电信竞争、呼叫外部性与接听方付费

本文扩展了Joen—Laffont—Tirole（2002）文章的模型，考察了在呼叫方与接听方合作决定通话长度条件下电信运营商的竞争策略。当引入接听方付费和呼叫外部性的假设进入电信竞争模型时，在线性定价条件下，电信运营商制定的呼叫价格与接听价格仍然随着网络替代程度的增加而减少，但是电信运营商不再能够利用接入费来进行合谋。在非线性定价条件下，电信运营商竞争策略是制定使消费者剩余最大化的呼叫价格与接听价格，然后利用固定费榨取消费者剩余。在基于网络的价格歧视条件下，与Joen—Laffont-Tirole（2002）模型相比较，由于通话时间由消费者合作决定。因此电信运营商将通过固定费进行市场份额的争夺，从而导致按边际成本定价。网络联接并没有因为电信运营商的竞争策略而发生中断。     

垄断竞争的电信业定价策略研究

讨论垄断竞争条件下电信业定价策略,对理解电信运营商的竞争行为、制定电信业竞争政策有重要的意义。本文将呼叫外部性引入模型,考察了呼叫方内部化接听方效用条件下企业定价策略,从而扩展了目前理论内容和结论。研究表明：当呼叫方内部化接听方的效用时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商仍然会通过提高接入费进行合谋;在非线性定价条件下,由于电信运营商可以利用固定费进行市场份额的争夺,电信运营商不再有利用接入费进行合谋的动机;在基于终接网络的价格歧视条件下,当消费者接听效用接近于呼叫效用时,电信运营商将会通过制定无穷大的呼叫异网价格来获取更大的市场份额,因此网络联接发生了中断。     

中外银行业有效竞争的外部性比较

从银行业竞争的沿革、监管体制、稳定性等方面比较分析我国银行业和外国银行业的竞争格局的外部性特征，对中国银行业国内银行与外资银行竞争格局态势作对比分析，由此提出优化银行业竞争环境的政策建议。     

外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响

外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响显著。在存在外部性的条件下,同样的资本和要素难以通过市场竞争获得同样的报酬,以利润函数作为切入点,分析某一银行的投入和产出之比发生的变化。金融产品的成本组成包含外部边际成本,选取税收负担、营业费用作为外部边际成本关键因素,分析外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响程度,由此提出优化银行业竞争外部环境的政策建议。     

基于网络外部性的技术标准竞争博弈分析

在现代科技社会中,技术标准竞争在企业发展战略中占据着举足轻重的位子,在竞争日益激烈的环境下,企业是采用合作模式还是竞争模式也是影响企业生存发展的重要因素。本文运用博弈论的方法分析了企业技术标准竞争策略的几种不同组合,并提出解决建议。     

地方政府间过度竞争的外部性分析

地方政府竞争行为外部性是地方政府制定公共政策、行使公共服务职能以吸引、拥有、控制和转化资源,占领和控制市场的副产品,它是由政治过程产生的,通过改变交易规则或产权从而造成相应的成本和收益转移的现象.地方政府竞争行为是一种政府行为,因此地方政府竞争行为外部性具有政府行为外部性的一般特征.规制过度竞争是转轨时期地方政府工作的重要内容.在目前我国的国情下,规制过度竞争导致地方保护主义和市场分割,产生了许多负的外部性.本文将从我国政府目前的约束条件出发,分析地方政府间过度竞争的外部性.     

地方政府间过度竞争的外部性分析

地方政府竞争行为外部性是地方政府制定公共政策、行使公共服务职能以吸引、拥有、控制和转化资源,占领和控制市场的副产品,它是由政治过程产生的,通过改变交易规则或产权从而造成相应的成本和收益转移的现象。地方政府竞争行为是一种政府行为,因此地方政府竞争行为外部性具有政府行为外部性的一般特征。规制过度竞争是转轨时期地方政府工作的重要内容。在目前我国的国情下,规制过度竞争导致地方保护主义和市场分割,产生了许多负的外部性。本文将从我国政府目前的约束条件出发,分析地方政府间过度竞争的外部性。     

网络外部性与IT企业竞争

从多个方面探讨了网络外部特性对IT企业竞争行为的影响，并结合我国 IT企业的实际情况提出了一些相关的发展建议。     

我国政府规制与电信竞争的实证分析

对《中国统计年鉴》1990—2005年的数据分析表明，政府规制是有利于促进竞争进而增加电信业务总量的，它们之间存在着长期稳定的正相关关系。在电信行业打破垄断引入竞争后，维护电信业务市场持续有效、公平的竞争成为对电信行业进行规制的重要内容之一。     

电信行业的垄断与竞争问题研究

本文通过明确电信垄断与竞争的分析视角 ,解读电信行业垄断与竞争的利弊 ,说明电信行业是竞争性垄断行业。竞争性垄断是在一种竞争的市场环境里形成并通过市场竞争电信行业维持下去的垄断。在竞争性垄断市场格局下 ,电信行业的竞争是有效率竞争     

网络外部性、需求异质性与电子支付创新*

需求方的网络外部性和异质性这两个特质对支付工具形态演变的收敛具有相反的作用力量。信息技术的发展,一方面通过用户基础的拓展和与法币体系的互联互通,缩小了新型电子支付工具与传统支付工具在网络效应上的差距,另一方面,通过支付媒介之外的各种附加功能的创造,使前者更好地契合了多样化的支付需求。电子支付创新丰富了可选择的支付工具种类,但不会威胁到法币的垄断地位。     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MERCANTILISM AND THE LEARNING BY DOING EXTERNALITY

This paper examines the degree to which the learning by doing (LBD) externality calls for an undervalued exchange rate. We obtain mixed results. For an economy where the LBD externality operates in the traded sector, real exchange rate undervaluation may be used to internalize this externality, if the LBD calls for subsidizing employment in the traded sector. If the LBD externality is embodied in aggregate investment, the optimal policy calls for subsidizing the cost of capital in the traded sector, and there is no room for undervalued exchange rate policy.     

PRODUCT FUNCTIONALITY,COMPETITION, AND MULTIPURCHASING

The more functionalities a good offers, the greater is its perceived quality. Equilibrium prices in standard spatial competition models depend solely on quality differences. We assume that new functionalities are more appreciated the closer a product is to a consumer's ideal variety. Prices are then increasing in functionality levels. Furthermore, we endogenize whether consumers buy only one of two varieties (single‐purchase) or both (multipurchase). Under multipurchase, there might be a hump‐shaped relationship between equilibrium prices and functionality levels. Therefore, it could be optimal for each supplier to sacrifice sales and set prices so high that multipurchase is eliminated.     

PRIVATE GOOD,EXTERNALITY, PUBLIC GOOD*

In two recent investigations into the economic problems of externality the authors have noted in passing that the welfare or optimality conditions in the case of a consumption externality seemed identical with the welfare conditions in the case of public goods as originally stated by Samuelson.¹ The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the welfare conditions for a public good are a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality where a public good is defined as a good ‘which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good’ (Samuelson [4]). Since the welfare conditions for a private good are also a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality, it follows that we have a range of externality with the pure private good and the pure public good as polar cases.     

ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS, COMPETITION, AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

Distilled spirits producers recently voted to eliminate their voluntary ban on broadcast advertising. The ban received public support because of the high social cost associated with alcohol consumption and the belief that advertising promotes alcohol consumption and abuse. In spite of this belief, the empirical evidence indicates that advertising has no significant effect on the market demand for distilled spirits. This evidence has led many policy economists to conclude that eliminating the ban will have no effect on alcohol consumption. The purpose of this research is to show that this conclusion is incorrect because it ignores the fact that advertising restrictions may affect industry competition as well as market demand.     

COMPETITION, PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COST-REDUCING INNOVATION

Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations.     

电信资费模式研究

未来电信运营企业出于争夺市场、刺激消费的目的,将更加细分市场、更多地采用打包的可选择三部定价模式。这些模式有别于垄断市场上,以榨取用户更多消费剩余为目的而采用的打包销售模式。     

TAX COMPETITION,RELATIVE PERFORMANCE,AND POLICY IMITATION

Rather than about their absolute payoffs, governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments. Moreover, they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere. I study such behavior in a standard tax competition game. Both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies, evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept. Independently of the number of jurisdictions involved, an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players. It, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses.