排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在（非）排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。     

减排技术的跨国转让与环境政策选择——基于Stackelberg竞争的博弈模型

细分外国企业对减排技术的转让方式,使转让方式与东道国环境政策相匹配,是一个有待深入研究的问题.在Stackelberg竞争模型中考虑拥有减排技术的外国企业作为市场跟随者在东道国市场上与东道国企业竞争,分析外国企业减排技术的最优授权方式,提出东道国政府的最优环境政策选择.从分析结论看:固定收费和特许权收费的技术授权都可以增加外国企业利润,但外国企业更偏好于特许权收费的技术授权,而双重收费可能降低外国企业的利润;技术授权对东道国的社会福利不确定,特许权收费的技术授权总可以增加外国社会福利,固定收费和双重收费的技术授权可能恶化外国社会福利;特许权收费和双重收费下减排技术的扩散可以有效改善环境,而固定收费则可能增加排放总量;特许权收费的技术授权需要东道国制定相对宽松的环境政策.东道国政府需要根据不同污染物的污染属性和扩散程度适时调整环境税政策,以实现企业利润、社会福利和环境的共同改善.     

跨国多期技术授权方式选择及社会福利分析--基于空间数量歧视竞争的框架

跨国技术授权作为企业获得竞争优势的重要途径已经受到理论界的关注。与以往的内部技术授权研究不同,文章构建了一个外国拥有技术的企业与东道国企业的空间数量歧视竞争模型,考察多期技术授权存在技术泄露、关税内生及空间竞争对外国拥有技术的企业的最优授权策略选择以及东道国社会福利的影响。研究表明：(1)外国拥有技术的企业偏好双重收费方式,且固定收费方式优于特许权收费方式;(2)双重收费方式不能同时实现拥有技术的企业和社会福利的最优,但可以实现社会福利的次优;(3)外国企业应该通过双重收费方式或固定收费方式进行技术授权,而东道国政府不应一味地提高关税水平,适当地降低进口关税有利于跨国技术授权的实现。文章的结论对于发展中国家的技术引进以及技术出口政策的制定具有一定的现实意义。     

竞争政策与跨国最优技术授权策略

本文探讨当前中国在知识产权领域实施(宽松)竞争政策的理论基础。基于本国国有企业和私营企业与具有成本优势的外国企业进行古诺竞争的寡头模型,分析生产型外国企业如何将降低成本的专利技术分别授权给本国的两家企业。我们的研究表明:当不能歧视性授权时,外国企业总是偏好特许权收费方式;当能够歧视性授权时,外国企业在技术创新程度较大时会偏好固定收费方式。由于在歧视性授权下,外国企业将更多的利润转移到母国,因此本国福利在不允许歧视性授权下更高,但全球福利却相反。因此,本国政府从本国福利极大化的角度往往会强化竞争政策,限制歧视性授权;尽管从全球角度看,不限制歧视性授权的宽松竞争政策能够提升全球福利。     

上游垄断型市场结构对下游企业技术创新的影响和机制分析

依托产业链实现创新资源配置和创新能力提升是推动创新驱动发展的重要途径。现有对市场结构与企业创新关系的研究主要集中在产业内竞争,而产业链垂直关系下的市场结构对企业从生产到商业化变现的创新过程的影响有待深入探讨。利用工业企业数据库匹配企业专利数据库,实证研究上游垄断型市场结构对下游企业技术创新的影响。结果显示：(1)垄断型市场结构对下游企业技术创新存在净促进作用,包括增加生产技术创新即专利申请,及商业化变现阶段创新即新产品产值。(2)从正负两方面解释上游垄断对下游企业技术创新的影响。一是负向来看,上游垄断通过提高下游企业中间品投入成本、增强融资约束,制约下游企业创新。二是正向来看,倒逼机制推动下游企业创新,具体包括强化优胜劣汰机制,倒逼企业通过创新提高生存能力;强化企业创新利润机制,增强企业创新激励。(3)异质性分析发现,上游技术垄断增强下游企业技术创新,而上游行政垄断则显著抑制下游企业技术创新。由此得到打破上游行政垄断,用市场化手段解决上游技术垄断;对下游中小企业创新发展提供政策支持;为下游企业融资约束解困等三方面政策启示。     

企业研发与专利保护——基于企业间策略性竞争的分析视角杨

本文使用空间价格歧视模型,分析了企业研发决策与政府专利保护之间的关系。结果不仅证明了企业在专利保护程度较高、研发环境较好时会进行研发,研发数量与政府的专利保护呈倒U型关系,而且发现,企业研发后,在专利保护程度极低和极高时,企业会采用特许权方式对外专利授权,中间状态下企业不对外授权。从社会福利和社会创新的角度来看,专利保护不是越多越好,而是存在一个临界的拐点。该拐点随着社会研发环境和行业交易费用的增加而递增。     

国有资本投资运营公司的创新驱动路径研究——基于扎根理论的探索性分析

从国有资本授权经营制度实施来看，国有资本投资运营公司如何展开创新驱动发展战略的路径选择仍未得到系统性解释。本文以中央和地方层面国有资本投资运营公司为研究对象，探析其为什么既要有效授权又要技术创新，并试图通过制度创新与技术创新的协同来探究其创新驱动路径的选择问题。研究结果表明：（1）基于“功能定位→运行机制”的资本经营模式和“功能定位→履职授权”的资本授权模式，两类公司探索并形成制度创新驱动路径。（2）两类公司通过市场机会识别能力、社会网络关系能力和组织学习吸收能力等方面的动态能力提升，形成以持续性竞争优势为核心的技术创新驱动路径。（3）利用对接机制形成制度创新与技术创新的协同，以此完善可能的创新驱动路径选择问题。本文从“制度—技术”双重因素视角探索了国有资本投资运营公司的创新驱动路径，为深化国资国企改革及实施创新驱动发展战略提供重要参考。     

企业跨境风险投资海外技术探索：双重劣势与投资策略——基于科技型企业多案例分析

企业跨境风险投资（Cross—borderCorporateVentureCapital，简称跨境CVC）是指企业以知识搜寻和技术投资为导向的海外冒险活动，对在位企业创新活力提升、组织韧性增强及国际竞争力跃迁起重要作用。然而，在进行海外技术探索时，跨境CVC面临来自东道国制度环境和目标技术领域的双重外来者劣势，如何通过合理的投资安排应对双重劣势，对于跨境CVC价值实现格外重要。基于实物期权理论，对跨境CVC活动决策过程和投资逻辑进行研究，以英特尔、Alphabet、联想和百度4家科技型企业跨境CVC活动为研究样本进行案例分析，从投资单元、投资伙伴、技术领域、投资区位、投资阶段和投资信息披露等维度归纳双重外来者劣势应对策略。研究结论有助于丰富外来者劣势概念内涵并拓展实物期权理论应用场景，打开科技型企业跨境CVC过程“黑箱”，为我国企业跨境CVC战略规划与实施提供理论依据和实践指导。     

中国生物技术制药产业创新现状可视化研究——基于科学计量学的专利数据分析

本文运用科学计量学的方法对我国生物技术制药领域1999—2008年的专利数据进行统计分析,进而对这10年来该领域的技术创新现状进行可视化研究,具体从创新全貌、发展速度和趋势、各地区发展水平差异、各类专利申请人创新成果比较、重点创新领域等几个方面进行分析,并分别与国外在华授权专利情况进行对比。研究认为10年来我国生物制药领域总体技术创新能力得到了持续增强,个别技术和产品领域创新成果丰富,发展潜力较大。但这些创新成果主要集中于个别地区和申请人手中,具有较强的垄断性,企业还未成为我国生物技术制药领域的创新主体。同时,通过与国外数据进行对比发现国外在华授权专利数量有逐步逼近国内授权专利数量的趋势。     

专利制度与技术创新的互动性研究

在实施技术创新过程中如何充分发挥专利制度的驱动和保障作用,本文想要作简要探讨,以期企业界能进一步强化专利意识,充分运用专利战略,促进技术创新工程的顺利实施。１．专利制度与技术创新内在联系的探讨技术创新是指新技术（包括新产品、新工艺）的研究开发、生产及其商业化应用有关的经济技术活动。并具有三个基本特点：（１）强调市场实现程度和获得商业利益是检验创新成功与否的最终标准;（２）强调从新技术的研究开发到首次商业化应用是一个系统工程;（３）强调企业是科技与经济的结合点,是技术创新的主体,是使科技成果向生产…     

Optimal patent licensing—Two or three-part tariff

We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.     

Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing

Evidence reveals that there are more than 50% product innovation licensings applied within industries. We study product innovation licensing (quality-enhancing licensing) in both exclusive and non-exclusive schemes each under unit/revenue royalty and fixed fee in a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly, where a quality-leading firm is an internal licensor. We show that, under a non-exclusive licensing, royalty licensing is the superior policy for the licensor if quality difference within firms is small, regardless of whether a unit or revenue royalty scheme is offered. Under an exclusive licensing, a two-part tariff is optimal. If fixed fee licensing is practicable, the licensor favors an exclusive licensing. Furthermore, an increase in quality difference within firms increases the optimal rates. Using the simulated results, we examine that licensing improves social welfare in all schemes, and the number of licensees will influence the magnitude of welfare enhancement.     

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.     

Commercialization of a demand-enhancing innovation: The release of a new apple variety by a public university

The upsurge of patented fruit varieties developed by university plant-breeding programs motivated this re-examination of optimal commercialization strategies when an innovator cares about profits for both itself and the licensees. Our theoretical findings suggest that the optimal licensing arrangement that maximizes weighted joint profits depends on the innovation level size, number of firms, and the weights assigned to the innovator and licensee profits. We designed an experiment to test the case with a small number of firms and found that the joint profits are the greatest under an exclusive per-unit royalty scheme. However, when the number of firms is large, as may be the case for a varietal introduction into the U.S. apple industry, our model suggests that the joint profits will be the largest under a nonexclusive contract, either with a two-part tariff, if the innovation level is high, or a per-unit royalty if the innovation level is low.     

Patent licensing in spatial models

We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing contracts in industries.     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

Licensing a quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm

This paper examines the case where a patent holder who is not a producer licenses its quality-enhancing innovation to an upstream firm, which sells its product through a downstream monopoly. It is found that the patent holder prefers a two-part tariff contract, which includes both a fixed-fee and per-unit output royalty. However, the royalty included in the licensing contract makes each firm price at a markup over marginal cost and therefore makes both consumers and the society worse off, if the innovation is small and the supplier is weak. From a welfare perspective, licensing by means of an ad valorem tax is more efficient, as it allows the upstream firm to be less aggressive when trading with the downstream firm.     

On contract duration of royalty licensing contracts

This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.     

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator

We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing.