价格信息成本与价格离中现象

本文在Varian(1980)中引入消费者价格信息成本和信息成本的分布。采用Janssen和Moraga(2000)的对称混合策略均衡定义，同时内生化了消费者的信息行为和厂商的定价行为，确定了Varian(1980)中的知情消费者比例。证明了厂商定价正期望利润均衡的存在性。本文证明了，在不完全价格信息条件下，市场普遍存在知情消费者，从而本文加强了Varian(1980)的结论。     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

基于消费者个人身份信息的价格歧视行为分析

价格歧视理论表明,厂商可以根据不同消费者群体需求曲线来实施价格歧视。然而现实情况中,厂商并不能直接了解消费者的经济特征,即需求曲线,而是依据一些消费者个人非经济信息,比如个人身份信息,如性别、来源地等来把消费者区分为不同的消费群体,并实施价格歧视。文章将分析厂商以消费者的个人身份信息为基础的价格歧视行为,通过分析,可以较清楚地理解消费者与厂商在交易中的信息披露与逆向选择行为。     

电子商务市场价格离散度的收敛分析

论文首先通过建立模型分析了在不同知情消费者比例下价格离散的结构形式，理论剖析了在搜索成本明显下降的电子商务市场，价格离散仍然持续存在的客观原因；进而运用在北京地区的93家电子商务零售网站、9大类535款商品、6313个价格样本数据检验了中国电子商务市场价格离散的情况，研究了其价格离散成因。结果表明在电子商务市场上，价格离散将持续存在，知情消费者比例与价格离散指标之间并不是一个单调关系；零售商特征，尤其是市场特征影响价格离散，各类零售商的定价依据不同。     

反倾销政策工具下市场均衡价格分析

成本优势是获取垄断利润的主要因素,政府政策介入会改变企业的成本优势,从而改变市场的均衡价格。不同的反倾销和补贴政策影响市场均衡价格和均衡利润的变化,反倾销税和价格承诺能削弱外国企业成本优势,降低对进口产品的需求,导致市场均衡价格上升;反倾销税使外国出口企业利润水平降低,一定程度会引致外国企业直接投资,价格承诺使外国企业完全保留了因提高价格所带来的利润;生产补贴降低了国内企业的边际成本,导致市场均衡价格下降,提高了国内企业的利润,但却减少了政府收入。采取适度的反倾销政策和补贴政策可以使国内外厂商的利润保持在竞争性利润水平上,进口国的利益目标应该是对本国消费者提供更低价格商品的基础上保护本国企业的利益。     

不完全信息静态博弈视角下的三度价格歧视分析研究

本文针对三度价格歧视存在信息不对称的问题,讨论了两个寡头垄断企业在成本信息不对称的情况下,在两个细分市场实施价格歧视的产量决策问题.将成本函数分为三种、两种及一种可选成本(完全信息)3类情况,通过海萨尼转换,根据成本甄别系数的不同取值范围,得出了两个寡头垄断企业相互制约下的均衡产量、均衡价格、均衡利润及相互关系.研究结果表明:成本甄别系数越小,成本信息劣势企业的均衡产量越高,均衡状态下的总利润也越高;当寡头垄断企业1采用较高成本时,企业1会更加倾向于隐藏自身成本,他在具有信息优势的同时还具有成本劣势;而当寡头垄断企业1采用低成本时,则不会隐藏自己的信息而更倾向通过信号传递,把低成本信息的优势传递出去,以使寡头垄断企业2按完全信息决策产量等结论.本文的研究结果将为信息不对称下的歧视定价提供理论依据.     

试论市场经济下的民生价格监管

党的十八大提出要为民生谋福利，但市场经济下，价格过度市场化却出现了定价不合理，价格大起大落，随意收费坑害消费者的情况，为此，应破除各种影响民生价格监管的思想障碍，加强民生价格监管，积极探索民生价格监管的方式方法，通过价格水平调控、价格信息公开、价格行为监管、行业价格引导等解决问题。     

参考价格与消费者的价格感知

众多的理论与实践研究都证明，消费者内心的价格标准——参考价格是决定其价格感知和购买行为的核心因素，研究参考价格对企业合理定价、与消费者沟通价格信息、开展价格促销具有十分重要的指导意义，文章对西方学者近几十年来的关于参考价格和消费者价格感知方面的理论与实证研究进行了系统的总结，并讨论了这些研究对我国学者及管理者的启示。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

价格歧视下四种市场类型的消费者剩余

市场按垄断程度由高到低可以分为四种类型：完全垄断市场、寡头垄断市场、垄断竞争市场和完全竞争市场。在发生二度价格歧视的情形下,这四种市场的价格歧视程度的定量结果是一个值得研究的问题。在二度价格歧视下,用微分法研究了一个垄断厂商市场情形,用博弈论方法研究了n厂商市场情形的均衡总产量,均衡价格,均衡总收益,总收益增长率,消费者剩余,厂商占有的消费者剩余率。最后把各种市场情形的上述指标归纳为统一的公式并详细分析了其性质。     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS IN CUSTOMER MARKETS

In customer markets an information asymmetry exists between a firm's current customers and prospective customers. When a firm changes its price, current customers are instantly aware of the price change, while potential customers are informed slowly of the change. The paper explicitly models this information imperfection and the associated asymmetry in firms' customer flows. The main result of the paper is that, because of the information asymmetry, there will be a range of marginal cost and demand over which the firm has no incentive to change price. It is also shown that prices will be more upwardly flexible than downwardly flexible. The size of the range, and the extent of downward price inflexibility, depends on the rate at which information is transmitted to customers.     

INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous-goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse-U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.     

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales.     

Multi-item EOQ model while demand is sales price and price break sensitive

In this paper, the authors study a multi-item deterministic EOQ (economic order quantity) model for a vendor when the demand rate of the essential commodities decreases quadratically with increasing sales price and increase exponentially with increasing level of price breaks. A price discount is offered to the customers when the revenue of the vendor crosses the level of price break. The main aim of the present article is to find out the optimal order quantities, optimal selling prices and optimal level of price break in order to maximize the average profit of the whole products. Numerical examples are also illustrated to test of our proposed model.     

The Dynamics of Markups and Inventories in Retailing Firms

This paper is concerned with the interaction between price and inventory decisions in retailing firms and its implications for the dynamics of markups and the existence of sales promotions. We consider a model where a monopolistically competitive retailer decides price and inventories, and assumes lump-sum costs when placing orders or changing nominal prices. In this model, the existence of stockout probabilities and fixed ordering costs generate a cyclical price behaviour characterized by long periods without nominal price changes and short periods with very low prices ( i.e. sales promotions). We estimate this model using a unique longitudinal dataset with information about retail and wholesale prices, inventories, orders, and sales for several brands in a supermarket chain. Based on the estimated model we perform several counterfactual experiments that show the important role that inventories and fixed ordering costs play in the dynamics of retail prices and the frequency of sales promotions in this dataset.     

PRICE FLOORS AND QUALITY CHOICE

This paper studies effects of price floors in a simple model of vertical product differentiation. We find that even non‐binding price floor (i.e., minimum price set below the lowest Nash equilibrium price in the baseline model) can increase quality on the market, if the cost of quality is sufficiently low. Where a binding price floor does not increase the equilibrium quality, it makes consumers worse off. There is also a possibility of over‐investment into quality as a result of the binding minimum price.     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

MONOPOLY POWER AND DOWNWARD PRICE RIGIDITY UNDER COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT

A method of 'backward deduction' is used to analyse the decisions of a firm, setting price and quantity before demand observations are made, with the option to adjust price at a cost after demand is observed. It is shown for such a firm that the events of (1) downward price rigidity; (2) overproduction; and (3) a high degree of monopoly power are closely related. The paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature on costly price adjustment in its treatment of disequilibrium situations and focus on monopoly power in relation to price rigidity. The main results are obtained for a linear demand curve and a uniform demand distribution.     

Estimation of hedonic price functions with incomplete information

Existence of persistent price dispersion suggests that some buyers find lower prices through search and information acquisition, while some sellers charge higher prices by gathering information on potential buyers. If buyers are not fully informed of the lowest price available in the market they end up paying a price higher than if they had full information. Similarly, if sellers are not fully informed about the highest price they could charge, they too suffer by receiving a price lower than had they had full information. This paper develops a hedonic price model that incorporates the effects of incomplete information on both sides of the market and obtains estimates of the discrepancies between market prices and buyers’ maximum willingness to pay and sellers’ minimum willingness to accept. Correlates of such price discrepancies are also explored. We apply the technique to a data set constructed from the American Housing Survey, and find that incomplete information has had a significant impact on housing prices.     

FDI与房价

本文在存量模型基础上,构建了一个外资参与的房地产市场局部均衡模型,考察了外资对房价的影响。理论模型显示,需求环节外资流入将导致房价上涨,开发环节外资流入将导致房价下降。本文使用中国35个大中城市1996-2010年的房地产市场和FDI数据,发现开发环节外资（FDI）对中国大中城市房价具有显著负向影响。另一方面,FDI与房价的影响是非对称的,FDI对房价的影响大于房价对FDI的影响。因此,为抑制高房价,在对需求环节外资（“热钱”）严格限制下,应鼓励外资进入房地产开发。此外,收入是影响房价的最主要因素;城市化越快,房价越容易上涨。