Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption

We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different implicit prices for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.     

地区腐败、企业性质与高管腐败

企业所处的外部环境对企业高管腐败行为的影响日益引起学者的关注,地区腐败作为企业所处外部环境的重要特征,对企业高管腐败行为会产生何种影响?通过手工搜集2007-2013年我国各省市地方官员腐败和上市公司高管腐败的数据后发现:地区腐败越严重,所在地区的企业高管发生腐败的可能性越高;进一步研究发现,地区腐败对民营企业高管的影响作用更加明显,而2012年开始的反腐行动尚未对地区腐败影响高管腐败产生实质的约束作用。研究有助于深化对企业高管腐败环境诱因的理论认知,同时,将政府官员腐败的经济后果拓展至企业管理层面。     

Corruption,development and demography

This paper presents an analysis of the joint, endogenous determination of bureaucratic corruption, economic development and demographic transition. The analysis is based on an overlapping generations model in which reproductive agents mature safely through two periods of life and face a probability of surviving for a third period. This survival probability depends on the provision of public goods and services which may be compromised by corrupt activities on the part of public officials. The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterised by multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not be feasible. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts that low (high) levels of development are associated with high (low) levels of corruption and low (high) rates of life expectancy. The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Corruption, institutions and regulation

We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively affects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform.     

Corruption, institutions and trade

The economics literature describes various factors that affect trade between countries, which, in addition to the standard economic and geographic factors, also include cultural, ethnic and historical factors. The present study is apparently one of only a few attempts in the literature to examine directly the effects of corruption on trade and the first attempt to examine trade over time in a specific country whose level of corruption changed significantly. Israel was chosen as the subject of the study mainly because of the fact that, according to international indexes, the country’s status as a civil society has declined significantly over the past decade. According to the corruption index of Transparency International, Israel was ranked 33rd in the world, at the end of the sample period in 2008, having fallen from 14th in 1995. The results of the research can serve as the basis for comparison to similar studies of other Western countries. The study’s conclusions support the hypothesis that the effect of corruption on trade of any given country is significant, stable and negative.     

Corruption,conflict and the management of natural resources

The documented link between natural resources and civil conflict is not well understood. This paper uses a political economy framework to explore the prevalence of resource-based civil conflict driven by group-level discontent. The theoretical model proposed here offers a policy-based explanation: under conditions related to the quality of governance, discontent about resource management can affect the likelihood of an insurgency. Resource policy arises endogenously as the corrupt government trades-off industry contributions and the cost induced by manifestations of resource-related discontent. The conservation effects of civil unrest are analyzed and government corruption emerges as an important determinant of conflict. The paper also presents some empirical support for the model’s predictions.     

Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.     

Media,Education and Corruption: Investigating the Associations

We study the interactive association of press freedom, access to media and education with a nation's corruption levels. A free press generates unbiased information that greater access to the media helps propagate; and a greater degree of education, in the same context, helps individuals apply that information. This entire process generates a vigilant and corruption‐free economy. It is therefore important to consider these factors in conjunction.     

Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa

This paper uses panel data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. I find that corruption decreases economic growth directly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital. A unit increase in corruption reduces the growth rates of GDP and per capita income by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points and between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points per year respectively. The results also indicate that increased corruption is positively correlated with income inequality. The combined effects of decreased income growth and increased inequality suggests that corruption hurts the poor more than the rich in African countries. Received: March 19, 2001 / Accepted: December 14, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first AmFiTan International Conference on Development Ethics in February 2000, Dar er Salaam, Tanzania. I thank two anonymous referees of this Journal for helpful suggestions. I am, however, solely responsible for any remaining errors.     

Corruption,regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States

This paper investigates whether the costs of corruption are conditional on the extent of government intervention in the economy. We use data on corruption convictions and economic growth between 1975 and 2007 across the US states to test this hypothesis. Although no state approaches the level of government intervention found in many developing countries, we still find evidence for the “weak” form of the grease-the-wheels hypothesis. While corruption is never good for growth, its harmful effects are smaller in states with more regulation.     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

Nigeria and the Market for Corruption

Two Keynesian economists, Peter Wynarczyk and Brian Snowdon, of the Newcastle upon Type Polytechnic, resist Professor Charles Rowley's argument that economic doctries can be falsified     

