THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION BY MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN CANADA

The objective of the paper is to determine how the utilisation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) by Canadian manufacturing firms is related to their characteristics, activities, competitive strategies and industry sector in which they operate. The principal source of information used in this endeavour is the Statistics Canada Survey of Innovation 1999.

The paper starts with an overview of other studies that looked at the use of intellectual property rights in Canada. Follows a conceptual framework presenting variables likely to explain the use specific IPRs by Canadian manufacturing firms.

The use of IPRs is to a great extent correlated with basic economic characteristics of firms, their activities and industry environment. A series of estimated logit regressions predict the probability that a firm will use a specific IPR instrument. Also estimated is the contribution of the use of IPRs to the probability that a firm innovates.

The decision of a firm to use IPRs is often not independent of the decision to innovate. To eliminate the potential endogeneity bias I estimate a two-stage logit model. A comparison of the single- and two-stage logit models shows that the nexus from the protection of intellectual property (patents) to innovation may be weaker than indicated by the single equation model.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper studies the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and economic growth for a cross-section of countries for the period 1960–1990. The analysis focuses on effects of IPRs on growth using a quantitative index of IPRs. The paper finds that IPRs affect economic growth indirectly by stimulating the accumulation of factor inputs like R&D and physical capital. The positive effects of IPRs on factor accumulation, particularly of R&D capital, are present even when the analysis controls for a more general measure of property rights     

Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries

This paper studies intellectual property rights (IPRs) and innovation in developing countries. A model is developed to illustrate the trade-off between imitating foreign technologies and encouraging domestic innovation in a developing country's choice of IPRs. It is shown that innovations in a developing country increase in its IPRs, and a country's IPRs can depend on its level of development non-monotonically, first decreasing and then increasing. Empirical analysis, with a panel of data for 64 developing countries, confirms both the positive impact of IPRs on innovations in developing countries and the presence of a U-shaped relationship between IPRs and economic development.     

Trade‐related intellectual property rights: industry variation and technology diffusion

Abstract This paper assesses how a strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects international technology diffusion by altering the volume of high‐tech exports into developing countries. A simple North‐South general equilibrium model in which industries differ in their imitation rates is developed. Stronger IPRs encourage Northern firms in a wider range of industries to start exporting. Exports in industries with the highest risk of imitation rise, while exports in other industries may fall. More technology diffuses to the South because new high‐tech products are introduced in the Southern market. This works against the reduction in technology diffusion caused by limited imitation.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.      

Enforcement of Intellectual Property,Pollution Abatement,and Directed Technical Change

We theoretically investigate the interaction between endogenous enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and tax-financed pollution abatement measures. IPRs affect dirty and clean intermediates alike such that higher IPR enforcement may promote the transition to the clean technology, if this technology is productive enough. If the green technology is relatively unproductive, higher IPRs promote the dirty technology while pollution is increasing. As households are due to subsistence consumption subject to a hierarchy of needs, the level of IPR enforcement as well as the level of abatement measures depends on the state of technology and is increasing during economic development. Thus, if the incentive to enforce IPRs is low the level of abatement measures is also low. This argument provides a theoretical foundation for the observed clash of interests in international negotiation rounds regarding the harmonization of IPR protection and actions to combat climate change.     

The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights,and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements

The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of “green” technologies. Using a simple model, we highlight a conflict between international environmental agreements (IEAs) on emissions reductions and international systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on abatement technologies. When IPRs are strong and global, IEA signatories anticipate rent extraction by innovators. This hold‐up effect reduces abatement, potentially to levels below those of non‐signatories, and it reduces the number of signatories to self‐enforcing IEAs. We explore policy options that respect existing property rights, but avoid the strategic interaction between signatories to an IEA and innovators.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励

本文构建了一个扩展的具有自主创新的南北产品周期模型,讨论了知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体影响。本文发现,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体效应依赖于南方的初始技能劳动水平和北方创新性质导致的市场结构。在垂直创新的寡头市场,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新没有激励效应,它对南北双方都造成伤害;在水平创新的垄断竞争市场,当南方技能劳动短缺时,严格知识产权保护在短期有利于南北双方,但并不激励南方自主创新。当南方技能劳动充裕时,适度的知识产权保护会激励南方的自主创新,并在长期对南北双方都有利。研究发现,南方存在一个最优知识产权保护强度,其依赖南方的技能水平以及市场的竞争程度。     

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North–South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection because it encourages a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology‐intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.     

Intellectual property rights protection and recorded music sales��focus on 26 OECD countries panel data

This thesis mainly studies the relationship between intellectual property rights protection and recorded music sales by use of 26 OECD countries panel data from 2000 to 2007. Following Png and Wang (2006), the production equation of recorded music is developed. Meanwhile, the author introduces other independent variables such as per capita GDP, employment rate and R&D, population and economic openness. The econometric methods consist of two way fixed effects method, Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation and dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step difference GMM (generalized method of moments) by use of Stata 10.0. The findings are as followings: Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection exerts positive effect on recorded music sales, and the influencing coefficient is at the range of 0.815 to 0.915. Meanwhile, economic openness also has positive influence. The studying results suggest that IPRs protection can reinforce the sale of recorded music, and it is very urgent to enhance IPRs protection.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: A NEW FRAME-OF-ANALYSIS

The debate on software intellectual property rights (IPRs) has not only highlighted fundamental issues regarding the scheme of protection that software enjoys, it has also pointed out major gaps in the representation of computer programs as economic goods. In this respect, various interpretations of software propose a limited outlook by referring only to particular aspects of computer programs.

The paper discusses the economic nature of software and computational processes and how they should be properly represented as commodities by focusing on software IPR legislation in the US. It elaborates the similarities and differences between software applications and machines on the basis of historical evidence from the evolution of information technologies and computer science. Further, we discuss whether computer programs should enjoy IPR protection (like their physical equivalents) and which legal regime would induce the maximal degree of societal benefits, while satisfying private and public interests.

The paper also elaborates the essential issues of the distinction between ideas and expressions and the ways they are treated as intellectual property. It highlights major aspects in the debate over protection of software applications by both patents and copyrights and analyses the economic impact of the joint regime.

By highlighting the dissimilarities in the economic nature and market behaviour of ideas and expressions we point out the difficulties in drawing parallels between software and physical equivalents. Finally, we provide alternative ways to establish coherent juridical basis and legal policy of software IPRs that aim at stimulating innovation and developing the technological landscape in information technologies.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Interest in links between protection of intellectual property and growth has been revived by developments in new growth theory and by the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. The relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime and rate of growth is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint, reflecting the variety of channels through which technology can be acquired and their differing importance at different stages of development. We investigate the impact of IPR protection on economic growth in a panel of 79 countries using threshold regression analysis. We show that whilst the effect of IPR protection on growth depends upon the level of development, it is positively and significantly related to growth for low‐ and high‐income countries, but not for middle‐income countries. This suggests that, although IPR protection encourages innovation in high‐income countries, and technology flows to low‐income countries, middle‐income countries may have offsetting losses from reduced scope for imitation.     

服务贸易出口、知识产权保护与经济增长

本文首先基于知识产权保护这一视角从理论上研究了服务贸易出口驱动经济增长的作用机理,并且认为,知识产权保护强化了服务业出口部门对其他部门所产生的外部经济溢出效应以及由此分解而来的要素配置效应和技术溢出效应。随后基于90个国家1998—2007年面板数据的经验研究表明:(1)技术与知识密集型服务业出口部门比劳动密集型、资本密集型服务业出口部门更加能够通过要素配置效应和技术溢出效应来促进经济增长;(2)相比于劳动密集型、资本密集型服务业出口部门而言,知识产权保护更加易于强化技术与知识密集型服务业出口部门的要素配置效应,但由于发展中国家的知识产权保护制度不够完善,这些国家服务贸易出口的要素配置效应未能得到强化;(3)不管对于发达国家还是对于发展中国家而言,知识产权保护均强化了劳动密集型、资本密集型、技术与知识密集型服务业出口部门的技术溢出效应。     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

Public Sector Science And The Strategy Of The Commons

We model the conditions under which incumbent firms may purposefully create an intellectual property (IP) commons such that no firm has the incentive to invest in new product development, despite the potential profitability of a public sector invention. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate by eliminating exclusive IP rights—the strategy of the commons—is motivated by a fear of cannibalization and supported by a credible threat. We show how the degree of potential cannibalization is related to this market failure and characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the strategy of the commons is played.     

Modes of Foreign Direct Investment and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: Wholly‐owned or Joint Venture? Firm‐level Evidence from Taiwanese Multinational Manufacturing Enterprises

This paper finds evidence from Taiwanese manufacturing multinational enterprises (MNEs) for the period 2003–2005 to show that Taiwanese manufacturing MNEs are more likely to choose joint ventures (JVs) if intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in the foreign direct investment (FDI) host country is strong. The estimation results suggest that if a country with an IPR strength similar to the level of Chile increases its IPR protection to the strength of Taiwan, the probability of forming JVs in that country will increase by 13.8%. One policy implication of this study is that developing countries can stimulate local participation by IPR reform.     

创新网络中企业自主知识产权交互对创新绩效的影响

共享经济环境下区域性创新网络的形成,推动了网络中不同企业节点的协同发展。伴随着企业的市场发展需求,依据知识产权保护进行知识搜索和产权交互成为企业间协同创新的重要内容。基于企业间竞合理念,从创新网络中企业节点间互动机制视角出发,探讨企业自主知识产权交互、实际吸收能力、知识产权风险与企业创新绩效之间的关系。研究表明：企业自主知识产权交互与创新绩效之间呈显著倒U型关系;实际吸收能力对企业创新绩效产生直接显著作用,并且部分中介企业自主知识产权交互与创新绩效之间的关系;另外,知识产权风险能够正向显著调节企业自主知识产权交互与实际吸收能力之间的关系。研究结论有利于进一步强化创新网络企业间自主知识产权交互和实际吸收能力,并在有效规避知识产权风险的同时促进企业创新绩效提升。     

A note on disease burden and pharmaceutical R&D

We examine the relationship between research and development (R&D) expenditures and the expected impact of diseases in a simple theoretical framework that allows for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection to be strong or weak. In our theoretical model, an agent forms an expectation of the impact of a disease using a publicly available statistic on the (population level) disease burden, such as disability-adjusted life year. We show that a profit-maximising firm will exert relatively more R&D effort on diseases with intermediate expected impacts. We also discuss how a weak IPR regime alters the pattern of R&D investment.