双寡头企业广告投入策略的研究

伴随着市场经济的发展,企业之间的竞争也日趋激烈。广告作为企业促进销售的一种催化剂,在企业竞争中扮演着重要角色。企业对广告投入的决策势必影响着企业的竞争力和效益。本文对双寡头垄断市场中企业广告投入策略的效益最大化问题进行了建模,并对完全信息条件下企业的广告投入进行了静态的博弈分析。     

Brand versus generic advertising and the decision to advertise collectively

This study uses Lancaster's (1966, 1979) characteristics model of consumer theory, combined with imperfect information, to support a firm's advertising choice of a combination of brand and generic advertising. However, as consumers become well educated about a firm's product, spillovers from generic advertising become large. When spillovers are large, firms have a greater incentive to collude on generic advertising. The firm's decision to include advertising collectively with its competitors will follow from its own analysis of the benefits versus the costs of such a union. The success of collective advertising may, however, depend on the control of free-riders.     

The effect of advertising on the distribution-free newsboy problem

Advertising is very important for the newsboy problem because the shelf-life of the newsboy product is short and advertising may increase sales to avoid overstocking. In this paper, models to study the effect of advertising are developed for the distribution-free newsboy problem where only the mean and variance of the demand are known. As in Khouja and Robbins (2003), it is assumed that the mean demand is an increasing and concave function of advertising expenditure. Three cases are considered: (1) demand has constant variance, (2) demand has constant coefficient of variation, and (3) demand has an increasing coefficient of variation. This paper provides closed-form solutions or steps to solve the problem. Numerical results of the model are also compared with those from other papers. The effects of model parameters on optimal expenditure on advertising, optimal order quantity, and the lower bound on expected profit are derived or discussed.     

Product Market Competition and Corporate Real Estate Investment under Demand Uncertainty

This article theoretically and empirically analyzes the interactions among corporate real estate investment, product market competition and firm risk. In our model, firms own strategic real estate or lease generic real estate. Our model predicts that strategic real estate ownership is positively correlated with industry concentration and negatively related to demand uncertainty. Also, firm risk is higher for firms with more strategic real estate operating in a more concentrated market. This prediction arises because smaller investments induce greater market competition, which effectively eliminates the right tail of the firm's profit distribution. We provide strong empirical support for our predictions. In particular, firm value is more volatile in less competitive markets for a given level of demand uncertainty.     

Competition in the Korean Internet Portal Market: Network Effects, Profit, and Market Efficiency

Internet portals serve as platforms for coordinating advertisements, content, and user markets. We model portal structure with South Korean market data to explain network effects and other competition factors. We also analyze network effects on profit and market efficiency. The results indicate a negative network effect from banner advertisements in the user market, which is countered by a network effect from content provision. In the advertising market, the network effect from user demand is positively identified, which explains profit making through increased user visits. Furthermore, we show that network effects due to market concentration result in increases in consumer surplus.     

Incorporating Prior Information into A GMM Objective For Mixed Logit Demand Systems

Random parameters demand system estimates can generate upward sloping demands and imply margins outside of the theoretical bounds for profit maximization. If such violations are numerous enough, they can confound merger simulation exercises. Using Lerner indices for multiproduct firms playing static Bertrand games, we find that up to 35 per cent of implied margins for beer are outside the bounds. We characterize downward sloping demand and the theoretical bounds for profit maximization as prior information and extend the GMM objective function, incorporating inequality moments for product‐level own‐elasticities and brand level or product level Lerner indices. Very few violations remain when an inequality constrained estimator is used.     

A big data driven framework for demand-driven forecasting with effects of marketing-mix variables

This study aims to investigate the contributions of promotional marketing activities, historical demand and other factors to predict, and develop a big data-driven fuzzy classifier-based framework, also called “demand-driven forecasting,” that can shape, sense and respond to real customer demands. The availability of timely information about future customer needs is a key success factor for any business. For profit maximization, manufacturers want to sense demand signals and shape future demands using price, sales, promotion and others economic factors so that they can fulfil customer's orders immediately. However, most demand forecasting systems offer limited insight to manufacturers as they fail to capture contemporary market trends, product seasonality and the impact of forecasting on the magnitude of the bullwhip effect. This paper aims to improve the accuracy of demand forecasts. In order to achieve this, a back-propagation neural network-based model is trained by fuzzy inputs and compared with benchmark forecasting methods on a time series data, by using historical demand and sales data in combination with advertising effectiveness, expenditure, promotions, and marketing events data. A statistical analysis is conducted, and the experiments show that the method used in the proposed framework outperforms in optimality, efficiency and other statistical metrics. Finally, some invaluable insights for managers are presented to improve the forecast accuracy of fuzzy neural networks, develop marketing plans for products and discuss their implications in several fields.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Inventory decisions for substitutable products with stock-dependent demand

We study a retailer’s inventory policy for two products. The products are substitutable and have inventory dependent demand, so a higher inventory level of a product increases its sales. We model the joint effect of demand stimulation and product substitution on inventory decisions by considering a single-period, stochastic demand setting. We provide the first order optimality conditions for the profit maximizing order quantities and interpret them using marginal analysis. We also consider two heuristic solutions that separately account for either demand stimulation or product substitution. Our numerical analysis reveals that the optimal policy by appropriately using sales information that quantifies substitution and demand stimulation can produce significantly higher profits. The profit benefits are lessened under certain circumstances, such as when the two products have similar critical fractile values, suggesting that in such instances the heuristics may be used effectively.     

Do Newspaper JOAs Charge Monopoly Advertising Rates?

Conventional wisdom argues that all commercial and economic competition between two daily newspapers stops when they merge their advertising and printing capabilities to form a joint operating agreement (JOA). Clearly the JOA acts a monopolist in the sale of advertising, but there are two forces that may constrain the JOA to sell more advertising than a profit maximizing single paper monopolist would find optimal. First, there is the possibility of what is sometimes termed ``end game competition'. Disposition of assets from a JOA are often not determined until the JOA is near its termination date, and this may induce the weaker paper to maintain quality, both to improve its bargaining position and to keep open the possibility of remaining in the market as a competitor at the end of the JOA. Second, a daily paper arguably has to maintain a certain level of advertising and maintain a certain ``look' and ``feel' if it is to be considered a daily paper. This may constrain the JOA to sell more advertising and maintain a higher joint circulation than might be optimal for a single paper monopolist. We present econometric evidence that shows JOAs to have ad rates that are closer to those of competitive dailies than to those of single paper and 2-edition monopolists.     

Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market

In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits in the TV industry be. We also show that joint profits may be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.     

The measurement of conjectural variations in an oligopoly industry

Using independently derived estimates for the market demand elasticity and firm marginal cost, this paper measures the conjectural variations (cv's) of the eight largest U.S. steel firms for the years 1920 to 1972. Comparisons are then made between the measured cv's and those predicted by certain industry conduct hypotheses. Specifically the hypotheses are those for competitive behavior, Cournot behavior, imperfect collusion, and industry profit maximization (perfect collusion). One of the two extreme theories of firm behavior, industry profit maximization, is rejected, but the acceptance or rejection of the other theories depends on the assumptions made about the cost structure of the sample firms.     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Pharmaceutical followers

We estimate a model of drug demand and supply that incorporates insurance, advertising, and competition between branded and generic drugs within and across therapeutic classes. We use data on antiulcer drugs from 1991 to 2010. Our simulations show that generics and “me-too” drugs each increased consumer welfare more than $100 million in 2010, holding insurance premiums constant. However, insurance payments in 2010 fell by nearly $1 billion due to generics and rose by over $7 billion due to me-too antiulcer drugs.     

Pricing with Endogenous Direct Advertising in a Monopoly

This paper develops a model of informative advertising in which a firm builds a database using its historical sales records in order to directly target ads on those consumers who have a high probability of purchasing its products. We show that the firm can use this type of direct advertising as a screening mechanism to identify high demand consumers. As a result, direct advertising can work essentially as a device to increase a firm's monopoly power. From a social point of view, this implies that the transition from traditional mass-advertising to direct advertising can generate a trade-off between higher advertising efficiency and greater monopoly power. We compute the model to shed light on the relative strength of these two forces, and find that while direct advertising might have a substantial negative impact on consumers, this advertising technology can only occasionally reduce welfare.     

Competition and Strategic Budget Choices in the Motion Picture Industry*

In this article, we study the effect of differentiation on firms' optimal investments in advertising and product quality in the specific context of the motion picture industry. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized model uncovering that competition in advertising is the highest for intermediate levels of horizontal differentiation, while product quality increases monotonically in differentiation. We corroborate our theoretical predictions with a large dataset on the movie industry confirming both the inverted U-shaped relationship between advertising and differentiation, and the monotonically increasing relationship between product quality and differentiation.     

The degree of competition in the advertising industry

After a merger wave began among advertising agencies in the late 1960's, the Federal Trade Commission investigated the anticompetitive effects of the mergers and concluded that the industry would remain competitive. In this paper, we employ a method suggested by Bresnahan to investigate the issue of competition in the advertising industry. The method uses industry-level data over the period 1972–87 to consider the determinants of supply and demand for advertising messages and to calculate the degree of market power on the supply side of the market. Statistical results support the hypothesis that the industry was competitive over this period.We thank Robert Coen of McCann-Erickson, Inc., for providing data on advertising costs and expenditures and W. Bradford Todd of the Richards Group for information about the industry. Lacy Glenn Thomas directed us to McCann-Erickson. We also thank James C. Murdoch, two anonymous referees, and the Editor, William G. Shepherd. Pornpong Sumanun provided research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Estimating the Demand for Service Bundles under Three‐Part Tariffs

Consumers may face demand uncertainty when choosing a service plan under three‐part tariffs, and preferences for multiple services may be inter‐dependent. To examine such a demand system, we construct a two‐stage discrete/continuous choice model for service bundles, allowing for interactive utility and preference correlations. Implementing a piecewise maximization approach to consumers’ non‐differentiable utility maximization problem, we estimate the model via simulated method of moments. We empirically illustrate the model using data from a Chinese wireless service provider. Our counterfactual analysis shows that the three‐part tariffs with interchangeable units show no significant loss of revenue, compared to existing tariffs.     

Economic benefits from promoting linseed in the diet of dairy cows for reducing methane emissions and improving milk quality

Linseed for feeding dairy cows reduces methane emissions and increases the omega-3 content of milk. In a lab experiment, milk bottles from cows fed a diet with or without linseed were offered to French participants for eliciting their willingness to pay (WTP). Successive messages highlighting the different effects of linseed were revealed to participants. We find that messages including the ones on methane emissions and omega-3 in milk significantly impact the participants’ WTP. These WTP estimates are used for welfare simulations that underline the positive impact of a public advertising campaign informing about linseed. When informing participants via a campaign becomes difficult, some regulatory tools like a quality standard may complement this advertising campaign.     

Does purely predatory advertising exist?

"Purely predatory advertising" has been defined as advertising which redistributes market share but does not affect market demand. Purely predatory advertising is commonly assumed in the industrial economics literature; but its existence is an empirical question. Since cigarette advertising is widely considered to epitomize purely predatory advertising, we analyze firm level panel data for the United States cigarette industry to study the question of existence using an econometric procedure which corrects for autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation. Statistical tests support the hypothesis that cigarette advertising is purely predatory.