工资合约、灰色收入和职业生涯考虑

本文用一个简单的两期动态模型分析年薪制下的显性激励和隐性激励。本文明确引入“灰色收入”作为企业经营者收入的一部分，定义广义的“职业生涯考虑”，同时，放弃了完全竞争市场的假设。通过对现行年薪制下经理考虑“灰色收入”时显性激励和隐性激励的共同作用的分析，本文解释了如下经济现象：虽然现行的年薪制引入了显性的工资合约，但并不一定使得经理的努力程度提高，而且也不能解决灰色收入问题。     

国有商业银行的激励机制与公司治理结构

随着国有商业银行的公司治理结构的不断改进,国有商业银行中的与委托代理理论相关的激励问题已经成为阻碍国有银行发展的重要因素。以往的论文主要论述了激励机制不足产生的代理人与委托人利益的偏差,提出增加显性收入。文章在这些国有银行高级管理人员是经济人的假设下,分析了他们乐意接受明显偏低的显性报酬(股权收入,年薪等)而不另谋高就的经济原因,发现他们可以通过“内部人控制”所带来的控制权来使自己获得更多的隐性或灰色收入,由此提出在改善激励机制增加显性收入的同时,降低通过控制权所带来的隐性或灰色收入,并结合国内外经验提出政策建议。     

公司治理结构与激励选择

在现代公司治理结构中，有效的激励和约束机制是减少委托风险、降低代理成本、提高企业绩效的焦点问题。本文从考察公司治理结构下委托代理关系产生的“代理问题”着手，研究公司治理结构下解决“代理问题”的激励制度安排，提出隐性激励和显性激励的配合使用是解决公司治理结构中“代理问题”的关键所在。通过对现代公司治理结构下两种激励制度的比较分析，探讨我国在试行年薪制与经理股票期权过程中要注意的问题，提出了我国国有企业公司治理结构下激励机制的设计思路。一、公司治理结构下的委托代理关系按照现代公司理论，出资者（如股东…     

考虑知识属性的供应链企业间知识交易契约

基于供应链合作创新的视角,考虑知识的显性和隐性属性,运用委托-代理理论设计了供应链企业间显性知识和隐性知识交易的多任务激励契约机制。研究表明:如果显性知识和隐性知识的转移成本函数相互独立,那么激励相容条件下两类知识交易的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优激励因子是各类交易下知识买方边际收益的增函数、知识卖方绝对风险规避系数、各类知识转移边际成本变化率和业绩方差的减函数,在此基础上提出了效率风险的概念;如果两类知识的转移成本函数相互依存,那么在激励相容条件下隐性知识交易的最优激励契约是"门槛型激励契约",并定量地给出了知识卖方的"门槛激励条件"。     

经理股票期权和年薪制的比较分析

建立健全国有企业激励约束机制,对搞好国有企业具有现实意义。本文通过对经理股票期权与年薪制这两种激励方式的比较研究,分析了股票期权在弥补年薪制的缺陷、增强长期激励效果方面的值得重视的作用,提出了实行“年薪制+股票期权”激励方式的建议。     

考虑承接商隐性收益的外包主体收益博弈

在对外包过程中的主体收益分配研究中,现有研究模型主要针对外包主体的显性收益,很少把隐性收益作为考虑因素.本文构建一个不对称信息的外包商和承接商收益博弈模型,研究外包商在同等激励条件下,承接商考虑隐性收益和不考虑隐性收益时,外包主体付出努力程度及收益分配的变化.研究发现:(1)隐性收益对承接商付出的努力是有影响的.随着承接商的成长,承接商更多考虑显性收益.(2)无论承接商是否考虑隐性收益,发包商都会对外包过程进行监管,其努力水平不变.(3)考虑隐性收益后承接商的总收益增加,随着承接商的发展,隐性收益时总收益产生的增量减少.     

论内外部经理人市场与银行分支机构棘轮效应之改进

虽然目前国有商业银行引入了效率导向的考核激励机制,但分支机构经理＂留一手＂现象依然普遍。针对这一现状,依据委托代理理论的基本逻辑,用两阶段动态模型分别对银行分支机构绩效考核中棘轮效应、引入内外部经理人市场后经理人效用函数变化对棘轮效应的改善进行分析,得出相对于外部经理人市场而言,完善的内部经理人市场能更有效改善棘轮效应,激励经理努力工作。建议实施与绩效挂钩的职务显性货币收益,建立控制权约束机制,减小隐性控制权收益。     

经理层期权激励计划的可操作性分析

我国传统工资制度和现行年薪制的重大缺陷在于缺乏长期报酬激励,由此引发的经理短期行为成为制约企业长期发展的瓶颈。经理层期权激励是解决这一缺陷的最佳方式。制度环境是否完善是股票期权在我国能否成功实施的关键。     

国有企业高管薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响效应研究

本文基于影响企业绩效各种要素的结构特征,以2014—2016年A股上市的391家国有控股公司为研究对象,通过构建多元回归分析模型,研究国有企业高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系,着重探究显性激励与隐性激励的交互效应对企业绩效的影响.研究结果表明,政府下辖国有企业显性激励不显著,只有隐性激励显著,交互作用结果比较复杂,隐性激励与年薪激励相互增强,隐性激励与股权激励相互抑制.自然垄断国有企业隐性激励的效果要明显优于显性激励,交互作用结果表明,显性激励与隐性激励相互增强.自由竞争的国有企业交互作用结果表明,两种激励方式相互增强,其中,年薪差距和股权差距的激励效果更为明显.基于此,笔者建议,应针对不同产权类型的国有企业实行差异化的高管激励方式.     

研发外包中价值不可验证的隐性知识共享激励

收益共享是激励代理人努力工作的有效手段之一,但在研发外包中服务商隐性知识价值难以验证,收益共享难以实现。对此,建立了显性知识和隐性知识共享努力的多任务委托代理模型,模型的求解分析表明,当服务商显性和隐性知识共享努力成本存在替代关系时,模型将回归于一般的单任务模型;当存在互补关系时,客户对显性知识的激励同样能激励隐性知识共享,且激励效果随互补性的增加而越发有效。此时,客户最优的显性知识共享激励系数与成本相关系数、隐性知识共享努力成本系数正相关,而与显性知识创造共享努力成本系数、服务商风险规避度、方差负相关。     

Government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market: the case of China

We show that the many unusual features of China’s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes.     

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal–agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures.     

投资管理人最优报酬合同三题

资产管理行业的发展是近年来我国金融系统最重要的结构性变化之一,而如何签订与投资管理人的报酬合同是关键问题。本文从委托——代理关系的视角,分析委托资产管理的特殊性,就最优报酬合同是否应该含有比较基准、是否应该是线性的以及业绩报酬是否应该是隐性的进行了探讨,指出投资管理人的最优报酬合同不应照搬一般的委托代理合同。     

Does work pay in France? Monetary incentives, hours constraints, and the guaranteed minimum income

This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France's main welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI) to estimate monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients. Based on the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially offered to each individual, we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed manner. Relating these gains to observed employment, we then estimate a simple structural labor supply model. We find that potential gains are almost always positive but very small on average, especially for single mothers, because of the high implicit marginal tax rates embedded in the system. Employment rates are sensitive to incentives with extensive margin elasticities for both men and women usually below one. Conditional on these elasticities, simulations indicate that existing policies devoted to reducing marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution, such as the intéressement earnings top-up program, have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope. The negative income tax (Prime pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception.     

董事会激励对公司效率影响的随机前沿分析

本文将激励形式分为两种内部激励——显性激励、隐性激励和两种外部激励——产品市场压力、资本市场压力,并以2005—2008年度中国纺织服装行业上市公司为样本,利用随机前沿模型实证分析了董事会激励对公司效率的影响。结果表明:显性激励方面,董事会薪酬激励优于权益激励;隐性激励方面,董事长更替对公司效率有积极显著的影响,而董事长和总经理的两职合一对公司效率有负面的影响。外部激励方面,产品市场的竞争压力比资本市场的收购风险对公司董事会更有约束力。     

On the efficiency of markets for managers

Summary. This paper examines the efficiency of the outside labor market in inducing optimal managerial behavior in the presence of learning. It shows that the incentives provided by the market can be more efficient than the original analysis of Holmstr?m [6] would suggest. Moreover, under a mild additional assumption, the existence of an -efficient equilibrium can be guaranteed if a manager is patient. This result supports Fama's [4] original idea that the outside labor market can be efficient in disciplining top managers. These results also suggest that the empirically documented low levels of explicit incentives for managers might be due to the presence of implicit incentives provided by the outside market. Received: March 18, 1997; revised version: April 19, 2000     

Wage subsidies, work incentives, and the reform of the Austrian welfare system

We analyze the employment and income effects of a needs-based minimum benefit system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”) which has recently been introduced in Austria. The aim of this reform was to reduce poverty as well as to increase work incentives for recipients of social assistance. On the basis of a behavioral microsimulation model we show that this new system slightly increases employment but reduces incomes for the poorest households remaining unemployed. As an alternative, we analyze a budgetary neutral reform proposal which reduces financial incentives for marginal employment and provides a wage subsidy rewarding working longer hours. This alternative reform would yield larger positive employment effects, but more households would suffer from income losses. Overall, income inequality and poverty are affected little, however, both under the new social welfare system and the alternative reform proposal.     

PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION IN THE FACE OF A MEANS‐TESTED PUBLIC PENSION

We investigate whether households adjust their asset portfolios just prior to retirement in ways that are consistent with maximizing eligibility for a means‐tested public pension. We utilize detailed micro data for a nationally‐representative sample of Australian households to estimate a system of asset equations which are constrained to add up to net worth. Our results provide little evidence that healthy households or couples are responding to the incentives embedded in the means tests determining pension eligibility by reallocating assets. While there are some differences in asset portfolios associated with having an income near the income threshold, being of pensionable age, and being in poor health, these differences are often only marginally significant and are not clearly consistent with the incentives inherent in the Australian age pension eligibility rules. Any behavioral response to the incentives inherent in the age‐pension means test appears to be predominately concentrated among single pensioners who are in poor health.     

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.     

Distributional Comparisons Using the Gini Inequality Measure

This article is aimed at undergraduate and graduate economics students, as well as public sector economists, who are interested in inequality measurement. It examines the use of the Gini inequality measure to compare income distributions. The implicit distributional value judgements are made explicit, via the use of a particular form of Social Welfare Function. Emphasis is given to the interpretation of changes in inequality.