产业潜在竞争优势理论与中国制造业发展方向

内容中国正处在工业化加速和产业结构升级调整的关键时期,关于未来制造业发展方向的选择标准,学术界莫衷一是。本文从需求分析的角度,提出产业潜在竞争优势的概念和理论,认为,具有本国密集需求的产业是具有潜在竞争优势的产业,当本国密集需求与世界需求发展方向相一致,该产业将具有国际竞争优势。     

比较优势演化、全球价值链分工与中国产业升级

随着全球分工体系的深化与国际贸易形式的演进,国际生产与贸易的格局正经历着深刻的调整,全球价值链成为了当今国际分工的主要发生形式,对各国的价值创造体系持续进行着重构与深化,产业结构也随之发生巨大的变化。自改革开放以来,中国通过参与全球价值链分工使得中国经济迅速发展,但产业结构仍停留在价值链的分工中低端,而要实现经济可持续发展,就必须首先实现产业结构的升级。本文从比较优势的演化入手,讨论了比较优势如何演化以及全球价值链分工与中国产业升级三者的联动关系,分析了中国产业的三大基本特征,认为中国产业升级必须走比较优势非线性演化与线性演化并重之路,促进生产要素的高级化、推进产业模块化、实施产业集群,枸建区域联动的国内价值链体系。     

中国制造业以服务化转型构建新竞争优势研究

中国制造业做大做强需要在国际市场上构建新的竞争优势,而这很大程度上依赖于制造业服务化转型,制造业企业可通过向客户提供成套解决方案或集成服务获得价值增值进而提升竞争力。尽管我国先后出台了一些政策措施来降低制造业服务化市场准入门槛,但仍存在与制造业相配套的现代服务业创新能力不强、制造业产业价值链延伸度不足、服务在价值链的比重较低、难以协调个性化生产与规模化生产的效率、中低端制造业企业提供附加服务的动力不足、中小型制造企业缺乏持续发展动力等问题。为促进制造业服务化转型,应加大政策支持力度,确定制造业企业的转型方向;制造业应重构企业价值链、充分利用"互联网+制造业"为客户提供智能服务、重视终端消费者的个性化体验、采取多种服务方式并转变为集成服务的供应商。     

产业集群的分工优势

产业集群(industrial cluster)是指特定产业以及支撑和关联产业在一定地域范围内的地理集中，形成产业集群的过程也被称为产业集聚(industrial agglomeration)。产业集聚不是什么新机制，而是一种在世界范围内较为普遍的经济现象。早在工业化发展时期，它就成为产业发展的一种有效模式。随着     

国际垂直专业化分工与中国制造业产业升级——基于16个行业净附加值比重的分析

笔者借鉴Hummel(2001)的方法计算了中国制造业16个细分行业的垂直专业化指数以及行业净附加值比重,并实证分析了二者之间的关系。在考察的7个年份当中,制造业总体及14个细分行业的垂直专业化指数都逐渐上升,说明中国参与垂直专业化分工的程度在不断加深,但制造业总体以及16个细分行业的净附加值率在考察年份中却呈现先增后降的趋势。通过参与国际垂直专业化分工,促进了中国制造业的产业间升级,但却导致了细分行业净附加值比重的下降,对制造业的产业内升级作用不明显,中国制造业仍然处于全球价值链的低端。     

中国医药制造业竞争优势演化的实证分析

医药制造业是高技术产业,它的发展已成为21世纪重要的经济增长点.近年来中国医药制造业的竞争优势也在逐步提升之中.本文构建了产业竞争优势评价模型,对中国医药制造业竞争优势的演化阶段进行了实证分析.分析结果表明,中国医药制造业竞争优势基本上处于生产要素导向阶段,要提升中国医药制造业的竞争优势,必须实行跨越式发展和提高医药制造业的自主创新能力.     

从比较优势到竞争优势——以甘肃产业调整实践为例

文章首先阐述了比较优势和竞争优势理论,然后分析了甘肃经济长期以来走资源导向型发展战略遇到的问题,最后提出了甘肃产业调整应走竞争优势导向型发展之路的若干思考。     

制造业:产业升级

2011年机械行业整体的投资策略和思路就是沿着机械行业产业升级的两条主线寻找优势企业。2011年机械行业整体的投资升级的两条主线寻找优势企业。     

比较竞争优势与中国产业的国际定位

比较优势理论虽然强调要素优势在一国产业定位中的作用，却把要素优势等同于产业优势，忽略了其它的约束条件，致使践行比较优势理论的发展中国家长期陷入“贫困化增长”之中，竞争优势理论所强调的优势要素，因与发展中国家的资源禀赋结构相距甚远，对发展中国家产业定位的指导意义十分有限。鉴于发展中国家的经验教训和我国大国经济的特征，中国在参与国际分工，对本国产业进行国际定位时，要把比较优势和竞争优势结合起来，形成比较竞争优势，按照比较竞争优势原则定位我国的产业，既能解决长期困扰发展中国家的贫困化增长问题，又能推动我国产业结构的升级和就业的增加。     

