外部关税约束、自由贸易区规模与世界自由贸易

本文在外部关税约束条件下分析了几种不同类型的自由贸易区与世界自由贸易的关系，本文结果显示，一个实行开放成员国地位的自由贸易区可以实现世界自由贸易，但是当自由贸易区以追求成员国福利最大化为目标时，在世界规模大于4时，该自由贸易区的扩张不可能最终实现世界自由贸易。本文还研究了对称的自由贸易区是否可以通过进一步的融合从而把世界变成一个一体化的自由贸易区，结果显示，具有对称市场能力的自由贸易区可以通过进一步的融合提高成员国福利，从而最终实现世界自由贸易。     

南北型自由贸易区的原产地规则对其成员国的差异性影响

作者在3×3×2的模型中分析了南北型自由贸易区对其成员国的非对称性影响.在目前南北型自由贸易区的典型贸易模式下,严格的原产地规则主要通过影响成员国之间的贸易条件,增加发达成员的福利,而减少发展中成员的福利.严格的原产地规则还会抑制发展中成员国的出口,增加发达成员国的关税收入,或者减少发展中国家的关税收入.     

两岸自由贸易区先行先试研究

一、两岸自由贸易区先行先试的可能性　目前,世界上自由贸易区有三种形式：一种是多边自由贸易区,即两个以上独立关税区达成自由贸易的制度安排;一种是双边自由贸易区,即两个独立关税区达成的自由贸易安排;一种是一个经济体内的境内关外特别关税区,如自由港等,保税区也是一国关境内的自由贸易区.基本的制度安排是自由贸易区内实现关税豁免及货物进出口自由,但对外实现独立的关税政策.     

区域经济一体化对多边自由贸易体制的影响——一个简单的制度经济学解释

区域经济一体化组织的出现是否有利于推动多边自由贸易的实现,这一问题已经引起了学者们的广泛关注.从制度经济学的角度看,先走区域经济一体化的道路,然后再进行区域经济组织的自由贸易合作,从而最终实现全球贸易的自由化,能够比"一味地"等待世界所有国家同时实现贸易的自由化给各利益主体带来更大的现期净收益.因此,相比WTO所推行的多边贸易自由化而言,区域经济一体化具有更多的现实性和可行性,它将为世界自由贸易的实现做阶段性准备.当然在此过程中,还应该注意加强WTO对区域经济一体化组织的监督和协调,以引导它向更有利于提高世界福利和贸易自由化的方向发展.     

“中国—新西兰自由贸易协定”背景下两国对处贸易发展

2008年4月,中国签订了与西方发达国家的第一份自由贸易协定——《中华人民共和国和新西兰政府自由贸易协定》.随着自由贸易协定的签署,如何进一步在自由贸易协定基础上发展两国贸易关系,提升企业的竞争力,实现自由贸易带来的福利提高等是今后两国发展对外贸易的重要内容.本文基于“钻石”模型及其战略性自主创新政策相关研究,在分析近年来新中贸易数据的基础上提出了进一步发展新中贸易的对策建议.     

双边自由贸易协定深度异质性及区内全球价值链效应*——基于GVC修正引力模型实证研究

双边自由贸易协定深度嬗变,全球价值链引致贸易形成机制和形式变化,使得自由贸易区理论基础、影响机制和功能效应更替。本文基于对双边自由贸易协定深度演化以及相较于其他区域贸易协定的深度异质性研究,将公司产权理论纳入自由贸易区理论框架,形成双边自由贸易区内全球价值链效应的多维理论机制,并且运用适应全球价值链发展的修正引力模型和世界银行的贸易协定内容数据库对理论机制假设结论进行实证检验。研究发现：双边自由贸易协定总深度对区内成员国之间的全球价值链关联产生正向影响,相较于贸易相关条款深度而言,投资相关条款深度影响更大。此外,自由贸易区对象国差异性也会影响双边自由贸易区全球价值链效应的发挥。根据对象国不同选择差异化的自由贸易区深度在双边自由贸易区构建中重要性凸显。本文将为全球价值链背景下中国构建高标准自由贸易区网络的对象国选择、自由贸易区模式选择等提供政策参考。     

对双边FTA的历史考察及中国参与双边FTA的利益分析

20世纪90年代,全球兴起了一股双边自由贸易热,越来越多的国家选择通过签定双边自由贸易协定构建双边自由贸易区来实现自由贸易。在此之前,历史上曾两度出现过双边自由贸易热,各有其产生背景和特点,新一轮双边FTA更以其优越性成为新世纪国际贸易发展的新趋势。中国应顺应历史发展潮流,积极融入新一轮双边FTA,从而获得相应的利益。     

浅析中国-东盟自由贸易区降低贸易壁垒效应

中国-东盟自由贸易区（CAFTA）的成立会带来许多静态与动态的经济效应，其中降低贸易壁垒效应指的是经济一体化成立后由于贸易壁垒的降低所带来的成员国福利的增加。文章通过使用标准的全球贸易分析项目及相关的实证数据，分析探讨了中国-东盟自由贸易协定给成员国带来的降低贸易壁垒效应。     

东北亚区域一体化的福利效应分析

东北亚区域的全面合作将使各个成员国的实际GDP、进出口额以及福利水平全面提升,会使各个成员国在不同的领域得到收益。中国在农业、渔业、纺织业、轻工业、装备制造业等五个产业部门的国际竞争力要大于其他各国,中国在装备制造业和生产性服务业等新兴产业所拥有的优势将给其他国家带来长远且持续的福利效应。为了增加东北亚区域一体化的福利效应,我国应大力拓展自由贸易区谈判对象范围,加强东北地区对外开放环境的建设与优化,建立东北地区互动发展协调机制。     

中国-东盟自由贸易区税收协调的基本构想

相对欧盟和北美自由贸易区而言,中国-东盟自由贸易区的建设刚刚起步。随着商品、服务、人员和资本的交流不断扩大,区域间的投资和贸易不断增长,而成员国之间的税收政策差异产生的税收冲突,逐渐成为财经合作的瓶颈。如何进一步开展自由贸易区内的税收协调,以解决税收利益的冲突与矛盾,消除成员间商品、服务以及生产要素自由流通的各种障碍,实现区域内各国福利的最大化,是加快中国东盟自由贸易区建设的关键。     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

Dynamic Free Trade Networks: Some Numerical Results

To help predict whether the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) continues until global free trade is effectively attained, this paper investigates dynamic paths of FTAs, generated by numerical simulations of a model of an FTA network formation game with many countries. The characteristics of the final FTA network naturally depend on how the proposer of an FTA is chosen in each period. The paper finds that if the country that has the largest incentive to form an FTA is chosen as a proposer in each period, the network evolution always leads to a unique final FTA network, which may or may not be the complete network of FTAs. FTA networks often evolve to a partition of the world into a small number of groups of asymmetric size owing to the negative network externality caused by preference erosion.     

Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia

Trade policy in East Asia has switched from non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization, reinforced by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to discriminatory free trade agreements (FTA). The paper surveys the FTA activity of the major regional players: China, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes that emerging FTAs are weak and partial. A hub-and-spoke pattern of dirty FTAs will not drive regional economic integration or further integration with the global economy. Rather, it could be a force of regional economic disintegration – especially if the multilateral trading system weakens further. At the same time, FTA activity is distracting attention from the WTO, and, more fundamentally, from unilateral liberalization and domestic structural reforms. Hence, East Asian trade policies need to be rebalanced, with better-quality FTAs and more focus on the WTO. However, more important than the WTO and FTAs is a fresh spurt of unilateral liberalization and structural reform outside trade negotiations.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

Rules of origin and gains from trade

Free trade areas (FTAs) involve unharmonized tariffs and rules of origin that have prevented proving the formal general equilibrium existence of a welfare-enhancing FTA. This paper identifies the most restrictive limit that rules of origin can enforce and still continue to guarantee gains from trade for FTA formation. We note that many commonly used rules of origin exceed this condition in practice. We apply the identified welfare-supporting rules of origin and prove the existence of a FTA general equilibrium involving only within-FTA transfers that is at least as satisfactory for every consumer as an arbitrary original world trade allocation. The analysis also helps to explain why hub-and-spoke extensions of FTAs cannot be expected to guarantee gains from trade for all participants in general.     

Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade

We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.     

FREE TRADE AREAS AND RULES OF ORIGIN: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Incorporating an intermediate input into a simple small-union general-equilibrium model, this paper first develops the welfare economics of preferential trading under the rules of origin (ROO) and then demonstrates that ROOs can improve the political viability of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Two interesting outcomes are derived. First, a welfare-reducing FTA that was rejected in the absence of ROOs can become feasible in the presence of these rules. Second, a welfare- improving FTA that was rejected in the absence of ROOs can be endorsed in their presence, but upon endorsement it can become welfare inferior relative to the status quo.     

Measuring fixed costs for firms’ use of a free trade agreement: Threshold regression approach

By employing the threshold regression method, we estimate the average tariff equivalent of fixed costs for the use of a free trade agreement (FTA) among all existing FTAs in the world. It is estimated to be around 3%.     

EAST ASIAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: DO THEY PROMOTE GLOBAL FREE TRADE?

Abstract.  We quantitatively evaluate the effects different paths have on East Asian Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), which include expansionary, duplicate and overlapping RTAs. By applying a computable general equilibrium model analysis, we find that the static effect of existing, proposed and negotiating East Asian RTAs on world and members' welfare is sufficiently positive. It will lead to non-discriminatory global free trade, by triggering the domino effect of regionalism if the RTAs take an expansionary path by cooperating with each other, in contrast to competing to achieve the first mover advantage, or hub self-interest.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.