A Perfect Impasse? Cuba's Move Towards the Market and the United States' Move Towards Cuba

This article first analyses the internal economic trajectory of the Cuban economic reforms and evaluates their effectiveness in delivering the extensive and intensive development needed to correct Cuba's structural and economic imbalances. It concludes that without the lifting of the US economic sanctions success will at best be only partial, with serious implications for long‐term stability. The article then evaluates the reasons for the US economic sanctions against Cuba and argues that while the embargo policy might have failed to topple the Cuban communist regime, it has served other, largely unacknowledged, purposes that are important in explaining why the policy has persisted. The article concludes by suggesting that the US is not likely to jettison the sanctions regime while Cuba's single‐party, state‐led economic system remains. At the same time, Cuba is not likely to jettison its single‐party system while the sanctions remain.     

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: FAILED FOREIGN POLICY TOOL AND A COST TO AMERICAN BUSINESS

In recent years the US government has increased its use of economic sanctions in order to punish countries, organisations and individuals. This form of foreign policy has become an increasing burden on US business and adversely affects US competitiveness and perceived reliability in the global marketplace. In addition, economic sanctions are generally ineffective in producing the desired changes and often harm the people they were intended to help. This paper argues that economic sanctions are an increasing menace to US business, represent an ineffective tool of foreign policy, and do not meet generally accepted ethical standards.     

DESTROYING A COUNTRY IN ORDER TO SAVE IT: THE FOLLY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST MYANMAR

The government of the United States has imposed economic sanctions on the Union of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, due to the ruling junta's lack of respect for democracy and human rights. This paper proposes that those sanctions, while well intended, are ineffective, unethical and harmful to the people to whom they are intended to help.     

THE POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF PRIVATE ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS*

Governments are able to manipulate economic transactions in order to achieve foreign policy goals. This article addresses the question: can managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) structure economic transactions in ways that will limit the costs resulting from government intervention? Using a transaction cost framework, the efficiency of alternative structures (exporting, joint ventures, licensing, or wholly owned subsidiaries) for protecting a firm's interests are assessed. We argue that the traditional focus on the dyadic relationship between supplier and buyer misses sources of transaction costs; by conceptualizing economic transactions as embedded in a political context, additional sources of transaction costs are revealed. We examine three cases of home government intervention in US MNE transactions with the Soviet Union. We find that the full range of structural alternatives is affected by government sanctions, although sanctions are imposed on exporting relationships first and removed last. We find that MNEs are, therefore, beginning to insulate international transactions by making their overseas subsidiaries more independent of US technology and supplies with the hope that the US government will be less likely to impose its will extraterritorially by intervening in foreign subsidiaries’private economic transactions.     

AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

This paper is the third in a series of articles that examines the shortcomings of economic sanctions. Drawing on Mill's utilitarianism, Kant's categorical imperative and Rawls's theory of justice, the conceptual frameworks of consequentialism, deontology and contractualism are used to demonstrate the unethical nature of this increasingly popular instrument of foreign policy.     

Sanctions will Exacerbate Apartheid

The imposition of sanctions, far from stimulating the economic independence of blacks, is likely to increase repression and bloodshed. John Burton, Research Director at the Institute of Economic Affairs, regrets the triumph of emotional impulse over common sense.     

Escalating penalties: a supergame approach

The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyze the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within a supergame framework, in which the legal authority is assumed to minimize the social costs of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at an exogenously given maximal tolerable level.     

Public Contracts as Accountability Mechanisms: Assuring quality in public health care in England and Wales

Contracting in the public sector is designed to enhance the accountability of service providers to their funders. The idea is that quality is improved by the use of service specifications, monitoring of performance and imposition of contractual sanctions. Socio-legal and economic theories of contract indicate that it will be difficult to make and enforce contracts to achieve this. The results of a study of National Health Services contracting in England and Wales are reported. We conclude that contracts alone are not sufficient to improve accountability – collibration of various regulatory measures (including more hierarchical mechanisms such as performance targets) is required.     

Reflections on a siege economy

The paper examines the political and economic effects for South Africa of living in a state of economic siege. It points out that most economies already exist in partial isolation, often self-imposed. The most serious consequence of sanctions will be the granting to the government of a moral licence to react repressively, thus shutting off existing political and economic ‘safety valves’. The net result will be even more stringent political repression, and further resistance to change. The government will find it hard to retreat from this situation, and relax the repression. The result is a society without the flexibility to change.     

Criminalizing price-fixing

We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price-fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.     

The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identifying the effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy using newspaper coverage

This paper focuses on the identification and quantitative estimation of sanctions on the Iranian economy over the period 1989–2019. It provides a new time series approach and proposes a novel measure of sanctions intensity based on daily newspaper coverage. In absence of sanctions, Iran's average annual growth could have been around 4–5%, as compared to the 3% realized. Estimates of the proposed sanctions-augmented structural VAR show that sanctions significantly decrease oil export revenues and result in substantial depreciation of Iranian rial, followed by subsequent increases in inflation and falls in output growth. Keeping other shocks fixed, 2 years of sanctions can explain up to 60% of output growth forecast error variance, although a single quarter sanction shock proves to have quantitatively small effects.     

Open innovation/integration versus disintermediation/disintegration

Supply chain disintegration is considered, due to its importance as an enabler for the management of technology innovation. This research is urgent as it is relevant to a wide range of other occurrences outside of technology innovation management, including: major policy or regulatory changes, industrial actions, economic sanctions, trade wars, trade realignment – such as Brexit, natural disasters, civil disorder and conflict, and financial crises. Disintegration is the re-alignment of partners and coordination within a supply chain to enhance customer value. This process is driven by one of more of the following: introduction of new technology or input, elimination of existing technology or input, change in customer requirements, and/or change in other external factors. The interdisciplinary nature and intellectual foundations of disintegration are considered. Finally, areas of research need are offered.     

ETHICAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PARTICIPATION

The paper explores the orthodox economic perspective on criminal participation and recognises its theoretical and empirical successes during its relatively short history. Questions are raised, however, over its conceptual underpinnings and its correspondence with reality. Paradoxically, the economics of criminal participation can neither tell us why we have had so much crime in living memory nor why we should not be currently experiencing far more. It assumes 'criminals are (potentially all of) us' and that crime is normal. It is argued that there is a need to bring in the moral dimension directly (without reducing it to a mere price) in order to understand why many agents renounce crime and often sacrifice apparent material advantages by doing the right thing. The economics of crime perspective needs to recognise more fully the role of internal as well as external sanctions impacting on behaviour.     

Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REVISITED: ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO WHY THEY FAIL

Economic sanctions have a poor track record in achieving their objectives. In most cases, they are ineffective in bringing about policy change, cause increased suffering in the sanctioned country and reduce opportunities for business. This paper provides additional insights into why sanctions fail by examining two overlooked factors: power–dependency theory and pressure for political stability.     

The deterrent impact of police: An examination of a locally provided public service

This paper develops and empirically tests a model of crime deterrence in an urban area. There are two important departures from past efforts to study the impact of criminal sanctions. The first is that the provision of sanctions from the local public sector is modeled; this is accomplished by specifying the distributional goals of local government and by specifying the production of safety. The second departure is that actual crime and reported crime are differentiated theoretically and in the empirical work. An empirical test of the model, using a unique neighborhood data set, shows that police deter crime significantly; however, this deterrent impact cannot be demonstrated without the distinction between actual and reported crime.     

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge, trust and recourse: imperfect substitutes as sources of assurance in emerging economies

Uncertainty prevents voluntary interactions, but institutions of trust and/or recourse can substitute for knowledge by making promises relatively credible. Trust and various sources of recourse are imperfect substitutes, however, as demonstrated by consideration of the trade-offs between trust based on repeated dealings, recourse to informal private sanctions such as reputation threats, ostracism sanctions and third-party dispute resolution through formal commercial organizations operating under customary law, and the state's coercive legal system. The problems of knowledge and interest imply that, though not perfect, private sources of trust and recourse are superior in emerging markets to state-provided recourse.     

Risky Businesses? Young People in Informal Self‐Employment in Sofia

This article studies how perceptions of the risks associated with informal self‐employment depend on the interplay between the institutional, structural (network) and cultural embeddedness of economic action. Informal self‐employment should create at least three types of risk. The first concerns the possible legal and social sanctions that stem from the illegal character of the entrepreneurial action. The second is related to the complete lack of social security protection among those for whom informal self‐employment is their sole employment. The third is connected with the lack of guarantees concerning contract enforcement, which may increase the probability of opportunistic behaviour by business partners and clients. On the basis of a qualitative study of young, highly educated, informally self‐employed workers in Bulgaria's capital Sofia, I argue that these risks are compensated by the specific network and cultural embeddedness of the economic action. This compensation takes the form of various types of insurance against risks. Its core is the replacement of the vacuum of institutional‐system trust with interpersonal trust. Thus, the specific constellation of institutional, network and cultural embeddedness is able to solve the problem of opportunism, as well as to create the perception that the informally self‐employed are faced with not much greater risks than registered self‐employed workers.