沪深两市开盘信息披露方式的创新探讨

交易信息披露方式作为证券市场交易制度内容之一，影响着市场透明度，有利于强化市场价格发现机能，提高市场效率，改进市场监督作业，对交易所而言，最佳市场透明度必须是在一定的制度、市场结构与政策环境下，估量不同市场参与者相互抵触利利益的比重，对市场公平性、流动性、稳定性、有效性、竞争性统一进行考量并取舍，以寻求平衡，于是本文借鉴国际经验，仅就沪深两市的开盘信息披露现状进行有关探讨。     

交易透明度与信息揭示制度：国际趋势与启示

由于经济文化环境、交易制度、市场结构，技术模式和投资者分布等方面的差异，不同交易所在交易信息揭示的种类，数量和程度方面有所区别。本文首先总结了采取指令驱动的主要交易所的交易信息揭示制度和市场透明度，在比基础上分析了交易所交易信息揭示制度变革与市场透明度的发展趋势．希望能对我国证券市场交易信息揭示制度的发展提供一点有益的借鉴和启示。     

证券交易的透明度与信息揭示制度：理论综述

证券交易过程中，交易信息的发布、扩散和传递方式对于各类市场参与者非常重要。目前关于信息揭示制度和交易透明度对市场运行效果的影响尚存在许多争议。本文讨论了交易透明度的含义、研究者和市场机构对于交易透明度的争论、交易透明度与市场绩效的关系，以及不同交易透明性的市场之间的竞争等问题，系统总结了目前与证券交易透明度和交易信息揭示有关的理论观点，以期把握交易信息揭示程度对市场产生的影响，以及由此引起的交易透明度对市场的运行效率产生的影响。     

我国商业银行信息披露问题研究

商业银行信息披露作为我国进一步完善市场经济机制、强化银行市场约束、提高金融透明度亟待解决的一个重要课题,特别是当前银行业经营巨变的环境中,银行业信息屏蔽已成为金融风险的一个重要根源。事实证明,凡是走向世界,与国际接轨的银行都回避不了信息披露制度,都需要经历信息披露的考验。     

论商业银行会计信息披露的现状与完善对策

一、商业银行会计信息披露的质量要求 提高商业银行信息披露质量是强化市场约束、提高金融透明度的必然要求,也是我国参与国际竞争的必要条件.我国商业银行由于发展较慢,在信息披露上与国际先进水平存在较大差距.所以如何进一步加强相关制度的合法性,如何确保信息披露的真实可靠,如何保证信息披露内容的及时有效变的越来越受人们的关注.     

应进一步提高资产证券化市场透明度

随着我国资产证券化市场发行规模稳定增长,资产支持证券及其底层资产的透明度引起投资者和监管层的高度关注。本文分析了透明度对于资产证券化市场发展的重要意义,并以欧盟STS标准和美国信息披露制度为借鉴,提出了我国资产证券化市场透明度建设方面的建议。     

货币政策透明度:理论分析与操作实践

增强货币政策透明度正在成为一种国际趋势。理性预期、信息不对称和货币政策动态不一致性理论为货币政策透明度提供了理论支持。西方工业国家的中央银行通过提高货币政策透明度，对提高货币政策的有效性起到了积极的作用。我国货币政策透明度近年来在不断提高，但仍有继续改善的空间，应在建立货币政策信息公开制度、规范信息披露的内容、改善信息披露的形式、加强与公众的沟通方面做出努力。     

日本投资者关系活动的发展及启示

投资者关系活动(IRA,Investor Relation Activities)是指上市公司面向现有和潜在投资者进行的战略广告宣传活动,向他们传达公司的经营状况和发展前景,以便其在获得充分信息的情况下做出投资决策.在日本,投资者关系活动已成为上市公司自愿披露信息的重要渠道,成为对证券交易法律及交易所规则所要求的强制性信息披露的必要补充.     

沪深两市交易所XBRL信息披露平台功能比较分析

可扩展商业报告语言(XBRL)近年来在我国得到了积极的推进并成绩显著,我国沪深两市交易所都已利用XBRL技术建立了自己的信息披露平台.本文将分别从上市公司信息披露和行业信息披露对沪深两市交易所的XBRL信息披露平台功能进行梳理比较和评价,指出该平台目前存在的缺陷,并提供完善建议,以推动我国XBRL信息披露平台的建设.     

