Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

External aid donors have gradually shifted from a benign view of the African state to one that presumes a conflict of interest between the state and its own private sector. What are the implications of this diagnosis for the design of aid programs? We develop a model that locates slow growth in the overly narrow interests of a political elite. We study the impact of aid on policy choice and private investment and the role of conditionality in securing the gains from aid. The results capture key features of the current diagnosis while underscoring the need for more sophisticated treatments of domestic political institutions, institutional change, and donor motivations.     

The political economy of industrialisation

This paper analyses how incentives under different sets of political institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. I set out an endogenous growth model with non-overlapping generations, where agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, skills and political power. The skills of the political elite play a crucial role for industrialisation to occur. It is shown that a flat wealth distribution and a skilled political elite enhance development the most in elitist regimes, while democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in terms of industrialisation. The theoretical results regarding elitist regimes are in line with evidence on the Industrial Revolution.     

Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity

We develop a dynamic political economy model in which investment in the state capacity to levy taxes and deter crime is a policy variable, and we study the evolution of state capacity when policy is chosen by an elite. We show that democratization in the sense of expansion of the elite leads to an increased investment in state capacity and to a reduction in illegal activities and has nonmonotonic effects on tax rates as it reduces the willingness of the elite to engage in particularistic spending but enhances its willingness to provide public goods. Depending on initial conditions, consensual political changes may lead either to democratization or to the entrenchment of an immovable elite.     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long‐term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.     

Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenously determined in a political economy equilibrium. Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters, who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers.     

内生无效制度——对进入壁垒和贸易保护的思考

本文构建一个模型来考察为什么垄断、进入壁垒和贸易保护在许多国家长期存在。政治精英对中间产品索取高价的偏好导致了支持垄断和贸易保护的无效经济制度和政治制度。价格操纵机制表明,政治精英偏好于通过提高中间产品价格来增加垄断利润。提高税率虽然会增加政治精英的税收收入,但会降低对中间产品的需求,从而减少垄断利润。因此,价格操纵情况下的最优税率低于收入摄取情况下的最优税率,这与Acemoglu(2006)的结论相反。     

National borders,the global economy and geopolitics: A view from Yemen

The wider geographic scales of the new interdependencies called ‘globalisation’ are not new to peripheral states such as Yemen. In the colonial and post‐colonial world sensitivity to international developments has always been important in the course of local events. What is new is the particular configuration of political and economic institutions at various levels including, critically, the national level. This paper argues that, on the one hand, the new geography of economic and political ‘globalisation’ has left Yemen with distinctly ‘old’ forms of economic integration into world markets, but that, on the other hand, regional geopolitics have opened certain opportunities for Yemen's political elite to refashion itself as a strategic geopolitical player so as to maintain international flows of military and economic aid. The end result is the continued national dominance of these same elite. ‘Globalisation’ in this sense is a national political project.     

SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930

While scholars have devoted considerable attention to U.S. trade policy in the 1930s, particularly the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, little quantitative research focuses on the factors impinging upon elite decision makers who shaped Smoot-Hawley. We look at 11 votes on the Senate floor related to Smoot-Hawley to examine the impact of a variety of measures of constituency economic interests and member characteristics on elite decision making. Contrary to our expectations, the evidence does not support a pressure group model of policy making. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of political parties in making the Tariff Act of 1930.     

A political economy approach to endogenous industrial policies

This paper uses a political economy perspective to study the endogenous formation of economic policies and its interplay with political institutions. This paper provides a novel view that both the institutions and economic development status are essential factors in endogenously determining economic policies. The model aims to explain both the differences in the degree of adopting industrial policies as well as the differences in the types of industrial policies being implemented. Using a concise framework with two country-specific characteristics, the baseline model can capture three main types of industrial policy platforms of interest. In a country where voters’ political awareness is positively skewed and press freedom is relatively low, pro-heavy industry policies would be present most of the time; South Korea is representative of this type of countries. In a country where voters’ political awareness is positively skewed and press freedom is relatively high, there is usually an active industrial policy, though the target of the policy changes over time. Specifically, the policy is favoring the industry of which the industry-specific TFP is relatively high; Japan is representative of this type of countries. In a country where voters’ political awareness is negatively skewed and press freedom is relatively high, there is usually no active industrial policy; the U.S. is representative of this type of countries.     

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Creditor protection and the dynamics of the distribution in oligarchic societies

This paper analyzes the impact of weak contracting institutions on economic development and the wealth distribution in a Ramsey-type growth model. We show that, at low levels of accumulation, weak contracting institutions strongly favor the economic elite: By preventing market entry, such institutions provide the “oligarchs” with cheap access to credit—which is highly beneficial as long as capital is scarce. At the same time, a broad cross-section of society faces only low returns so that capital accumulation is slowed down and the capital stock gets concentrated in the hands of the elite. At higher levels of development, however, weak contracting institutions are harmful to all segments of society and institutional reform becomes unanimously supported. So the model helps to explain the pervasiveness of weak contracting institutions in less-advanced economies.     

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

This paper argues that the issues raised by the industrial policy debate are as much political as they are economic. There is every reason to believe that, without substantial reform of political institutions, efforts to administer a rational new industrial policy would soon degenerate into the type of inconsistent morass of special-interest-generated policies which industrial policy advocates rightfully criticize as our de facto set of industrial policies.
This important political dimension has been overlooked by many industrial policy advocates. An important exception is Robert Reich, who has proposed a new centralized industrial policy agency in hopes that the battle of conflicting interests would promote greater aggregate efficiency. We argue that on theoretical grounds, however, such centralization might either increase or decrease efficiency. The competition of the military services under the Defense Department gives us a close analogue for study. Unfortunately, however, our review of efficiency in defense policy suggests that this would be a very poor model on which to base a broader industrial policy. To promote substantial increases in defense and industrial policy efficiency appears to require that much more fundamental institutional reforms be considered.     

Costs of change and political polarization

We study a two-period model of policy-making where (i) changes of current policies impose costs on all individuals that increase linearly with the magnitude of the policy shift and (ii) political power changes over time. We show that policy polarization is minimal for intermediate marginal costs. In turn, welfare is a single-peaked function of the marginal cost. One interpretation is that societies with political institutions that impose positive but moderate costs on political reforms simultaneously achieve the highest welfare and the lowest policy polarization.     

Educated Bandits: Endogenous Property Rights and Intra‐Elite Distribution of Human Capital

This article presents a simple model of endogenous institutions linking property rights to the distribution of human capital between political and economic elite groups. In the absence of institutional constraints, the commitment problem of the political elites is intensified, because their human capital can turn out to be a double‐edged sword raising their efficiency in predation as well as in production. In general, the more human capital the political elites have, the stronger the institutional concessions they are ready to offer to attarct investment. Provided that predation depends sufficiently on human capital, the political elites can credibly commit to respect property rights by specializing in fields that are relevant for the priavte sector. Brain drain can undermine the transition to stable property rights even when the political elites are well‐educated. Comparative narratives from Malaysia and Zimbabwe are presented to motivate the theoretical discussion.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

Protecting Property: The Politics of Redistribution,Expropriation, and Market Openness

This paper develops a formal model to disentangle the competing political incentives for redistribution, expropriation, and market openness. Although redistribution and expropriation are both types of government extraction, redistribution re‐allocates wealth within the citizenry, while expropriation re‐allocates wealth from citizens to the government. Representative political institutions increase redistribution and reduce expropriation. Market openness changes these incentives, as foreign investors prefer reductions in both redistribution and expropriation. When political institutions are representative, the government will rely more on reducing expropriation, rather than limiting redistribution, to attract foreign investment. Under representative institutions then, openness partially reinforces the preferences of voters rather than undermining them. In addition, market liberalization occurs only when the policy changes needed to attract foreign investment are relatively small. If existing policies are satisfactory to foreign investors, moves toward openness may be accompanied by greater redistribution and expropriation, as governments are tempted by a larger base for extraction. Thus, openness has ambiguous effects on economic policy, at times encouraging and at times constraining extraction.     

Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.     

Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador

This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province-level electoral results, we test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measures of inequality and elite power used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution.