关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究

本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

经理人股票期权理论及其模型分析

经理人股票期权是为了适应现代企业制度的需要,对经理人员实行的行之有效的约束激励机制,其本质就是让拥有控制权的经理人员一方面能够拥有一定的剩余索取权,另一方面还要承担相应的风险,从而激励经理人最大限度地维护企业所有者的利益。本文通过阐述经理人股票期权的激励作用,提出了期权理论模型,进而使经理人建立长期激励的良性循环具有指导意义。     

经理人股票期权的会计归属研究

从经理人股票期权的性质角度分析，经理人股票期权不是企业的负债，而应是企业的权益．但是不符合现有会计模式权益的定义。因此，主张把经理人股票期权纳入现有的报表要素中，如此处理-应增强所有者权益定义的独立性，突出权益的剩余索取权的经济实质；二应拓宽所有者权益的内涵，建立“或有权益”概念。     

股票期权与上市公司经理人激励

根据委托—代理理论,签约双方目标函数不一致且信息非对称,引致激励不相容问题发生.要解决此问题,必须注重代理人长期报酬设计,将经理人利益与企业发展紧密结合起来.采用股票期权的制度安排方式,以股票增值实现代理人的剩余索取,能有效防范经理人道德风险的发生.针对我国国企经营者长期激励偏弱的现实,引进股票期权制度,重塑经理人激励约束机制,对深化激励制度改革具有重要的借鉴意义.     

对经理人股票期权会计确认问题的探讨

本文在现代企业理论框架内对股票期权会计确认问题进行了探讨。作为经营者分享企业剩余的契约安排,股票期权实质上是经理人的专有性投入,应当确认为企业的资产,并确认经营者的权益。同时,随着知识经济的发展,现有的会计反映模式应当由业主权益观变更为企业主体观,以更好地反映利益相关者的投入及企业的价值。     

借晋商智慧结晶 创新企业管理体制——金融机构股权激励探析

股权激励是一种通过经营者获得公司股权形式给予企业经营者一定的经济权利,使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策、分享利润承担风险,从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务的一种激励方法.股权激励机制的种类多样,典型的模式有：股票期权、股票增值权、限制性股票、虚拟股票、账面价值股票、特定目标奖金、业绩股份、储蓄-股票参与计划、股票无条件赠予、影子股票、延期支付、经理人收购等等.     

论股票期权计划及其在我国的发展前景

中国的股票市场在经历了一波火热的行情后,开始走向震荡整理阶段。这与管理层对股市泡沫的隐忧而采取一系列的直接和间接的调控措施有关。然而决定股票市场长期健康发展的一个关键因素是上市公司治理结构的完善和业绩的提高。完善公司治理成为摆在上市公司面前的一项重要任务。在这样一个背景下,增加实施股票期权等与股票市场挂钩的激励方法在国内的公司成为一种趋势,股权激励日益被各界所关注,目前,A股上市公司已近或正在启动股权激励相关方案的已达到30%左右。股票期权计划又是股权激励的一种最主要的方式。然而,股票期权是不是适合我国上市公司的方案却是值得冷静思考的一个问题。一、股票期权计划的激励效应公司制的区别于其它企业组织形式的一个最主要的特点就是,所有者和经营者的分离。以股份制公司为例,股东拥有对企业资产的所有权和索取权,拥有对公司经理人进行选择、激励和监管的权力;而经理人拥有的是企业的剩余控制权。绝大多数股东不可能亲自参与企业的管理和经营,而只是以委托的形式委托经理人代理经营公司资产。这是因为股东与经理人各自的资源优势不同,股东拥有非人力资本优势,而经理人拥有人力资本优势,双方通过合约联系在一起,发挥各自的优势创造财富。然而由于双方...     

我国实施股票期权的思考

在对人力资本产权特征进行分析的基础上,揭示人力资本通过股票期权参与分享企业剩余是企业发展的内在要求。从法律法规环境、市场环境和公司内部治理结构三个方面深入分析我国实施股票期权的环境限制并对环境的完善提出相应的建议。     

论股票期权的会计处理

20世纪70年代以来,在国外企业广泛实施的经理人股票期权计划(ESOP),在90年代后期被逐渐引入我国.随着我国越来越多的企业准备实施经理人股票期权,规范其会计处理成为保障经理人股票期权激励计划实施的关键问题之一,确定股票期权会计处理原则和规范股票期权会计处理已经提到必须解决的日程上.本文在借鉴美国会计规范的基础上,根据我国国情,从经理人股票期权的会计确认、计量和报告等三个方面,研究在规范我国经理人股票期权会计过程中应注意的一些问题.     

Finance, Politics, and the Accounting for Stock Options

The politics of option accounting crosses party lines, reflecting both the interests of the affected constituencies and the desire for power over standard setting. House Bill HR-3574, which mandates an assumption of zero stock price volatility, runs counter to the recently passed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule requiring fair-value expensing of stock options. For any option issued at or out of the money, where strike prices are normally set, expense recognition is zero under this bill's mandated assumption.
Besides excessive use of stock options, the lack of a "final peace" in the option accounting war appears to have encouraged another questionable corporate practice. This article examines a sample of "six-and-one restructurings," exchanges of options in which expensing of re-priced (deep out-of-the-money) options can be avoided if employees wait at least six months and one day before receiving new options. The authors found that market-adjusted stock prices tend to decrease during the six-month period before the strike price is reset. This result provides one more reason why companies should be required to use fair-value option pricing models to expense options.     

TRANSFERABLE STOCK OPTIONS (TSOS) AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN EQUITY-BASED PAY

The dominant form of equity pay in the U.S. will change dramatically when accounting rules are changed (most likely in 2005) to require companies to charge the cost of their stock option plans on their income statements. Many companies are already switching from stock options to other forms of equity pay, especially restricted stock. The most notable switcher was Microsoft, the world's largest user of stock option pay. In July 2003, partnering with J.P. Morgan, Microsoft created a onetime transferable stock option (TSO) program that allowed holders of underwater Microsoft options to sell their options to J.P. Morgan in return for restricted shares.
But the most important consequence of this transaction may not be a widespread shift by corporate America to restricted shares, but rather the creation of a more costeffective kind of stock option. By clearing the potentially messy hurdles involving taxes, accounting, SEC rules, and "transaction mechanics," Microsoft has opened the door for TSOs to be considered as an ongoing equitypay instrument, perhaps replacing standard stock options (which are not transferable). TSOs share the key advantages of restricted stock in terms of providing robust retention and ownership incentives and higher valuecost efficiency, while maintaining the key "leverage" advantage of options. In so doing, they create significant upside (and downside) while largely avoiding the "pay for pulse" problem of restricted stock. They also introduce the discipline of competitive pricing by third-party bidders. The bid prices of investment banks create nearly all of the information required for accurate estimates of option cost, which should foster greater board accountability and improved corporate governance.     

复杂网络视角下中国经理人研究热点与趋势测度

随着企业的不断成长和壮大,企业所有者的精力和能力逐渐无法独自驾驭庞大的企业组织,引进和建立经理人制度成为大势所趋。经理人的发展状况不仅成为企业未来发展的关键,也成为研究中国情境下的企业的学者们关注的重点。在中国知网(CNKI)1986~2013年的数据库中,搜索以"经理人"为"篇名"的所有论文的关键词作为基础数据源,基于复杂网络理论,构建经理人关键词的分析网络,借助UCINET6.0软件,利用密度、最短路径、派系、中心性等指标对所构建的"经理人关键词网络"的整体结构、节点进行分析。研究发现,经理人研究领域围绕经理人和职业经理人两个核心点展开,经理人角色定位、职业经理人市场等为研究的热点,对期权激励以及业绩的研究成为未来研究的趋势。     

A Proposal for Expensing Employee Compensatory Stock Options for Financial Reporting Purposes

This article presents an accounting approach for employee stock options based on the insight that the currentperiod compensation expense should reflect only that part of the option value that is earned independent of the obligation of continued employment. Given that the maturity of vested options is typically shortened to 90 days when an employee resigns or is terminated, this method views the employee as owning a 90-day option (even if the stated maturity of the option is ten years) and earning a 90-day extension to that option each quarter as a result of the employee's continued employment. In the case of vested options, the compensation expense in each quarterly accounting period is thus the value of the 90-day extension of the option's maturity. There is no option expense in the quarter when the option is either exercised or expires.
In the case of unvested options, the expected option value at vesting should be estimated quarterly starting at the time of grant and the corresponding estimated expense should be revised and allocated as a pro rata accrual each quarter over the vesting period. The cumulative expense over the entire vesting period will equal the fair market value of the option at its vesting date.
Besides reflecting the economics of the exchange of value for labor involved in stock option grants, this approach has a number of practical advantages:

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  The 90-day maturity permits the use of publicly traded options to determine fair market value and makes Black-Scholes and other (lattice) pricing models more reliable.

       
  
  

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders

Executive stock option plans have asymmetric payoffs that could induce managers to take on more risk. Evidence from traded call options and stock return data supports this notion. Implicit share price variance, computed from the Black-Scholes option pricing model, and stock return variance increase after the approval of an executive stock option plan. The event is accompanied by a significant positive stock and a negative bond market reaction. This evidence is consistent with the notion that executive stock options may induce a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.     

Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent

Besides the commonly cited reasons for the use of stock options, including motivating employees, conserving cash, exploiting favorable accounting and tax treatment, and retaining managers, we demonstrate a complementary benefit of option-based compensation: options also prove efficient in matching managerial pay to ability. Options are useful because they force a manager to put his pay on the line. If a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm, he must naturally also overstate the firm's worth with him at the helm. As a result, the firm offers a generous package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability. Since both the likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability, only a gifted manager takes such a gamble.     

股权激励会计处理及其经济后果分析——以伊利股份为例

本文结合《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》的相关规定,以伊利股份为例研究股权激励费用化的会计处理及其经济后果。研究结果表明,股权激励的费用化将对上市公司的业绩产生影响,且股权费用摊销集中程度的不同,对公司产生的影响也不同。股票市场对股权激励费用化的会计处理及公司业绩的变化有负向反应,而且反应的程度与激励费用对公司业绩的影响成正比。同时股权激励设计有福利之嫌,股权激励费用化的会计处理有可能导致上市公司修改其股权激励的方案。     

银行信贷过程中的客户融资渠道策略分析

现代银行产品的营销策略已经从"以产品为中心"逐渐发展成为"以客户为中心"的层面,即以客户需求为导向,通过信贷客户经理和企业间的"博弈",在达到营销银行产品目的的同时使企业融资达到最优化.现代意义的客户经理不仅要熟悉原有的贷款操作流程,更多的是要扮演企业融资策划师的角色.本文试从银行信贷客户经理的角度出发,对我国现有不同融资渠道成本进行比较,并在此基础上对企业的融资方案做出具体的情景分析,以揭示银行客户经理对各种融资渠道特征的了解和融资规划的最优化设计在信贷营销过程中的重要作用,力求为银行信贷产品的营销提供一条新思路.