Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

On the Term Structure of Default Premia in the Swap and LIBOR Markets

Existing theories of the term structure of swap rates provide an analysis of the Treasury–swap spread based on either a liquidity convenience yield in the Treasury market, or default risk in the swap market. Although these models do not focus on the relation between corporate yields and swap rates (the LIBOR–swap spread), they imply that the term structure of corporate yields and swap rates should be identical. As documented previously (e.g., in Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993)) this is counterfactual. Here, we propose a model of the default risk imbedded in the swap term structure that is able to explain the LIBOR–swap spread. Whereas corporate bonds carry default risk, we argue that swap contracts are free of default risk. Because swaps are indexed on "refreshed"-credit-quality LIBOR rates, the spread between corporate yields and swap rates should capture the market's expectations of the probability of deterioration in credit quality of a corporate bond issuer. We model this feature and use our model to estimate the likelihood of future deterioration in credit quality from the LIBOR–swap spread. The analysis is important because it shows that the term structure of swap rates does not reflect the borrowing cost of a standard LIBOR credit quality issuer. It also has implications for modeling the dynamics of the swap term structure.     

Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default

The standard Principal–Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985, Econometrica53, 69–76) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is not permitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest rates, and default rates as functions of the level of bankruptcy protection level. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D80, G21, G28, J30.     

The term structure of credit spreads with jump risk

Default risk analysis is important for valuing corporate bonds, swaps, and credit derivatives and plays a critical role in managing the credit risk of bank loan portfolios. This paper offers a theory to explain the observed empirical regularities on default probabilities, recovery rates, and credit spreads. It incorporates jump risk into the default process. With the jump risk, a firm can default instantaneously because of a sudden drop in its value. As a result, a credit model with the jump risk is able to match the size of credit spreads on corporate bonds and can generate various shapes of yield spread curves and marginal default rate curves, including upward-sloping, downward-sloping, flat, and hump-shaped, even if the firm is currently in a good financial standing. The model also links recovery rates to the firm value at default so that the variation in recovery rates is endogenously generated and the correlation between recovery rates and credit ratings before default reported in Altman [J. Finance 44 (1989) 909] can be justified.     

Measuring Credit Risk of Individual Corporate Bonds in US Energy Sector

In this paper, using the measures of the credit risk price spread (CRiPS) and the standardized credit risk price spread (S-CRiPS) proposed in Kariya’s (A CB (corporate bond) pricing model for deriving default probabilities and recovery rates. Eaton, IMS Collection Series: Festschrift for Professor Morris L., 2013) corporate bond model, we make a comprehensive empirical credit risk analysis on individual corporate bonds (CBs) in the US energy sector, where cross-sectional CB and government bond price data is used with bond attributes. Applying the principal component analysis method to the S-CRiPSs, we also categorize individual CBs into three different groups and study on their characteristics of S-CRiPS fluctuations of each group in association with bond attributes. Secondly, using the market credit rating scheme proposed by Kariya et al. (2014), we make credit-homogeneous groups of CBs and show that our rating scheme is empirically very timely and useful. Thirdly, we derive term structures of default probabilities for each homogeneous group, which reflect the investors’ views and perspectives on the future default probabilities or likelihoods implicitly implied by the CB prices for each credit-homogeneous group. Throughout this paper it is observed that our credit risk models and the associated measures for individual CBs work effectively and can timely provide the market credit information evaluated by investors.     

Sovereign credit spreads

The paper develops a structural credit risk model to study sovereign credit risk and the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. The model features endogenous default and recovery rates that both depend on the interaction between domestic output fluctuations and global macroeconomic conditions. We show that sovereigns choose to default at higher levels of economic output once global macroeconomic conditions are bad. This yields to default rates and credit spreads that are substantially higher compared to normal times. We derive closed-form expressions for sovereign debt values and default times and focus on the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. As opposed to standard theories of sovereign debt, this paper’s structural model generates much richer default patterns and non-linearities through regime-shifts in the global macroeconomic environment. Moreover, changes in the global environment reveal the interconnectedness of the financial system.     

Hedging of a credit default swaption in the CIR default intensity model

An important issue arising in the context of credit default swap (CDS) rates is the construction of an appropriate model in which a family of options written on credit default swaps, referred to hereafter as credit default swaptions, can be valued and hedged. The goal of this work is to exemplify the usefulness of some abstract hedging results, which were obtained previously by the authors, for the valuation and hedging of the credit default swaption in a particular hazard process setup, namely, the CIR default intensity model.     

Use of credit and arrears on debt among low‐income families in the United Kingdom

Household accumulation of debt and arrears on debt, especially among low‐income families, is an extremely topical issue in the UK media and in policy circles. This paper utilises data from the UK's Survey of Low Income Families in order to examine use of credit, and default and arrears, among low‐income families with children. It shows how credit use and accumulation of arrears differ between single parents and couples with children, and also between homeowners and renters. It also briefly examines the persistence of arrears on specific forms of credit using the panel element of the data‐set, now named the Families and Children Survey.     

A Model of Mortgage Default

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero‐profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan‐to‐value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable‐rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

Differential default risk among traditional and non-traditional mortgage products and capital adequacy standards

We develop a framework to quantify credit risks of non-traditional mortgage products (NMPs). Ex ante probabilities of default are caused by willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay problems and the high default rates for NMPs confirm that payment shock is a critical default risk indicator. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted using three correlated stochastic variables (mortgage interest rate, home price, and household income) under normal and stressed economies. Results confirm that the default risk of 2/28 and option ARM contracts requiring a minimum monthly interest payment have a greater probability of default than other mortgage products in all economic scenarios. Additionally, the credit risk of NMPs is primarily systematic risk, suggesting that these products should require higher risk-based capital. Due to the non-linear distribution of credit risk, even the advanced internal-based rating approach of the Basle II framework can understate the risk involved in these NMPs.     

Empirical credit cycles and capital buffer formation

We model 1927–1997 US business failure rates using an unobserved components time series model. Clear evidence is found of cyclical behavior in default rates. We also detect significant longer term movements in default rates and default correlations. In a multi-year backtest experiment we show that accommodation of default rate dynamics has important consequences for credit risk capitalization requirements. Static or myopic variants of credit portfolio models miss significant periods of credit risk accumulation. Empirically congruent dynamic models by contrast provide more timely warning signals of credit risk build-up. In this way they may mitigate some of the pro-cyclicality concerns.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Irreversible investment,managerial discretion and optimal capital structure

We explore the significance of employee compensation and alternative (reservation) income on investment timing, endogenous default, yield spreads and capital structure. In a real-options setting, a manager’s incentive to under(over)invest in a project is associated to labor income he has to forego in order to work on the project, the manager’s salary, his stake on the project’s equity capital and his subsequent income, should he decide to terminate operations. We find that the optimal level of coupon payments decreases with managerial salary and ownership stake while it is increasing in the manager’s reservation income. Yield spreads (optimal leverage ratios) are increasing (decreasing) in the manager’s salary and ownership stake, while they are decreasing (increasing) in the manager’s reservation income. Exploring agency costs of debt as deviations from a value-maximizing investment policy, we document a U-shaped relationship between agency costs of debt and the managerial compensation parameters: the manager’s reservation income, salary and ownership share.     

What Constitutes Evidence of Discrimination in Lending?

We analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. We show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.     

Evidence on the insurance effect of bankruptcy exemptions

Defaulting on one’s debts when experiencing an adverse event can help insure households against unexpected income risks. But the effect of allowing default on debt levels is ambiguous, not least because lenders may restrict access to credit. Hence the optimal punishment for bankruptcy is unclear. The US states allows householders to keep a variety of assets when filing for bankruptcy – the ‘bankruptcy exemptions’ – and these exemptions change substantially between states and over time. By exploiting these differences this study shows that raising the exemptions (i) marginally decreases the level of unsecured debt that household’s hold; (ii) makes consumption smoother. Thus, despite the effect on debt levels, the generous provisions to debtors in arrears may be helping US households to insure themselves against income risk.     

The rise of risk-based pricing of mortgage interest rates in Italy

This paper assesses how much mortgage interest rates in Italy are priced on credit risk as proxied by the probability of household mortgage delinquency estimated using the EU-Silc database. Owing to data availability, we restrict the analysis of mortgage pricing to Italian households. Consistent with the more widespread use of credit scoring, estimates indicate that Italian lenders have increasingly priced mortgage interest rates on household credit risk. For mortgages granted between 2000 and 2007, we find that a 1% point increase in the probability of default is associated with a 21 basis point rise in mortgage interest rates, lower than the 38 basis point premium Edelberg (2006) estimated for the US at the end of the 1990s.     

Implied migration rates from credit barrier models

The risk-neutral credit migration process captures quantitative information which is relevant to the pricing theory and risk management of credit derivatives. In this article, we derive implied migration rates by means of a recently introduced credit barrier model which is calibrated on the basis of aggregate information such as credit migration rates and credit spread curves. The model is characterized by an underlying stochastic process that represents credit quality, and default events are associated to barrier crossings. The stochastic process has state dependent volatility and jumps which are estimated by using empirical migration and default rates. A risk-neutralizing drift and forward liquidity spreads are estimated to consistently match the average spread curves corresponding to all the various ratings. The implied migration rates obtained with our credit barrier model are then compared with those obtained via the Kijima–Komoribayashi model.     

Modeling the evolution of implied CDO correlations

CDO tranche spreads (and prices of related portfolio-credit derivatives) depend on the market’s perception of the future loss distribution of the underlying credit portfolio. Applying Sklar’s seminal decomposition to the distribution of the vector of default times, the portfolio-loss distribution derived thereof is specified through individual default probabilities and the dependence among obligors’ default times. Moreover, the loss severity, specified via obligors’ recovery rates, is an additional determinant. Several (specifically univariate) credit derivatives are primarily driven by individual default probabilities, allowing investments in (or hedging against) default risk. However, there is no derivative that allows separately trading (or hedging) default correlations; all products exposed to correlation risk are contemporaneously also exposed to default risk. Moreover, the abstract notion of dependence among the names in a credit portfolio is not directly observable from traded assets. Inverting the classical Vasicek/Gauss copula model for the correlation parameter allows constructing time series of implied (compound and base) correlations. Based on such time series, it is possible to identify observable variables that describe implied correlations in terms of a regression model. This provides an economic model of the time evolution of the market’s view of the dependence structure. Different regression models are developed and investigated for the European CDO market. Applications and extensions to other markets are discussed.     

A mathematical model for multi-name credit based on community flocking

We present a new mathematical model for multi-name credit that employs stochastic flocking. Flocking mechanisms have been used in a variety of models of biological, sociological and physical aggregation phenomena. As a direct application of a flocking mechanism, we introduce a credit risk model based on community flocking for a credit worthiness index. Correlations between different credit worthiness indices are explained in terms of communication rates and coupling strengths from the flocking system. Based on the flocking model, we compute credit curves for individual names and default time distributions. We also apply the proposed model to the pricing of credit derivatives such as credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations.