What Makes Workers Happy? Anticipated Rewards and Job Satisfaction

Using data collected from over 9400 employees in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Serbia, across a wide variety of workplaces and sectors, we identify the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that workers desire and expectations of receiving these rewards. We use ordered probit regression analysis to evaluate the association between anticipated rewards and job satisfaction, hypothesizing that reward desirability matters most for extrinsic rewards linked to numeric values. Data strongly support our hypothesis in the case of expected job security; limited support is found in the case of expected promotion. For non‐numeric extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, a strong positive link between job satisfaction and the reward variables often is observed, even if the expected reward is not highly desired. While own earnings typically are positively linked to job satisfaction, peers' earnings may be positively (Kazakhstan, Armenia, Russia) or negatively (Krygyzstan, Serbia) linked to job satisfaction, but not always statistically significant.     

The Urban Homeowner's Residential Location Decision in an Asset-Pricing Context

Homeowners determine the maximum site bid price for homeowner housing within a two-period expected-utility model. The bid price is a function of the expected cash flows to sites, the quantity of housing consumed and a relocation option. The bid price is derived in the general case as a function of the homeowner's portfolio risk, including the total risk to the site, and the market price of risk. The bid price is derived under a spatial measure as a function of distance from an arbitrary location. Specific results are obtained when the household experiences log-linear utility for housing and other goods. Use of the market price of risk simplifies analytical solutions to the bid price equation.     

How Do Land Auction Formats Influence the Market Structure and Aggregate Surplus of Real Estate Development?

This article proposes a duopoly dynamic game theoretic model to investigate the market structure and aggregate surplus of real estate development when land is sold in a sealed‐bid first price auction vis‐à‐vis an open English auction. It relaxes the assumption of symmetric bidders. The land values have common value and private value components. We find that the sealed‐bid first price auction introduces competition in the real estate development market. The open English auction leads a monopoly market. State agencies are recommended to increase the aggregate surplus of real estate development by publishing past bidding information under the sealed‐bid first price auction and reducing information asymmetry between bidders.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition

The literature on patent license auctions in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to bid high in order to signal an aggressive output strategy in a downstream Cournot market game, and conversely bid low to signal acquiescent pricing in a Bertrand market game. The present paper examines the information revealed by publishing the winning or the losing or no bid, assuming an oligopoly with differentiated goods. We rank disclosure rules and find that it is not optimal for the innovator to disclose the winning bid, regardless of the mode of competition.     

USING BIDDING STATISTICS TO PREDICT COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION COST

The completed cost of a competitively bid construction project often exceeds the original low bid. This paper presents two models to predict completed construction cost based upon characteristics of the submitted bids. Data on completed projects were obtained from New Jersey Department of Transportation for 298 highway construction projects. Median bid and normalized median absolute deviation (NMAD) were selected from various bid characteristics as the best predictors of completed construction cost. Regression and neural network models were developed from the data. Both models have similar utility to predict completed costs. Due to ease of use, the regression model is preferred over the neural network model.     

Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food aid procurement

The competitive bid process used by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian food aid is subject to bidder gaming that can increase prices and deter competition. Additionally, suppliers and carriers are matched after bid submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine the optimal auction mechanism to minimize gaming then justify pre-bid planning between suppliers and carriers using properties of the cost distribution functions. We operationalize these changes with a uniform price auction. The improved mechanism should deter gaming, enhance bid participation, and increase delivered food aid volumes.     

Should Firms Consider Employee Input in Reward System Design? The Effect of Participation on Market Orientation and New Product Performance

Will increasing employee participation in reward decisions increase new product performance by first increasing a firm's level of market orientation? Literature offers limited insight to the effects of listening to employees regarding reward system design and whether this may influence market orientation implementation and new product performance. This paper provides research to fill the gap by examining the relationship between participation‐based reward systems, market orientation, and new product performance. Based on expectancy theory, a conceptual model was developed suggesting that participation‐based rewards will increase market orientation by considering employees' desires regarding performance rewards. To test the model, a mixed method was used to collect data. First, in‐depth interviews were conducted with managers from 11 different firms to verify the proposed model. Then a multi‐industry sample of managers from 290 firms was surveyed to maximize generalizability of the results. Data were analyzed using structural equation modeling techniques to simultaneously fit the measurement and structural models. The findings show that market orientation significantly impacts objective new product performance and mediates the relationship between participation‐based rewards and objective new product performance. Participation‐based rewards positively affect market orientation but surprisingly affect new product performance negatively, while positively moderating the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. The results suggest that managers should include employee input in designing reward systems. However, managers should also be careful of how much input they allow employees in determining their rewards and goals as more input will improve market orientation or responding to information collected by, and disseminated throughout the firm, and that, in turn, will improve some types of new product performance. However, the direct effect of employee input can decrease new product performance suggesting that there may be a trade‐off between various success measures of new products developed and introduced by the firm.     

A Multinomial Logit Framework to Estimate Bid Shading in Procurement Auctions: Application to Cattle Sales in the Texas Panhandle

We develop an empirical methodology based upon multinomial probability models to estimate the magnitude of bid shading in cattle procurement in the Texas Panhandle region. The methodology works well in settings where data allow a good estimation of a bidder’s probability of winning, but the approach does not rely upon the bidding process following any particular structural framework or on the existence of a control group. Estimated markdowns of price from the competitive level are in the range of 5–10% and are somewhat larger than estimates of oligopsony markdowns from previous studies of cattle procurement in the U.S.     

Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through in Multi-Unit Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Approach*

We explore input cost pass-through in multi-unit procurement auctions. Whether cost shocks are private versus common across firms has important implications for discriminatory, but not uniform price auctions. We provide evidence of asymmetric pass-through of private cost shocks in discriminatory auctions. Unlike uniform price auctions, revenue-maximizing bidders in discriminatory auctions ‘pad’ bids close to the expected clearing price for units with costs below that price, but they do not bid below cost on higher cost units. Therefore, if costs are higher than expected, the clearing price rises and if costs are lower than expected, the clearing price remains high.     

Entry into auctions: An experimental analysis

This paper investigates entry decisions into first and second-price auctions using an experimental design to extract information on willingness-to-pay to enter (WTE). We find that subjects tend to overpay to enter both auction formats. In particular, if the subjects believe they will be bidding against bidders following the risk-neutral Nash strategy, their WTE is greater than the optimal risk-neutral amount 97% of the time for first-price auctions (FPA) and 90% for second-price auctions (SPA). If they believe that they are bidding against subjects who bid as do the other subjects, they submit a WTE that is too high 92% of the time for FPA and 69% of the time for SPA. We also find, in line with previous studies, significant overbidding in both the FPA and SPA. We then investigate whether introducing risk aversion (RA) or “joy of winning” (JOY) can explain the joint observation of over-entry and overbidding. In particular, using bid data alone, we structurally estimate three models, one allowing RA only, one allowing for JOY only and one allowing for both RA and JOY. While a model with JOY alone overestimates WTE, we find that RA alone can explain 38% of WTE but a model with both RA and JOY (where RA is estimated using FPA bids, and JOY is estimated using SPA bids) can explain 65% of WTE. Moreover, JOY appears to explain nearly all of the male WTE but only 44% of the female WTE.     

Information advantages of large institutional owners

We study the relation between the percentage of outstanding shares held by a firm's largest institutional owner and the bid–ask spread on that firm's shares, a measure of information risk. We find that the greater the percentage of shares held by the largest institutional investor, the greater the bid–ask spread in share prices. In contrast, the percentage of shares held by smaller institutional owners is related to lower bid–ask spreads. The results imply that only the largest of a firm's institutional owners—and no other institutional owner—is perceived to hold an information advantage. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions

We analyze the “roundness level” of bids—defined as the number of zeros at the end of the bid—in public procurement auctions for construction works in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, where a bid-rigging case was filed. We hypothesize that bid rigging increases the roundness of bids through the bid coordination process. Specifically, winners choose round numbers to avoid any miscommunication when they announce their planned bids to other ring members, and losers prefer round numbers when they arbitrarily bid above the winning bid. We find that (1) there is a positive relationship between the roundness of a bid and its relative value as a fraction of the reserve price, (2) the roundness of bids is higher when collusion is active than when it is inactive, (3) among the ring bids, the roundness of the lowest bids is even higher than that of the other bids, and (4) bids by non-ring members are also round when collusion is active.     

Sourcing from the Enemy: Horizontal Subcontracting in Highway Procurement

I empirically consider the effect of horizontal subcontracting on firm bidding strategies in California highway construction auctions. Subcontractors are hired by prime contractors prior to the auction, and the subcontractor may also be a competitor in the primary auction. While horizontal subcontracting may improve productive efficiency, it softens the horizontal subcontractor's bid strategy, since winning the auction may entail losing subcontracting business. I find that while each additional competitor supplied by the firm is estimated to increase its bid by 1.4 per cent, the winning bid is uncorrelated with horizontal subcontracting. This points toward an efficiency motive for cross‐supply.     

Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data

Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact that value bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory evidence shows that subjects do not learn to bid their values as they gain more experience. In the present paper, we re-examine the second-price auction data from Kagel and Levin’s (Econ J 103:868–879, 1993) classic paper. We find that auction efficiency increases over time, even though the frequency of overbidding is unchanged. We argue that the rise in efficiency is due to a decline in the variability of overbidding. This is consistent with subjects’ learning to bid more like each other.     

FORM OF CONTROL: A CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE AND CEO REWARDS

Based on two research streams, we investigate whether acquiring firms’ form of control might be associated differently with CEO rewards or excess returns. We theoretically reason that in manager-controlled corporations acquisitions may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders and CEO rewards might be based on nonperformance criteria. In owner-manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms acquisitions may benefit the stockholders. While CEO rewards of owner-controlled firms may be based on performance criteria, however, executive rewards of owner-manager-controlled firms may be based on both performance and nonperformance factors. The findings indicate that for manager-controlled firms acquisition announcements result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms such announcements result in positive excess returns. The findings also suggest that increases in corporate size due to acquisitions are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards of manager-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms. For owner-controlled firms, excess returns are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extrinsic Rewards,Intrinsic Motivation,and New Product Development Performance

Reward structures can have a significant impact on the performance of new product development (NPD) teams. However, there are several gaps in our understanding of how different types of extrinsic rewards influence the creative performance of NPD teams. Drawing on key theoretical objectives for advancing rewards-creativity research in general, and NPD research in particular, this study incorporates a cognitive and behavioral view of rewards use. In so doing, we distinguish between three kinds of extrinsic rewards: financial, recognition, and social (based on their properties). We then draw upon self-determination theory to hypothesize the differential effects of three types of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic task motivation, and subsequently the creative performance of NPD teams. The proposed framework is tested using two rounds of survey data from 238 members of 64 NPD teams in the high-tech industry. Results of a multilevel structural equation modeling (MLSEM) analysis show that financial rewards have a negative relationship with intrinsic task motivation, while recognition and social rewards have a positive influence. Complexity of the product being developed not only helps to mitigate the negative effects of financial rewards on intrinsic task motivation, but it also reduces the positive effects of social rewards on intrinsic task motivation. Intrinsic task motivation is found to have a positive effect on NPD creative performance in terms of both the developed product’s degree of innovation and its quality. Theoretical and managerial implications are explored.     

Is the ‘Linkage Principle’ Valid? Evidence from the Field

We present field evidence concerning experienced bidders that supports the linkage principle—specifically, the prediction that in affiliated‐values auction environments the expected revenues generated at open‐outcry, ascending‐bid auctions are higher than those under auction formats that reveal less information to participants. Using field data from a large seller of automobiles who experimented with different selling formats, we have found that average revenues were significantly higher under an English auction than under a dynamic Internet auction format that revealed less information to bidders.     

Auction design and bidding strategy for the note issuance facility

Three auctioning methods are considered for the Note Issuance Facility. They are (i) the discriminatory auction where each winning bidder is paid his own interest rate bid, (ii) the stop-out-rate auction where all winners are paid the interest rate that clears the market, and (iii) the lowest-rejected-bid auction in which all winners are paid the lowest rejected interest rate bid. For each auctioning method, the bidder's optimal bidding strategy is derived and the note issuer's corresponding expected interest rate is obtained. The results under these three auctioning methods are then compared.     

Bias and Error in Mine Project Capital Cost Estimation

Previous analyses of small samples of mining projects have found that feasibility studies tend to underestimate the as-built capital costs of the project. Our review of 63 international mining and smelting projects confirms that as-built capital costs are, on average, 14% higher than as estimated in the bankable feasibility study. There is little attenuation over time of this bias in capital cost estimation, appearing to reflect an absence of learning on the part of the project sponsor or the consulting engineering firm. We argue that this persistence of bias is instead intentional and rational, driven by a scarcity of project financing and the need by project sponsors to inflate the project economics in a bid to secure financing. We find some empirical support for our contention. A second phase of the analysis examines estimation error. Roughly half of all projects' as-built capital costs fall outside of the expected ± 15% of the feasibility study capital cost estimate, even after allowing for intentional estimation bias. Cost overruns of 100% or more happen in roughly 1 out of 13 projects. Smaller projects have less estimation accuracy than large projects. Finally, our analysis of the cost overrun data reveals that a shifted lognormal probability distribution should be used when modeling mining project capital costs in a Monte Carlo analysis.