自由经济与国际分工：剖析全球城市个案

经济全球化的相关进程促使世界各个大城市生化联结而成一个相对有机的体系,令城市产生新的经济活动特征和产业结构调整,并使城市的中枢地位与影响力变得更突出。＂全球城市＂的衍生是全球经济发展与全球化进程深化的结果。全球城市既是国际经济全球化的空间依托、区域经济集团的支撑点、各类＂经济圈＂的核心,也是国家实现与国外经济联系的桥梁和基地,故此对＂全球城市＂的形成及其发展进行研究便具有积极意义,也将对＂全球化＂现象具体作用于经济实体的过程提供一个独特的诠释视角。据此,尝试检视＂全球城市＂这一概念框架,继之指出香港正是全球化时代中的一个全球城市,并进而剖析香港城市衍生为＂全球城市＂的背后动力因素。     

International trade and the division of labor

This paper develops a model of international trade based on the division of labor under perfect competition. International trade, by eliminating the duplication of coordination costs, leads to a greater variety of tasks, each produced at a larger scale than in autarky. The greater variety of tasks implies greater division of labor and hence gains from trade. Extending the model to two factors of production yields the additional result that if the two countries are sufficiently similar in their relative endowments, then both factors of production can experience gains from trade.     

Management innovation and core competitive advantages of SMEs

The paper first introduces the concept of core competence. Based on that, it proposes that small and medium enterprises （SMEs） should actively implement management innovation and describes the contents of management innovation. The conclusion is that SMEs should build the core competitive advantages through management innovation, in order to achieve better performance in the fierce market competition.     

现代产业体系下产业政策解析——基于分工的超边际分析框架

本文主要探讨一国经济起飞与其产业政策之间的关联性这一个超边际问题。通过对现代产业体系发展动力的分析,对中央政府在产业政策、地方政府在产业集群发展方面的作用局限性分析,提出替代产业政策的商业化方式用以促进现代产业体系高级化的可行性。同时,还对中观层面的同业协会在现代产业体系中的作用及作用机制问题作了初步阐述。     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

The division of labor and the extent of the market

Summary. A firms degree of specialization is modeled as the number of different goods it produces. When a firm chooses its degree of specialization, it faces a tradeoff between the fixed cost and the marginal cost of production. A firms degree of specialization is shown to increase with the extent of the market. Meanwhile, the real wage rate, as a measure of the extent of the market, is endogenously determined in the model and is shown to increase with the division of labor.Received: 29 April 2002, Revised: 18 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: A10.The author thanks an anonymous referee and Antonio Ciccone for their very valuable and constructive suggestions. I thank Deborah Minehart, Robert Schwab, and Daniel Vincent for their valuable guidance and advice. I also thank Mingchao Chen, David Selover, and Xiaokai Yang for their helpful advice.     

Encephalization and division of labor by early humans

We draw on Ricardian comparative advantage between distinct persons to map out the division of labor among proto-humans in a village some 1.7 million years ago. A person specialized in maintaining a cooking fire in the village is of particular interest (Ofek, Second nature, economic origins of human evolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001). We are also interested in modeling hunting by village males in teams. The large issue is whether and how specialization (division of labor) and interpersonal trade might have driven brain-expansion in early humans. We emphasize the need for early humans to develop the capacity to see themselves in others’ shoes (other-regardingness) in order for regularized trading to follow division of labor.     

On the choice between international capital and labor mobility

This paper examines the choice of international factor mobility. It proves in a two-country, two-factor, one-commodity model that the policy-setter, when it maximizes its own welfare by following the Ramaswami policy of monopsonistic import of its scarce factor, impoverishes the passive country. Furthermore, the paper studies the choice of mobility in a two-commodity model and shows that the optimality of the monopsonistic import policy extends to a situation with trade in goods. Lastly, it addresses the welfare effects in the passive country in the two-commodity model.     

Control rights,competitive markets,and the labor management debate

Labor-managed firms are often asserted to display perverse short-run behavior and defective investment incentives. These criticisms rely upon assumed departures from the neoclassical framework of complete and competitive markets, including restricted trading in worker memberships. This paper treats management by capital and by labor as special cases within a common analytical setting, and shows that there is no basis for distinguishing between these two principles of organizational design in a competitive-market environment: capital can be collectively owned by a labor-managed firm without undermining investment incentives. Future debate should thus center on identification of pertinent market failures.     

The division of labor is limited by the extent of the law

The present paper starts from the observation that there is still no analysis of private law as a basis for international trade, i. e. private transactions between noncompatriots (cf. Schmidt-Trenz 1990). Although authors like Buchanan, Hayek, Williamson, Böhm and Eucken have talked about the significance of a system of private law for the coordination of private transactions, they left out of their analysis the domain of protective state activity in international private business transactions vis-à-vis the multitude of legal orders and national enforcement organs. p ]It is the intention of this paper to focus upon the problems of the coordination of private foreign trade activities in the shadow of the territoriality of law. Specifically, it is asked: What are the causes for the fragmentation of private law in the world, and what are the consequences of the territoriality of law for the coordination of decisions concerning transactions between non-compatriots? The paper also deals with the question of how international coordination-efficiency can be fostered by international constitutional policy.