The Management of Technology (MOT) Degree: A Bridge Between Technology and Strategic Management

This article examines a new degree, the Management of Technology (MOT). To create customer value and competitive advantage in today’s technological environment, bridges must be built between managers who know what needs to be done and technologists who know how to do it. The traditional MBA program has focused on defining what needs to be done vis-a-vis customers and competitors. The traditional MS in technology program focused on how to do it. The emerging MOT programs bridge the two perspectives. Forces creating demand for MOT programs are explored and current MOT programs examined. This paper describes the MS in Technology Management program at Pepperdine University’s George L. Graziadio Graduate School of Business and Management as representative of MOT programs. The author has taught in Pepperdine University’s MS in Technology Management program since 1989.     

The speed of adjustment as a measure for competitiveness

The authors are grateful to G. Lensink for research assistance. Special acknowledgement is due to Prof. Harry P. Bowen of the Graduate School of Business, New York University, who was kind enough to supply much of the data, and to Prof. L. Beinsen for his comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Preferences over characteristics and utility functions over commodities

Following Lancaster, preferences are defined over a set of characteristics, while commodities vectors are transformed into characteristics by a production function. We assume that both the preferences over the characteristics and the production functions are “neoclassical” and we characterize the set utility functions over the consumption space derived as the composition of preferences over characteristics and production functions. We prove that, under regularity conditions, any function can be derived by such a composition. Thus, the theories of characteristics does not impose any restrictions on derived utility functions. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. The research of Aldo Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556. Paolo Siconolfi acknowledges the support of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.     

Generic existence of competitive equilibria when the asset market is incomplete: A symmetric argument

Summary The argument for the generic existence of competitive equilibria when the asset market is incomplete can be formulated with symmetric treatment of all individuals. The argument extends to a large economy.This text presents research results of the Belgian programme on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by its authors. The Commission of the European Communities provided additional support through the SPES grant CT91-0057. The second author acknowledges the generous support of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

When does Strategic Debt-service Matter?

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equity-holders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occassioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalitiesExpanded versions of this paper were presented in conferences and seminars at the Scottish Institute for Research in Finance, European Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, 10th Derivative Securities Conference, Santa Clara University, Virginia Tech, the Norwegian School of Management, the Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Duke University, and Carnegie-Mellon University. We benefitted greatly from the comments of participants at these seminars and would particularly like to thank Francesca Cornelli, Kose John, Pete Kyle, Sanjay Unni, and Raman Uppal in this context     

The Management of Technology (MOT) Degree: A Bridge Between Technology and Strategic Management

This article examines a new degree, the Management of Technology (MOT). To create customer value and competitive advantage in today's technological environment, bridges must be built between managers who know what needs to be done and technologists who know how to do it. The traditional MBA program has focused on defining what needs to be done vis-a-vis customers and competitors. The traditional MS in technology program focused on how to do it. The emerging MOT programs bridge the two perspectives. Forces creating demand for MOT programs are explored and current MOT programs examined. This paper describes the MS in Technology Management program at Pepperdine University's George L. Graziadio Graduate School of Business and Management as representative of MOT programs. The author has taught in Pepperdine University's MS in Technology Management program since 1989.     

Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy

Summary. One of the main challenges for monetary economics is to explain the use of assets that are dominated in rate-of-return as media of exchange. We use experimental methods to study how a fiat money might come to be used in transactions when an identically marketable, dividend-bearing asset, a consol, is also available. Our experimental economies, which have an overlapping generations structure, have the property that the only stationary rational expectations equilibria (SREE) require exclusive use of the consol as the medium of exchange. In a baseline treatment, agents use the consol exclusively, as would occur in an SREE. However, in other treatments, we observe episodes of rate-of-return dominance,with consistent use of fiat money as a medium of exchange. The results show that two properties of our economies are associated with the rate of return dominance anomaly. The first is a history of trading with fiat money, prior to the introduction of the consol. The second is the timing of the dividend payment; when the dividend payment follows the execution of trades between generations, hoarding of the consol occurs on the part of the old, who earn dividends by hoarding. In our economies, settling transactions with a dividend-bearing asset does not improve allocations over those resulting from trading with fiat money. Received: July 11, 2002; revised version: July 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"We thank Anne Villamil, participants in the 2000 Purdue University Conference on Monetary Economics, the Summer 2000 meetings of the Economic Science Association, and a referee, for very helpful comments. We thank the Krannert School of Management and the Purdue University Center for International Business, Education and Research for financial support and Vivian Lei for research assistance. We also thank Ron Michener for referring us to the historical account of the early introduction of money into the American colonies, as reported by Benjamin Franklin. Correspondence to: G. Camera     

THE U.K. PERSONAL SAVINGS RATIO: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE

An earlier version of this paper was written in 1976 when both authors were members of the Economics Department of the University of Stirling; it should not be interpreted as reflecting the official position of the Bank of England in any way. We would like to thank Professor Jack Revell (University College, Bangor) and Dr Alan Budd (London Business School) who both read and commented upon an earlier version. The traditional disclaimer applies.     

