Do going concern opinions provide incremental information to predict corporate defaults?

Review of Accounting Studies - Investors, regulators, and academics question the usefulness of going concern opinions (GCOs). We assess whether GCOs provide incremental information, relative to...     

Structural breaks in volatility spillovers between international financial markets: Contagion or mere interdependence?

This paper conducts an investigation of volatility transmission between stock markets in Hong Kong, Europe and the United States covering the time period from 2000 up to 2011. Using intra-daily data we compute realized volatility time series for the three markets and employ a Heterogeneous Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model as our baseline econometric specification. Motivated by the presence of various crisis events contained in our sample, we detect time-variation and structural breaks in volatility spillovers. Particularly during the financial crisis of 2007, we find effects consistent with the notion of contagion, suggesting strong and sudden increases in the cross-market synchronization of chronologically succeeding volatilities. Investigating the role of mean breaks and conditional heteroskedasticity in the realized volatilities, however, we find the latter to be the main driver of breaks in volatility spillovers. Taking the volatility of realized volatilities into account, we find no evidence of contagion anymore.     

What matters more in board independence? Form or substance: Evidence from influential CEO-directors

We exploit heterogeneities among CEO-directors and find that influential CEO-directors (ICDs) provide value through advising and monitoring. To expansively capture their relative influence, we identify CEO-directors who command more pay than the appointing firm's CEO. We find ICDs are more (less) likely to serve on the compensation (audit) committee. ICDs serve on more board seats and benefit more by serving on these seats. ICDs improve the performance of their appointing firm by increasing CEO pay-performance sensitivities and by helping with R&D and M&A activities. Alternatively, uninfluential CEO-directors are largely inconsequential or even detrimental to the appointing firm.     

Financial Contagion in the Laboratory: Does Network Structure Matter?

We explore the role of interbank network structure and premature liquidation costs for the likelihood of financial contagions in a laboratory experiment. We consider complete versus incomplete networks of banks linked together by interbank deposits, and we further vary premature liquidation costs. Subjects play the role of depositors deciding whether or not to withdraw funds from their interconnected bank. We find that when liquidation costs are high, a complete network structure is significantly less vulnerable to financial contagions than an incomplete network structure. However, when liquidation costs are low, network structure is less important for the frequency of financial contagions.     

Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China

This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery of tests. Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment, for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members. Moreover, we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension. Overall, our findings suggest that independent directors’ social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.     

The ownership effect on corporate investment distortion in the transitional economies: Mitigating or exacerbating?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This article analyzes how asymmetric information in corporate management and equity financing distorts corporate investment and how different...     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Does corporate diversification exacerbate or mitigate earnings management?: An empirical analysis

The purpose of this study is to determine whether earning management is exacerbated or alleviated in diversified firms. An explicit distinction is made between industrial and geographic diversification. The empirical evidence shows that earnings management is mitigated by 1.8% in industrially diversified firms. The evidence also shows that a combination of industrial and global diversification helps alleviate earnings management by 2.5%. Global diversification alone, however, does not appear to impact earnings management. We argue that diversified firms derive their cash flows from disparate business divisions. The accruals generated by these business divisions are imperfectly correlated and, hence, tend to offset each other at the entire firm's level, making it difficult for managers to manage earnings considerably in either direction. Finally, our results show that diversified firms do not suffer more severe informational asymmetry, which may explain why earnings management does not occur to a greater extent in diversified firms.     

Contagion from the crises in the Euro-zone: where,when and why?

The prevalence of contagion between the Euro-zone countries and other European countries since the Greek crisis of 2009 is now well – known, but the factors that influence the pattern of this contagion are not well understood. We investigate this question both within Europe and beyond to the USA and Japan, using an asymmetric M-GARCH model that focuses on extreme values of the risk premia on government bonds. We compare these extreme values with news of major events and find that they are highly correlated. We find a different pattern of contagion emanating from Ireland compared to the other crisis countries of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We also examine the factors that have made countries vulnerable to contagion and find that financial factors are more important than trade ones. However, intra-Euro-zone trade has also been a significant factor between the major Euro-zone economies. There is little evidence that global factors affect contagion between EU member states, but some evidence that nominal exchange rate movements offer a degree of insulation from contagion for the non-Euro zone states.     

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.     

A research note on standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing?

Over the past two decades, more and more U.S. firms are voluntarily issuing costly standalone Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports. Nevertheless, firms’ motivations for issuing standalone CSR Reports are not clear. In this paper, we consider two different explanations: signaling and greenwashing. The first explanation, signaling, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports as a signal of their superior commitment to CSR, which suggests firms with stronger social and environmental records will be more likely to issue standalone CSR Reports as compared to those without. The second explanation, greenwashing, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports to pose as “good” corporate citizens even when they do not have stronger social and environmental records. To provide insight into these explanations we compare the CSR performance scores of firms that issue CSR reports to those firms that do not. We control for firm size, leverage, profitability and industry. We find that firms that voluntarily issue standalone CSR Reports generally have higher CSR performance scores, which suggests that firms are using voluntary CSR Reports to publicize stronger social and environmental records to stakeholders.     

Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?

By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws’ passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a “quiet-life” hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws’ passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact.     

Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America?

We examine how corporate culture influences firm behavior. Prior research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion. We find that this relationship also influences organizational behavior. Firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure, as measured by variances in equity returns or returns on assets. They exhibit a lower investment rate and less growth, but generate a more positive market reaction, when they announce new investments. Finally, chief executive officers are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in their previous firm when they switch employers.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

Does external uncertainty matter in corporate sustainability performance?

Motivated by the prevalence of corporate sustainability and the rise of uncertainty at the national level, we investigate the impact of three sources of uncertainty; namely, economic policy, climate change, and political instability, on firms' sustainability performance. Using a sample of 6804 firms from 72 countries spanning 15 years, our study revealed that uncertainty due to climate change, economic policy, and political instability negatively affects firms' sustainability performance. This finding is in line with the real options theory that uncertainty in an external environment discourages firms' long-term investment (e.g. investment in corporate sustainability). In addition, the results show that the option for delay in sustainability investment moderated the relation between uncertainty at the national level and firms' sustainability performance. Firms with better sustainability performance had higher firm value when facing uncertainty. Interestingly, firms with higher profitability performed better in sustainability when facing uncertainty at the national level.     

Contagion models a la carte: which one to choose?

We propose a copula contagion mixture model for correlated default times. The model includes the well-known factor, copula, and contagion models as its special cases. The key advantage of such a model is that we can study the interaction of different models and their pricing impact. Specifically, we model the default times of the underlying names in a reference portfolio to follow contagion intensity processes with exponential decay coupled with a copula dependence structure. We also model the default time of the counterparty and its dependence structure with the reference portfolio. Numerical tests show that correlation and contagion have an enormous joint impact on the rates of CDO tranches and the corresponding credit value adjustments are extremely high to compensate for the wrong-way risk.     

Covenants in convertible bonds: Boon or boilerplate?

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.     

Fiduciary duty or loyalty? Evidence from co-opted boards and corporate misconduct

We examine the effect of co-opted boards on corporate misconduct and document a significant positive relationship. Utilising a large sample of public U.S. companies from the period 2001 to 2015, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of co-opted directors on a board leads to a 4.3% rise in corporate misconduct. This outcome is robust to a series of sensitivity tests and continues to hold after accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. Further analyses indicate that co-opted directors propose fewer board agenda items, exhibit lower attendance at board meetings, and receive compensation packages in excess of industry norms, which exacerbate stakeholder-agency conflicts. Cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that the documented relationship is most pronounced among firms with weak external monitoring, greater CEO-board social ties, boards whose members have high career concerns, and where CEO power is low. Additional tests reveal that co-opted directors engage in more environmental- and workplace-related violations than other types of stakeholder violations. Overall, our investigation generates original evidence that the presence of co-opted directors aggravates the incidence of corporate wrongdoing. Our study contributes to the continuing debate on the role of boards of directors and has policy implications for those responsible for devising and monitoring effective systems of corporate governance.     

Are conditional illiquidity risks priced in China? A cross-sectional test

In this study, we theoretically derive conditional illiquidity risks from the conditional liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (CLCAPM) that we propose by incorporating funding illiquidity into the LCAPM, and we examine whether they are priced empirically in China's A-share market. We provide new evidence of the positive premiums of conditional illiquidity risks even after controlling for mispricing signals and sentiment. The finding suggests that conditional illiquidity risk could be an alternative channel to explain the cross-section of stock returns. Moreover, investors could obtain higher premiums as compensation for their tolerance of more highly conditional illiquidity risks during high market volatility (low market returns) periods.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.