上市公司信息披露：比较与借鉴

为防止公司丑闻重演,增强投资者对本国资本市场的信心,各国证券监管者与交易所推出了一系列改革方案.2000年来,世界各国信息披露呈现以下特点:(1)与公司治理有关信息披露的规定急剧增加;(2)对信息即时披露的规定愈趋严谨,大多数交易所已实施公平披露规则(fair disclosure),防止公司选择性揭露重要信息;(3)为改善信息的发布机制,很多交易所采用实时信息发布系统;(4)强化信息披露监督及执行机制,很多交易所对于违反规定的上市公司采取较为严厉的处罚.     

Informed trading on debt covenant violations: the long and short of it

We examine whether disclosure of complex information events reduces information asymmetry by investigating the long‐ and short‐term impact of firms' disclosure of debt covenant violations on the probability of informed trading. We argue debt covenant violation disclosures provide informed agents with a long window of opportunity to trade on their private information largely due to the uncertainty arising from the debt renegotiation process. We find the probability of informed trading is greater after the disclosure, particularly when the violation outcomes are unresolved or where there is concern about possible future violations.     

Insightful Insiders? Insider Trading and Stock Return around Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures

This study asks whether insider trading associates with an information advantage around first‐time debt covenant violation disclosures in SEC filings, which potentially results from early access to information about the debt covenant violation disclosure. We document two results. First, we find net insider selling up to 12 months before a debt covenant violation disclosure, which precedes investors' negative returns before disclosure; and net insider buying up to 12 months after disclosure, which precedes investors' positive returns after disclosure. Second, we show that net insider trading one to two months before and after the violation disclosure associates predictably with investors' short‐term reaction to the covenant violation announcement.     

Effects of prior voluntary disclosure on earnings announcements in an environment with low information and regulation

This study examines the association between levels of annual report voluntary disclosure and the market reaction to the next interim earnings announcement in a market with both low regulation and analyst following. We examine the first order effects of voluntary disclosure by using direct measures for both the level of voluntary disclosure, and the market effects of such disclosure. The results show that preannouncement voluntary disclosure significantly reduces the price and volume reactions in the earnings announcement period, and is consistent with the Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) framework and the Atiase and Bamber (1994) empirical findings. We extend the analysis to investigate trading behavior during the earnings announcement period, and observe the trading behavior predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994). We conclude that voluntary disclosure in annual reports can be regarded as an important determinant of preannouncement information precision in markets with low regulation and analyst following, and observe the expected trading behavior as modeled in Kim and Verrecchia (1991a), and extended in Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994).     

How disclosure quality affects the level of information asymmetry

We examine two potential mechanisms through which disclosure quality is expected to reduce information asymmetry: (1) altering the trading incentives of informed and uninformed investors so that there is relatively less trading by privately informed investors, and (2) reducing the likelihood that investors discover and trade on private information. Our results indicate that the negative relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is primarily caused by the latter mechanism. While information asymmetry is negatively associated with the quality of the annual report and investor relations activities, it is positively associated with quarterly report disclosure quality. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that that the negative association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is stronger in settings characterized by higher levels of firm-investor asymmetry.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

The mandatory disclosure of trades and market liquidity

Financial market regulations require various 'insiders' to disclosetheir trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatorydisclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits.This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunitiesfor insiders even if they possess no private information onthe asset's value. We also show that insiders will generallynot voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure tobe forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis isthat the market cannot observe whether an insider is tradingon private information regarding asset value of is trading forpersonal portfolio reasons.     

Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives

This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure “quality” in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide higher quality disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading.     

增发融资市场运行中的问题及制度完善研究

目前中国增发融资出现了市场融资功能错位、发行监管效率不高、发行折价幅度偏大、内幕交易和利益输送频发以及信息披露不完善等问题。借鉴国外成熟市场制度,从上市审核、发行主体、发行定价、发行对象、流动性限制、信息披露制度等方面完善中国增发融资市场的相关制度,从而提高市场的运行效率。     

Information‐Hedging Disclosures and Insider Trading

I model the effect of disclosure on the tradeoff between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well‐informed, risk‐averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk‐averse insider's information‐based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk‐averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.