New market creation through transformation

Is new market creation a search and selectionprocess within the theoretical space of all possible markets? Or is it the outcome of a process of transformation of extant realities into new possibilities? In this article we consider new market creation as a process involving a new network of stakeholders. The network is initiated through an effectual commitment that sets in motion two concurrent cycles of expanding resources and convergingconstraints that result in the new market. The dynamic model was induced from two empirical investigations, a cognitive science-based investigation of entrepreneurial expertise, and a real time history of the RFID industry. JEL Classification: M13, M31, D4, D52, D71, D72, L1, L2, P42 We would like to thank the Batten Institute at the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia, for supporting this research. We would also like to thank the following on specific contributions to our thesis: Anil Menon for his relentless insistence on more precise formulations of effectual reasoning; Jim March for his conversation and for inspiring us to dig into Type I and Type II errors; Rob Wiltbank for firming up the section on opportunity costs; and Stuart Read for helping us clarify our writing. Correspondence to: S.D. Sarasvathy     

Exchange rate models and parameter variation: The case of the Dollar-Mark exchange rate

This paper is drawn from Chapter 3 of the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago (Wolff, 1985). He is very grateful to the members of his dissertation committee — Michael Mussa (Chairman), Joshua Aizenman, Robert Aliber, Jacob Frenkel, David Hsieh, John Huizinga, and Arnold Zellner — and to seminar participants at the University of Chicago, the London Business School and INSEAD for many helpful comments.     

Asset markets and the information revealed by prices

Summary When nominal assets serve to transfer revenues across states of the world, noninformative rational expectations equilibria exist. At noninformative prices, the restricted information under which individuals optimize can be modelled as restricted participation of the individuals in asset markets. When assets are nominal, the indeterminacy of equilibrium prices, and, generically, allocations as well, which characterizes economies with restricted participation guarantees that noninformative equilibrium prices exist.This work was supported in part by grant No 26 from the program Pole d' Attraction Interuniversitaire — Deuxieme phase of the Belgian government of CORE, Universite' Catholique De Louvain. The second author acknowledges the generous support of the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. We wish to thank David Cass for very helpful comments.     

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188–1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627–657, 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity. This paper was started while the authors were visiting the Harvard Business School during the fall of 2000. We are grateful for their hospitality and financial support. Vesterlund acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and Potters from the Royal Netherlands’ Academy of Arts and Sciences. We thank Henrik Orzen for assistance in conducting the experiment. We also thank David Cooper and an anonymous referee who helped us improve the paper. Finally we thank Chris Anderson, Jim Andreoni, John Duffy, Simon Gaechter, Ernan Haruvy, Muriel Niederle, Jack Ochs, Elke Renner, Al Roth, participants at ESA-meetings (Barcelona, 2001), the Leadership and Social Interactions Workshop (Lyon, 2003), SITE (Stanford, 2004) and seminar participants at Alabama, CMU, Duke, Keele, Maryland, Nottingham, NYU, Pittsburgh, OSU, and York for valuable comments.     

Market power, survival and accuracy of predictions in financial markets

In a standard General Equilibrium framework, we consider an agent strategically using her large volume of trade to influence asset prices to increase her consumption. We show that, as in Sandroni (Econometrica 68:1303–1341, 2000) for the competitive case, if markets are dynamically complete and some general conditions on market preferences are met then this agent’ long-run consumption will vanish if she makes less accurate predictions than the market, and will maintain her market power otherwise. We thus argue that the Market Selection Hypothesis extends to this situation of market power, in contrast to Alchian (J Pol Econ 58:211–221, 1950) and Friedman (Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953) who claimed that this selection was solely driven by the competitiveness of markets. I would like to thank T. Hens, A. Kirman and A. Sandroni for many stimulating conversations and encouragements. Two anonymous referees also provided very valuable comments.     

