Geographic diversification and agency costs of debt of multinational firms

This paper examines the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders of multinational and non-multinational firms and provides an explanation for the puzzle that multinational firms use less long-term debt, but more short-term debt than domestic firms. Using a sample of 6951 firm–year observations for multinational and domestic firms over the 1988–1994 period, we find that alternative measures of agency costs have statistically significant negative effects on the firm's long-term leverage. The results, however, also show that the negative effects of agency costs of debt on long-term leverage are significantly greater for multinational than non-multinational firms. It is documented that the effect of the agency costs of debt on leverage are increased by the firm's degree of foreign involvement. The evidence shows that firm's increasing foreign involvement exacerbates agency costs of debt leading to lower (greater) use of long-term (short-term) debt financing. This result is also confirmed using alternative measures of foreign involvement. The evidence is consistent with the view that multinational corporations (MNCs) are susceptible to higher agency costs of debt than domestic corporations because geographic diversity renders active monitoring more difficult and expensive in comparison to domestic firms. The results fail to support the view that MNCs' lower long-term debt ratios are due to the advantages of the internal capital markets.     

Do multinational and domestic corporations differ in their leverage policies?

This paper examines the leverage policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) in comparison to those of domestic corporations (DCs). Prior studies document that MNCs have lower leverage levels. However, our analysis of U.S. firms over the period 1981–2010 reveals that the leverage levels of MNCs are not significantly lower than those of DCs if we control for key firm characteristics related to leverage levels. We also find that MNCs and DCs do not differ significantly in terms of their debt maturity structure, the speed of leverage adjustments, or the propensity to issue debt vs. equity (or vs. not to issue debt). The results suggest that MNCs' financial policies at the corporate level are not significantly influenced by their greater exposures, in comparison to DCs, to market imperfections such as taxes and regulations. Interestingly, however, our additional analysis of MNCs from outside the U.S. reveals that non-U.S. MNCs issue securities more frequently and adjust leverage faster than their domestic peers.     

Internal capital networks as a source of MNC competitive advantage: Evidence from foreign subsidiary capital structure decisions

This paper documents multinational company (MNC) strategic advantages arising from its internal financial network. Using data from US multinational company affiliates in 62 countries, we show that MNC affiliates in countries with low credit availability, poor creditor protections, high political risks, and high inflation are found to bear high interest costs and multinational affiliate debt ratios are high in high tax countries. In addition, affiliates in countries with high (low) credit availability, a high (low) corruption index, low (high) political risks and high (low) currency depreciation are found to carry high external (parent) debt ratios. We also find that currency depreciation, credit availability, and location in common law countries are negatively associated with the use of parent (relative to external) debt. Thus, our findings suggest that affiliates substitute external debt with parent debt using internal capital markets to overcome weak external financial markets and institutional environments. This is important evidence of the strategic competitive advantage based on financial networks enjoyed by MNCs.     

The capital structure of multinational corporations: Canadian versus U.S. evidence

Contrary to the U.S. evidence, we show that Canadian multinational corporations (MNCs) display higher leverage than domestic firms (DCs). This higher leverage is due to lower agency costs of debt associated with MNCs' U.S. operations. We also find that the Canadian firms with international bond market access have higher leverage than firms without such access. Comparison with a U.S. matched sample shows that the sensitivity of leverage to firm-specific factors differs between the two countries, especially for the MNCs samples. Our evidence indicates that capital structures of MNCs are a complex interaction of both home and host country factors and differences in leverage determinants across countries.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

Convertible debt and asset substitution of multinational corporations

Internationalization enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to diversify their sources and types of debt, as well as earnings, although doing so can negatively impact firm risk and the agency costs of debt. Utilizing a primary sample of United States (US) based MNCs compared with domestic corporations (DCs), we find that MNCs are indeed riskier than DCs when considering systematic risk. Further, recognizing the heterogeneity of long-term debt, we find these MNCs consistently maintain a higher convertible debt ratio compared to DCs. We argue this is to mitigate the agency costs related to the asset substitution problem.     

How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.     

Internationalization and the capital structure of firms in emerging markets: Evidence from Latin America before and after the financial crisis

This study examines the impact of internationalization on the capital structure of firms in emerging markets before and after the financial crisis of 2008, with evidence from five countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). We find that before the financial crisis, Latin American MNCs are characterized by lower debt levels than purely domestic firms. However, after the financial crisis, we find that the MNCs are characterized by higher debt levels. This finding suggests that after the financial crisis, the Latin American MNCs (like many firms) may be taking advantage of their access to low interest rates in the global capital markets.     

Diversification and Capital Structure: Some International Evidence

This study examines the effects of international and product diversification on capital structure with 232 firms from 30 countries. Results for the full sample show that international diversification is negatively related to financial leverage, but further analyses indicate that this is mainly attributable to US firms. For non-US firms, we fail to find a significant relationship. Results also show that product diversification is positively related to financial leverage, indicating that such diversification allows firms to reduce their risks, thereby enabling firms to carry higher debt levels.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

The Effect Of International Acquisitions on Firm Leverage

To determine whether corporate international diversification leads firms to increase their leverage, we perform an event study that compares the leverage of corporations before and after they acquire foreign subsidiaries. We find that on average leverage increases from the first to the third year following the acquisition. When we examine the relation between additional debt financing after foreign acquisitions and the characteristics of these acquisitions, we find that in addition to such major determinants as size and profitability, debt financing is explained by geographical and industrial diversification effects.     

Original-Issue Systematic and Default Risk Pricing Efficiency of Speculative-Grade Bonds

We investigate whether primary market, original‐issue risk premiums on speculative‐grade debt are justified solely by expected defaults or whether these risk premiums also include other orthogonal risk components. Studies of secondary‐market holding period risk and return have hypothesized that risk premiums on speculative‐grade debt may be explained by bond‐ and equity‐related systematic risk and possibly other types of risk. Using an actuarial approach that considers contemporaneous correlation between default frequency and severity and first‐order serial correlation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the entire original‐issue risk premium can be explained by expected default losses. This suggests that speculative‐grade bond primary markets efficiently price default risk and that other types of risk are priced as coincident as opposed to orthogonal risks.     

家庭债务与居民消费：一个文献综述

近年来我国家庭杠杆率快速上升,家庭债务与居民消费关系引发热议,相关文献 反映出：（1）家庭适度负债能促进消费增长;（2）家庭杠杆率上升存在临界值;（3）快速加 杠杆是主要风险来源;（4）识别家庭债务异质性可以缓解信贷约束。目前我国家庭杠杆率依 然处于合理区间,但需重视快速加杠杆带来的风险隐患。为保持居民消费平稳增长,本文提出 从供给侧优化金融条件,从需求侧约束快速加杠杆行为,并发挥减税的收入调节作用等建议。     

Does portfolio margining make borrowing more attractive?

This paper investigates the effects of a change in the margin rules of the U.S. financial securities markets. These rules determine how much investors can borrow to leverage their investments. Since the 1929 stock market crash, margin loans have been tightly regulated by the Securities and Exchange Act Regulation T. Between 2005 and 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission modified these margin rules because they were perceived as not adequately reflecting investment risk. The amended rules have made it more attractive for investors to borrow by opening new margin accounts and diversifying their investment positions. This paper tests the hypothesis that the change in the margin rules has increased margin debt across the U.S. securities markets. It provides statistical evidence that this structural change can be dated to the amendments in the rules.     

Modelling correlation dynamics of EMU sovereign debt markets during the recent turmoil

The purpose of the present study is to explicitly model the correlation dynamics of Eurozone sovereign debt markets. Our analysis runs from 2000 through 2014. Time varying correlations are derived from a dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model (t-cDCC model). We document substantial variability in correlations that is time and region-dependent. Evidence suggests that the Lehman collapse coupled with the German banks’ bailout programme and the events that followed have undermined sovereign debt integration. Moreover, sensitivity analysis provides useful insights that global and regional risk factors play pivotal role in explaining correlation structure both before and after the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We believe that our results entail important implications for market authorities, international fixed income portfolio diversification and asset allocation.     

Capital structure with risky foreign investment

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.     

Hot and cold IPO markets: The case of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius

The aim of this study is to assess the characteristics of the hot and cold IPO markets on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). The results show that the hot issues exhibit, on average, a greater degree of underpricing than the cold issues, although the hot issue phenomenon is not a significant driving force in explaining this short-run underpricing. The results are consistent with the predictions of the changing risk composition hypothesis in suggesting that firms going public during hot markets are on average relatively more risky. The findings also support the time adverse selection hypothesis in that the firms’ quality dispersion is statistically different between hot and cold markets. Finally, the study concludes that firms which go public during hot markets do not underperform those going public in cold markets over the longer term.     

The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.     

Safety Transformation and the Structure of the Financial System

This paper studies how a financial system that is organized to efficiently create safe assets responds to macroeconomic shocks. Financial intermediaries face a cost of bearing risk, so they choose the least risky portfolio that backs their issuance of riskless deposits: a diversified pool of nonfinancial firms' debt. Nonfinancial firms choose their capital structure to exploit the resulting segmentation between debt and equity markets. Increased safe asset demand yields larger and riskier intermediaries and more levered firms. Quantitative easing reduces the size and riskiness of intermediaries and can decrease firm leverage, despite reducing borrowing costs at the zero lower bound.