Interconnection in Network Industries

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple bill and keep rule.     

Interconnection regulation in India: Lessons for developing countries

Interconnection is not only a major competition issue per se, it is also a critical element of the basic telecommunications agreement of the WTO. An important issue in interconnection regulation is interconnection charging especially in the context of a dominant incumbent. Most regulators in developing countries face challenges in setting interconnection prices in the absence of market information on the incumbent's or entrant's costs, competition or demand and models suited for developing countries that also adhere to the WTO guidelines. There are few papers that illustrate the challenges faced by regulators in such a context. This paper attempts to bridge the gap by highlighting the nature of interaction between the regulator, incumbent, judiciary and the political environment, the role of formal models in setting interconnection charges and the implications of rapid technological changes in a developing country context through a case study of India.The case study highlights the point that besides independence, it is important to vest enforcement powers in the regulatory agency for it to be credible. Incorporating the WTO interconnection guidelines within a developing country context has implications for network growth and poses challenges to the regulatory processes.Although Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) started with a distortionary, inefficiently priced network providing low coverage and quality, it has meandered its way to a more reasonable network access pricing regime. The decreasing cost of technology and increasing incomes in India and political interventions in regulation have put pressure on TRAI to provide lower interconnection charges and faster telecom growth. Thus, it is pragmatic for regulators to start with a “quick and dirty” estimate, provided that they can signal the downward trend in interconnection pricing, rather than wait for the “correct” estimates.Adoption of future looking strategies (interconnection exchanges), use of a variety of formal models, and strengthening of regulatory capacity are all necessary steps in fostering a competitive environment. Interconnection regimes set up early in the reform process require a review. For successful competition, effective dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions are also important.     

Promoting effective competition through interconnection policy

Incumbent telephone companies argue for reliance on voluntary negotiations to determine the terms of interconnection, or alternatively for regulated access prices equal to those that an incumbent would accept voluntarily. Such prices are justified as necessary to prevent inefficient entry, based on an economic theory called the ‘parity principle’. This paper shows that the parity principle is largely inappropriate for setting interconnection prices in most current contexts, and that the claimed efficiency properties of the rule are often based on flawed, static analyses. Under dynamic considerations the parity principle can threaten the development of effective competition. The authors analyse examples where the parity principle has been advocated in the United States and New Zealand, explaining that interconnection charges are best set by legal or regulatory authority based on the costs of providing network access.     

The mixed blessing of a deregulatory endpoint for the public switched telephone network

Receiving authority to dismantle the wireline public switched telephone network (PSTN) will deliver a mixture of financial benefits and costs to incumbent carriers and also jeopardize longstanding legislative and regulatory goals seeking ubiquitous, affordable and fully interconnected networks. Even if incumbent carriers continue to provide basic telephone services via wireless facilities, they will benefit from substantial relaxation of common carriage duties, no longer having to serve as the carrier of last resort and having the opportunity to decide whether and where to provide service. On the other hand, incumbent carriers may have underestimated the substantial financial and marketplace advantages they also will likely lose in the deregulatory process. Legislators and policy makers also may have underestimated the impact of no longer having the ability to impose common carrier mandates that require carriers to interconnect so that end users have complete access to network services regardless of location.This paper will identify the potential problems resulting from prospective decisions by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), such as the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to grant authority for telecommunications service providers to discontinue PSTN services. The paper also will consider whether in the absence of common carrier duties, private carriers providing telephone services, including Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP), voluntarily will agree to interconnect their networks. The paper will examine three recent carrier interconnection issues with an eye toward assessing whether a largely unregulated marketplace will create incentives for carriers to interconnect networks so that consumers will have ubiquitous access to PSTN replacement and other broadband services.The paper concludes that private carrier interconnection models and information service regulatory oversight may not solve all disputes, or promote universal service public policy goals. Recent Internet interconnection and television program carriage disputes involving major players such as Comcast, Level 3, Fox, Cablevision and Google point to the possibility of increasingly contentious negotiations that could result in balkanized telecommunications networks with at least temporary blockages to desired content and services by some consumers.     

Pricing Network Interconnection: Advantages Held by Integrated Telecom Carriers

A recurring telecommunications policy debate centers on whether incumbent, vertically integrated local exchange carriers have an incentive to discriminate in price against down-stage service rivals who interconnect to their network (a price squeeze). The concern is typically voiced in one of two claims: (1) there is an incentive for an incumbent to use a price squeeze when access prices are set above long-run incremental cost; or (2) prices set at that cost are preferred for interconnection because they eliminate incentives for a price squeeze. In principle, form (1) is generally true (Proposition 1), but form (2) is generally not (Proposition 2), The proof of these Propositions reveals why pricing access at long-run incremental cost coupled with appropriate price floors in the down-stage market does eliminate the incentive to squeeze.     

Prices for long-distance voice telephony in Germany

This paper examines the first 16 months of competition in the German market for long-distance voice telephony on the fixed network. It concentrates on price level and price structure. Competition induced by the entry of both network operators and switch-based service providers decreased the price level substantially. Furthermore, after initial attempts to design innovative price structures, most firms gave up differentiation, and instead charged uniform prices for long-distance calls for residential customers. Moreover, the decrease in the price level seems to have induced a shift in the peak-load structure, which raises concern about the regulation of the peak-load structure of interconnection charges.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Cost orientation and xDSL services: Retail-minus vs. LRAIC

Forward-looking long run average incremental cost (LRAIC) bottom-up models have now established themselves as a popular methodology to guide European telecommunications regulators’ setting of interconnection charges between the incumbent and other operators. The purpose of this article is to discuss the adequacy of using bottom-up LRAIC models or retail-minus to calculate bitstream access charges—the charges typically applicable to wholesale xDSL services. In particular, the author is interested in the cost drivers of such services, how different they are from circuit-switched voice services, and ultimately whether retail-minus should be preferred over LRAIC models when setting these bitstream charges.     

Welfare effects of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico

The telecommunication sector in Mexico was highly concentrated until 2013. The sector was mostly composed by a dominant player, a rationed market (low density of services), a poor institutional design, high tariffs, and weak regulation agents. The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index was 5333 for mobile telephone and 7,029 for fixed telephone services—among the highest scores in the world. In order to promote competition in the sector, Congress approved a reform in 2013 to establish a new regulator empowered to impose asymmetrical rules in the case of the predominance of a single firm. A declaration of preponderance of the dominant player was issued, promoting free interconnection rates and the mandatory sharing of its passive and active infrastructure with the rest of the firms in the industry. The new institutional design led to increased competition in the sector, decreasing the mobile and fixed telephone prices while increasing the coverage and penetration of these services. In this article, an applied general equilibrium model for the Mexican economy is employed to assess the impact of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico in the telephone sector, consumer welfare, and income distribution. The model is static, encompassing 10 types of consumers (rural and urban and the five income quintiles) and 40 sectors (of which four are disaggregate telecommunications industries). It assumes fixed wages and capital rental prices as well as idle resources. The main results indicate that the effects of the reform are not minor; the drop in telephone prices would reduce the general consumer price index by almost 2%, and the value added would increase by more than 3%, benefiting mainly households in the highest income quantiles.     

Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations

This paper studies a theoretical model aimed at assessing the optimal access charges and retail prices in the postal sector. It takes explicitly into account three main characteristics of the postal sector: the ability of entrants to bypass the incumbent’s delivery network; the imposition on the incumbent, but not on entrants of universal service obligations; and the provision of access to both competitors and customers. The paper first develops analytical formulations of the optimal access charges and the incumbent’s end-to-end retail price. It then presents calibrated results illustrating the impact on prices and welfare of various scenarios.     

Which Are The Main Drivers Behind Residential Electricity Prices?

Over the last decade the residential electricity price in most EU Member States has been increasing. Even after the introduction of significant reforms such as the liberalisation of the electricity market. This upward trend is in response to the development of different price components along the electricity supply chain. In order to identify and analyse these components for EU-Member States, a more detailed price apportionment than those offered by public sources like Eurostat and IEA is necessary. The methodology proposed in this study analyses the development of the residential electricity price and its main components between 2002 and 2012 for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The main drivers of the price trends observed for these four countries are subsequently identified, quantified and compared. Furthermore, the residential expenditure on electricity in each country is examined in connection with the evolution of residential electricity consumption. The results show how and to what extent the residential electricity price for the selected EU Member States depends on price components such as the electricity wholesale price, the gross margin, network expenditures, energy taxes and other levies related to the decarbonisation of the national energy system. Furthermore, this detailed analysis of residential electricity prices throughout the last decade provides a sufficient data basis to draw some prospective conclusions in terms of a short-term price outlook.     

Anti‐Competitive Interconnection: the effects of the elasticity of consumers' expectations and the shape of the network effects function

I find that interconnection might cause the market to be less competitive, and might lead to an increase in the price firms charge for their product. Absent interconnection, firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason is to obtain revenue from selling the product to a consumer (as in the case without network effects). The second reason is that by expanding the network by one more consumer, the product becomes more attractive to all other consumers. Interconnection eliminates the second reason—when firms interconnect, they are no longer concerned with consumers' following the crowd. I show that consumers and society might be worse off from interconnection. I focus on two factors that make the (post‐interconnection) price increase larger: consumer expectations that are highly sensitive to prices and consumers putting a high value on small increases in network size at the equilibrium market shares. Both of these factors make firms highly competitive, but only if the firms' products' networks are not interconnected.     

Consumer behavior towards on-net/off-net price differentiation

This paper explores how consumers react towards price differentiation between on-net and off-net calls in mobile telecommunications - a pricing policy that is common in many mobile telecommunications markets. Based on a survey of 1044 students it is demonstrated that some consumers may suffer from a "price differentiation bias", i.e., a fair number of consumers may overestimate the savings that result from reduced on-net and/or off-net charges, as they do not appear to weigh the prices with the probabilities of placing off-net and on-net calls. This may help to explain why it have been the smaller operators in various countries who have introduced on-net/off-net price differentiation. The paper also discusses the implications that such a consumer bias may have for market competition.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

The implications of economic efficiency for US telecommunications policy

Subsidizing local residence telecommunications service from toll services has produced large distortions in US state and interstate toll markets. While both the business and residence groups as a whole would benefit from lower toll prices and higher residence prices, the fact that toll usage is concentrated means that most residence subscribers would be made worse off. It is therefore politically difficult to implement efficient telecommunications pricing. However, this same concentration of toll usage makes it advantageous for large toll users to bypass the local network to escape the subsidy-laden carrier access charges. Such a bifurcation of the telecommunications network has the potential for making most residence subscribers even worse off than they would be under an efficiency- enhancing reduction in toll prices.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

Impact of roaming regulation on revenues and prices of mobile operators in the EU

We use a difference-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the EU roaming regulation on mobile operators’ average revenues per user (ARPU) and the retail prices of mobile services. Our results suggest that due to the regulation the ARPU of EU mobile operators decreased since 2007 on average by 9.1%. When considering purchasing power parities, the decline of ARPU is estimated on average at 5.8%, but in this case we cannot reject that there was no decrease at all. We also find that the impact of the regulation on ARPU depends on traffic imbalances, which may be related to tourism flows, and has a stronger negative impact on operators from countries with a surplus in tourism traffic. There is however no difference in the impact of the regulation on cross-country and national operators. Moreover, our results suggest that the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regulation implemented in June 2017 had no impact on the tariffs of national mobile plans.     

Regulation and efficiency in transition: The case of telecommunications in Italy

In regulating the telecommunications industry, the separation between network and retail functions, which is designed to countervail the market power of incumbent operators, is a relevant issue. Despite its importance, little empirical research has addressed the effects of such a separation. Accordingly, this paper provides insights into the consequences of the Italian communications regulatory authority's (AgCom) decision to impose this type of separation on the incumbent telecommunications operator, Telecom Italia. In particular, the studied separation is between the firm's network-related functions, and those used for provision of its communication services. The present research finds that the type of separation implemented by AgCom allows a provider to maintain the advantages of operational scale in its network structure without dampening competition in the existing market for communications services. The study also offers further empirical evidence on the advantages of a composite vs. translog function in analyzing the multiproduct cost structure of a telecommunications operator.     

On access pricing in telecoms: theory and European practice

This paper discusses European legislation concerning interconnection between telecommunications operators. An important and distinct element of regulatory policy in the European Union is that operators with significant market power are required to provide cost-based interconnection whereas other operators are not required to provide such cost-based interconnection. It analyzes the consequences of different interconnection charges for competition and investments. Using recent insights from the theoretical literature on competition in telecommunications, it finds that the socially optimal regulatory policy concerning interconnection has the same characteristics as that adopted in the European Union.     

Cost allocation of WCDMA and wholesale pricing for mVoIP and data services

This study estimates cost-based prices for wholesale voice and data services provided to 3G (WCDMA) MVNOs according to their distinct types. For estimation, 3G MVNOs are classified into different types, and the overall cost of WCDMA facilities are separated into voice and data components based on their subscriber rates, actual traffic rates, as well as efficiency consideration of traffic rates. The study then calculates cost-based wholesale prices of voice and data services for each of the 3G MVNO types. The result of this study shows that a cost-plus pricing scheme can help achieve the policy goals of the regulator, namely, lowering telecommunications tariffs and facilitating the introduction of new convergent-type services, far more effectively than the current retail-minus pricing scheme. The findings of this study may assist firms in developing business models based on 3G networks and telecom regulators in designing policies related to interconnection, mVoIP, prepaid calls, wholesale services, and network neutrality.