Perfect Bayesian implementation

Summary We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition which we callcondition . The condition is analogous tocondition C that Moore and Repullo [1988] show to be necessary for subgame perfect implementation in games of complete information, and it is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991]. Our first theorem establishes that Incentive Compatibility, Closure and Condition are necessary for implementation.Our second theorem establishes sufficient conditions. We show that any SCS which satisfies Incentive Compatibility, Closure and a condition called Sequential Monotonicity No Veto (SMNV) is implementable. SMNV is similar in spirit but weaker than the Monotonicity No Veto condition stated in Jackson [1991]. It is also similar to a combination of condition and No Veto Power, which Abreau and Sen show to be sufficient for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium.This paper is a revised version of a chapter of my dissertation at Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. I would like to thank, without implicating, Faruk Gul, Bob Wilson and especially John Roberts for their constant advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank participants at the 1993 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society and a referee for comments leading to substantial improvement in the paper. Financial support from Bocconi University is gratefully acknowledged.     

An evaluation of the performance of an applied general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy

Summary In 1985–86 the authors were members of a team that constructed a static applied general equilibrium model that was used to analyze the impact on the Spanish economy of the 1986 fiscal reform, which accompanied Spain's entry into the European Community. This paper compares the results obtained to recently published data for 1985–87; we find that the model performed well in predicting the changes in relative prices and resource allocation that actually occurred, particularly if we incorporate exogenous shocks that affected the Spanish economy in 1986. We also analyze the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the labor market and macroeconomic closure rules; we find that the central results are robust.We gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF Grant SES 89-22036 (Kehoe) and CICYT Grant PB 89 + 0309 (Polo and Sancho). We thank participants in the IIASA Applied General Equilibrium Conference, Laxenburg, Austria, August 1991; the International Trade Workshop at UCLA, March 1992; the Graduate Public Finance Course at the University of Minnesota, Winter 1993; Antonio Gomez Gomez-Plana; and Betsy Caucutt for helpful suggestions. Above all, we wish to thank our colleagues who have worked with us on the MEGA (Model d'Equilibri General Aplicat) Project at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Antonio Manresa, Pedro Javier Noyola, Jaime Serra-Puche, Cristina Echevarria, Walter Garcia, Ana Laborda, and Xavier Ramirez. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: an experimental approach

Summary We design and analyze experimental versions of monetary overlapping generations economies under alternative policy regimes. Economies with a constant level of real deficit financed through seignorage, economies in which the level of deficit is adapted in order to follow a monetary policy with a target rate of inflation, and economies with preannounced changes in deficit levels are reported here. We also examine the behavior of an economy with no stationary competitive equilibrium. Our time series are compared to rational expectations equilibrium paths and to adaptive learning dynamics.Financial support for our work from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, the National Science Foundation (SES-8912552), Richard M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds, and the Ministry of Education of Spain is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Javier Diaz-Giménez, Jean Michael Grandmont, Robert Lucas, Albert Marcet, Charles Plott, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Michael Woodford for commenting on our work. We also thank Vijay Rajan for developing the software for the computerized experimental environment, and Jackie Cuccaro and Dhananjay Gode for their research assistance.     

Learning,non-equilibrium beliefs,and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

Summary. We present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players' preferences that also incorporates random utility (noise). We estimate the model using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they are out-of-equilibrium, change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. In Japan and in the US, the estimated proposers' beliefs are further away from the uniform prior than the estimated equilibrium beliefs. The results seem to provide support for a non-pecuniary payoff explanation in all countries. Received: May 16, 2000; revised version: December 15, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alvin Roth for providing us with the data sets of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991). We are very grateful to Vincent Crawford, Joel Sobel, and an anonymous referee for all their comments and feedback. We are also grateful to J?rg Borrmann, Bruno Broseta, Jimmy Chan, Liran Einav, Bernd Engelmann, Drew Fudenberg, Oscar Jorda, Muriel Niederle, Pedro Pereira, Georg Weizs?cker, and audiences at the California Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and at the European Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Lausanne for their comments. Costa-Gomes was affiliated with the Harvard Business School during part of his work on this project. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence to:M.A. Costa-Gomes and K.G. Zauner     

Tenures That Shook the World: Worker Turnover in Russia, Poland, and Britain

We study worker turnover to investigate to what extent the length of time a worker has been employed by a firm shapes the turnover process in a transition economy. Using survey data, we compare the pattern of turnover with a Western economy, Britain. We show that tenure-turnover rates are higher in Russia and lower in Poland than in Britain. The characteristics of workers hired in the state and private sectors do not look very different. State and private sector firms in Poland offer the same wages to new recruits, but new private sector jobs in Russia appear to offer wage premia relative to new state jobs. We argue that these observations are consistent with a framework in which the value of seniority in jobs begun under the old order may be small and the value of a continued job match unsure, offset, in Poland at least, by insider resistance to layoffs.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 639–664. Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, IZA, Bonn, The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, and EERC, Kiev; Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, IZA, Bonn, and The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor.