OPTIMAL TAXATION ON MIXED DIAMOND GOODS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE CAR OWNERSHIP IN CHINA

Abstract. The ‘diamond effect’ exists when a consumer's utility depends on the exchange value, not just on the intrinsic consumption effects of the good. Yew‐Kwang Ng has discussed the optimal tax on a pure ‘diamond’ good. This paper extends Ng's model to cover mixed diamond goods. It uses three mathematical models to show that the optimal tax on a mixed diamond good with both intrinsic and diamond effects depends on the proportion of the diamond effect. The result may explain the violation of the Ramsey Rule in practice, and may be used to formulate private car taxes in China.     

Lifetime Utility Maximization When the Consumer's Lifetime Depends on his Consumption*

A model of consumer behaviour is postulated whereby expected lifetime is an argument of the consumer's utility function and the consumption pattern chosen by the consumer affects his subjective probability distribution over expected, lifetime. Although introducing uncertainty makes the derivation of general conclusions difficult, it is shown for a simple two-good case that there are significant implications for income and substitution effects and the shape of the consumer's demand curve.     

Who you are or whom you know? Consumption interdependences in social networks

This paper presents an analysis of whether a consumer's decision to switch from one mobile phone provider to another is driven by individual consumer characteristics or by actions of other consumers in her social network. Such consumption interdependences are estimated using a unique dataset, which contains transaction data based on anonymized call records from a large European mobile phone carrier to approximate a consumer's social network. Results show that network effects have an important impact on consumers’ switching decisions: switching decisions are interdependent between consumers who interact with each other and this interdependence increases in the closeness between two consumers as measured by the calling data. In other words, if a subscriber switches carriers, she is also affecting the switching probabilities of other individuals in her social circle. The paper argues that such an approach is of high relevance to both switching of providers and to the adoption of new products.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

Advertising in demand systems: testing a Galbraithian hypothesis

In this paper we argue that the influence of advertising upon the inter-product distribution of demand is a system-wide phenomenon which is investigated better through a demand equation system rather than through single equation methods. Attention is focused upon a dynamic version of Deaton Muellbauer's AIDS model modified to include advertising terms. Within this framework using data on consumer's non-durable expenditure in the UK we carry out a preliminary test of Galbraith' hypothesis that advertising may affect the composition of aggregate consumer demand.     

我国流转税收入分配效应的实证分析

对2002-2009年我国增值税、消费税和营业税在不同收入户城镇居民间的分布及其对收入分配的影响进行综合分析,可得出三点基本判断:一是增值税表现出明显的累退性,且累退的症结在于适用低税率商品的消费需求缺乏收入弹性;二是不同消费品的调节效果相互抵消,消费税对收入分配的整体影响并不明显,但呈逐步向累进性发展的趋势;三是营业税表现出稳定的累进性。全部流转税呈现非常轻微的累退性,决定流转税收入调节效果的主导因素是消费品的需求收入弹性。通过恰当选择课税对象和实施差别税率,特定流转税完全有可能起到缩小收入分配差距的作用。     

Uncertainty and Consumption in Keynes's Theory of Effective Demand

Keynesian uncertainty normally exercises influence over effective demand via private investment. This paper expands the scope of influence of uncertainty to comprise private consumption as well. When private spending is explicitly made subject to uncertainty the individual consumer is forced to take active steps to make the future predictable. Contracted, sticky money prices are key tools in the consumer's efforts to keep uncertainty at a minimum and match earnings with consumption costs. However, even if prices are successfully contracted there is still need for preparedness against contingencies. Consumers therefore regulate their propensity to consume with reference to their confidence in the future: the propensity to consume is high when confidence is strong and low when confidence is weak. Because of its effect on the propensity to consume, consumer confidence exercises a significant influence on macroeconomic activity in general.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

Border tax adjustments and tariff‐tax reforms with consumption pollution

We develop a model of a small open economy, where pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities of the same good differs. We show that the first‐best policy combination calls for consumption taxes on all polluting goods, and border tax adjustment (BTA) measures, that is, tariffs or import subsidies. We identify conditions under which well‐known tariff‐tax reform policies for developing economies, such as a consumer‐price‐neutral piecemeal reform of trade and a consumption tax, and a consumer‐price‐neutral reform of all trade and consumption taxes improve welfare. We also evaluate whether reforms of trade taxes alone are superior to consumer‐price‐neutral reforms of trade and consumption taxes.     

A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY*

We model a spatial market in which the utility of each consumer is affected by the consumers who buy precisely the same product. The marginal contribution of consumers x's purchase on consumer y depends on |x–y|, which declines as |x–y| increases. Such modelling of preferences fits goods that signal a consumer's place in society—clothing styles, automobiles and jewellry are examples. For 2n + 1 firms we find the unique symmetric equilibrium and derive comparative statics on the optimal number of firms, the largest number of firms the market can support, and the behaviour of profits per firm as n increases.     

Disneyland monopoly,interlinkage and usurious interest rates

Interlinkage between labour and credit markets is interpreted as a consequence of a monopolistic moneylender's attempt to extract consumer's surplus from the borrower by levying a two-part tariff. This analogy enables us to draw on the literature on non-linear pricing to high- light issues in agrarian structure. The consequence of policy interventions, like taxes and minimum wage legislation, is studied. It is shown that the moneylender will charge ‘usurious’ interest rates if wages are rigid downwards or there is a tax on agricultural income or borrowers have heterogeneous preferences. Some geometry for analysing interlinkage is developed and used for deriving some of the results.     

Identification of Dynamic Models of Rewards Programme

“Frequent‐buyer” rewards programmes are commonly used by companies as a marketing tool to compete for market share. They provide a unique environment for studying consumers’ forward‐looking behaviour. The consumer's problem on accumulating reward points can be formulated as a stationary infinite horizon discrete choice dynamic programming model. We show that the parameters of this model, including the discount factor, are well‐identified. In particular, it is possible to identify state‐dependent discount factors (i.e. discount factors can vary with the number of reward points). We discuss how this identification result is related to the goal‐gradient hypothesis studied in the consumer psychology literature.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Beyond mobile number portability: measuring consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market

Japan's mobile phone market has been oligopolized by three incumbents who are seeking vertically integrated business models, which may prevent competitors from using platform layers to provide original services. We conduct two types of conjoint analysis to measure consumer stated preferences and draw two main conclusions from the analyses. First, the average consumer is willing to pay more than JPY 2000 (US $20) to increase mobile service portability. Second, the average consumer's willingness to pay corresponds to JPY 100–200 (US $1–2) per song for securing music download platforms. A dilemma exists in consumer preferences for service portability in Japan's mobile phone market, namely the choice between free mobile service portability and convenient music download platforms.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

Stabilizing consumer choice: the role of ‘true dynamic stability’ and related concepts in the history of consumer choice theory

Abstract

It is often argued that the inability of Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium theory to produce an adequate proof of the stability of the Walrasian price adjustment mechanism was one of the program's most significant failures. This paper will not question this standard interpretation of the history of general equilibrium theory, but makes the case that characterizing the ‘stability’ question in terms of market stability– in particular the stability of the equilibrium price vector in the Walrasian general equilibrium model – actually helped to stabilize the standard model of consumer choice in general equilibrium theory and elsewhere within microeconomics. The problem of the stability of ‘consumer's equilibrium’ was much discussed early in the twentieth century, and it has recently re-emerged in a different guise as the ‘endowment effects’ and ‘reference dependencies’ of contemporary behavioral economics, and yet it disappeared from mainstream discussion during the period 1950 to 1980. This paper argues that shifting the discussion from the intra-agent stability of the individual consumer to the inter-agent stability of the competitive market contributed – despite its ultimately negative impact on general equilibrium theory – to the long period of stable normal science consumer choice theory enjoyed during the middle of the twentieth century.     

The Problem of Optimum Income Taxation: A Remark on Its Monotonicity Constraint

We apply a generalized version of Brito and Oakland's (1977) approach to deal with monotonicity constraints in the nonlinear taxation problem of Mirrlees (1971) . This allows removing some analytical weaknesses in the derivation of the necessary conditions that characterize the optimal income tax, impossible to handle with the type of variation used for the proof in Mirrlees (1969) . The qualitative properties of the tax are thus restored provided the candidate consumption functions are restricted to be twice differentiable, except on countably many points, with no corners near the intervals where they show a strictly concave shape.     

Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a ‘tax lottery’. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with a lottery in which consumers can win cash prizes. The winning probabilities in this lottery depend on all consumers' private good consumption decisions. We show that for a given ad-valorem tax, an appropriately designed lottery can implement an efficient allocation in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The lottery component corrects the distortion in private consumption due to the ad-valorem tax, while the resulting tax revenue is sufficient to efficiently provide the public good and pay out the lottery prize.     

An income fluctuation problem

A consumer has a t period planning horizon problem, at each period, he gets additionals incomes that are i.i.d. random variables, and he must decide how much of his income will be spent in consumption, yielding some utility, and how much will be saved to maximize the total expected utility. No borrowing is allowed, and for the amounts saved no interest is paid. Using the concepts of competitive prices it is shown that as t → ∞ the corresponding limit of the consumption policy is strictly bounded above by the expected value of the random income.