroeconomic control, political costs and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed real estate companies

Firms in China have faced high political costs during China’s economic transition, because they are affected by macroeconomic policies. However, research to date has offered no consistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management in China. This study tests whether real estate firms attempt to decrease earnings during periods of macroeconomic control, using variables related to the national real estate market as proxies for political costs. We find that political costs are negatively related to earnings management in listed real estate firms. In addition, we find that non-state-owned enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period. Our results are consistent with the political costs hypothesis.     

Political scrutiny and earnings management in the oil refining industry

The fortunes of the oil refining industry have historically been tied to the political process. In periods of high gasoline prices public outcry increases pressure on the political process to increase regulation, taxation, and other costs on the industry. This study explores the relationship of gasoline prices and oil firm earning with accounting earnings management of oil firms. Findings indicate that firms make accounting changes and discretionary accruals to decrease (increase) earnings in periods when gasoline prices and oil firm earnings are rising (falling).     

Do managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts?: Evidence from Australia

This paper examines whether managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous Australian studies on benchmark-beating have focused on loss avoidance and small earnings increases as benchmarks [Coulton, J., Taylor, S., & Taylor, S. (2005). Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management? Accounting and Finance, 45, 553-576; Holland, D., & Ramsay, A. (2003). Do Australian companies manage earnings to meet simple earnings benchmarks? Accounting and Finance, 43, 41-62]. This paper extends this earlier research on benchmark-beating in Australia by incorporating analyst forecast as an important benchmark. Using three different models of unexpected accruals as proxies for earnings management, this study did not find any significant difference between the mean and median unexpected accruals of the “‘just meet or beat” group as against the “just miss” group. Furthermore, for a long period of time (1997-2002), the proportion of Australian firms ‘just meeting or beating’ analyst forecasts benchmark increased, although such increase was not statistically significant.     

Earnings quality at initial public offerings

We show that, contrary to popular belief, initial public offering (IPO) firms report more conservatively. We attribute this to the higher quality reporting demanded of public firms by financial statement users and consequentially higher monitoring by auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny [Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 83–128]. We also question the evidence of Teoh et al. [1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974] supporting the alternative hypothesis that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to influence IPO pricing. We conjecture that upward-biased estimates of “discretionary” accruals occur in a broad genre of studies on earnings management around similar large transactions and events.     

Cash from operations and earnings management in Korea

Our study investigates the relationship between the operating performances of Korean industrial firms and the behavior of discretionary accruals during the period 1994-1997. We hypothesize that the degree of earnings management will depend on the firm operating performances. We construct 10 “cash from operations (CFO)” portfolios to test if there are systematic differences in discretionary accruals across portfolios.Four test methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change test) are used to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. We compare three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary accruals and total accruals) in testing the earnings management hypotheses.The results support the hypothesis that Korean industrial firms manage earnings. When operating performance is poor, the firms tend to choose income-increasing strategies. In addition, when operating performance is extremely poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while some of the exceptionally well-performing firms tend to select income-decreasing strategies.     

Managerial discretion in distressed firms

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986–2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptcy-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings management behaviour, (c) whether earnings management differs between firms that discontinued operations and firms that survived thereafter, and (d) the effect of earnings management on subsequent stock returns. Our results are consistent with downwards earnings management 1 year prior to the bankruptcy-filing. Results also show that (a) firms receiving unqualified audit opinions 4 or 5 years prior to the bankruptcy-filing event manage earnings upwards in subsequent years, consistent with Rosner [2003. Earnings manipulation in failing firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, 361–408], (b) more conservative earnings management seems to be related to the qualified audit opinions rendered in the preceding year, (c) firms with long-term negative accruals the year of bankruptcy-filing have a greater chance to survive thereafter, and (d) more pronounced (negative) earnings management is associated with more negative (next year's) subsequent returns.     

