Public–private partnerships for the provision of public goods: Theory and an application to NGOs

When will a public good or service be provided by the government, when will it be provided by a NGO, and when will we see a private–public partnership? This paper provides a model where a typical public good requires different inputs which raises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties. But hold-up problems due to contractual incompleteness in specifying tasks discourage separation of ownership and management. The fact that public goods have the property of non-rivalry and non-excludability and that NGOs tend to be non-profits drives our key results. We apply the framework to NGOs in developing countries which, in the last few decades, have been increasingly involved in various capacities in the provision of a wide range of public goods and services.     

An alternative approach to the construction of multi-regional input–output tables of the Czech Republic: application of the CHARM method

Empirica - The main scope of the paper is to review the construction method of (multi-)regional input–output tables (RIOTs) in the Czech Republic at the NUTS 3 regional level. We compare the...     

Temporal stability of preferences and willingness to pay for natural areas in choice experiments: A test–retest

The main objective of this paper is to test the temporal stability of stated preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) values from a Choice Experiment (CE) in a test–retest. The same group of participants was asked the same choice tasks in an internet-based CE, conducted twice with a time interval of one year without interviewer interference. We examine choice consistency at individual choice task level and transferability of the underlying indirect utility function and associated WTP values. The results show that choices are consistent in 57 percent of the choice occasions. Comparison of the choice models over time shows that the estimated preference and scale parameters are significantly different, suggesting that choice behaviour changed between the two surveys. Differences between marginal WTP estimates for individual choice attributes are statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. However, we show that this can result in significantly different WTP values for policy scenarios. The instability of estimated mean WTP values for different policy scenarios asks for caution when including WTP values in cost-benefit analysis.