Prediction of <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-records from a general class of distributions under balanced type loss functions

We study the problem of predicting future k-records based on k-record data for a large class of distributions, which includes several well-known distributions such as: Exponential, Weibull (one parameter), Pareto, Burr type XII, among others. With both Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches being investigated here, we pay more attention to Bayesian predictors under balanced type loss functions as introduced by Jafari Jozani et al. (Stat Probab Lett 76:773–780, 2006a). The results are presented under the balanced versions of some well-known loss functions, namely squared error loss, Varian’s linear-exponential loss and absolute error loss or L ₁ loss functions. Some of the previous results in the literatures such as Ahmadi et al. (Commun Stat Theory Methods 34:795–805, 2005), and Raqab et al. (Statistics 41:105–108, 2007) can be achieved as special cases of our results. Partial support from Ordered and Spatial Data Center of Excellence of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad is acknowledged by J. Ahmadi. M. J. Jozani’s research supported partially by a grant of Statistical Research and Training Center. é. Marchand’s research supported by NSERC of Canada. A. Parsian’s research supported by a grant of the Research Council of the University of Tehran.     

A conceptual model of public sector corporate entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship has been conceptualized as a process that can occur in organizations of all sizes and types (Burgelman, Academy of Management Review, 8, 32–47, 1983; Miller, Management Science, 29, 770–791, 1983; Gartner, Academy of Management Review, 10, 696–706, 1985; Kao, Entrepreneurship, creativity and organization, 1989). This paper develops a conceptual model of public sector corporate entrepreneurship. The proposed model is intended to depict the main antecedents that relate to corporate entrepreneurship within the public sector and the impact of corporate entrepreneurship on public sector organizational performance (growth, development and productivity), as well as factors influencing its continuous performance. Following discussion of the model’s contents, the potential value for researchers and those engaging in public sector corporate entrepreneurship are described.     

On the natural selection rule in general linear models

We consider a problem of selecting the best treatment in a general linear model. We look at the properties of the natural selection rule. It is shown that the natural selection rule is minimax under to “0–1” loss function and it is a Bayes rule under a monotone permutation invariant loss function with respect to a permutation invariant prior for every variance balanced design. Some other condition on the design matrix is given so that a Bayes rule with respect to a normal prior will be of simple structure.     

Hypothesis testing and parameter estimation based onM-statistics ink samples with unequal variances

Summary Ink samples with unequal variances,M-tests for homogeneity ofk location parameters are proposed. The asymptoticχ ²-distributions of the test statistics and the robustness of the tests are investigated. NextM-estimators (ME’s) of parameters are discussed. Furthermore positive-part shrinkage versions (PSME’s) of theM-estimators for the location parameters are considered along with modified James-Stein estimation rule. In asymptotic distributional risks based on a special feasible loss, it is shown that the PSME’s dominate the ME’s, and preliminary test and shrinkageM-versions fork≧4.     

A Q-Analysis of Census Data: Intra-Household Income Allocation and School Attendance in Chiapas, Mexico

Q-analysis, introduced by a mathematician Ron Atkin, is a useful tool to explore social structures. I introduce essential concepts and techniques of q-analysis to show q-analysis’s potential ability to analyze and extract information from census data – the work that most researchers have done mainly with statistical methods. Using Mexican census and q-analysis, I examine whether children of female-headed household aged 15–19 were more likely to attend school than male-headed household children in Chiapas, Mexico in 2000. My findings are consistent with the large body of previous research, many of which were conducted with statistical methods: women’s control of income tends to results in a better welfare for their children, defined as children’s school attendance by the sex of heads of household in my study. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a-analysis of census data. I conclude that while it has some weaknesses, q-analysis is a complimentary method to statistical methods for analysis of census data that may overcome some limitations that statistical methods often face such as an incapability of handling a small sample.     

Durbin’s random substitution and conditional Monte Carlo

Durbin (Biometrika 48:41–55, 1961) proposed a method called random substitution, by which a composite problem of goodness-of-fit can be reduced to a simple one. In this paper we provide a method of finding the p-value of any test statistic, for a composite goodness-of-fit problem, based on the simulation of a large number of conditional samples, using an analog of Durbin’s proposal in a reverse-type application. We analyze a Bayesian chi-square test proposed in Johnson (Ann Stat 32:2361–2384, 2004) which relies on a single randomization and relate it with Durbin’s original method. We also review a related proposal for conditional Monte-Carlo simulation in Lindqvist and Taraldsen (Biometrika 92:451–464, 2005) and compare it with our procedure. We show our method in a non-group example introduced in Lindqvist and Taraldsen (Biometrika 90:489–490, 2003).     

Response of double-auction markets to instantaneous Selling�CBuying signals with stochastic Bid�CAsk spread

Statistical properties of order-driven double-auction markets with Bid–Ask spread are investigated through the dynamical quantities such as response function. We first attempt to utilize the so-called Madhavan–Richardson–Roomans model (MRR for short) to simulate the stochastic process of the price-change in empirical data sets (say, EUR/JPY or USD/JPY exchange rates) in which the Bid–Ask spread fluctuates in time. We find that the MRR theory apparently fails to simulate so much as the qualitative behaviour (‘non-monotonic’ behaviour) of the response function R(l) (l denotes the difference of times at which the response function is evaluated) calculated from the data. Especially, we confirm that the stochastic nature of the Bid–Ask spread causes apparent deviations from a linear relationship between the R(l) and the auto-correlation function C(l), namely, R(l) μ -C(l){R(l) \propto -C(l)}. To make the microscopic model of double-auction markets having stochastic Bid–Ask spread, we use the minority game with a finite market history length and find numerically that appropriate extension of the game shows quite similar behaviour of the response function to the empirical evidence. We also reveal that the minority game modeling with the adaptive (‘annealed’) look-up table reproduces the non-linear relationship R(l) μ -f(C(l)){R(l) \propto -f(C(l))} (f(x) stands for a non-linear function leading to ‘λ-shapes’) more effectively than the fixed (‘quenched’) look-up table does.     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

Mapping the successful succession process in family firms: evidence from Greece

The succession process in family firms has by far been determined to be the most critical phase in the family business life-cycle (e.g. Morris et al. Journal of Business Venturing 18:513–531, 1997; Wang et al. 2000) and characterized as the period in which most family firm fatalities occur (Handler and Kram Family Business Review 1:361–381, 1988). This paper is an empirical study on Greek family firms and seeks to identify the critical success factors that have a major impact on the outcome of a generational transition in the leadership of the family firm. Based on an integrated conceptual framework proposed by Pyromalis et al. (2006), we test the impact of five factors, namely the incumbent’s propensity to step aside, the successor’s willingness to take over, the positive family relations and communication, succession planning, and the successor’s appropriateness and preparation on both the satisfaction of the stakeholders with the succession process and the effectiveness of the succession process per se. The results provide a useful insight and confirm the importance of the aforementioned factors in the succession process by mapping a safe passage through the family business succession process, and by contributing not only to the overall family business literature but also generating strong arguments in favor of the family firm as an integral entrepreneurial element for a region’s sustainable economic development.     

On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

Faynzilberg and Kumar (Rev Econ Design 5(1):23–58, 2000) show that the usual Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions to validate the first-order approach in moral hazard agency models are no longer valid in the generalized agency case. They consider the risk-averse agent case and identify one set of technological conditions, where the production technology satisfies the linear distribution function condition in actions and types, that validates ex-ante the first-order approach. With the usefulness of their decomposition approach, we show that the first-order approach in the generalized agency case can be checked ex-ante under the Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions when the agent is risk-neutral but there is a binding limited liability constraint on the agent’s wage.      

Optimal Social Design: Estimating a Social Welfare Function from Questionnaire Data

A social design x evokes a response y from a set of individuals. The value of the design is expressed in terms of a social welfare function which is derived from Arrow’s formulation of social choice. Making certain simplifying assumptions the social welfare function can be expressed in terms of individuals’ ideal designs. A method for estimating the social welfare function from quite limited empirical evidence is developed. The method is applied to an educational case study. There was considerable variation in individuals’ ideal designs. The components of the social welfare were estimated: the welfare ideal, the population sensitivity, the population variation, the deviation from the ideal and the welfare ceiling. Methodological problems are discussed.     

Estimating a restricted normal mean

Let X ₁, X ₂, ..., X _n be a random sample from a normal distribution with unknown mean μ and known variance σ ². In many practical situations, μ is known a priori to be restricted to a bounded interval, say [−m, m] for some m > 0. The sample mean , then, becomes an inadmissible estimator for μ. It is also not minimax with respect to the squared error loss function. Minimax and other estimators for this problem have been studied by Casella and Strawderman (Ann Stat 9:870–878, 1981), Bickel (Ann Stat 9:1301–1309, 1981) and Gatsonis et al. (Stat Prob Lett 6:21–30, 1987) etc. In this paper, we obtain some new estimators for μ. The case when the variance σ ² is unknown is also studied and various estimators for μ are proposed. Risk performance of all estimators is numerically compared for both the cases when σ ² may be known and unknown.     

Discrimination of Observations into One of Two Elliptic Populations based on Monotone Training Samples

In this paper we deal with the problem of classifying a p-dimensional random vector into one of two elliptically contoured populations with unknown and distinct mean vectors and a common, but unknown, scale matrix. The classification procedure is based on two-step monotone training samples, one from each population, with the same monotone pattern. Our aim is to extend the classification procedure, which proposed recently by Chung and Han (Ann Ins Stat Math 52:544–556, 2000). This procedure is a linear combination of two discriminant functions, one based on the complete samples and the other on the incomplete samples. The performance of the proposed classification rule is compared with the plug-in method, this means with the classification rule which arises if the unknown parameters are substituted, into the usual classification rule, by their estimators. In order to apply the plug-in method, the MLE of the location parameters and of the common scale matrix of g ≥ 2 elliptically contoured populations are analytically obtained on the basis of two-step monotone training samples.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Workplace Bullying: Application of Novak’s (1998) Learning Theory and Implications for Training

This paper applies Novak’s (1998) theory of learning to the problem of workplace bullying. Novak’s theory offers an understanding of how actions of bullying and responses to bullying can be seen as deriving from individualized conceptualizations of workplace bullying by those involved. Further, Novak’s theory suggests that training involving Ausubel’s concept of meaningful learning (Ausubel Educational Theory 11(1): 15–25, 1961; Ausubel et al. 1978) which attends to learners’ pre-existing knowledge and allows for new meaning to be constructed regarding workplace bullying can lead to new actions related to workplace bullying. Ideally, these new actions can involve both a reduction in workplace bullying prevalence, and responses to workplace bullying which recognize and are informed by the negative consequences of this workplace dynamic.     

On the calibration of design weights using a displacement function

In the present investigation, we propose a new method to calibrate the estimator of the general parameter of interest in survey sampling. We demonstrate that the linear regression estimator due to Hansen et al. (Sample Survey Method and Theory. Wiley, NY, 1953) is a special case of this. We reconfirm that the sum of calibrated weights has to be set equal to sum of the design weights within a given sample as shown in Singh (Advanced sampling theory with applications: How Michael ‘selected’ Amy, Vol. 1 and 2. Kluwer, The Netherlands, pp 1–1247, 2003; Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Survey Method Section [CD-ROM], Toronto, Canada: American Statistical Association, pp 4382–4389, 2004; Metrika:1–18, 2006a; Presented at INTERFACE 2006, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2006b) and Stearns and Singh (Presented at Joint Statistical Meeting, MN, USA (Available on the CD), 2005; Comput Stat Data Anal 52:4253–4271, 2008). Thus, it shows that the Sir. R.A. Fisher’s brilliant idea of keeping sum of observed frequencies equal to that of expected frequencies leads to a “Honest-Balance” while weighing design weights in survey sampling. The major benefit of the proposed new estimator is that it always works unlike the pseudo empirical likelihood estimators listed in Owen (Empirical Likelihood. Chapman & Hall, London, 2001), Chen and Sitter (Stat Sin 9:385–406, 1999) and Wu (Sur Methodol 31(2):239–243, 2005). The main endeavor of this paper is to bring a change in the existing calibration technology, which is based on only positive distance functions, with a displacement function that has the flexibility of taking positive, negative, or zero value. At the end, the proposed technology has been compared with its competitors under several kinds of linear and non-linear non-parametric models using an extensive simulation study. A couple of open questions are raised.     

Optimal process parameters under LINEX loss function with general input quality characteristic

In this paper we generalize the quality and cost trade-off problem of Chang and Hung (Qual Quant 41: 291–301, 2007) under the LINEX loss function. We consider the general input characteristic given by the random variable X with moment generating function m _X (t) and output characteristic given by the deterministic transformation Y  =  g(X). The two cases we consider are when g(X) is an affine function of X and X follows (1) the gamma distribution, and (2) the double exponential distribution.     

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

In this game [Aruka in Avatamsaka game structure and experiment on the web. In: Aruka Y (ed) Evolutionary controversies in economics. Springer, Tokyo, pp 115–132, 2001], selfishness may not be determined even if an agent selfishly adopts the strategy of defection. Individual selfishness can only be realized if the other agent cooperates, therefore gain from defection can never be assured by defection alone. The sanction by defection as a reaction of the rival agent cannot necessarily reduce the selfishness of the rival. In this game, explicit direct reciprocity cannot be guaranteed. Now we introduce different spillovers or payoff matrices, so that each agent may then be faced with a different payoff matrix. A ball in the urn is interpreted as the number of cooperators, and the urn as a payoff matrix. We apply Ewens’ sampling formula to our urn process in this game theoretic environment. In this case, there is a similar result as in the classic case, because there is “self-averaging” for the variances of the number who cooperate. Applying Pitman’s sampling formula to the urn process, the invariance of the random partition vectors under the properties of exchangeability and size-biased permutation does not hold in general. Pitman’s sampling formula depends on the two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet distribution whose special case is just Ewens’ formula. In the Ewens setting, only one probability α of a new entry matters. On the other hand, there is an additional probability θ of an unknown entry, as will be argued in the Pitman formula. More concretely, we will investigate the effects of different payoff sizes from playing a series of different games for newly emerging agents. As Aoki and Yoshikawa (Non-self-averaging in macroeconomic models: a criticism of modern micro-founded macroeconomics, Economics Discussion Papers 2007-49. . November 26, 2007) and Aoki (J Econ Interact Coord 3:1–3, 2008) dealt with a product innovation and a process innovation, they criticized Lucas’ representative method and the idea that players face micro shocks drawn from the same unchanged probability distribution. In the light of Aoki and Yoshikawa (Non-self-averaging in macroeconomic models: a criticism of modern micro-founded macroeconomics, Economics Discussion Papers 2007-49. . November 26, 2007), we show the same argument in our Avatamsaka game with different payoffs. In this setting, innovations occurring in urns may be regarded as increases of the number of cooperators in urns whose payoffs are different.     

On the distribution of Harter

In his seminal paper, Harter (1951) derived the exact distribution of Wald’s classification statistic. In this note, we consider the more general problem of deriving the exact distribution of the product XY when X and Y are independent student’s t random variables with any degrees of freedom. Our results are simpler and more general than those presented by Harter (1951).