The nature of information in accruals and cash flows in an emerging capital market: The case of China

Our study investigates the relative and incremental information content of earnings, operating cash flows, and accruals in the emerging capital market of China. The issue is tested by regressing stock returns on the levels of earnings and their components. Based on a sample of 1516 firm-years for listed Chinese firms during 1995–1998, our results demonstrate that earnings have relative information content over operating cash flows. The autocorrelations and cross-sectional correlations also imply that earnings have greater persistence and predictability than operating cash flows. We also find that discretionary accruals provide incremental information beyond that contained in nondiscretionary accruals, consistent with the argument that discretionary accruals improve the relevance of earnings in reflecting the fundamental values of the listed Chinese firms. Unlike prior findings in the studies on developed markets, we find no strong evidence that the value attached to discretionary accruals is lower than the value attached to nondiscretionary accruals. This is consistent with the argument that managerial policy choices available for the listed Chinese firms were rather limited during our sample period under relatively uniform People's Republic of China Accounting Standards (PRC-GAAP), thus, producing fewer opportunities for earnings management. An alternative interpretation could be that Chinese investors are functionally fixated on earnings.     

Executive compensation and earnings management: Empirical evidence from Japan

This study investigates the relation between discretionary accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The analyses also show that firm managers receiving no bonus adopt income-decreasing accruals and extraordinary items. In particular, evidence shows that negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment. Finally, the research indicates that the association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. This study contributes to the literature on earnings management from an international comparative perspective since most previous studies on earnings management and executive compensation have focused on U.S. firms.     

Short term real earnings management prior to stock repurchases

This study examines whether firms engage in income-decreasing real earnings management before open market stock repurchases to reduce the cost of stock buybacks. In the short run, managers have the ability to underproduce inventory and increase discretionary expenditures, thus decreasing current period earnings. We find that managers engage in both of these activities before repurchasing their firms’ shares, especially the latter. Also, companies increase their discretionary spending before making repurchases to a greater extent following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as when they are financially healthy and have high marginal tax rates. Finally, we document that firms with the most income-decreasing real earnings management experience the largest positive abnormal returns during the subsequent period. Our findings highlight the importance of considering firms’ use of real operating decisions, as opposed to just opportunistic disclosure practices, around significant corporate events, such as the repurchase of their own stock.     

Audit firm size, public ownership, and firms' discretionary accruals management

In this study, we developed and tested three hypotheses concerning earnings management in Belgium (i.e., a continental European environment). The three hypotheses are about: (1) income smoothing, (2) Bix Six auditors, and (3) public ownership. The study is motivated by the finding by Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1] and Francis, Maydew, & Sparks [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17] that Big Six audit firms act as a constraint on both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. The finding raises questions as to the determinants of earnings management in other institutional settings such as that of Belgium. Accordingly, we study publicly available financial statements of a matched sample of publicly and privately held Belgian firms. Following Francis et al. [Audit. J. Pract. Theory 18 (1999) 17], DeFond and Subramanyam [J. Account. Econ. 25 (1998) 35], and Becker et al. [Contemp. Account. Res. 15 (1998) 1], we use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. We find that Belgian companies—both private and public—engage in income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of prior-year earnings. The evidence is also supportive of the other two hypotheses, but only when companies have earnings that are above target and have incentives to smooth earnings downwards. The fact that our results on the impact of Big Six auditors and ownership type are different for above and below target firms in Belgium, and differ with findings on U.S. samples, can be explained by the Belgian institutional environment.     

Do auditing standards improve the accounting disclosure and information environment of public companies? Evidence from the emerging markets in China

In this paper, we investigate the impact of the implementation of a set of new auditing standards in 1996 on the information environment in the emerging markets in China. Because the implementation of such standards can increase the quality and/or quantity of accounting disclosures, it can be conceptualized as an improvement in the information environment of public companies. We investigate the improvement in accounting disclosure and information environment from both the market perspective and the accounting perspective. First, consistent with the information economics literature (e.g., [Holthausen, R., & Verrecchia, R., (1990). The effect of informedness and consensus on price and volume behavior. The Accounting Review, 65, 191–208]), we find that companies experience a significant increase in trading volume and price volatility subsequent to the implementation of the standards. Second, consistent with the literature on earnings management (e.g., [Chen, C. W. K., & Yuan, H. Q., (2004). Earnings management and capital resource allocation: evidence from China's accounting-based regulation of right issue. The Accounting Review, 79, 645–665, Jian, M., & Wong, T. J., (2004). Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: evidence from Chinese corporate groups. Working Paper, Nanyang Technological University and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]), we find a decrease in earnings management and, hence, an increase in quality of earnings. Finally, we find a decrease in the synchronicity of stock prices and, hence, an increase in the quality of firm-specific information available to investors, which is consistent with the literature on price synchronicity (e.g., [Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W., (2000). The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 215–260]). Our results have significant implications for standard setters, regulators, researchers, managers, and investors in general and those in the emerging markets in particular.     

