金融科技与银行价值链的重塑

金融科技在显著提升银行服务水平和经营效率的同时,也对银行业的竞争环境产生了深刻影响,商业银行在服务场景和渠道、客户信息以及资金等方面的传统竞争优势受到挑战.为快速获取必要的金融科技能力,银行加速推进数字化转型,并在其价值链的多个环节与科技企业开展合作.银行价值链由封闭的自我循环模式转向开放的合作模式,且价值链中的高附加值活动存在向少数企业集中的趋势.银行业的风险特征也由此发生重要变化:传统的战略风险、信用风险、流动性风险、操作风险、法律风险与系统性风险依然存在且变得更加复杂;科技风险、网络风险与数据安全等问题日渐凸显.作为应对,我国应结合银行业的实际情况,对现有银行监管框架和模式进行再评估,督促指导银行在推进数字化转型的过程中密切关注相关风险,进一步加强监管能力建设,以更好地守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线.     

Analyzing the effect of derivatives on the financial soundness of commercial banks in Italy: An approach based on the CAMELS framework

Italian economy is among the biggest economies in the Europe which suffered from the repercussions of the global financial crisis during this last decade. The weakness of Italian banking system coincides with the common debate about the implication of derivatives in the distress of banks’ soundness. Thus, the aim of our research is to examine the effect of derivative instruments on the banks’ soundness in Italy. To reach our goal, the CAMELS approach is employed to define the soundness of Italian commercial banks. To overcome the endogeneity issue of variables, an appropriate econometric procedure, namely the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM system) is applied using data from 22 commercial banks in Italy over the period 2005–2015. Explanatory variables are defined by derivative instruments (forwards, swaps, options, and futures), bank‐specific variable (bank's size as non‐CAMELS variable), industry‐specific variables (CR3, CR5, and HHI as indicators of bank's sector and market concentrations), and country‐specific variables (GDP and inflation). The main results reveal that the majority of the CAMELS indicators are favorably affected by derivative instruments especially forwards and options. The most important conclusion is that using derivative instruments does not threaten the financial soundness of commercial banks in Italy. As major implication decision‐makers and experts—after the global financial crisis—should not consider derivatives in part as responsible of the fragility of the Italian banking system.     

Banking industry volatility and banking crises

While studies using balance sheet information of banks and macroeconomic indicators to forecast banking crises are prolific, empirical research using market information of banks is relatively sparse. We investigate whether banking industry volatility, constructed with the disaggregated approach from Campbell et al. [Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk? The Journal of Finance 56, 1–43] using exclusively publicly available market information of banks, is a good predictor of systemic banking crises in the analyses including data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets. We find that banking industry volatility performs well in predicting systemic banking crises for developed markets but very poor for emerging markets, which suggest that the impact of market forces on the soundness of the banking system might be different for developed and emerging markets. We also find that those macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on the probability of banking crises. Therefore, the traditional cross-country results of the studies on banking crises need to be interpreted cautiously.     

A Cross‐Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance

Ongoing changes in the structure and nature of banking, as well as banking crises across the globe have focused the attention of policy makers on the appropriate structure, scope, and degree of independence of banking supervision. Key issues for banking supervision structure are whether there should be one or multiple supervisory authorities, and whether the central bank should be involved in bank supervision. The issue pertaining to the scope of supervision is whether bank supervisory authorities should supervise other financial service industries, including in particular securities and insurance. Finally, the issue regarding the independence of supervisory authorities is the degree to which bank supervisors should be subject to political and economic policy pressure and influence. How these issues are addressed is important, because policies that fail to provide for an appropriate bank supervisory framework may undermine bank performance and even lead to full‐scale banking crises. The intense interest policy makers have shown in these issues has not been matched, however, by researchers. In particular, there is very little systematic empirical evidence on how, or indeed whether, the structure, scope, or independence of bank supervision affects the banking industry. This paper addresses this gap in three respects. First, drawing on the existing literature, we discuss the various policy issues surrounding the structure, scope, and degree of independence of bank supervision. Second, we provide comparative information on the actual choices that have been made regarding these three aspects of supervision across a wide range of developed and emerging market economies. Third, using both country‐specific data for 55 countries in all parts of the world, and data for over 2,300 individual banks in those countries, we examine the relationship between the structure, scope, and independence of bank supervision and one key dimension of the banking industry – bank profitability. Our results indicate, at most, a weak influence for the structure of supervision on bank performance. In particular, we find some evidence that a single‐supervisor system enhances bank performance. However, following our discussion of the caution one must use in interpreting data on the supervisory framework, our re‐estimates using an alternative source of data on the structure of supervision failed to duplicate this result. Our results have a bearing on a key dimension of the policy debate on how to structure supervision. In particular, given the dearth of empirical evidence on the issues, advocates of one form or another of supervisory structure have asserted that a particular change is likely to affect (favorably or adversely, as the advocate sees fit) the performance of banks. Our results provide little support at best to the belief that any particular bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance. This is significant, because it suggests that the on‐going debate might more broadly focus on the impact of the supervisory structure on other aspects of the health of the banking system, including individual bank safety and soundness, systemic stability, and the development of the banking system.     

The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.     

The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.     

The impact of banking regulations on banks' cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence

This paper uses stochastic frontier analysis to provide international evidence on the impact of the regulatory and supervision framework on bank efficiency. Our dataset consists of 2853 observations from 615 publicly quoted commercial banks operating in 74 countries during the period 2000-2004. We investigate the impact of regulations related to the three pillars of Basel II (i.e. capital adequacy requirements, official supervisory power, and market discipline mechanisms), as well as restrictions on bank activities, on cost and profit efficiency of banks, while controlling for other country-specific characteristics. Our results suggest that banking regulations that enhance market discipline and empower the supervisory power of the authorities increase both cost and profit efficiency of banks. In contrast, stricter capital requirements improve cost efficiency but reduce profit efficiency, while restrictions on bank activities have the opposite effect, reducing cost efficiency but improving profit efficiency.     

Firm valuations and board compensation: Evidence from alternative banking models

This study examines whether the board of directors' compensation schemes affect stock market valuations for banks in a dual banking system (Islamic and conventional banks). We employ an international sample of 11 countries for the period 2010–2015. Our results show that for the full sample (i.e. irrespective of the bank type), board of directors' compensation has a significant and positive impact on stock market valuations. For different bank types, we find that the positive effect of the board of directors' compensation on market valuations holds only for conventional banks, with insignificant evidence for their Islamic counterparts. We, also, examine the impact of Shari'ah supervisory board's compensation on Islamic banks value. Our results show that investors positively perceived and priced information related to this boards' compensation.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

Equity market information,bank holding company risk,and market discipline

For market discipline to be effective, market factors such as changes in firm equity and debt values and returns, must influence firm decision making. In banking, this can occur directly via bank management or indirectly though supervisory examinations and oversight influencing bank management. In this study, we investigate whether equity market variables can provide timely information and add value to accounting models that predict changes in bank holding company (BOPEC) risk ratings over the 1988–2000 period. Using a variety of equity market indicators, the findings suggest that one-quarter lagged market data adds forecast value to lagged financial statement data and prior supervisory information in the logistic regressions. Furthermore, using extensive out-of-sample testing for the years 2001–2003, we find: (1) that multiple models estimated over different phases of the business and banking cycles are superior to a single model for forecasting BOPEC rating changes; (2) that equity data adds economically significant power in forecasting BOPEC rating upgrades and performs well for identifying no changes; (3) that for downgrades, the accounting model forecasts the best; (4) that modeling the three possible risk ratings categories simultaneously (downgrade, no change and upgrade) minimizes both Type I and Type II classification errors; and (5) that using multiple models to forecast risk ratings enhances the overall percentage of correct classifications.     

Systemic risk analysis using forward-looking Distance-to-Default series

Based on Contingent Claims Analysis, this paper develops a method to monitor systemic risk in the European banking system. Aggregated Distance-to-Default series are generated using option prices information from systemically important banks and the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index. These indicators provide methodological advantages in monitoring vulnerabilities in the banking system over time: (1) they capture interdependence and joint risk of distress in systemically important banks; (2) their forward-looking feature endow them with early signaling properties compared to traditional approaches in the literature and other market-based indicators; (3) they produce simultaneously smooth and informative long-term signals and quick and clear reaction to market distress and (4) they incorporate additional information through option prices about tail risk and correlation breaks, in line with recent findings in the literature.     

The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors

Using a new database covering some 91 supervisory agencies, this paper examines how important various skilled experts are in the supervisory process and the relative usage of different kinds of such experts. We seek to explore what kind of perspective supervisors in different institutional settings may adopt: a macro-oriented perspective or a more micro-approach? The answer to this question is relevant, as there is evidence that many financial crises have been macro-induced.It is found that central banks employ more economists and fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing than non-centralbank supervisory agencies. This result would indicate that an institutional setting with direct or indirect central bank involvement is more likely to produce a macro-approach. Next, there are significant economies of scale in financial supervision, though this can be measured by several alternative variables (e.g., the relative scale of bank intermediation). Finally, there do not appear to be major economies of scope. A more complex financial system with a well-developed stock market would need both more supervisors as well as more skilled ones.     

Predicting rating changes for banks: how accurate are accounting and stock market indicators?

We aim to assess how accurately accounting and stock market indicators predict rating changes for Asian banks. We conduct a stepwise process to determine the optimal set of early indicators by tracing upgrades and downgrades from rating agencies, as well as other relevant factors. Our results indicate that both accounting and market indicators are useful leading indicators but are more effective in predicting upgrades than downgrades, especially for large banks. Moreover, early indicators are only significant in predicting rating changes for banks that are more focused on traditional banking activities such as deposit and loan activities. Finally, a higher reliance of banks on subordinated debt is associated with better accuracy of early indicators.     

The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?

We study whether central bank independence (CBI) and monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policymakers assigning banking supervision to central banks. Our empirical analysis shows that, assuming a benevolent government, a higher degree of central bank operational (economic) independence is associated with a lower probability of supervisory powers being entrusted to the monetary authority. We interpret this result as deriving from governments’ fear of the risk of excessively discretionary monetary policy. However, there is evidence that – conditional on operational independence – central banks are more involved in supervision when they pursue tighter monetary policy goals (a specific aspect of political independence). Our interpretation is that the latter may represent a commitment to mitigate central banks’ discretion in the monetization of financial distress. Our study suggests that CBI can be relevant, not only for its alleged effects on macroeconomic variables, but also in influencing policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of banking supervisory powers.     

Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking?

Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.     

Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks

Although credit risk is an important factor that financial institutions must cope with, the determinants of bank problem loans have been little studied. Using panel data, we compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks in the period 1985–1997, taking into account both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power are variables that explain credit risk. However, there are significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the relevance of the institutional form in the management of credit risk. Our findings raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators, the advantages of bank mergers from different regions, and the role of banking competition and ownership in determining credit risk.     

Bank globalization and efficiency: Host- and home-country effects

Analyzing 126 countries for 1995–2013, we investigate the link between bank globalization and efficiency from the perspective of both host and home countries. We find strong and consistent evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with lower efficiency in host countries (host-country effect), while foreign expansion in the banking sector improves the efficiency of banks at home (home-country effect). We further observe that the effect of bank globalization is dependent on the regulatory and institutional regimes of the respective host (home) countries. Specifically, stringent activity restrictions, tight supervision, fewer limitations on foreign banks, lower market entry barriers, and less government interference all help mitigate the efficiency loss from foreign bank entry. Less supervision power, multiple supervisors, more restrictions on foreign banks, and a competitive banking market are all conducive to the higher efficiency gain of incumbent domestic banks from the respective country’s outward investments in the banking sector. Moreover, we find that the adverse impact on efficiency from foreign bank presence is less pronounced for less risky, more profitable, and larger banks, while banks that are more efficient, more profitable, taking on more risk, and/or smaller gain more efficiency from their country’s foreign expansion.     

Disciplina de mercado en el sistema bancario centroamericano

This article empirically tests the market discipline hypothesis in the Central American banking system. Whether the riskier banks (with the worst bank fundamentals) pay higher interest rates and attract fewer amounts of deposits. We use dynamic panel data models and the generalized method of moments (SYS GMM) estimator, and a sample of 30 banks from six Central American countries over the years 2008-2012. In contrast to most of the previous empirical literature, particularly in developed countries, in Central America we did not find evidence for market discipline. The results are robust to different indicators of the bank fundamentals, to the effect of the internal demand for funding by banks, and to other econometric methods. These findings indicate weakness in the disclosure policy of banking information.     

Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

This paper examines market discipline in the credit default swap (CDS) market and the potential distortion of CDS spreads which arises when a bank is thought to be too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find evidence for market discipline in the CDS market. However, CDS prices are distorted by a size effect when a bank is considered to be too-big-to-fail. A 1 percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS spread of a bank by about 2 basis points. We further find that some banks have already reached a size that makes them too-big-to-be-rescued. While the price distortion for these banks decreases, the existence of banks that are considered to be too-big-to-rescue raises important new issues for banking supervisors.