高管权力与高管腐败——基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角

上市公司的高管腐败及其治理是我国反腐败的重要领域。因此,高管权力与高管腐败的关系日益受学者的关注。本文运用逻辑斯蒂模型,基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角分析了高管权力诱发高管腐败行为的影响。研究发现:高管权力越大,越可能诱发高管腐败行为;内部控制质量越好,高管腐败概率越低,且高质量的内部控制可以抑制高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为;上市公司所在地市场化进程水平越高,高管腐败概率越低,且市场化进程水平越高越能抑制企业高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为。研究结果表明:良好的内部控制与外部环境是可以约束高管权力减少腐败,降低权力进行寻租的空间。     

信誉腐败和信息流通

信誉的腐败是我国商品经济过渡时期中存在的一个普遍问题,在商品交易中各种欺诈行为比比皆是,其严重性危害了有效市场体制的建立.从经济学角度分析,在单次双方博弈中,由于存在信息的不对称,各方都有进行商业欺诈的积极性.重复博弈虽能有效的解决这个悖论,但是在市场中,重复博弈的基础是信息的有效流通.缺乏这种基础,重复博弈无法采取"触发战略"(triger strategy),而只是单次博弈的简单重复,信誉腐败问题仍然不能得到解决,因此建立畅通的信息流通体制是恢复我国市场信誉的重要途径.     

Corruption in the Context of International Business

Abstract

Corruption is widely accepted in the popular press as a problem for economic development and in conducting international business. Yet, it remains somewhat under-researched, particularly in an academic setting. This article describes corruption in the context of international business. It presents a critical evaluation of the conceptual and methodological issues associated with corruption. In doing so, it portrays the inherent complexities in studying this topic. The paper ends with recommendations for addressing the main concerns.     

Corruption, Growth, and Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences?

This paper uses panel data from 61 countries at different stages of economic development over a 20-year period to investigate regional differences in the effect of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. Using two measures of corruption, we find that there are statistically significant regional differences in the growth and distributional impacts of corruption. The largest growth impact of corruption is found in African countries while OECD and Asian countries have the lowest growth impact. On the other hand, the largest distributional impact of corruption in found in Latin America. A 10% decrease in corruption increases the growth rate of income by about 1.7% in OECD and Asian countries, 2.6% in Latin American countries, and by 2.8% in African countries. A one standard deviation decrease in corruption decreases the gini coefficient of income distribution (0–1 scale) by 0.05 points, 0.14 points, 0.25 points, and 0.33 points in OECD, Asian, African, and Latin American countries, respectively. The results are robust to various specifications, measurement of corruption, measures of investment, as well as the conditioning variables. The results have interesting policy implications for economic growth, especially in low income countries with high rates of corruption.     

洗澡的腐败风险

乌克兰新任总统下令“禁止官员上公共浴室泡澡”今年1月就任乌克兰总统的尤先科上台伊始就称,任人唯亲、欺诈和腐败是乌克兰面临的最大问题,清除腐败将是本届政府的首要任务。而尤先科总统治理政府官员腐败开出的第一剂药方竟然是“禁止官员上公共浴室泡澡”。乌克兰人素有有事     

采购腐败控制方法研究综述

基于近年来有关采购腐败控制方法研究的文献,将采购腐败控制方法归纳为四大类,即:基于采购参与人员本身;基于采购流程;基于监督体制以及基于收益、成本分析的采购腐败控制方法,详细阐述分析了这些采购腐败控制防治方法,最后展望了采购腐败控制方法的研究前景.     

Corruption control,shadow economy and income inequality: Evidence from Asia

Developing countries often suffer from high corruption, high income inequality and poor institutional arrangements that give rise to large shadow economies. Earlier evidence shows that shadow economies moderate the negative effects of corruption on income inequality in highly unequal South American countries. For Asia, we show that the persistence of shadow economies raises inequality even if corruption control is strong. Supported by static and dynamic panel data analyses of 21 countries in Asia between 1995 and 2015, we show that in order to combat rising inequality, corruption control must be complemented by the ability to translate secondary and tertiary school enrolment into industrial and, more importantly, service sector jobs. Countries with low corruption but high inequality can reduce inequality by committing to higher public consumption expenditures. Further, combining greater trade openness with low corruption lowers inequality, except for countries in South Asia.