积极回应内部控制法案与管理层利润预测精度——基于日本数据的实证研究

以日本上市公司为研究对象,在考虑盈余管理行为的基础上分析并检验积极回应内部控制法案的上市公司是否具有较高的管理层利润预测精度。结果表明,那些委托会计师事务所构建和完善其内部控制系统以应对内部控制法案的上市公司具有较高的管理层利润预测精度。因此,有效的内部控制有助于企业实施全面预算管理。     

The effect of local political corruption on earnings quality

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Our study examines whether political corruption of a local government at judicial district level influences earnings management activities of firms...     

Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management?

I hypothesize and find that earnings management via accruals is driven partially by the prevailing market‐wide investor sentiment. Managers inflate earnings in periods of higher sentiment, but report more conservatively during periods of low sentiment. Moreover, the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises is also positively associated with investor sentiment. These results are robust to: (i) controls for time‐varying firm characteristics such as growth, investment opportunity sets, future profitability, leverage and size; (ii) macroeconomic variables such as future inflation, GDP growth, and growth in industrial production; (iii) multiple proxies for investor sentiment; and (iv) discretionary revenues as alternative measure of earnings management. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that firms whose stock returns co‐move more with investor sentiment are more (less) likely to manage earnings upward via abnormal accruals in quarters of higher (lower) sentiment. The findings of managers’ strategic use of abnormal accruals show the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to heightened managerial incentives to overstate earnings and to report optimistic earnings numbers during periods of high investor sentiment.     

Are Accruals during Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic?

We find evidence that initial public offering (IPO) firms, on average, have high positive issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. The IPO-year abnormal, and not expected, accruals explain the cross-sectional variation in post-issue earnings and stock returns. The results are robust with respect to alternative abnormal accruals and earnings performance measures. IPO firms adopt more income-increasing depreciation policies when they deviate from similar prior performance same industry non-issuers, and they provide significantly less for uncollectible accounts receivable than their matched non-issuers. The results taken together suggest opportunistic earnings management partially explains the new issues anomaly.     

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from non‐forecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.     

When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance.     

Earnings management at rights issues thresholds—Evidence from China

Burgstahler and Dichev (BD) (Burgstahler, David, Ilia, Dichev, 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23(1), 99–126.) and Degorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (DPZ) (Degeorge, Franscois, Patel, Jayendu, Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72(1), 1–33.) examine earnings management among American firms by looking at actual distributions around critical thresholds. Chinese firms must meet minimal ROE requirements if they are to have rights issues. Using a distribution approach, we examine whether Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regulatory requirements. Our empirical findings indicate that Chinese firms indeed heavily engaged in earnings management to meet the rights issue thresholds during the period 1994–2002. In addition, we show that these firms changed their behavior in response to changes in regulatory requirements. Furthermore, we analyse the pervasiveness of this practice and the means used in earnings management at the relevant ROE thresholds. Our findings have direct policy implications for the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Earnings Management and Firm Performance Following Open-Market Repurchases

Both post‐repurchase abnormal returns and reported improvement in operating performance are driven, at least in part, by pre‐repurchase downward earnings management rather than genuine growth in profitability. The downward earnings management increases with both the percentage of the company that managers repurchase and CEO ownership. Pre‐repurchase abnormal accruals are also negatively associated with future performance, with the association driven mainly by those firms that report the largest income‐decreasing abnormal accruals. The study suggests that one reason firms experience post‐repurchase abnormal returns is that post‐repurchase realized earnings growth exceeds expectations formed on the basis of pre‐repurchase deflated earnings numbers.