Markets for Tradeable Emission and Ambient Permits: A Dynamic Approach

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor. For multiple receptors, the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential,multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction.     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.     

Emission Taxes and Tradeable Permits A Comparison of Views on Long-Run Efficiency

We compare three different views on the long runefficiencies of emission taxes which includethresholds (inframarginalexemptions), and of tradeable emission permitswhere some permits areinitially free. The differences are caused bydifferent assumptions aboutwhether thresholds and free permits should besubsidies given only to firmsthat produce, or full property rights. Treatingtax thresholds, as well asfree permits, as property rights would departfrom the conventional view,but would allow greater flexibility in makingeconomic instruments bothefficient and acceptable. Such flexibilitycould be very important inachieving efficient control of greenhouse gasemissions.     

基于Internet的排污权交易平台分析与设计

利用现代信息技术进行排污权交易平台的开发是河南省排污权交易体系的一个重要组成部分,也是排污权交易发展的必然趋势。排污权交易平台的开发以排污权交易为核心,基于B/S三层体系架构,实现排污权总量控制、申购、交易、跟踪预警、信息管理、平台维护和信息发布等为一体的系统功能,为更好地实现排污权交易提供了系统性的支持平台和有力的实施保障。     

我国排污权初始分配的研究

排污权初始分配是排污权交易制度实施过程中各方争论的一个焦点，也是一个技术和政治上的难题。目前国内外排污权初始分配的模式主要包括免费分配、有偿分配及此二者组合三种。本文对这三种模式的不同实施方法和各自的优缺点进行了论述，并分析了我国目前排污权初始分配的现状，最后基于免费分配和有偿分配相组合的模式对我国排污权初始分配进行了新的设计。     

基于模糊层次评判模型的确定排污权总量方法研究

简要总结排污权总量确定问题研究的历史及现状,从协调经济增长与环境保护的角度出发,建立了确定排污权总量的评价指标体系,并借助AHP模糊评判数学方法对确定排污权总量问题进行了探讨。通过实际算例表明,该评判模型为我国建立排污权交易制度,确定排污权总量提供了有效的解决途径。     

北部湾排污权拍卖交易建立的可行性分析

北部湾地区属于国家重点开发地区,近几年来开发的热潮始终不减,随之而来的生态环境破坏问题更是值得人们去关注,在我国虽然排污权拍卖的交易制度还尚处在萌芽阶段,但其重要性是不容忽视的,文章通过博弈模型,引进政府、排污企业、环境保护者三方,并结合北部湾地区自身特点,分析排污权拍卖交易实现的可行性及其条件,为解决北部湾在大开发过程出现的环境保护问题提供理论依据,使北部湾开发建设遵循可持续发展战略要求。     

中国省域碳排放权分配——基于环境FCAM

考虑CO_2排放的非期望产出特性,以最大化整体平均效率为目标,构建省域碳排放权分配的环境固定成本分摊模型(FCAM)。对世袭制、平等主义和支付能力三种公平分配原则下的省域碳排放权初始分配结果进行加权组合,从而获得综合公平原则下的省域碳排放权分配方案。以基于环境FCAM的分配方案趋同综合公平原则下的分配方案为目标,构建优化模型,以融合效率和公平。2020年省域碳排放权分配结果表明:最终分配方案在达到效率最优的同时,属于"绝对平均",较好地融合了效率和公平;基于强度减排压力和总量减排压力对30个样本省进行分类的结果基本一致。最后,针对四类省区的具体情况提出了相应的减排建议。     

排污权交易会计国际发展评述及启示

作为环境管理的有效手段,排污权交易自上世纪70年代提出后得到迅速推广,而由排污权交易引致的会计规范问题也日益受到国际机构及各国会计准则委员会的关注,美国、欧盟及日本等西方发达国家和组织纷纷在理论规范和实务应用两个层面予以推进,排污权交易会计准则体系已逐渐形成。因此,在构建我国排污权交易会计规范体系时,应针对实际情况,首先采用非活跃市场下的无形资产法和无交易市场下的环境负债净额法,待时机成熟时再引入公允价值法,边试边做,循序渐进。     

排污权有偿使用阶梯式定价研究——以化学需氧量排放为例

依据河南省2010年污染源普查数据,分析了不同行业化学需氧量排放的公平性问题,基于不同行业经济贡献与排污量之间的差异性的基础上,参考阶梯水价和电价的制定思路,提出了排污权阶梯式定价,并对其内涵与经济学特征进行了分析,最后,在恢复成本法定价的基础上制定了河南省化学需氧量有偿使用阶梯式价格。     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

从社会资本角度探索创新排污权初始分配模式

文章主要探讨排污权初始分配的制度性缺陷,分析我国将排污权免费分配给企业的弊端,提出将排污权在初始分配环节按人头免费发放给每一位社会公民的制度设想。分析论证在此制度框架内,政府、企业和社会公众的利益如何实现动态均衡,强化政府对环境保护的监督管理职能,降低寻租可能性;刺激企业降低排污总量,合理决策排污权购买量和治污技术投入量的水平;强化社会公众对于环境保护的动力机制,鼓励全民监督污染源;加快发展第三方中介机构,完善排污权市场的功能。最后提出要实现这一制度设想,还必须破解科学技术、法律政策和环保设施等现实制约条件。     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

The Complete Welfare Effects of Cost Reductions in a Cournot Oligopoly

This paper provides the smallest upper bound or the critical level for a Cournot firm's market share below which its cost reduction reduces welfare. It shows that a firm's cost reduction increases social welfare with nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs if and only if its market share is above the critical level, which is equal to a weighted sum of the other firms' market shares. The paper also reports similar results for technological spill-overs within any given set of firms.     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial firms produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission quotas to firms, and permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across firms on the basis of the quotas. We show that an environmental policy that decreases an aggregate number of emission quotas could degenerate economic growth and lower environmental quality in the long run. We also show the implications of this result for environmental policy.