REIT IPOs and the Cost of Going Public

We examine Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that went public between 1986 and 2004. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REIT IPOs are associated with lower levels of underpricing relative to traditional issues. We also find that REITs are associated with smaller file price revisions. Both findings are potentially attributable to the lower level of uncertainty associated with pricing REITs. In contrast, using an alternative measure of issuance costs that incorporates the share retention decision by preexisting owners, we find no significant difference between REIT and non-REIT issues, suggesting the results of previous studies are not robust to various specifications of issuance cost and that preexisting owners do not necessarily benefit from the lower level of underpricing. Additionally, we find no difference in the issuance costs of equity versus mortgage REITs, particularly once we control for the use of umbrella partnerships.

Analyst Activity and Firm Value: Evidence from the REIT Sector

This paper is the first to examine (1) properties of analyst forecasts and (2) effects of analyst following on firm value for all REITs on CRSP, Compustat and I/B/E/S. Our results suggest that REITs operate in an information environment that has changed over time. We find that for periods when the REIT industry was either in the developmental stage (pre-1992), or after other structural changes in the industry (post-2000), more analysts cover REITs and forecasts are more accurate and less biased. Further, we find that mortgage REITs are more transparent than other REIT structures and exhibit properties of analyst behavior that are different from other types of REITs. Our investigation into the effect of analyst coverage on REIT value suggests that analyst coverage increases REIT value (as measured by Tobin’s q) and that the causality does not run the opposite way.

Real Estate Risk Exposure of Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study examines the linkage between equity real estate investment trust (REIT) returns and the private real estate factor. The results reveal a tighter connection between REIT and the private real estate market starting from 1993. In addition, large-cap REITs seem to behave more like real estate than do small-cap REITs. Overall, the results are consistent with three notions: (1) that institutional investors provide information-gathering services (Bradrinath et al., Rev. Financ. Stud., 8:401–430, 1995), (2) that a more sophisticated investor base improves information flow, and (3) that a high degree of participation from institutional investors strengthens the linkage between REIT returns and the underlying real estate factor (Ziering et al., The evolution of public and private market investing in the new real estate capital markets, Prudential Real Estate Investors, Parsippany, NJ, 1997).

Discovering REIT Price Discovery: A New Data Setting

This study decomposes real estate investment trust (REIT) returns into two components: (1) real returns, and (2) public returns. The real returns are based on the changes in the private, appraisal-based net asset values of REITs, whereas the public returns are measured by the variations in REITs’ premiums/discounts. This study then investigates the price discovery of REIT prices. The results indicate that lagged public returns are useful in predicting real returns. In addition, the study documents concurrent factor exposures for public returns and lagged factor exposures for private returns under a variety of asset pricing models. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that public markets are more efficient in processing information.

Financial Leverage,CEO Compensation,and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper studies the determinants of corporate hedging practices in the REIT industry between 1999 and 2001. We find a positive significant relation between hedging and financial leverage, indicating the financial distress costs motive for using derivatives in the REIT industry. Using estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of CEO’s stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of CEO’s stock and stock option portfolios to stock price, we find evidence to support managerial risk aversion motive for corporate hedging in the REIT industry. Our results indicate that CEO’s cash compensation and the CEO’s wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility are significant determinants of derivative use in REITs. We also document a significant positive relation between institutional ownership and hedging activity. Further, we find that probability of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs.

How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?

We investigate 95 takeovers of property companies all over the world and find that only two of those are hostile. To determine the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, we first study characteristics of targets and acquirers compared to a control sample, using the complete global universe of listed property companies during the most recent takeover wave (1999–2004). We find that the inefficient management hypothesis holds for both REITs and non-REITs, as targets exhibit significant underperformance before takeovers. In the second part of this study, we investigate shareholder wealth effects following takeovers and confirm previous findings that abnormal returns for targets and bidders are distinctly different for the real estate sector. Moreover, we show that this difference not only holds for REIT-to-REIT mergers, but also for mergers of real estate firms without a REIT-status.

Momentum Profitability and Market Trend: Evidence from REITs

This study investigates Real Estate Investment Trusts’ momentum returns in different market states, and explains the momentum phenomenon with a risk-based dividend growth theory of Johnson (Journal of Finance 57:585–608, 2002). Our results show that momentum returns of REITs are higher during up markets. This study finds that winners’ dividend/price ratios are higher than those of losers, and momentum returns are positively correlated with the difference between winners’ and losers’ dividend/price ratios. We also find that momentum returns are higher after the legislation change of REITs in 1992, and that dividend/price ratios of REITs are also higher after 1992, suggesting that a persistent shock to REIT’s dividend/price ratios in 1992 partly explains REITs’ higher momentum returns after 1992. In sum, results of this study suggest that momentum returns of REITs can be jointly explained by a time-varying factor (market state) and a cross-sectional variance in dividend yields.

Idiosyncratic Risk and REIT Returns

The volatility of a stock returns can be decomposed into market and firm-specific volatility, with the former commonly known as systematic risk and the later as idiosyncratic risk. This study examines the relevance of idiosyncratic risk in explaining the monthly cross-sectional returns of REIT stocks. Contrary to the CAPM theory, a significant positive relationship is found between idiosyncratic volatility and the cross-sectional returns. This suggests that firm-specific risk matters in REIT pricing. The regression results further show that once idiosyncratic risk is controlled for in the asset-pricing model, the size and book-to-market equity ratio factors ceased to be significant. The explanatory power of the momentum effect remains robust in the presence of idiosyncratic risk.

The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings

The factors influencing the cash holdings of REITs are examined with the view that the REIT industry should yield new information regarding the drivers of corporate cash policy due to their unique operating conditions. The availability of REIT line of credit data also allows us to test the association between cash holdings and line of credit access and use. Data constraints in prior investigations have left this an unresolved empirical question in the cash holdings literature. The baseline results show that REIT cash holdings are inversely related to funds from operations, leverage, and internal advisement and are directly related to the cost of external finance and growth opportunities. Cash holdings are also negatively associated with credit line access and use. The results imply that REIT managers elect to hold little cash to reduce the agency problems of cash flow thereby increasing transparency and reducing the future cost of external capital.

Monetary Shocks and REIT Returns

We investigate the influence of unanticipated changes in US monetary policy on Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT’s). Although a number of studies have investigated the issue of interest rate changes, the effect of unanticipated changes has not previously been addressed in terms of possible effects on both REIT’s returns and volatility. The results show a strong response in both the first and second moments of REIT returns to unexpected policy rate changes. The results for the impact of the shock on both mean and volatility of returns is consistent with results from studies addressing broader equity markets. However, we find evidence both against behavioral changes in volatility coincident to US monetary policy decisions and asymmetric responses to the monetary policy shock.

Does acquirer cash level predict post-acquisition returns?

This paper investigates whether an acquirer’s pre-announcement cash level can predict post-acquisition returns. Harford (1999, Journal of Finance, 54, 1969–1997) shows that some cash-rich acquirers have lower announcement period returns than other acquirers, suggesting the market partially anticipates poor future performance. This paper shows that the acquirer’s cash level is also strongly and negatively predictive of post-acquisition returns, indicating that the announcement response is incomplete. Post-acquisition return on net operating assets (RNOA) is significantly decreasing in acquirer cash, suggesting that the market responds to subsequent poor operating performance as it is reported. Overall, these results are consistent with the market’s inattention to a less prominent accounting signal (acquirer cash) but attentiveness to a more prominent accounting signal (RNOA), as proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, Journal of Accounting Economics, 36, 337–386).

Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs

We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find that REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.

Institutional Investment and the Turn-of-the-Month Effect: Evidence from REITs

Many studies have hypothesized that the turn-of-the-month effect is caused by institutional investment. However, there is little evidence to support this hypothesis. This study provides an empirical test that measures the impact of the level of institutional investment on the turn-of-the-month effect using a sample of REITs over the period 1980 to 2004. We find that a significant change in the turn-of-the-month effect occurred following the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 which relaxed the requirements on the level of institutional investment in REITs. The evidence suggests that the dramatic rise in institutional holdings can account for a good part of this change. However, the impact of institutional investment may not be as large as some researchers have suspected. There is no evidence to suggest that institutional investment impacts returns on the day when the turn-of-the-month effect is most pronounced, suggesting that this calendar anomaly is not caused exclusively by institutional investors in the market.

Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?

This study investigates firms that repurchase their stock to finance an acquisition. Since research shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than stock-financed acquisitions, why do firms that have available cash initiate the extra transactional step. I find these firms are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. On average, these firms have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements and thus may choose repurchasing to signal undervaluation. Furthermore, the stock acquisition step allows these firms to share risk, counteract the negative effects of dilution, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.

CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy

This paper examines the relationship between CEO entrenchment and dividend policy of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We develop an index for CEO entrenchment using CEO tenure and duality and find that this index has significant impact on dividend policy. We further separate our sample into two sub-groups: REITs with and without nomination committees. Our analyses show a strong positive relationship between CEO entrenchment level and dividend payout for REITs without a nomination committee. In REITs with nomination committees, CEO entrenchment has less influence on dividend policy. We conclude that dividend policy serves as a substitution for other governance mechanisms. Further, our results are consistent with the evidence for other US firms—CEO that are more entrenched pay higher dividends to avoid shareholder sanctions and the threat of takeover.

Price–volume relations of DAX companies

This study provides empirical evidence of the joint dynamics between stock returns and trading volume using stock data of DAX companies. Contemporaneous as well as dynamic interactions are investigated for a period from January 1994 to December 2005 on a daily basis. Our results suggest that there is almost no relationship between stock return levels and trading volume in either direction. We find that trading volume is contemporaneously positively related to return volatility. In addition, we establish that lagged return volatility induces trading volume movements. Finally, we examine dependencies in the tails and find no significant support for the hypothesis of the independence of the maximal values of absolute returns and trading volume.

Conditional Volatility of Equity Real Estate Investment Trust Returns: A Pre- and Post-1993 Comparison

We examine the dynamic behavior of Equity Real Estate Investment Trust (EREIT) volatility in a GARCH context 1972–2006 using monthly EREIT returns, and comparing volatility performance for “early” Equity REITs 1972–1992 with that of “modern” EREITs 1993–2006. Consistent with findings for conventional firms, we find that EREIT conditional volatility is time-varying, persistent, and predictable. There is a positive relationship between expected return and expected risk in EREIT stocks pre-1993, but the relationship disappears after 1993. We find no evidence that negative shocks affect EREIT volatility differently from positive ones in either time period. Different from reported results for conventional firms, we find that changes in the conditional volatility of fundamental macroeconomic variables have strong explanatory value for future changes in EREIT volatility. Finally, comparing EREIT volatility performance with volatility in the Russell 2000 Index, a proxy for small stocks, we find that EREIT volatility behaves differently from that of small stocks in many respects, indicating that risks in the small stock index cannot effectively proxy for risks in the EREIT market.

Evidence of feedback trading with Markov switching regimes

Previous research has concluded that the degree of return autocorrelation observed in index returns varies linearly with the volatility of the series, and that feedback traders are at least partly responsible for this phenomenon. Using daily Australian bond and equity market returns, we test this conclusion directly by using a Markov switching model for changing variance that explicitly allows the autocorrelation of returns to vary with the volatility regime. We find evidence that a significant proportion of investors in both the Australian equity and bond markets are positive feedback traders and are responsible for the observed increase in negative autocorrelation in index returns during periods of high and increasing volatility.

Herding,momentum and investor over-reaction

In this paper we study the impact of noise or quality of prices on returns. The noise arises from herding by market participants beyond what is justified by information. We construct a firm-quarter-specific measure of speculative intensity (SPEC) based on autocorrelation in daily trading volume adjusted for the amount of information available, and find that speculative intensity has a significant positive impact on returns. Both cross-sectional and time series variation in SPEC are consistent with conventional wisdom, and with implications of theories of herding as in DeLong et al. (1990, J Political Econ 98(4):703–738). We find that high-SPEC firms drive the returns to momentum trading strategies and that investor over-reaction is significant only in the case of high-SPEC firms.

How Do Employees View Their Underwater Stock Options?: Evidence from the Stock Option Exchange Program

This paper examines the participation decisions of employees in a stock option exchange program aimed at restoring value to underwater options. The program invites employees to exchange their existing underwater options for new options, the value of which is determined by the company stock price in 6 months and 1 day. The participation turns out to vary cross-sectionally and, perhaps surprisingly, the employees do not surrender all their underwater options. We find that employees actively and rationally consider a variety of factors to make their participation decisions, rather than blindly surrendering their underwater options. The participation decisions of non-executive employees seem to be well anticipated by stock market investors, since no abnormal stock returns are related to the participation decisions.