Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Deposit market competition,wholesale funding,and bank risk

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.     

Credit risk transfer and financial sector stability

In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.     

Foreign entry and bank competition

Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: The entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets.     

Foreign bank entry and bank competition: Cross-country heterogeneity

This study investigates the impact of foreign bank entry on bank competition in the host countries. Using data for 148 countries over 1987–2015, I find that although on average an increase in the number of foreign banks is associated with more competition in the host country, competition increases in developed but decreases in developing countries. Stringent capital requirements, higher market entry barriers, and effective credit information sharing can mitigate the impact of foreign bank entry, while better supervision and external governance strengthen the link between foreign bank presence and competition. The findings justify the regulations on bank capital adequacy and call for an effective credit information sharing mechanism.     

Bank risk,competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review

The outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and of the European sovereign debt crisis again raised questions about the vulnerability and the behaviour of banking institutions. The unconventional monetary policies that followed have flattened the yield curve and created a low interest rates environment. This can give rise to risk-taking behaviour from banks and can therefore undermine the stability of the banking system with negative impact of the credit supply, corporate investment and real economy. This article proposes a literature review on the main determinants of bank lending and risk-taking decisions, going through the competition in the banking market, the bank connectedness with firms and the role of monetary and banking authorities. The systemic risk concept is also discussed as well as its drivers and potential measures that should be monitored by prudential authorities in order to preserve financial stability.     

Credit rating dynamics and competition

I analyze the market for credit ratings with competition between more than two rating agencies. How can honest rating behavior be achieved, and under which conditions can a new honest rating agency successfully invade a market with inflating incumbents? My model predicts cyclic dynamics if sophisticated investors have a high impact on agencies’ reputation. In contrast, if trusting investors have the main impact, then the dynamics exhibits a saddle point rather than cycles. In this case, regulatory support for honest rating agencies is only needed for a limited time, but the effect is sustainable in the long run.     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bank-borrower relationships

This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank-borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank-borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.     

Elections,political competition and bank failure

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

On competition,risk, and hidden assets in the market for bank credit cards

The market for credit cards has been the subject of recent attention and controversy because of ‘high’ profits earned on credit cards and substantial premiums on the resale of credit-card receivables. This paper estimates risk—return profiles for credit-card banks and explores the role of intangible assets in determining resale premiums on credit-card receivables. In addition, the effects on the resale market of securitization and the opportunity cost of acquiring new accounts are analyzed. Using alternative measures of risk and alternative control groups, we find, for the years 1989 to 1995, that credit-card banks earned significantly higher returns on assets but that these returns were associated with greater risk-taking. Analysis of premia for the years 1993 to 1995 suggest that acquiring banks pay higher premia for mid-sized regional accounts than for larger, national portfolios, perhaps because of richer cross-selling opportunities.     

Credit line takedown and endogenous bank capital

This paper investigates the implications of the uncertain timing and usage of loan commitments for the optimal level of bank capital. We use trended Brownian motion to proxy the stochastic takedown of credit lines. Relying on “time to first passage” mathematics, we derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of the bank credit line as well as the likelihood for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan takedown. Armed with these analytical results, we solve for the optimal level of bank capital within a simultaneous equation framework in order to capture the interrelationships of the endogenous variables. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations which refuse to yield reduced form solutions and provide no immediate intuition. Therefore, the maximizing values of the bank’s decision variables were simulated over a host of realistic scenarios. We document the comparative static behavior of the bank’s decision variables when equity is unencumbered by capital requirements and, also, examine the impact of the same parametric changes on bank behavior when equity is a fixed proportion of lending. Further simulations produce the expected time to liquidity depletion under different capital requirement schemes.     

Credit risk,owner liability,and bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis

We relate credit risk and owners’ personal guarantees to bank loan maturities during the global financial crisis. The findings, which remain robust to reverse causality, show that firms rated as low risk, with a strong relationship with the bank, whose owners provided personal guarantees and with large loan sizes obtained longer maturities. Banks with larger nonperforming loans provided loans with shorter maturities. Firms with low‐ and high‐risk ratings that provided owners’ personal guarantees obtained longer maturities. These findings shed additional light on the relationship between risk and loan maturities and the role of personal guarantees in reducing information asymmetries.     

Assessing bank competition for consumer loans

Based on frontier analysis, we derive inferences of bank consumer loan competition from estimating a revenue-cost ‘competition efficiency’ (CE) frontier. The competitiveness of the $400 billion U.S. bank consumer loan market is then assessed by comparing results from our frontier CE measure with other competition measures, such as HHI, Lerner Index, and H-Statistic. These measures are weakly related to one another and only half of them identify banks with the highest loan price as also being the least competitive. This is the opposite of what is expected. Using the frontier CE measure, the most and least competitive banks are not located in the most populous states and the largest banks are underrepresented. Overall, the HHI should not be used to indicate competition.     

Information reusability,competition and bank asset quality

This paper explains the recent decline m bank asset quality using the notion of information reusability. Banks are viewed as information processors; they exist because of their advantage in extracting the surplus associated with the reusability of borrower-specific information. It is shown that a bank's incentive to screen loan applicants, and hence maintain the quality of its assets, depends on the surplus this screening can produce, which in turn depends on information reusability. Two recent changes in banks' operating environment are increased competitition and greater temporal volatility in borrower credit risks. The former has directly reduced banks' informational surplus while the latter has impaired information reusability. Hence screening expenditures have been reduced and the diminution of screening has lowered the quality of bank assets. It is also shown that an increase in deposit insurance premia has an effect similar to that of narrowing interest spreads and therefore will result in reduced asset screening and impaired asset quality.     

Monetary transmission and bank competition in the EMU

The introduction of the euro has led to renewed attention for monetary transmission in the European Union. This special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance includes papers that contribute to the development of both the theory and empirical applications of the monetary transmission channel that assumes various types of imperfections. The issue includes papers that can best be described by the credit view and studies on concentration and competition in the European banking industry. This introduction positions the papers in this active field of research.