Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Deposit market competition,wholesale funding,and bank risk

Empirical research on the effect of bank competition on bank risk has so far produced very inconclusive results. In this paper we revisit this long-standing debate and propose a new empirical approach that is concentrated on the relationship between deposit market competition and bank risk. This approach closely follows the traditional theoretical views of the competition and risk relationship and is focused on testing the classical moral hazard problem of the bank: deposit market competition raises the optimal risk choice of the bank by raising the costs of bank liabilities. Since banks can substitute between retail and wholesale funding, we relate deposit market competition to wholesale market conditions and examine their joint effect on the risk of bank assets. The analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset, which combines retail deposit rate data with data on bank characteristics and data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 US banks. Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition.     

Credit risk transfer and financial sector stability

In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.     

Foreign entry and bank competition

Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: The entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets.     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bank-borrower relationships

This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank-borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank-borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.     

Elections,political competition and bank failure

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.     

Credit line takedown and endogenous bank capital

This paper investigates the implications of the uncertain timing and usage of loan commitments for the optimal level of bank capital. We use trended Brownian motion to proxy the stochastic takedown of credit lines. Relying on “time to first passage” mathematics, we derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of the bank credit line as well as the likelihood for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan takedown. Armed with these analytical results, we solve for the optimal level of bank capital within a simultaneous equation framework in order to capture the interrelationships of the endogenous variables. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations which refuse to yield reduced form solutions and provide no immediate intuition. Therefore, the maximizing values of the bank’s decision variables were simulated over a host of realistic scenarios. We document the comparative static behavior of the bank’s decision variables when equity is unencumbered by capital requirements and, also, examine the impact of the same parametric changes on bank behavior when equity is a fixed proportion of lending. Further simulations produce the expected time to liquidity depletion under different capital requirement schemes.     

Assessing bank competition for consumer loans

Based on frontier analysis, we derive inferences of bank consumer loan competition from estimating a revenue-cost ‘competition efficiency’ (CE) frontier. The competitiveness of the $400 billion U.S. bank consumer loan market is then assessed by comparing results from our frontier CE measure with other competition measures, such as HHI, Lerner Index, and H-Statistic. These measures are weakly related to one another and only half of them identify banks with the highest loan price as also being the least competitive. This is the opposite of what is expected. Using the frontier CE measure, the most and least competitive banks are not located in the most populous states and the largest banks are underrepresented. Overall, the HHI should not be used to indicate competition.     

Bank competition and the cost of bank loans

I comprehensively study the effect of bank competition on the cost of bank loans using U.S. bank loan data from 1995 to 2010. The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads and covenant intensity. I show that loan spreads and covenant intensity are negatively related to bank competition. I also find that non-investment grade and financially constrained firms benefit more from bank competition than investment grade and financially unconstrained firms do. Lenders with low market power are more willing to reduce loan price than lenders with high market power in competitive lending markets. The results suggest that lenders give favorable loan terms to borrowers in competitive loan markets.     

Credit market equilibrium with bank monitoring and moral hazard

We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexistwith capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources.An incentive problem exists between the firm's insiders andoutside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only creditbut also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannotprecommit to a particular level of monitoring there is a uniquecredit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combinationof bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, amarginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financingwould raise the firm's stock price.     

Multiple bank regulators and risk taking

The potential for banks to arbitrage between regulators exists both in the US, with its multiple federal banking regulators, and in Europe, due to multinational banking. This paper models multiple regulators that have an agency bias, which can give rise to a “race to the bottom”. The model is used to analyze the interaction between the regulatory equilibrium and several salient pre-crisis features: rising bank leverage; wholesale funding with asymmetric information; and increasing supervisional costs to disentangling bank asset exposures. Each of these raises bank risk taking on its own, but regulatory competition is shown to be an amplification mechanism.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks’ transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.     

Product market competition and credit risk

This study theoretically and empirically investigates effects of product market competition on credit risk. We first develop a real-options-based structural model in a homogeneous oligopoly and show that credit spreads are positively related to the number of firms in an industry. The disparity of firm size in an industry is relevant to both product market competition and credit risk, and we therefore extend the model to an asymmetric duopoly case. In particular, we demonstrate that credit spreads of relatively small (large) firms within an industry are positively (negatively) related to Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the relative firm size in an industry is an important determinant of credit risk. The models’ implications are empirically scrutinized by a reduced-form hazard model and generally supported. By performing out-of-sample analyses, the results demonstrate that firm size together with the interaction terms between intra-industry firm size dummies and competition intensity can effectively predict default.     

商业银行在信用证纠纷中的法律问题

近年来,我国商业银行因开立信用证引发的纠纷越来越多,涉及的法律问题越来越复杂。从法院审理的信用证纠纷案件结果看,有相当一部分是以开证银行败诉告终,商业银行为此付出沉重的代价。因此,信用证纠纷的法律问题研究对于保护商业银行合法权益、防范信用证风险具有重要意义。     

Common risk factors in bank stocks

This paper provides evidence on the risk factors that are priced in bank equities. Alternative empirical models with precedent in the nonfinancial asset pricing literature are tested, including the single-factor CAPM, three-factor Fama–French model, and ICAPM. Our empirical results indicate that an unconditional two-factor ICAPM model that includes the stock market excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve is useful in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns. However, we find no evidence that firm specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in bank stock returns. These results have a number of important implications for the estimation of the banks’ cost of capital as well as regulatory initiatives to utilize market discipline to evaluate bank risk under Basel II.